







THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION AND THE GREAT WAR

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Steel Strike of 1919"*



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POINT OF VIEW

The following pages attempt to treat of Functioning—Governmental Functioning at a time of peculiar crisis in the nation's career. They do not assume to be a history of the Great War. They undertake, rather, to select a few of the greater matters which engaged the attention of the Wilson Administration in that notable period, those that came nearest the hearth, the heart-center of the great Republic; those that the history of the future will necessarily select as the chief center of the impulses of the nation's throbs for humanity.

As these touch upon matters of history, perhaps of statecraft, it is proper to add that it is not only war-time orders of the President of the mightiest republic of recorded time, or the thrilling utterance of eloquent lips; not the laws of Congress or the decrees of a great and orderly Senate; nor yet the surge and urge of irresistible armies—not these alone constitute history. They are a part. No less a part thereof are the din and uproar and tumult in the busy places of trade or where crowds gather to hear their spokesmen—or the spokesmen of their opponents; the shout and noise and clash of opposing social and economic forces; the ringing of bells, the blasts of whistles, the toot of horns, the "confusion worse confounded" in the celebration of victory or the signing of an armistice, yet order in it all—these constitute an essential part of history.

But chief of all and center of all is that place where the child is taught its mother's tongue and lisps its early prayers; where father and son, mother and daughter are accustomed to meet on common ground; where tears are shed and griefs are shared, where fond love first finds its joys;

where the infirm ease their pains and the strong learn to bear the burdens of the weak; where God is revered, and the nation's unassailable foundations are based—the fire-side. It is here that the historian who would seek the starting point, the very center and the whole circumference of the fabric of the nation's greatness, must search; omitting which, he fails of truth. Bolshevism, anarchism, destruction of all kinds can never disturb the nation's balance, until they first shake these sure foundations. But once these finest elements are lost out of the nation's life, once the nation's women are nationalized, turned into cattle, then these foundations are shaken, the nation loses its morale, and the Republic of the fathers is at an end.

If the course of the Wilson Administration at any time caused depression because admitting the *dernier* forces to a partial temporary control, it passed with the breaking of the new day. The night of gloom is gone, let it be hoped forever.

The author felt that when Mr. Bryan swung the Baltimore convention to Woodrow Wilson, after his chief competitor had a majority of the convention, he performed one of the most notable acts of our entire political history and for the public good. With an open mind, he was favorably inclined toward Mr. Wilson when he entered upon his first term in the presidency, and resented Theodore Roosevelt's first broadsides against the President after the European conflagration started. Yet, in common with millions of others, was compelled to admit the correctness of Mr. Roosevelt's position.

In the matter of labor his sympathies always have been, and now are, ardently with the real working man as distinguished from the professional agitator-man. Brought up on a hill farm in an eastern state, where, at the age of sixteen, and not yet grown, he cut the grain in the hilly fields by swinging the cradle with strong men, he knows from personal experience the hardest of manual labor. If

the following pages reveal the fact that he has no more sympathy with autocracy in labor circles than in industrial capitalism, the presidency, or Prussia, that is a necessary incident to this study. He has no sympathy with a so-called laboring man, who, merely because he is in an organized group, will smite an honest laboring man merely because he happens to be outside of that group, as the great majority are. "A man's a man for a' that." His brand of democracy is as broad and deep as humanity itself. He regards America as the great hope of the world's democracy, because she is free and her people unshackled.

THE AUTHOR.



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CHAPTER I

COMING STORM AND PREPARATION

The low, long roll of thunder was heard along the eastern horizon on a morning of that fateful last week in July, 1914. The sound of it stretched across the sea and reached America and circled the globe. No cloud was in sight; no cause apparent. Yet the first peal grew into a terrific roar, the whole heaven was darkened, and the world was caught in an awful storm. Thick darkness was round about.

The diplomatic battle, with Sir Edward Grey as the center of all the parleys having for their end the peace of the world, was ended within ten days. England held aloof, warning France that for her to advance toward Germany beyond the line of diplomatic prudence would endanger her support. The first week in August saw military force arrayed against military force. The usual poise of the world was upset by the fierceness and ruthlessness of the onslaught, and little Belgium was first made to feel the heavy blow of the cruel ravager; and her endurance for the first ten days of self-effacement, together with England's ready navy saved to the world that civilization which was the product of twenty centuries of human effort. For it enabled France to gather her forces and England to

assemble her resources and to get her bearings in the new relationships.

America was in a maze. To her the situation was stupefying. The Thing seemed unreal. It was like a tale from cloudland—impossible. The American was confused, baffled. He knew that there was disordered movement in the world; that the world was out of joint. He witnessed a combat of giants on an unheard-of scale. The world was beginning to sway and reel like a drunken man. Events were not taking place in their usual course. History seemed to have come to an end; and history seemed to be beginning anew. Had mankind gone mad? Was civilization's very foundation to be destroyed? Was all that had been built upon the teachings of the Christ to be discarded? Was civilization itself sagging?

These were the questions that ran through the mind of America from day to day and from week to week.

Then came the quick and mighty forging forward toward Paris, once Belgium was prostrate. It seemed that nothing would stop the onward sweep, and that the French capital must be reached within a few weeks and surrender to the sword. But the marvel of it was that within a few miles of the city the tide was stemmed. And at this time, but a few weeks after the titanic struggle began, the distinctively American citizen was glad that the tide had been turned back and that Paris was saved. For already, with incomplete knowledge, there was a growing feeling that Germany was in the wrong, that the outrage on Belgium would not bear the scrutiny of modern civilization, and that the German government proposed to use every means within its power, fair or foul, civilized or savage, to accomplish its purpose.

And treachery and propaganda were at work in America, but by the Central Powers only. Cunningly devised, it was so insidiously operated as to mislead thoroughgoing Americans. Its purpose was to win America to the Ger-

man cause; or, failing in that, so to confuse judgment and blur vision by falsehood and innuendo as to weaken any attempt to align American sentiment with the Allies. In fact, this had begun years before, when, by some means, even American textbooks used in the schools were prepared in such form as to laud Germany and things German. Thousands of American students attending German universities imbibed of the materialistic and hideous doctrines which Germany, through her universities, had been foisting upon the world; and at the ripe moment many of them stood by Germany, eminent Americans, teaching public law in great seats of American learning, aiding in the literary propaganda prepared in Germany for American consumption.

The extent of this treacherous propaganda was not fully known to the American public until the United States entered the war, and in its fullest extent will probably never be revealed. It was open and notorious in large population centers, but was by no means confined to the cities. North Dakota, an almost solidly agricultural section, was sedulously cultivated through the pro-German leaders of the Nonpartisan League; others soon became well known.

Openly where it seemed best, elsewhere clandestinely, Germany zealously backed up these efforts. If it was not an attempt to frighten America with a vision of Japan reaching out for the Philippines, Hawaii, and even California, then it was a setting forth of how England was seeking to catch unwary America in an effort to break down her commerce, or to push the Irish question to the front.

This persistent propaganda had a distinct anti-Ally influence, both immediately and for the future. By dividing American sentiment, it served well its purpose at the beginning of hostilities in Europe, as well as when America should have entered the armed conflict, when the first steps toward peace were contemplated, and while the Peace Congress was in session, as well as in the execution of the Treaty.

On the other hand, it was a potent force helpful to the cause of the Allies, in that it caused the organizing of the American forces everywhere as they had not been previously organized. And these, fortifying the American public with the facts in the case, cleared the way for a fairer understanding of the conflict in Europe and strengthened Allied sentiment in America.

For each time the Allies undertook to state the justice of their cause, there immediately came into existence a stream of literature and of pronouncements from certain pulpits that told how false was every statement thus made. On September 7, 1914, the German kaiser himself protested to President Wilson against the conduct of the enemy in using dum-dum bullets. The sole purpose was to blur the vision, at a time when the American public was not aware of the dastardly attempts of the German Government, aided by the pro-Germans in the United States, to put forth any false statements that might tend to show the Germans right, the Allies wrong.

And this influence reached Administration circles where it seemingly had more influence than upon the general public. Not only did it influence individual congressmen so that they were at all times pro-German, but it influenced Congress as a whole.

The chief prop of this official propaganda in America was the German-American Alliance, whose wishes found expression in resolutions in the House offered by their chief spokesmen, Vollmer and Bartholdt. The Alliance at Minneapolis telegraphed a member of the House: "In the name of Christian humanity and the spirit of neutrality we beg your support of Bartholdt's bill to stop munitions of war from America reaching Europe." It was not that they cared one iota about Christian humanity or the spirit of neutrality or the stopping of munitions from reaching Europe; what did concern these pro-German organizations was that Germany, barred by the effective naval operations

of Great Britain, was unable to receive these munitions. Germany made no objections to any neutral country, herself included, shipping munitions of war in the Boer War.

About this time a great neutrality meeting was announced for Philadelphia by the newly formed American Neutrality League, and its secretary invited Dr. Rhineland, Bishop of Pennsylvania, to be one of its vice-presidents. But the good bishop saw through this neutrality scheme, and declared that from information which had then lately reached him it appeared that this agitation was chiefly "not really in the interest of neutrality, but in hostility to the Allied nations, and with the hope of helping Germany and Austria in their campaign." And further stated: "As an American citizen pledged to uphold American ideals, I am altogether against Germany and Austria in this war, on the ground that they are threatening, and would destroy, as far as they have opportunity, those political and personal liberties and rights which we Americans have made the foundation of our government."

Here was the reply of a real American who saw through all the jugglery of pro-Germanism. And, of course, in the opinion of the secretary of the League, this letter showing real Americanism placed the Bishop of Pennsylvania as a partisan and made him ineligible as a vice-president of a neutrality meeting. But eminent men were present, and to get them into such meetings was always a large part of the plan. Governor Brumbaugh presided, while congressmen made bitter anti-British speeches, and resolutions were adopted which were zealously anti-Ally and vigorously pro-German; and the enormous throng unable to gain entrance to the meeting turned itself into a overflow meeting which manifested its neutrality by singing "Die Wacht am Rhein" and "Deutschland Ueber Alles." The influence of such meetings entered very emphatically into Administration circles in Washington.

Yet, the Administration presumably had at hand inti-

mate knowledge of all the transactions of a foreign nation, a belligerent, in the country. But it was never explained to the American people why the Administration did not know what the German Imperial Government was doing by way of violation of the requirements of international law; or, knowing, why it did not put a stop to this underhanded, insidious campaign to drag America into the side that was wrong, and which men of the perspicacity of Bishop Rhineland and others, who at this time were proclaiming the inhumanity and heartlessness of the German Government and the justice and righteousness of the Allied cause, could see so clearly.

The war in Europe had scarcely more than begun when the German-American Alliance, through its president, Dr. J. C. Hexamer, requested President Wilson to ask Japan to keep her hands off in the East at the time she demanded of Germany withdrawal of armed ships from that quarter. Immediately thereafter, on August 18, 1914, President Wilson delivered one of his notable war addresses to the American people. Coming at that time, it was regarded as the Administration's reply. Among other things, he said:

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say and do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned.

* * * * *

I venture, therefore, my fellow-countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest

wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action; a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

As this address, in some respects of the finest, came after the ravishment of Belgium, the President was most severely criticised for asking red-blooded Americans to be "neutral in thought," as his address was understood to mean, after the brutality shown toward little Belgium; and to maintain the "fine poise of undisturbed judgment" and to remain "dispassionate" after the blood-thirsty methods of brute force exhibited toward innocent women and children of a prostrate people. One of the picture-posters afterward used very effectively by the Administration in seeking enlistments, showing a stalwart young American, when he heard the tale of brutality, throwing off his coat to settle with the offender, accompanied by the injunction: "Tell it to the marines," was a very clear expression of the feelings of the real American. He was not dispassionate or neutral in the face of outraged conscience.

And as the people now began to complain of the do-nothing spirit of the Administration, in the face not only of the great wrong in Europe but of the attempted violation of American neutrality by the outrageous German propaganda carried on officially in the nation's capital, Dr. Bernhard Dernberg, the chief propagandist on the rostrum, was gently invited to discontinue his operations. But the propaganda continued in greater volume and with greater effect than ever. A great effort was made to control the leading newspapers of the country.

On the other hand, the method was being delved into. The facts were being set before the Administration, not by

its own agents, but by some of the shrewdest private detectives in the land. The revelations made by the *Providence Journal* astonished the country. Even the Administration, with the proof in its own hands, was slow to believe. It did not like to admit that while it was asking the people to be neutral in thought and undisturbed in spirit, there was being carried on, under the very shadow of the White House, by the accredited ambassador of Germany, a scheme to divide the Republic by enemies within and by force without.

And when the notable book of James M. Beck, "The Evidence in the Case," set before the people the causes leading up to the open rupture in Europe, there was such a revulsion as is seldom seen, in so short a time.

It is doubtful whether history can credit the Administration with dealing fairly with the American people in this matter. With all the evidence it had or should have had with the opportunities of knowledge, it is difficult to credit the Administration with the purpose of square-dealing with the people, in its effort to lead them in a direction not warranted by the facts. The President's own accredited and trusted minister to the Netherlands at the time the conflagration burst forth, in referring to the events of vast magnitude that were rapidly crowding upon each other beginning with the last week in July, 1914, said:

We who stood outside the secret councils of the Central Powers were both bewildered and dismayed. Could it be that Europe of the twentieth century was to be thrust back into the ancient barbarism of a general war? It was like a dreadful nightmare. There was the head of the huge dragon, crested, fanged, clad in glittering scales, poised above the world and ready to strike. We were benumbed and terrified. There was nothing that we could do. The monstrous thing advanced, but even while we shuddered we could not make ourselves feel that it was real. It had the vagueness and the horrid pressure of a bad dream.¹

¹ Henry van Dyke's "Fighting for Peace," p. 45, Scribners, New York, 1917.

Doctor van Dyke was keenly aware of the unblushing brutality of the Hohenzollerns, and all that belong with them, whom he best knew as the Potsdam Gang.

And yet, two years later the President went so far as to declare:

This Great War that broke so suddenly upon the world two years ago, . . . has affected us very profoundly, and we are not only at liberty, it is perhaps our duty, to speak very frankly of it and of the great interests of civilization which it affects. With its causes and objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore.

Is that true? Was not Bishop Rhinelander's perception of the great moral issues involved the keener? And had it become true that America had no conscience? Where there is a lively conscience in a great people there is certain to be a lively interest against a wrong-doer, whether he be a private or a public character, and there will be an ever-increasing volume gathering until the wickedness is swept away. At first the people resented Theodore Roosevelt's broadsides against President Wilson; but as the conflict proceeded and the right and wrong of it became clearer, they swerved from Washington to Oyster Bay; they were learning that it was not the President of the United States, but the sage of Sagamore who was to pilot America through safe channels in the storm that was rocking the world.

Indeed, the President knew better, as witness his next inaugural expressions:

The war inevitably set its mark from the first alike upon our minds, our industries, our commerce, our politics, and our social action. To be indifferent to it or independent of it was out of the question.

And on the same occasion he described the German methods as "organized wrong."

It was during this period that there came into being

many societies with beguiling names to win American favor. Among these were American Neutrality League, American Independence Union, American Truth Society, American Peaceful Embargo Society, Friends of Peace, Friends of Truth.² That these influenced Mr. Wilson may be accepted as fact. His sense of right was not so far gone that he did not know. It may have been blunted by an overweening ambition. The course of the presidential campaign and the methods used by his managers and accepted by him, suggest that it was held in abeyance. He was unsteady, wavered when firmness in the right was the only safe course to pursue. It led to doubt, created uncertainty. This led a prominent member of Congress to declare, when urged to stand by the President, that he would gladly do so if the President would but take a stand for something. It was this wobbling that gave Germany her opportunity which she used to the full. The President, while in the attitude of what he described as "watchful waiting" in another international matter, displayed what became a marked characteristic of his as he remained the longer in the presidency—antagonizing the course which he admittedly knew to be the right, and showing favor to the admittedly wrong.

At this time of serious business in the world's history, the President manifested a partiality for pacifists. He had them in all the cabinet positions that were of chief importance at such a time as then marked the world. Mr. Garrison, a fighting secretary of war, was displaced by a man so notably a pacifist as to be known as antagonistic to the best Americanism. Henry Ford, who later received Mr. Wilson's support for United States senator, spent freely of his money, said to run into the millions, first in full-page advertisements in American newspapers, and then on his peace-ship trip to Europe, a plan that received adverse attention in the English Parliament. Prominent men in the

² John B. McMaster's "United States in the World War," p. 140, D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1918.

President's cabinet were prominently connected with distinctively pro-German meetings in New York, his former Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, openly identifying himself with one of them.

These pacifists, who exerted a powerful influence in the Administration, sought to create in the United States a sentiment that was at all times of the greatest value to Germany, whether before, during, or after the war. They divided sentiment when it should have been united and firm against the brute forces then seeking to overturn civilization; they weakened the already weak Administration in a clear perception of duty to country and to humane principles.

But in time the forces of righteousness swept all barriers away. The dignity of the American nation had been flung to the winds. Her vessels on lawful missions were sunk. Her peaceful citizens lawfully travelling the highways of the sea were murdered. Even her government's representatives going to or from their posts of official duty were drowned in the depths. All these things were as nothing to a pacifist and pro-German. But the shame of it was that a national Administration permitted it. Good ringing notes were written by the American Government, and then the same outrages were permitted repetition. The Administration faltered when it should have been strong in action; it wavered when it should have been clear and unhesitating; it talked when it should have performed. It led to the expression that became common throughout the land: "Oh, for a Roosevelt in the White House!"

When, on May 7, 1915, the "Lusitania" was sunk by a German torpedo, after advertisements in American newspapers by the German Embassy at Washington warning that American travellers on it would be endangered, and of the 1,153 persons who thereby lost their lives, 114 were American men, women and children, a cry of horror mingled with rage went up from every quarter of the land. May 16 the Secretary of State sent his first "Lusitania" note to Germany

on the outrage. Midway between these two events, President Wilson in an address to a vast throng in Philadelphia used the words, "There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight." This became known as his "too-proud-to-fight" speech. All other incidents connected with it were soon forgotten. But it was a sad commentary upon the President's shrewdness and mental acumen that he could not have seen that that was a poor answer to the German militaristic power which had already determined that no sense of right or honor or neighborly obligation or treaty obligation should interfere with its desperate purpose.

Sinkings now come in rapid succession. On April 19, 1916, the President went before Congress with the whole question, declaring that "tragedy had followed tragedy on the seas in such fashion" and that "the roll of Americans who have lost their lives on ships thus attacked and destroyed has grown month by month until the ominous total loss mounted into the hundreds." And he declared that the severance of diplomatic relations was the only course open unless Germany immediately and radically mended her ways. And in this he met the best thought of the nation.

But the presidential election was to be held that year, and again he dallied. And the campaign slogans of his party are suggestive of motives: "He kept us out of war," and "You are at work, not at war." He had repeatedly told the German Government that no further outrages would be tolerated, and there was the same reason for a war with Germany April 6, 1916, as April 6, 1917.

After the election he sought to ascertain upon what terms peace between the warring nations could be made. To this end, he went before the Senate January 22, 1917. It is not clear why he went or what he expected to accomplish; but it is a part of the Administration's record. And in this address he used a notable phrase that has been following him as a nemesis ever since, when he declared for "peace without victory"—willing to condone all the worst

horrors and brutalities imposed upon civilized society. It took a permanent place with his "too proud to fight" and "with its causes and objects we are not concerned."

When James J. F. Archibald, pro-German lecturer in the United States, was detained by the British in August, 1915, he was found to possess high recommendations from the Austrian Ambassador Dumba and the German Ambassador Bernstorff. By papers found on him it was also disclosed that Bernstorff, while making explanations to the State Department of his connections with compromising transactions, was seeking to purchase or destroy manufacturing plants in the United States, and to cause strikes among the employes and disloyal union labor. It was early in 1916 that the noted "sink-without-a-trace" messages were being sent, and that Bernstorff was a party to acts of war against the United States. He was a party to the infamous Zimmerman notes seeking to engage Mexico and Japan in disrupting the integrity of the American Republic. The President knew, the world knew, these things.

But no step had been taken by the Administration looking toward preparation for eventualities. General Leonard Wood opened at Plattsburg, N. Y., the training-camp that became the model for the Government once war was declared. It brought down upon his head the wrath of the Administration. Colonel Roosevelt stirred the people to the importance of getting ready for the war into which the country was drifting, pleading for one hundred per cent robust Americanism, for a united front against German encroachments upon American rights, for substituting in the fighting departments of the Government fighting men for pacifists, and above all for preparation for the inevitable conflict.

The Administration at first sought to neutralize the effects of Roosevelt's speeches and his articles written for magazines and newspapers. He became the leader of robust Americanism, while President Wilson became the

leader and exponent of diluted Americanism and robust pacifism. "The two stood for irreconcilable doctrines: the one for justice at any cost; the other for peace at any price; the one for decision and preparedness to enforce it, the other for evasion and compromise." The pacifist War Secretary Baker declared there was ample time to prepare, since the war was 3,000 miles away; George Creel, socialist and internationalist, was chairman of the committee on public information. Men of this stamp at such a time cast a shadow over the entire Administration, which side-tracked the resolution of Representative Gardner for a National Security Commission, introduced October 15, 1915, for the purpose of ascertaining the state of the nation's preparedness.

And the President, after seeking to lull the people to sleep, declared they did not want war. Meanwhile, Colonel Roosevelt's editorials appearing in the *Kansas City Star*, with its wide circulation, were having a marked influence through the central West. The President toured the central northwest and the section in which the *Star* circulated. He returned to Washington and stated that the people wanted war. The company Mr. Bryan was keeping in those large days of history-making was not up to Roosevelt's standard. After the sinking of the "Lusitania," Mr. Bryan issued an address to German-Americans stating that the President was their warm friend. At the moment they were seeking to destroy America, he received numerous telegrams from German-American societies, and under the auspices of one he gave an address in New York City, presided over by the president of the United German-American Societies of that State. Others addressing this meeting were Frank Buchanan, later of rather undesirable notoriety for alleged unamericanism; Henry Vollmer, noted pro-German; the notorious Jeremiah O'Leary of pro-German fame; and among the worthies at the meeting were the Turkish ambassador; Austrian Ambassador Dumba, who did all in

his power to destroy American integrity; Captain Boy-Ed and Captain von Papen, both notoriously active against Americanism.

And these were the influences that were operating upon the President until he went out among the people where Roosevelt had been preaching by pen and by tongue that form of Americanism that always prevails when right is matched against wrong, and the people are permitted to see the truth. At a late day he admitted the *dernier* forces at work had "poured the poison of disloyalty into the various arteries of our national life," and that the time had come to make greater preparation. And on Flag Day, June 14, 1916, he marched at the head of a parade in the interest of preparedness, in Washington. In an address on that occasion he said:

There is a disloyalty active in the United States and it must be crushed. It proceeds from a minority, a very small minority but a very active and subtle minority. It works underground but it also shows its ugly head where we can see it, and there are those at this moment who are trying to levy a species of political blackmail, saying, "Do what we wish in the interest of foreign sentiment or we will wreak our vengeance at the polls." That is the sort of thing against which the American Nation will turn with a might and triumph of sentiment which will teach these gentlemen once for all that disloyalty to this flag is the first test of tolerance in the United States.

Herein President Wilson was speaking America's best thought. But soon thereafter came another sagging, as witness the campaign slogan of the party of which he was the head, "He kept us out of war."

Diplomatic relations with Germany were severed on February 3. The McLemore resolution, seeking to block the President's policy of arming merchantmen, had been ardently debated in and out of Congress, and every force standing for Germany and pro-Germanism backed the resolution. The President was bitterly attacked by his own

party, and every power Germany could exert was now used. Bernstorff sought to influence Congress and the newspapers. This was a year before diplomatic relations were severed. President Wilson replied to the vicious attacks: "You are right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to keep the United States out of war." But when the time for action came, he was ready to assume his part of the responsibility after the breaking off of diplomatic relations. April 2 he went before Congress and asked for the declaration that a state of war existed. This was granted by resolution on April 6.

Thus the nation was thrust into the stupendous conflict without adequate preparation, a condition for which the pacifist Secretary of War Baker thanked God. And the cost in money and blood for this condition can never be computed. America was suddenly turned into a military camp, making "confusion worse confounded." At the nation's capital everything was topsy-turvy. Men were getting into each other's way in the attempt to do something. "The call to arms found our country ill prepared for the great work that lay before it."³ The herculean task thus laid upon the nation by pacifism must be undertaken with the utmost expedition. The military and naval forces in great numbers were to be gathered and trained. Money in unheard-of sums must be raised. Peace industries had to be placed on a war footing. Transportation facilities must be converted to war purposes. The Council of National Defense must be organized and set about its serious duties, and there came into being a great number of boards, and committees of various sorts and sizes.

The President, on April 15, urgently appealed to producers of war material and foods to increase their output.

Theodore Roosevelt was granted authority by Congress, in the face of strenuous opposition from the President's supporters, to raise a force of 100,000 men at once from

³ McMaster's "United States in the World War," p. 366.

men outside the draft age of 21 to 31 years, to go to the front in Europe. Men from every section of the land, even from Alaska, were eager to join his standard, and as soon as Congress acted some even took the long trip from Alaska. But the President said him nay: "The business now in hand is undramatic, practical, and of scientific definiteness and precision."

At once the country was immersed in the task of armies, airplanes, navies, finance. The order for mobilization of the navy showed a lack by 35,000 of the 87,000 authorized for peace. To put it on a war footing required substantially 100,000 regulars and 45,000 reserves. The work of enlistment began at once, with all the devices of novelty known to American ingenuity. The countryside was attracted by cartoons and posters put up on fences, trees, stumps, rocks, and in every other conceivable place where they would catch the public eye. In the cities they were displayed in shop windows, at recruiting stations, in hallways of public buildings, on billboards, on vehicles. Naval men gifted in speech and song went in groups or singly in automobiles and caught the crowds on street corners where the throngs were passing, the hour of special value being at noon. And it was remarkable how the boys poured out of the unexpected places; as the lumber town of Bemidji, in the woods of northern Minnesota, or the prairie town of Pierre, South Dakota, both of which went quickly far beyond their quotas.

Appeals for army service were not less cogent, and volunteering went rapidly forward until the time for the draft. Meanwhile Congress, in a bitter debate over the selective draft measure, was closely divided, and compromise measures were offered. All of these the President wisely turned aside and stood firmly by his position for the selective draft, and June 5 was made registration day. The Census Bureau estimated the number who would fall within the registry at 10,000,000. The number actually was 9,586,508.

Mobilization began September 5, when five per cent of the men went to the sixteen instruction and training camps of the country, one-fifth of them starting each of five successive days. After October 3, the remaining fifteen per cent went as soon as practicable. It was a new event in the nation's history to witness these young men—physicians, clerks, farmers, lawyers, laborers, business men, rich and poor alike—leaving their homes in every city, town and hamlet of the land, to go into training to be made fit to fight in Europe.

Two days before the first men started for their camps, President Wilson took occasion to address them in this fine message worthy of place by every fireside:

You are undertaking a great duty. The heart of the whole country is with you.

Everything that you do will be watched with the deepest interest and with the deepest solicitude, not only by those who are near and dear to you, but by the whole nation besides.

For this great war draws us all together, makes us all comrades and brothers, as all true Americans felt themselves to be when we first made good our national independence.

The eyes of the world will be upon you, because you are in some special sense the soldiers of freedom. Let it be your pride, therefore, to show all men everywhere not only what good soldiers you are but also what good men you are, keeping yourselves fit and straight in everything, and pure and clean through and through.

Let us set for ourselves a standard so high that it will be a glory to live up to it and add a new laurel to the crown of America.

My affectionate confidence goes with you in every battle and every test. God keep and guide you.

But, true to their color, all who were willing to assist the German autocracy in every way possible, except to go to the German front and fight like men, were ready to do everything in their power to thwart the purposes of America, once she had taken a definite stand, ready to stab her soldier boys in the back. Anti-draft, anti-war, anti-America

demonstrations were made by Socialists and slackers in every large city of the land. They paraded the streets carrying red flags with such inscriptions as, "War is Hell—We Demand Peace." The Young People's Socialistic Society, organized throughout the country in the larger cities, held secret meetings to protest the war, though unwittingly they furnished some of the best secret-service material the Government had. Like the larger and more open meetings, such as that addressed by Mr. Bryan in New York, they were doing the things German autocracy liked best to have done. Some had taken their cue from men high in administration circles, getting their inscriptions from pre-war utterances such as Speaker Champ Clark's that a conscript looked much like a convict. In Oklahoma there was open resistance that amounted to civil war, in which several were killed and some two hundred were made prisoners and held under a charge of treason to the United States.

Everywhere pacifists, Socialists, Industrial Workers of the World, anti-war, anti-conscription, anti-America, pro-German organizations were busy with their propaganda, and operated under almost every conceivable name and designation, chief of which became "conscientious objectors to war." They were usually of the radical type found in European countries, chiefly from the Central Powers.

A call for funds with which to prosecute the war earnestly engaged the Treasury Department immediately the war was declared. Sums beyond the common reach of the American imagination, big as it is accustomed to view things, were asked. Seven billion dollars was asked by popular subscription, the largest sum any nation had ever undertaken to raise at one time in all the world's history. And it was over-subscribed, as were all the subsequent amounts, totalling some \$30,000,000,000, part of which was loaned to the Allies.

America's conscience must never be dulled to a great wrong, by a lulling pacifism in high places of power.

CHAPTER II

THE FOOD ADMINISTRATION

Once the country had engaged in the world struggle, the Administration wisely perceived that food was a vital factor in determining the tide of conflict.

The Council of National Defense appointed Herbert C. Hoover chairman of the Commission on Food Supply and Prices. His experience and success at the head of the Belgium Relief Commission, until the brutal acts of Germany made it no longer possible for him to serve there, pointed to him at once as the individual best fitted for such service. His Commission was charged with the high task of gaining the co-operation of all food distributing agencies, and of securing an increased production of food while preventing profiteering and waste. And nine days after our declaration of war, in a public appeal, the President urged the supreme need to be "especially foodstuffs," calling upon men and boys, "to turn in hosts to the farms" and declaring that it was "the time for America to correct her unpardonable fault of wastefulness and extravagance." To the South he particularly appealed to raise food as well as cotton.

The nation gave quick and generous response. Gardens were intensively cultivated. Vacant lots became gardens. Front yards, boulevards, railway rights-of-way, even in the great agricultural states of Minnesota and the Dakotas, were turned into lots. A campaign was started to teach saving in the kitchen with printed instructions from the Food Administration. "Preach the gospel of the clean plate" became a cardinal principle of patriotic housekeeping.

In mid-summer, 1917, the Food-Control Law was enacted, placing in the hands of Mr. Hoover so great powers over food that he was termed the Food Dictator. And he forthwith stated to the public that while it was not the purpose of the Food Administration to seek to apply punitive measures, he would not hesitate to apply in full measure "the drastic, coercive powers" with which Congress had invested him should occasion arise. And promptly there was mapped out a course of action for control of dealers as well as for conservation by consumers. Wisdom and tact marked the course of the Administration in dealing with the food problem during the war period.

"Food Will Win the War—Don't Waste It" became a slogan on farm, in mill, in kitchen, everywhere. The people, a great people, always accustomed to plenty, merely upon a request denied themselves of what they had grown to be accustomed to. There was never a murmur, except in a few isolated instances. The administration of Mr. Hoover has become one of the bright spots in the national Administration during the Great War. His work was thorough and scientific.

Once the American people were placed on a war diet, they were brought into immediate touch with one large meaning of war and understood the better. It brought war home to the people repeatedly every day. The form of the appeals made by the Food Administration, "for the boys over there," gave a patriotic turn to American thought in the saving of food. The importance of saving such prime foods as wheat, sugar and meat was advertised everywhere and all the time. It was before the people riding on trains, eating their meals in public places, in the thoroughfares of business, in the home. Corn bread and corn cakes, bran bread and bran muffins—these graced the tables of American eaters and were good for the health. They were aided by rye bread and rice cakes, and the value of barley as a food was soon learned. To all was added the joy of

the humor of it; for there came the "wheatless days" and the "meatless days."

"Sugar—save a lump every day for the boys over there," became a part of the daily menu. Sugar became scarce because of the wasted beet fields of Europe, and because of the lack of ships to carry it where abundant. Facing all passengers on railroad trains were large cards neatly printed in colors with this:

SUGAR

1. None on Fruits
2. None on Desserts
3. Less on Cereals
4. Less in Coffee and Tea
5. Less in Preserving
6. Less Cake and Candy
7. Use Other Sweeteners.

SAVE IT.

Errors were made here as elsewhere. While sugar was piled up in Honolulu because of no vessels to carry it, yet the refined product was being carried into the Hawaiian Islands, a large sugar producer with an abundance of the kind the people in the United States would have been glad to use.

With the shortage, unnecessary confections were cut down, though to but a limited degree, soda-fountains were closed, sugar-bowls were removed from the tables in public eating places, and families were limited to three pounds per person a month, then to two, still later to three, then again to four, and at length the limit was removed. It was not until the month before the armistice was signed that the Food Administration discovered that by permitting the public to purchase sugar weekly at the rate of two pounds per person for each four weeks instead of for the calendar month, it was allowing the people to use approximately 200,000,000 pounds of sugar extra, annually. Accordingly, new regulations went into effect October 15, 1918,

requiring that thereafter purchases be made semi-monthly instead of bi-weekly.

Admittedly, Mr. Hoover's administration was scarcely less than miraculous when the unpreparedness of the nation with which he had to contend in the first onrush of the war is considered. Notwithstanding this great efficiency, it was not understood why a limit was placed upon the price and use of primary food articles, such as wheat and wheat-flour, while substitutes which people were compelled to use were given an unlimited range in price.¹ This gave a solid basis for severe criticism of the Food Administration, and there grew up in the great grain-growing sections of the country, even, a feeling of antagonism toward the Food Administration that was akin to disloyalty, during the most stressful days of the war, because of the open profiteering on substitutes.²

Bacon was in first rank as the meat of the soldier, since most easily kept and most easily shipped. Readily the people granted the request to use less of it "for the boys over there." Already accustomed to heatless Monday, lightless Tuesday, wheatless Wednesday, meatless Thursday, the people, with light heart, talked of "eatless days"—which never came. For all through the campaign for food conservation the people were admonished not to allow themselves to be undernourished.

Among the injunctions of the Food Administration were those of dispensing with the fourth meal, using simple hospitality in the home, at church and community suppers serv-

¹ Under the Food Administration's orders, when bran was selling at \$28 per ton in carload lots, the housewife was compelled to pay for that same bran at the rate of \$180 per ton. While this was put up in paper boxes, she could not purchase it in any other form, even at the world's greatest primary market, Minneapolis. She could not obtain this palatable substitute in 5-, 10-, or 25-pound packages as she could the wheat flour.

² At that period of the war, the author, while awaiting a belated train at the little town of Philbrook, Minnesota, listened to the townsmen engaged in a quiet discussion of this matter at the station platform. Their views were unanimous. While none of them objected to the use of rye flour as a substitute, they protested vigorously the permitted profiteering on an enforced substitute.

ing the simplest kinds of home products well cooked and making such suppers a substitute for one of the three regular meals. A new word coined, bearing a cordial significance, was "hooverize," meaning the clean platter. It meant even more in war time, signifying elimination of waste as in the injunction not to "nibble crackers" while waiting for one's order to be brought on the table. It meant eating just sufficient to keep life at its best, wasting nothing.

Some splendid gains were shown as the result of this gastronomical self-denial of the people. For it was largely through the economies they practiced that in wheat and other cereals the fiscal year of 1917-1918 showed an increase over the preceding year of nearly 31 per cent in exports; while in meats, meat products and fats there was an increase in exports of 844,000,000 pounds, or nearly 39 per cent. And large as was this increase, it is still greater when contrasted with the conditions before the war.

But it was in the increased production that the Food Administration's chief opportunity for winning the war lay. While politicians and statesmen were arguing about \$2.20 wheat and a minimum of \$2.50 a bushel for wheat, the farmers, aided by the towns-people, were seeding and harvesting. For it became the practice, during the shortage of labor with the millions in the army and navy, for business men to close their places of business early and in automobile loads hurry to the fields to aid the farmers in caring for the crops.

At the very beginning of America's share in the armed conflict, the President's call was sounded to 6,000,000 farmers. During that year, these farm units planted in food crops 23,000,000 acres more than in 1916, and 32,000,000 acres more than the five-year pre-war average. During 1918 this acreage was still further increased. Every farmer in the land was on the firing line of food production, with no pacifism and slackism in the task. It was well that it

was so; for the appalling fact was later revealed that at the opening of the wheat harvest in 1918 there was on hand but a ten-day wheat supply. It was one of the real crises of the Great War. Yet, there was a slight decrease in the production of all grains in 1918, the difference as compared with that of 1917 being 160,000,000 bushels. This, however, was not a reduction in nutritive value; for the wheat crop of that year totalling 918,920,000 bushels was a distinct advance; and the corn crop of 2,749,000,000 bushels exceeded the five-year pre-war average by 17,000,000 bushels, and greatly superior to that of 1917.

And in the matter of live-stock, the total of beef, pork and mutton in 1918 was 19,495,000,000 as compared with 16,587,000,000 pounds in 1914, the year preceding the European outbreak. On January 1, 1918, there were on American farms 23,284,000 milch cows, compared with 20,676,000 of the previous five-year average; and 43,546,000 other cattle as compared with the five-year average of 38,000,000; also 71,374,000 swine to the previous five-year average of 61,865,000. In 1918 the milk produced was 8,429,000,000 gallons, or 141,000,000 more than in 1917; 299,921,000 pounds of wool, or 18,029,000 more than in 1917; 1,921,000,000 dozen of eggs, which is 37,000,000 dozen more than in 1917; and 589,000,000 head of poultry, exceeding the 1917 product by 11,000,000.

On the morning of January 29, 1919, with President Wilson in Europe, the people were confronted with a news item of strange import. It was that a bill, drawn by the Administration and taken on the previous day to the capitol by W. A. Glasgow, chief counsel of the Food Administration, asked for an appropriation of \$1,250,000,000 to be available at once and to be used in such manner as President Wilson should desire in carrying out the 1918 and 1919 guarantees to the farmers, through such agencies as he might create, or to utilize any department or agency of the Government; by the terms of which the President was

authorized to buy and sell wheat and wheat products and "foods and foodstuffs," and was given power to assume absolute control over dealers, millers, elevators, exchanges, and all others having anything to do with the distribution; and he was given complete control of all exports and imports of such articles of food. It placed in one man's hands virtual control of all the food of the country for a year and a half following. Compared with this proposed measure, the Food-Control Law of war time was mild in the powers delegated to the President.

There sprang up at once general opposition and there was created in the minds of the people a suspicion touching the matter of appropriating a billion and a quarter dollars and telling the President to use it as he might see fit. The bill was passed only in greatly modified form by the Congress in which the President's own party was the majority.

The average consumption of beans by the army was 125,000 pounds per day. Dried beans were a favorite food with the soldiers, and their food value was high and they were especially suitable under intensive training. Early in October, 1918, the War Department stated to the public that 2,000 carloads of potatoes and onions had been purchased for the army in the United States for that month, representing 36,000,000 pounds of potatoes and nearly 3,000,000 of onions, supplying the 119 camps, training-stations and posts. Nearly a thousand bids were received for delivery of these vegetables.

A report giving the subsistence stocks on hand as of November 1, 1918, and covering the more important articles shows the following, among others, for the camps and depots in the United States and France: 123,772,643 pounds of bacon, 52,850,249 pounds of fresh frozen beef; 26,247,563 pounds of canned roast beef; 44,664,577 pounds of canned corn beef; 14,493,479 pounds of canned beef hash; 39,383,656 pounds of canned salmon; 353,-

377,836 pounds of flour; 19,823,364 pounds of hard bread; 9,722,521 pounds of corn meal; 3,816,785 pounds of oat meal; 53,375,065 pounds of dry beans; 76,534,807 pounds of canned baked beans; 24,180,947 pounds of rice; 1,139,224 pounds of hominy; 86,512,001 pounds of canned tomatoes; 27,306,466 pounds of canned peas; 17,778,075 pounds of canned corn; 2,656,311 pounds of canned stringless beans; 4,105,064 pounds of dehydrated vegetables; 12,597,987 pounds of prunes; 9,280,288 pounds of evaporated fruit; 12,364,599 pounds of jam; 2,560,160 pounds of canned apples; 2,051,543 pounds of canned peaches; 2,998,299 pounds of canned apricots; 1,688,794 pounds of canned pears; 1,275,530 pounds of canned cherries; 1,170,034 pounds of canned pineapple; 31,269,335 pounds of coffee; 80,924,813 pounds of sugar; 82,355,725 pounds of evaporated milk; 7,368,108 pounds of lard and lard substitutes; 3,099,960 pounds of butter and butter substitutes; 956,467 gallons of vinegar; 572,155 gallons of pickles; 17,239,631 pounds of salt; 2,693,793 gallons of syrup; 2,129,098 pounds of candy and sweet chocolate; 752,371 pounds of full cream cheese; 4,317,556 pounds of chewing tobacco; 18,982,095 pounds of smoking tobacco; 49,314,150 cigars; 95,257,399 cigarettes. The meats included 465,604 pounds of ham.

Also, early in December, 1918, it was announced that contracts were made for the purchase of 9,000,000 pounds of candy for the American Expeditionary Forces, to supply each overseas soldier with a half-pound of candy every ten days as a part of his regular ration. And later in the same month it was officially announced that the largest single order for candy of record had been given. This, too, was for overseas soldiers, consisting of the highest grade of candies, including bar chocolate, sweet chocolate, chocolate vanilla bars, almond bars and peanut bars, aggregating 1,412,000,00 pounds. At the same time announcement was

made that the largest single purchase of chewing-gum in the history of the army had been made, consisting of 11,686,000 packages of the most popular brands.

Gradually, even before the signing of the armistice, the ban on the use of foods was lifted. In the early autumn of 1918, in the use of flour there was a change made from the required 50 per cent of substitutes with 50 per cent of wheat flour to a proportion of substitutes as low as 20 per cent. Yet at this time it was found necessary to apply some strictures in order to conserve more fully essential foods of the nation, particularly in hotels and restaurants, it being estimated that approximately 9,000,000 people ate their meals at public eating places.

And on December 4 there went throughout the country from Washington the joyous dispatch that all restrictions on the use of sugar were lifted; for immediately prior thereto, grocers were required to keep a record showing the amounts of sales to individual purchasers. And on December 25, new joy was added to Christmas by the sugar-bowls going back onto the tables in public eating places.

In the first week in December, 1918, the prices of some of the substitutes were these: ten pounds of barley, 65 cents; ten pounds of corn-meal, 65 cents; ten pounds of common buckwheat 83 cents; ten pounds of New York special buckwheat, \$1.22. While bananas were 70 cents a dozen for a very common grade, eggs 70 cents a dozen, and butter 70 cents per pound. These were Twin City prices.

And at his weekly conference with newspaper men, Mr. Hoover stated, on the afternoon of the day the armistice was signed, that since October, 1917, from reports received throughout the United States, the combined prices per unit of twenty-four most important foodstuffs were of the average cost of \$6.55 for the quarter ending June 30, 1918, as against \$6.62 in October, 1917. This showed a small drop, notwithstanding the fact that there had been

a steady increase in costs: wages, materials, rents, and transportation.

A fine quality developing from the necessities of co-operation during the war was the cordial spirit in which the United States Food Administration worked with various food administrations of the Allies. Ample food of proper nutritive quality for the fighting forces is always a matter of vital importance. And with the submarine menacing the food supply of our own men as well as the Allies, food must be sent to France, submarines or no submarines. There was cordial support from the naval forces of the Allies in giving protection, there was no less cordial co-operation from our Food Administration in the distribution of the food from America.

For the Food Controller of France, after the 1918 crop had been gathered, reported to his government that the total nutrition value of the crop of cereals for that year, as well as of beans and potatoes, in France, was below the total nutrition value of those products for the preceding year; the potato crop yielding but 7,500,000 tons, while the average for the ten preceding years had been 12,000,000, and yet they must supply all the armies in France, including English and American troops, out of this decreased potato crop.

And on September 24, 1918, the United States Food Administration stated that under agreement entered into with the food controllers of the Allies our footstuffs-export program for the ensuing year was:—wheat, rye, barley and corn, and flours calculated as grain for breadstuffs, 429,320,000 bushels, of which some 100,000,000 to 165,000,000 might be cereals other than wheat.

And it had become clearly apparent a full month before the armistice was signed that the necessity for feeding not only the millions of soldiers, but as well the hundreds of millions of less-than-half-fed peoples in Europe, would require still greater food need.

These obligations necessitated sending 50 per cent more food than was sent the year previous. Whereas 11,750,000 tons had gone then, now 17,500,000 tons must be provided by America. And it was made plain to the people that virtually the same estimate would stand whether the war would end then or a year later, the Food Administration putting out this suggestive announcement:

For 1918-1919 we have a clear-cut, business-like program that calls for steady marching and hard campaigning. We have pooled food resources with the Allies and planned to distribute the food to meet the needs of the hour. That means to keep in full health and strength the Allies, the armies, and our people at home; and at the same time to build up safe food reserves in this country. We know now how much food there is, where it is needed, and just how much can be shipped. The program agreed to calls for 67 per cent more meat and fat, 52 per cent more breadstuff, and 21 per cent more sugar than was shipped last year. . . . The army of women, trained by a year of food-saving in the United States, must forge ahead relentlessly, and sweep even laggards with them.

While this program was planned before the armistice was signed, the Food Administration did not relax its effort after that event. Late in November it planned to have read in all the churches of the land at a fixed date a statement showing even an enlarged program to save famishing Europe. This statement informed the people that,—

America's food pledge for this year is 20,000,000 tons, two-thirds more than last year; for the relief of more than three hundred million hungry people of the world will be brought home to the people of the United States during the first week in December. An intensive campaign to be known as conservation week for world relief will be carried on.

With Europe famished, its millions dead from undernourishment and absolute starvation, its many more millions in serious condition from lack of proper food, America would have been derelict in its moral obligations to the world had it not exerted itself as a great people to the

utmost to serve Europe in its supreme distress when the clash of arms had ceased. And President Wilson's first legislative recommendation based on a study of conditions in Europe looked to the relief of distress of populations "outside of Germany." He asked for an appropriation of \$100,000,000 to be used at his discretion to supply food to liberated peoples of Austria, Turkey, Poland and western Russia—peoples who had no recognized governments and were unable to finance international obligations. The appropriation was granted and on March 2 President Wilson appointed Mr. Hoover as Director-General of the American Relief Administration. The United States food-relief ship "Westward Ho" arrived at Danzig on March 6, and it was the first vessel to pass through the Kiel Canal after the outbreak of the war.

Public opinion was agreed that the national Food Administration was free in a remarkable degree from anything savoring of scandal, when the general Administration seemed like a seething mass of scandal in one form or another. This is peculiarly gratifying when it is remembered that the forces and individuals with whom and through whom it had to operate were so diverse in their characteristics. Perhaps the most scathing contribution to the literature of the subject is that of Alfred W. McCann,³ who declared that the last week in April, 1919, witnessed a shameless drive upon the wheat necessities of the nation with no justification other than the greed of the grain speculators and millers, and accused Food Administrator Hoover of predicting a needlessly high price for wheat.

While profiteers in food have the age merit back of them, and are regarded with no less favor in modern days than they were in ages past, they have always been looked upon with detestation. Hoarders of food were severely punished in ancient days. Pericles, the Athenian, 450 years

³ *Reconstruction* for June, 1919, New York.

before Christ issued a decree that persons found hoarding food should be compelled to drink the fatal hemlock; and some 700 years later the Roman Emperor Diocletian issued decrees similar to a modern "fair-price list" and directed that profiteers should be put to death.

With alacrity America will feed a famishing world; with equal alacrity will she smite those who would tear her down from her pedestal of fairness and justice and generosity.

CHAPTER III

THE FUEL ADMINISTRATION

But fuel became the inseparable and essential partner of food in winning the war. This fact became well established after some depressing delays.

As in practically all things else when the country was hurried into war unprepared, it was to the Council of National Defense to which the country had to turn for action in the matter of fuel. Accordingly, in May, the next month after the declaration of war, this Council appointed a commission on coal production, which, in turn, called together coal operators, some four hundred in number. These, through a committee, agreed upon a price for coal, of \$3 a ton east of Pittsburg, and \$2.75 west thereof. Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane was chairman of the committee making these prices, with what was believed ample precaution to avoid congestion of traffic and to speed production to the utmost limit, so that ample reserve stores could be accumulated. The Columbus, Ohio, and other papers attacked the prices as too high, and Secretary of War Baker, chairman of the Council of Defense repudiated the agreement as fixing too high a price. He was unwilling that the operators should receive more than \$2.45 a ton. The result was that many operators were compelled to close their mines, while those that continued operation could not increase their output as would have been done at the higher and previously-fixed price by the Lane committee. In consequence, a fuel famine followed with the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars to the industry of the country and the still further enforced and more serious delay in war equipment, incalculable suffering, disease and death. And

after all the mischief was done, the Administration sanctioned an increase in price to a figure higher than had been provided in the agreement made with the Lane committee.

It was in the midst of these chaotic conditions in August, that President Wilson appointed Harry A. Garfield, president of Williams College, to the position of national Fuel Administrator.

Previous to this, orders for coal by the million of tons were cancelled and little coal was moving. But now, with the approach of cold weather, new orders came in great volume. And there followed such a congestion of freight on the Atlantic seaboard for lack of ships to take it abroad, and such a dearth of cars to haul the coal, that by the end of the year the situation, because of the coal shortage, became most threatening, and was particularly serious in New England and New York.

On December 28 the Government had taken over control of the railroads; and the Director-General of Railroads promptly directed such routeing of cars as would most promptly and effectually relieve the situation which arose from the disastrous fuel shortage then confronting the country.

In these circumstances, for the purpose of saving fuel, manufactured gas was burned in some cities for heating purposes. Churches were urged to consolidate; coal on the sidetracks or in transit was seized for local use; the use of electricity, whose production required the use of coal, in hallways and offices, and for advertising purposes on the streets as well as for street lighting, was ordered cut. But in this matter there was a very generous difference of action in different sections of the country, even in different cities of the same section of the country. In Indianapolis, saloons, poolrooms, and theaters were closed until further notice; in Philadelphia, office buildings were required to eliminate the use of steam for heating purposes from seven o'clock in

the evening until seven in the morning, and all on Sundays and holidays except to keep pipes from freezing; in Michigan, churches were not allowed to be heated more than six hours a week, or business places more than nine hours each week day; in St. Paul there was a radical cut in street lighting, while in Duluth the streets blazed with light as though nothing had happened.

So serious a situation developed that on January 16, 1918, the Fuel Administrator ordered a drastic cut in the use of coal and directed the order in which coal-sellers were to give preference in coal deliveries. In all the country east of the Mississippi River, including Minnesota and Louisiana, all industrial plants, including those manufacturing war munitions, were required to shut down for five days, January 18 to 22, and in them no fuel was to be used except in the manufacture of perishable foods, the printing of daily newspapers and the current issues of other periodicals. The priority of deliveries was in the following order: railroads; domestic users, hospitals, food stores and hotels; public utilities; bunkers; municipal, county and state governments and public use generally; manufacturers of perishable goods.

Immediate and angry protest came from all parts of the country affected by the order. Even newspapers in west-Mississippi territory voiced pronounced opposition. Industry declared that it was uneconomical and would have disastrous effects and entail great loss upon industry and hardships upon working men of whom it would deprive wages aggregating millions of dollars. The United States Senate by resolution requested the Fuel Administrator to "delay for five days the order suspending the operation of industrial plants in portions of the United States in order that protests may be heard, investigation made and information presented."¹ Had this request been heeded, the whole

¹ McMaster's "United States in the World War," p. 422, op. cit.

purpose of the order would have been nullified. Winter and the emergency would have passed before hearings could have been completed.

Holding to the order, Fuel Administrator Garfield declared that it was necessary in order to prevent a crisis and widespread suffering. And when appeal was made to the President, his reply was:

This war calls for many sacrifices, and the sacrifices called for by this order are infinitely less than sacrifices of life which might otherwise be involved. . . . Halfway measures would not have accomplished the desired end.

In fact, the local fuel administrator in Chicago had announced that in Chicago industrial plants and factories would be obliged to close in five or six days unless relief came.

The fact is that when the stress in the fuel situation came during the severe winter of 1917-1918, the industrial production of the country was greater than the available ships could transport, with the delay caused by the lack of coal. The measure was drastic; but it was a war emergency and anything short of a drastic measure would have been futile.

Moreover, there immediately followed another order that for ten consecutive Mondays, beginning January 28, no fuel, other than necessary to prevent freezing pipes, could be used to heat business places except those used as public official offices and other specified places, such as for food supplies, physicians' offices and drugstores. It was estimated that this would effect a saving of 30,000,000 tons of coal and return the supply to normal.

Besides, it is doubtful whether there was any one single event, save the calling of the sons of the nation to arms, that so completely brought the American people to a sharp realization of the kind of war that was upon them.

To emphasize the seriousness of the situation yet

further, "heatless Mondays" were followed by "lightless Tuesdays." Church services were greatly curtailed and many schools were compelled to close, while many other unusual conditions attended the Government's successful efforts to keep coal moving toward industrial establishments; particularly to munition plants and all those engaged in war-equipment operations, and to the seaboard for the country's naval and merchant vessels. The extensive industries that sprang up because of the war, the railroad congestion due to the heavy shipment of material across the continent to the Atlantic seaboard, the most severe and exacting of thirty winters, and unsettled labor conditions—all these contributed to the fuel famine the first year the country was in the war. The winter of 1917-1918 was probably the most difficult for the people to pass through of any experienced since modern appliances came into use.

The saving effected by these several measures was large. In early August, 1918, the Fuel Administrator made public the statement that from the records which had been kept there was shown a saving of more than 60,000 kilowatt-hours, the equal of about 100 tons of coal, on the first of the "lightless nights" in the borough of Manhattan, New York City, indicating a saving in Manhattan alone of 40,000 tons of coal a year.

As a further means of saving as a war measure, daylight saving was put into operation by turning the clock one hour ahead. It was estimated that by this method, from the facts gathered from various sections of the country by the Fuel Administration to determine the saving in fuel that might be effected by the operation of the daylight saving law, a saving of 1,250,000 tons of coal had been effected during the seven months' operation of the law during the summer of 1918.

Broadly speaking, farmers opposed the plan while city workers favored it. Laboring people in the cities probably received the greatest benefit from its operation—workers

in factories, shops, stores and offices, for it not only gave them more hours of daylight for recreation in the evening, or for gardening, but it meant a large saving to the householder in the matter of lighting. To the last, those who furnished artificial light were witnesses, for it entailed an appreciable reduction in the aggregate of their income. And the total of savings from it, in homes and places of business, is estimated as high as \$60,000,000 each summer.

The position of the farmers on this plan is well stated by a newspaper correspondent in the heart of the agricultural West:

The daylight-saving plan takes an hour from the morning and adds it in the evening. When there has been a heavy dew during the night, which is true most of the time, we cannot begin work in the fields until this has dried off, usually between eight and nine o'clock by the old time.

That wouldn't be so bad if one didn't have hired help. I stay in the field myself until seven or eight in the evening, but my men, hired by the month, insist that their day's work is done at five or six, and won't stay on into the evening. That is their right, of course. Not all of them are that way, but the majority of them are. They wait around until the dew is gone, for they are not hired to do chores in many cases, then go out and work in the field until twelve, and quit at five so that they can go to town in the evening.²

Also came "gasless Sundays," the requirements of which the people accepted with the utmost good nature. It was not by an order, but merely a request on the part of the Fuel Administrator, that the people forego automobiling on Sunday, for the purpose of saving gasoline for war needs. Though criticism resulted, and some that was not good-natured, the result was more than the mere saving of essentials in war needs, important as was that. The people were alert, and keen to see who was unwilling to forego a mere personal pleasure for the sake of successfully carrying forward the war. On the first of the few Sundays it was in

²Sioux Falls, S. D., *Daily Argus-Leader*, July 21, 1919.

operation, there was alertness on the part of the public to note to what extent the request was observed. Weight of public opinion was probably never felt more than in the matter of this one simple request. They were but few who ventured out; but whoever had the hardihood to ignore the request, whether rich or poor, were made to understand unmistakably that ignoring the request would not be tolerated. This was made plain in the yellow stripes that were made to adorn the automobiles of offenders, in almost any town in which they stopped in any part of the nation. And if they did not stop, they were made to stop long enough to apply the yellow stripes of disapproval of disregard of the Fuel Administrator's course as to "gasless Sundays."

On October 17, 1918, he withdrew his request for gasolineless Sundays. The loyal response of the people to the appeal east of the Mississippi River, it was stated by the Fuel Administration, had saved at least 1,000,000 barrels, and to have made it possible to give to the men at the front the supplies required in the prosecution of the war.

The Fuel Administrator found it necessary to fix the price of coke and coal even after the signing of the armistice. On November 15, 1918, he ordered:

Coke produced in Taylor County, in the State of West Virginia, may be sold at prices per ton of 2,000 pounds, f. o. b. cars at ovens, not to exceed the following, viz., for blast-furnace coke, \$6.75; for selected 72-hour foundry coke, \$7.75.

Coke produced in Hopkins County, in the State of Kentucky, may be sold at prices per ton of 2,000 pounds, f. o. b. cars at ovens, not to exceed the following, viz., for blast-furnace coke, \$7.25; for selected 72-hour foundry coke, \$8.25.

This order shall be effective at seven a. m., November 18, 1918.

Also this, pertaining to a wholly different section of the country:

Bituminous coal mined by Temple Fuel Company, at its mine in the State of Colorado, may be sold at prices f. o. b. cars at the

mine, not to exceed \$2.15 per net ton for run of mine, \$3.40 per net ton for prepared sizes, \$1.55 per net ton for slack or screenings passing through a 1.25-inch screen. To these prices may be added the forty-five cents allowance for wage increase if the producing company is entitled to add such allowance under the President's order of October 27, 1917. The maximum price herein-above fixed for prepared sizes is subject to the following monthly summer reductions: April 1, 70 cents; May 1, 50 cents; June 1, 35 cents; July 1, 15 cents.

This order to become effective at seven a. m., November 18, 1918.

One of the best results of the Fuel Administration's efforts was the order against putting upon the market dirty coal. After the signing of the armistice it had not relaxed its vigorous dealing with mine operators who willfully ignored the regulations laid down for the careful preparation of coal to free it from impurities before placing it on the market for consumers. During the week ending November 16, 1918, four mines were ordered shut down because of this offense. After the Fuel Administration had placed the ban on dirty coal, a total of 119 mines had been closed, 12 of which, up to the week ending November 16, 1918, had received permission to resume operations.

The order of the Fuel Administrator that coal might be delivered to the curb and dumped there without further ado, raised a furor in certain circles. But it was war time, and there was a great shortage of men; the people smilingly accepted any hard or undesirable situation that arose, while fortifying themselves for the next. But when the man ordering coal was informed by the dealer that he might have the coal but that he would have to put it into the bin himself because of the lack of man power, and that he would therefore have a reduction of thirty-five cents per ton, and the driver delivering it, when about to dump it on the sidewalk as ordered, said that for a dollar-and-a-half per ton he would put it into the bin, the householder looked less philosophically upon the new situation.

The severe criticism heaped upon Fuel Administrator Garfield's shoulders, following his drastic fuel-saving order of January 16, 1918, was hardly properly placed. The situation in which the country was found was the logical result of the pacifist practices of the Administration for the previous three years, long before Doctor Garfield had any connection with the Administration's activities. It was only three days after this order that Senator Chamberlain made his notable speech in New York, declaring that the Administration had ceased to function in practically all branches, though his criticism was directed at the War Department.

The serious fuel situation had developed before Doctor Garfield was appointed. When Secretary of War Baker overthrew the coal prices fixed by the Lane Committee in June, 1917, two months before Doctor Garfield was appointed, he committed the first serious blunder in the fuel situation, as he had constantly blundered in the War Department; and before Fuel Administrator Garfield could remedy the error, the railroads were ceasing to furnish full service to the country, either under private or government control. And immediately thereafter followed the extremely severe winter eating into the coal stocks to an unprecedented extent.

To-day scarcely anyone denies the wisdom of Fuel Administrator Garfield's course. As soon as the extreme winter was past, he began gripping the situation in a manner promising well for the months to follow. He had determined that whatever difficulties might ensue for the following winter, the country would be well cared for in the matter of fuel. In October, 1918, the nation's fuel supplies were adequate and well distributed, but he still urged the need of economy. The coal stocks then on hand were greater than ever before; but he urged that the needs were also greater. The upper Great Lakes territory which cuts most deeply into transportation, had received the greatest proportionate supply. Fewer workers than ever before had

produced 38,000,000 tons more coal in the first six months of 1918 than were produced in the corresponding months of 1917. But now the railroads, under public control, had awakened to the situation which Fuel Administrator Garfield had tried to impress upon them before the desperate situation in the winter of 1917-1918, when the Director-General of Railroads failed to place an embargo upon the transportation of non-essentials.

Bolshevism, whether of American citizens or aliens, must never be permitted to control an essential to all the activities of the genuine American life.

CHAPTER IV

LABOR AND WAGES

With two large movements President Wilson's name must be inextricably linked: Labor and League. The bigness of the former was so lost sight of in the overshadowing importance of the other that, in large measure, it dropped from the public thought. In the form in which it was presented it became a problem, the solution of which would have been sufficiently notable in the career of any one man to give him a worthy place in the history of his country in time of peace; doubly so in time of war.

When, however, any man by his deliberate purpose, whether that purpose be high or low, creates his own problem and seeks to make it the problem of society, he deserves no consideration from history, other than the bare record, if he fails to solve that problem for the future. And if his handiwork leaves incomplete the solution of a problem which is of his creation and not of the demands of either the present or the future, he cannot be assigned the rôle of statesman, but rather of blunderer or traducer.

When, in the summer of 1916, President Wilson undertook to secure an understanding between the railroads and their trainmen, the public at once took keen interest, hoping for a happy solution. When, however, he undertook to force through Congress the Adamson bill, the interest was no less keen, but it became a depressing episode in the Administration's labor activities. It then, for the first time, became plain to the great public that President Wilson was willing to play autocrat to favor a strongly organized body of voters. That a subservient Congress yielded in ill humor did not relieve of executive odium. This course on the part

of the President marks the labor policy, if it be worthy of such designation, pursued by the Administration in time of peace.

But the Administration's attitude on the matter of salaries, labor, and the wage problem was a strange jumble during the entire eight years. That its course was inconsistent was a matter of minor importance; that it was a matter of injustice was a matter of great importance; that it was a matter involving Americanism itself was a matter of prime importance. Even for his own reputation the President failed to see in advance the natural consequences of his driving through the Adamson bill in 1916. Or if he did see it, that was a matter of minor importance at that moment. It was the presidential election, then just before him, that was of leading importance. But when the same unions that forced his hand in 1916, came three years later with a like demand for increase of wages, he woke to the peril he had stirred in 1916. Now it was almost the time to begin securing delegates for the presidential conventions, and once more the organized labor forces deemed it time to strike. They again approached the President with well-defined threats unless their demands for increased wages were granted. This time they came with some basis for their demands: greatly increased cost of living. That the great mass of the people, the great unorganized public, had to meet this increased cost of living without the greatly increased pay granted to the railroad men by the President's action of 1916 and by the Railroad Administration during the war and now by their new demand for increased pay, all of which must be loaded upon the public, did not disturb the trainmen.

The Adamson law had given the Big Four Brotherhoods—firemen, engineers, conductors, and brakemen—a wage increase of about \$70,000,000; to these was given a further increase of about \$160,000,000 two years later upon the recommendations of the Lane Commission to Director-Gen-

eral McAdoo. While all this was added to the burdens of the public with little or no increase in salaries or wages, the trainmen unblushingly came with the still larger demand of 1919, at which time the President was getting ready to tour the country in the interest of the League of Nations, and after Mr. McAdoo had added to the rail employes approximately \$250,000,000 per annum in addition to that of the Lane report.

Under these circumstances, the President did not meet the issue squarely as in 1916. He went immediately before Congress with the matter, apparently to seek a way to reduce living costs, so as to meet the complaint of the trainmen that it was because of the increased cost of living that they came; and he frankly spoke of the "vicious cycle" which another increase of railroad wages would but continue. And in order to rid himself of the matter until he could tour the country in the interest of the Covenant of the League of Nations, he agreed to call a conference of labor men, with others, to meet in Washington two months later. This met his immediate purpose. Always accommodating toward organized labor, the other laborers mattered little. Seeking to support the contention that while, under the enormous totals added to the railway pay-rolls of employes, the increase of wages had been but fifty per cent while the increased cost of living was fifty-five per cent, no heed was paid to the more imperative demands of the third party, the great unorganized public. The Housewives' League of the country, the Consumers' League of the nation, representing the tens of millions of the common folks, had published far and wide the intolerable increases in the costs of living. To it all the President was deaf. One might have thought he would feel some interest in the employes directly under his jurisdiction, the employes of the executive departments of the government, some of whom were receiving the same salaries that were paid before the Civil War with an increase of thirty-three cents a day; or,

one might think that he would take an interest in a matter of supreme importance in the District of Columbia, at the very seat of government, where seventy-five per cent of the teachers are paid annually \$800 or less. But they could not get his ear. Yet as soon as organized voters made demands, they had his attention.

But this time the "rubber-stamp" Congress had gone out of existence.

On the floor of the Senate, December 5, 1919, Senator Kellogg, of Minnesota, stated that while he had no criticism upon the wage increases given to railroad workers upon the report of the Wage Commission, of which Secretary Franklin K. Lane was chairman, he did criticise the Administration's issuing many orders reclassifying employes, placing them in the higher-wage class without change in actual employment. In this connection he pointed out that office boys of twelve or thirteen years, studying shorthand or going to school part of the time, had their wages raised to as high as eighty and ninety dollars a month, and that in many instances men in subordinate positions were receiving salaries higher than their superiors; he also added that these gross inequalities added greatly to the cost of operation of the railroads, created unrest, and had a bad effect on the morale of the service. Proceeding in his remarks, the Senator further stated:

Men are constantly being taken out of one class and placed in a higher skilled class. . . . In one case, men engaged in cleaning Pullman cars were taken out of the ordinary day-labor class and placed in the class of expert upholsterers and their pay raised from 40 cents to 68 cents an hour, and they still continue to perform their old duties. . . . That is going on all over the country.

As a matter of fact it was not a reduction in the number of hours of labor that the railroad men sought in their 1916 demands. What they put out for the public was just that. What they really demanded and obtained was a ten-

hour wage for an eight-hour day, and pay-and-half for all time over the eight hours. Indeed, they hoped to work every hour they could crowd in at that pay, up to the sixteen-hour limit.¹ And they accomplished that, in the development of this personal policy of President Wilson.

For there was no more demand for the President's backing a demand such as that made by the Big Brotherhoods of 1916, as a public policy, than that his forced measure should embrace all underpaid groups of workers or individual workers. Indeed, there was relatively less demand than for increased pay for such social forces of the nation as teachers who had to pay out large sums in preparation for their work, while the others were always receiving pay while in preparation for their life calling. The President's policy tended to develop the material side of the nation rather than the spiritual.

As a further result of this policy, when the nation found itself suddenly thrust into the war it was thrown into as great a muddle, with all its opportunity for preparation, as

¹ I had occasion to be in Williston, N. D., in November, 1918, from which town I took an early freight to a station a few miles east. In the caboose alone with a commercial traveller and myself, the brakeman was freely expressing his joy over conditions. He said the next day "the ghosts would be about," which he explained as meaning that it was pay-day, and he would receive \$110 for half a month's work. He stated further that he had been on the railroad but a short time, that he had no experience as a railroad man, that he was aged about 22 or 23 years, that their trains were very light, and that unless they had at least one way-car they could not go out; that his run to Minot was very light, that they had to reach that point not later than 9 o'clock, since at that hour the 16-hour limit expired, and that they had to kill time on the way to make it cover the sixteen hours (a cold-blooded method of bleeding the people with which any intelligent travelling man of experience is wholly familiar). That evening I met him in Minot at 9 o'clock and when I asked how long he had been in, he hilariously replied: "Just now got in."

In Minneapolis at the Soo shops worked a boy of 17 years, with little education, who had no one dependent upon him, and lived at home with his parents. He received upwards of \$200 a month. His preparation had cost him nothing, and he was paid for every hour of his preparation for his work.

In the P. R. R. shops at Sunbury, Pa., was a man engaged who gleefully wrote his friends that he had scarcely time to write as he was receiving \$11 for every day he was at work. These three instances in three widely separated sections of the country came to my attention at about the same time.—Author.

was England or France with the shells dropping at their doors and the very integrity of their territory threatened, with not a day for preparation. In consequence, there was an immediate demand for labor in all branches of industry in war preparation; and labor, in turn, made immediate demands for increased pay to meet that allowed the railroad brotherhoods under the President's pressure in 1916. It was confusion worse confounded; the "cost-plus-a-per-cent" plan was adopted by the Administration, under which grabbing contractors cared nothing as to how much they paid for labor for it was merely added to the cost and to that the per cent, which put into their pockets the more money as the cost became the greater—a plan under which even the cantonments were built by contractors, instead of having it done by the government's own engineer corps and other suitable branches of the service, thereby releasing hundreds of thousands of skilled laborers for essential work elsewhere, as was done in France.

Nor was it till the war was well done that the Administration adopted a general labor policy. On June 15, 1918, Secretary of Labor Wilson in a letter to the President stated:

A dispensable industry competes for the labor of an essential plant. Instances are frequent where one government project secures men at the expense of another. As a result, the labor turnover is alarmingly great, with a loss in war efficiency which we cannot afford.

And he added that one of the serious consequences of this situation was the effect upon the morale of the workers, producing and encouraging restlessness. And the President responding to the Secretary's suggestion that a central agency should be established to determine where labor should go, pointed to the United States Employment Service. Prior to this, the Administration was fumbling to find a policy that would fit the emergency of backing up at

home the boys that were doing the fighting at the front.

From this grew the "work-or-fight" order. When this policy was announced it met approval from one end of the land to the other. But some of the edge was taken from it by the announcement in early July that it would apply only to men of draft age. In his explanatory statement, General Crowder said that it was not a satisfying spectacle to see a contingent of one class of men marching down the street to camp, while other men of their own age, watching them from the shop windows remained behind to sell cigarettes or dispense soda-fountain drinks. "'Work or fight'—there is no alternative," he declared, to the delight of real Americans.

And the later draft law meant the same principle was to become operative; for the conscripting of all men between the ages of 18 and 45 was not so much a conscription of men to fight as it was of men to work. It meant work or fight and meant it with a certainty that could not be misunderstood.² The new edict became effective July 1, 1918.

And from about this time, the federal employment service became a most effective branch of government activity. Starting originally as a part of the immigration service, it was later placed upon a firm foundation that enabled it to render real service to the nation. As the harvest season of 1918 approached, the director-general at Kansas City, as an example, was in receipt of daily reports from his representatives in the field whereby he was fully informed as to the stages of the ripening grain, the probable time when harvesters would be required, and the number at each place. It linked the manless job with the jobless man. It did good service in aiding the returned fighters, at the close of hostilities, to get employment promptly and with little loss of time.

²General Crowder stated it naively in this way: "I believe the effect of the additional registration will be to recruit industry up to the point where there will be no shortage of industrial man power."

The growth of unionism was a notable result of the Adamson law. The government had opposed the unionizing of its employes; but as soon as the railways passed under its control, the Director-General prohibited interference with efforts of the employes to organize. If permissible in one branch of the service, why not in all? Accordingly, every branch of the service in the departments in Washington and out was unionized. The irony of it all was that it was done to protect the employe against the government's injustice itself—one of the sternest comments upon President Wilson's social-justice ideas in forcing upon the country the demands of the railroad brotherhoods in 1916, while some of the employes in his own executive departments were living on starvation salaries,³ established in 1857, when a \$500 salary was as good as a \$1500 salary in 1916. And it was known that the greatly increased pay then allowed to the railroad men, in addition to the previous advances, \$300,000,000 increase recommended in the Lane report, effective January 1, 1918, and still later another \$500,000,000, with still other increases later, was all added to the increased cost of living, of which those whose salaries had not been increased had to pay the larger proportionate share.

If President Wilson did not foresee some of the logical results of the policy which he inaugurated in 1916 when, under threat of a strike on the part of the railroad men, he discarded the principle of arbitration, that fact does not add to his qualification as statesman. It was the threat that was repeated in 1919 by the railroad workers, one of whose leaders declared they were using the method of the cavemen—sheer brute force to gain their ends. And on September 22, four days before the tie-up of the British railroads, the great steel strike in the United States occurred, led by one Fitzpatrick, a horseshoer who had never

³ Hearings by House Committee on Labor, spring of 1916. And in 1918 cabinet and other high officials asked that salaries of department employes be based at least upon decency and humanity.

worked in a steel plant, and William Z. Foster, a syndicalist. These were followed by the soft-coal strike on November 1, 1919, in violation of a contract of the miners with the government. These were not bona fide labor moves, but plans to break the will of the public. And yet another consequence of President Wilson's labor policy was the inordinately high wages paid in industrial centers, withdrawing from the farms the essential help that would otherwise have remained on the farm. And the warning going out from the farms is that the farmers will produce what they may be able to supply the hungry world in the great depletion of help, but that if the world goes hungry it will not be their fault.⁴ This is a serious problem for the future, created by President Wilson when he whipped the Adamson bill through Congress in 1916 to aid a favored class. And from that day, classism has grown by leaps and bounds in the United States. It sought to control the Administration and to become the government during 1919. By this time the Administration seeing its plight took the firm position it should have assumed in 1916. It is well illustrated in the attitude of laboring men in the "outlaw" switchmen's strike, April, 1920. John Grunau, Chicago radical leader, declared that "the fight has become one between the new and old unions"; while W. G. Lee, president of the brotherhoods of railroad trainmen, demanded that some law be enforced against the "outlaw" strikers. Yet Lee was among the first to object to the anti-strike clause in the Esch-Cummins railroad bill. The logic of this is that he was willing that his brotherhood may strike against the interest of the public but that he rejected the idea that any organization might strike against the policy of his own brotherhood. In other words, he was ready to exalt his Brotherhood above

⁴ See Senator Capper of Kansas in the *North American Review*, August, 1920. A serious omission in the review, as Senator Capper sees it, is that he fails to call attention to marked decrease in the number of farm-produced boys and girls in the last two decades, a factor upon which the farmer and the whole nation has relied heretofore.

Government and People. If, as held by organized labor leaders, the unrestricted right to strike is "natural and inherent," then it must be a right common to all and cannot be monopolized by some favored Brotherhood or Federation. But this was an unworthy frame of mind into which they were led by the favoritism of the coddling Administration.

Was labor loyal during the war? This was a question often asked by the public. Labor as a whole was thoroughly loyal. Too many labor leaders were utterly disloyal, though they took every precaution to conceal it from the public. They adopted the camouflaging method characteristic of the National Administration. In support of this view are cited the Bridgeport strike which was completely demolished by the energetic action of President Wilson; the threatened strike of railroad laborers, in which Director-General McAdoo's prompt action was decisive; and the letter Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, wrote Senator Thomas when the newspapers were stating that the latter was about to introduce a bill to penalize workmen who absented themselves from their employment in war plants, which meant in war time, when stating:

The workmen in the United States are doing their full share of service and duty. They are whole-heartedly supporting the war program. They are giving themselves, their sons, their brothers, and other blood relations on the firing line.⁵

In this pronouncement Mr. Gompers appears to proclaim the doctrine of vicarious patriotism, and to hold that men engaged in war plants were to be privileged above any other class in the country; that labor, *per se*, had a right to a preferred classification. And, like so many other labor leaders, he placed these highly-paid laborers above any other

⁵ Contrast, in *Collier's Weekly* for September 14, 1918, a statement of a shirk paid \$9.90 a day—a method quite common by laborers on government work during the war.

civilian class and even above the very men who, at that time, were giving their lives to the country and even for the high-priced shirks in war plants. Then, was labor loyal?

It was common for labor, in its organized form, to point the finger at the men fattening in the munition plants and in war industries of all kinds. It was proper. Profiteering by such industries was notorious. Yet these same laboring men were willing to fatten off the very life-blood of the boys who so earnestly put themselves into the conflict for civilization. The labor man was willing to grasp all he could in the hour of the Government's need, while the boys fighting for the very man who hid himself as a workman in the munition plants at home was suffering and dying in the trenches for a miserable pittance. Nor was this all. While the so-called laboring man was squeezing the last possible nickel out of the Government through organized labor and was receiving it with commendable regularity, the man with the fighting forces found it difficult to receive his little pay from the government, because of the inefficiency of the Administration, for himself, his wife, and his babe at home.⁶

Why the Administration of the war period should be willing to tolerate any such condition was inexplicable. The money was on hand for the government civilian employe who

⁶This became so notorious as to amount to a national scandal. The Administration promptly advanced the pay of well-organized railroad men, at first by the tens of millions, then by hundreds of millions, and later by the billion; while the neglect of the pay to the fighting men tarnished the nation's fair name. No civilian officer of the Administration from President down went without his pay regularly, nor did well-paid laboring men 3000 to 6000 miles from the firing line. One case illustrates the method. It is within my personal knowledge: No allotment was being paid the wife of the enlisted man until a law was enacted that all allotments to the wife should date back to the man's entry into the service. Then the Administration, instead of acting in a straight-forward manner, took from the pay of the fighter the \$15 per month of governmental allotment due the wife, and dating this allotment from January 13, 1918, though he had been in the service a full month previous; and up to the following December he had not been able to get from the Government any of that due to his infant child. This is in marked contrast with the Administration's care to pay promptly and with enormously increased wages organized labor.—Author.

remained away from danger and at a high salary or wage; why not for the fighting man who left wife and babe behind at one-third to one-fifth of the pay the other was receiving? Nor was this the only matter pertaining to labor and wages in which the Administration's attitude will not bear scrutiny. The public, after hostilities ceased, asked why organized labor was making so frequent appeals for amnesty for political prisoners of the Debs and Mooney type, and why the Administration was responding by the release of those of the type of Kate O'Hare. Other elements of the American citizenship were not worried lest some disloyalist should serve in prison the sentence imposed by the courts in the regular course of legal procedure after full sifting of the case. The public also wanted to know why, after the Administration's marked favors to organized labor, the payroll of labor was two and a half times as high as before the war while labor was less efficient, the work produced per man being greatly reduced. When Lloyd George was fighting the bolshevistic tendency of workingmen in England, he won by the proof that every previous wage increase had been followed by a lessening of production: that with 100,000 more miners at work at wages 172 per cent higher there was a decline of 16 per cent in production.⁷ His position was quite in contrast with that of the American Administration in favoring the coal strikers in the fall of 1919. Fuel Administrator Garfield fixed, upon a scientific basis, the miners' wages at a 14 per cent increase. His position was favored by the cabinet. President Wilson, however, overturned all in favor of the radical element among the miners who were violating a contract with the Government and practically threatening rebellion.

In that connection Doctor Garfield uttered the words of a statesman when he said:

If one class of workers demands more than like workers are getting, that class is trying to levy tribute upon the people of the coun-

⁷ See page 78.

try and does not differ from corporations which seek profits for the few at the expense of the many. They certainly put themselves in the position of law-breakers.

This attitude of sound sense was more than the Administration could bear, and Doctor Garfield promptly resigned his position of national Fuel Administrator, thwarted in his efforts to aid the vast unorganized public in its battle against organized labor and organized industry; for it was becoming notorious that between these two the public was being crushed, and in some instances evidence was not wanting that the two were working in harmony to squeeze from the purse of the public all it would endure. Garfield felt that sound principle had been deserted for a makeshift; he was unwilling to keep step in a march that was sure to be fatal to the future.

The public was glad of the opportunity to meet with captains of industry and captains of labor, in the Industrial Conference called by President Wilson to meet in Washington, October 6, 1919. It was the first of the kind. The great steel strike was on at this time, and passions were aroused. The public group had little opportunity in this Conference, which was presided over by Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, representing this group. He stated practically the same principle as Garfield. He declared that "Increase in the wage rate does not always give relief. The more productive we are, the sooner we shall replace the wastage of war, return to normal price levels and abolish the opportunity of profiteering." But the conference was dashed to pieces on the rocks of selfishness of the industrial and labor groups.

It is always thus. And it is doubtful whether the principle of the right to strike announced by Judge George W. Anderson,⁸ of the federal bench in Boston, is as sound as it may appear at first sight. For in almost all instances it is the great unorganized public that suffers, while the labor

⁸ Opinion in the deportation of aliens cases, June 23, 1920.

leaders and the industrial leaders continue to bleed this public. Says one writer touching this matter of the relations of the two selfish groups toward the public:

Labor unions and manufacturers' associations are morally on a par. Both are recruited by a changing personnel concerned about "getting on."⁹

The public is coming to understand this unity of purpose on the part of these two groups, so well concealed under the cloak of a savage warfare in too many instances; and it is one of the items charged by the public sternly against the Wilson Administration from the time President Wilson undertook, as a personal policy, to favor strongly organized voters, while ignoring the general public and workers in more important positions at a greatly less salary or wage. The insolence of wealth may deserve all the anathemas hurled against it; but the relentlessness of the autocracy of organized labor cannot escape the scathing it is receiving from the great American public now arousing itself to the real situation. If the Administration has innocently brought this about, it should be so recorded as a matter of historical significance.

During the spring of 1920, the cost of materials and of labor was so exorbitant that building operations were practically at a standstill. At that time builders would not assure any prospective building patron that material could be obtained, and owing to the uncertainty of the labor situation some would contract to erect houses only on the cost-plus plan—an adaptation of the plan upon which the Administration operated during the war period. But it did not work. The people were better economists than the National Administration. And while the situation was eased as to material by July 1, there was no change in the labor situation. Soon there was a shortage of houses in the United States estimated at a million.

⁹ H. M. Kallen, "The League of Nations," pp. 168-169, Marshall Jones Company, Boston, 1919.

Nor did the condition greatly change in the spring of 1921. It was only after the Railroad Labor Board rendered its decision, effective July 1, materially reducing wages on the railroads, that labor was forced to confess that it could not remain the only favored class in the country. Though late in the season to begin building operations, there was a very perceptible increase in activities in July.

Autocracy of labor controlling the Government and ruling the people means unfree labor and enforced subserviency of a helpless public. America must be kept free. The people are determined it shall be. The unwarranted threat of a strike October 30, 1921, on the part of railroad employes was so heartily disapproved by the public as a strike against the public rather than against the railroads, that its failure was foredoomed.

CHAPTER V

SHIPBUILDING

Here are some of the familiar sayings uttered during the war:—

President Wilson: "Food and other supplies must be carried across the seas, no matter how many ships are sent to the bottom."

Edward N. Hurley of the United States Shipping Board: "The whole war depends upon ships—ships depend upon labor, and labor depends upon the ability of this board, through an adequate reserve, to supply the yards."

David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Great Britain: "The road of victory, the guarantee of victory, the absolute assurance of victory, has to be found in one word, ships, and a second word, ships, and a third word, ships."

"The collapse of Russia and the reverses to Italy make it even more imperative that the United States send as many troops as possible across the Atlantic as early as possible."

The Shipping Board made its promises and statements to the country extravagant enough to appeal to one of America's most fundamental characteristics—a spirit of boastfulness that likes to believe in its own ability to accomplish anything that can be accomplished by man. The Shipping Board said, "We will build ships." America said: "Of course we will build ships." The Shipping Board said: "We will span the ocean with ships; we will carry grain and munitions and men to Europe over this bridge of ships, and not over a bridge of sighs." America said: "We will span the seas; we will carry grain and munitions and men to Europe over this bridge; we will send the pirates to the

bottom of the ocean; we will back our Allies to the last dollar." But the bridge of ships became a bridge of sighs.¹

To any one knowing the real situation which was developing, the game played by the chairman of the Shipping Board and his associates during the last half of 1917 and early part of 1918 was a staggering commentary on the power of publicity upon the people when administered through the governmental agencies of that day. It was also a somewhat disquieting commentary upon the intelligence of American public opinion, except for the fact that America had no standard by which to judge the propaganda put out by the Administration.

Long before America entered upon the armed conflict of the world, it was a recognized truth that the issue would be determined by the world's shipping. When it became an acknowledged reality that the ruthless destruction advocated as a policy by the German naval leader Tirpitz had become the policy of his government, then the world understood. America then understood.

Accordingly, by virtue of the Act of September 7, 1916, the United States Shipping Board was created and it, in turn, created the Fleet Corporation. And as a consequence, America went into shipbuilding as no other nation had ever previously gone into the business.

But it was put aside for so long a time, that when the crisis came, affairs came to be a muddle and efforts had to be redoubled to straighten them out, at a very great expenditure.

The upshot of the matter, however, shows that when America was aroused and set her shoulder to the wheel, she was capable of bringing to pass things hardly conceivable; that a prodigious program could be executed, even under the handicap of previous neglect and incapable management.

¹ *War Weekly*.

This chapter will seek to set out some of the things that should become a matter of permanent record for the general reader.

In April, 1917, when war was declared by the United States, there were in the thirty-seven steel shipyards of the country only 162 launching ways. In June, 1918, there were 398 ways so designed as to permit the construction of steel ships, three-fourths of them on the Atlantic coast north of Norfolk, or on rivers directly tributary. Upon the operation of these depended the success of the nation's ship-building project for the purpose of prosecution of the Great War's aims—replacing the shipping which the Central Powers had been destroying at the rate of a million tons a month, and transporting to Europe food, soldiers, and war implements.

But at a time when prompt action was urgently needed, there arose an unfortunate and aggravating wrangle between Mr. Goethals and Mr. Denman, men holding official positions of equal authority, as to whether steel or wooden ships should be built under the circumstances, including the great need of haste then demanded. Wooden ships, at first decided upon, were later discarded in favor of steel, for which Mr. Goethals contended from the first.

The urgent need of united, prompt, and efficient action at this time was indicated by the wholesale destruction of shipping by the submarines of the enemy countries. At the beginning of the Great War, the total tonnage of the merchant marine of the Allies and neutral powers was approximately 40,050,000. Of this, some 21,404,000 tons were destroyed, and the destruction was at an appalling rate when the Allies were not ready to replace it with new ships; this was what made it look, at one time, as if the toll of shipping which the enemy U-boats were taking would settle the war by starving the Entente Powers into submission before the United States could furnish sufficient ships to replace the excessive losses. But when the ravages of

the under-sea enemy boats were slackened, there was a breathing space during which this country had opportunity to retrieve, in a measure, its past errors.

But while more than half of the Allies' shipping was going to the bottom of the sea, it was replaced by two-thirds of the amount destroyed, or 14,270,000 tons of new shipping, besides 3,795,000 tons of enemy shipping seized. How much new shipping was constructed by the enemy is not known.

An error made by the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation in the beginning of its existence was the policy of not using to the full the shipbuilding facilities which then existed in the country and expanding them to the limit. Instead, it constructed many and expensive and extensive new yards, some of which were located in mere swamps. This policy not only delayed the start in the construction of new ships, but it rendered less simple the problems of labor and management—most important factors at a time when the enemy was destroying 1,000,000 tons of ships a month.

A man in the person of Edward N. Hurley, who was not a shipbuilder and who had had no experience in shipping matters, was placed at the head of the Shipping Board. As if this were not bad enough, he persistently ignored the advice of practical shipping men and began making the country the most extravagant promises, so that he led the people to forget that there was any submarine menace. Before he had been in office many weeks, the country was told that something like 10,000,000 tons had been contracted for. His press agents made the most of this promise to convince the country that this amount of tonnage was to be expected in 1918. Later the figure was reduced to 8,000,000, then to 6,000,000. Real shipbuilders warned the chairman against his unfounded promises, and urged him to save wrecking the facilities that already existed, since his policy was merely disturbing normal production without

enlarging it, while it was hopelessly congesting transportation facilities. But the warnings went unheeded, men who had spent their lives in shipbuilding were cast aside, and Mr. Hurley's press agents filled the newspapers with promises which led the public to believe that a thousand or more ships would be available for transportation of troops and supplies during 1918, of which number two hundred would be turned out at Hog Island yard alone.

This method of misleading the people continued throughout the fall and winter of 1917-1918. And when the promises were not fulfilled, Mr. Hurley pleaded rail congestion, the most severe winter known and the labor situation, and at length, no longer able to hold back the demands of the country, he, directly or indirectly, laid the blame upon the shipbuilders, and in an address at South Bend, Indiana, middle of July, 1918, he named 3,000,000 tons, merely adding that Mr. Schwab "believes 3,000,000 tons can be exceeded."

The situation became acute by the early spring of 1918. On March 26, just five days after the tremendous drive of the enemy began and within a few days of a year after we had entered the conflict, Mr. Hurley, in an address in New York before the National Marine League of the United States stated that all of the shipyards of the country were full when the Shipping Board took them over, and added:

It is only recently that America awoke to the vital needs of ships at a belated hour. At a belated hour came the realization that constant supplies must go to our boys already on the fighting line. At a belated hour came the realization that without ships we can neither keep up the line of supply nor get our new armies to the front. We are faced with the necessity of creating an entirely new industry. We had to undertake a job that would have daunted anyone but America.

And his hearers knew that had the Shipping Board kept hands off, the ships then filling the yards would have slipped

off the ways a good deal sooner than they did. And the real shipbuilders of the country knew that the statements of the chairman were not based upon fact. The truth is, he was an amateur and easily accepted proposals of men who had nothing to lose by experimenting.

Secretary of War Baker's serious error of judgment may have had something to do with the bad shipbuilding situation in January, 1918, when seventy 8,000-ton troop-ships were under construction. Believing that the war would be won without sending a large army to Europe, he changed the order for these vessels to cargo carriers, causing serious delay. Then when the great March German offensive showed the necessity for sending help quickly, the order for transports was renewed. And yet later it was again changed to cargo carriers.

But though the plans of the Shipping Board may have been slightly interrupted by this wavering attitude of Mr. Baker, it was not sufficient warrant for the propaganda so vigorously put out by the Board to deceive the public, by taking credit for seized and commandeered vessels, as if they were ships constructed by the Shipping Board and added that much to what the country could not have had otherwise.

But while the American public was being fed on false propaganda as to the amount of shipping that could be put out by the Shipping Board, the British admiralty was in possession of something akin to the truth. Sir Eric Geddes, first lord of the admiralty, in discussing the submarine menace before the House of Commons on March 5, 1918, said, among other things: "Despite glowing reports in the American press, there is no doubt that a considerable time must elapse before the desired output is obtained."

The Shipping Board had actually built and placed in foreign service up to and including March 22, 1918, two vessels aggregating 17,600 dead-weight tons. And this

contribution to the world's supply of shipping in the months when it was needed by the million tons a month represented, according to the British admiralty's somewhat cryptic reports of the day, the amount that was being destroyed every eight hours by the submarines for the eighteen months just previous.

In brief, notwithstanding the promises of what might have been success had the war lasted long enough, America's shipbuilding program was a failure. But the situation was so obscured by misleading propaganda, as were the failures in other important war branches of the government, that the public did not sense what was going on. It had no standard of measurement.

And this system of camouflaging was so thorough in its operation that Congress was no better informed than the general public. Nor was this latter fact known until it came out in a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce in March, 1918, when Harris D. H. Connick, vice-president of the American International Corporation, which was responsible for the Hog Island yard, the most extensive of them all, was called before the committee. It was his testimony that disillusioned the country. It ran in this fashion:

SENATOR NELSON: When will we get the first ships? How soon will we get any on the water, so we can use them?

MR. CONNICK: You are going to get twenty-five A ships the first of October, or, say, the first of November.

SENATOR NELSON: Those are the first we will get?

MR. CONNICK: Those are the first you will get.

SENATOR NELSON: And that will not be until next October?

MR. CONNICK: That will be next October. You get your twenty-five B ships in the middle of December. It will be over seven months then before we can get any ships out of those ways. We have to build the yard and then build the ships.

SENATOR NELSON: It will be over seven months before we can get any of these ships?

MR. CONNICK: Yes, sir; I would say up to that date.

SENATOR NELSON: And then we may get as many as twenty-five?

MR. CONNICK: You will get fifty.

SENATOR NELSON: Within seven months?

MR. CONNICK: I will count up. (After making calculation.) It is going to be about eight months before you can get your first twenty-five ships, and it is going to be about nine and one-half months before you get your next twenty-five ships. We can not get them by October. In eight months you are going to get about twenty-seven or twenty-eight, and then you are going to get the fifty ships in the next six weeks.

And after that they come very fast. You are going to have fifty-nine ships—that is, if the material and the labor functions as it has done before—by the first of April; you will have your fifty small ships and your seventy big ships by the middle of July—that is, if we get the material and everything comes along the way it is supposed to come. We see no reason now why it should not do so.

SENATOR NELSON: The main thing I am interested in—what are we going to get soon—this year?

MR. CONNICK: All you can expect are those fifty ships this year.

SENATOR NELSON: And we will not get any until next winter?

MR. CONNICK: That is right, you will not get any ships until next winter; no, sir; not one.

SENATOR HARDING: We are not getting many ships this year at all except commandeered ships that have been completed?

MR. CONNICK: I do not know what the Shipping Board is doing at other yards.

SENATOR NELSON: Not over ten outside of the commandeered ships.

SENATOR HARDING: That is what I say—all of our ships put into service will be the requisitioned ships, English and Norwegian ships, which are built here in the yards, the biggest share being English ships.²

And this was the most optimistic statement of the situation that could be offered. That it was disheartening to that real veteran of heroic mould, Senator Nelson, is evident from his form of questioning.

² *War Weekly*.

When hostilities had ceased and the country was no longer fearful of permitting the light to shine in, various investigations were started to let the public know who was at fault in the serious delays and great waste that grew out of the perilous situation in which the country was found when the war was upon it. And then it developed how accurate had been the outlining of the situation by Mr. Connick.

In speaking to one such resolution adopted by the Senate on November 22, 1918, Senator Harding severely criticized the shipping situation. Three great fabricating shipbuilding plants had been built by the government to save the nation from the ravages of the enemy submarines. Of these, to the end of 1918, the total output was four ships. One plant which was to have delivered 124, delivered one; while another which was to have delivered 24, failed to deliver even one.

It was frequently asked why the government during the crisis such as the world then saw often selected the wrong man for an important position. For the man selected is the heart of the program. Every problem is a problem of personnel. It appeared to be the politics that was at the bottom of it.

The Administration discarded men of practical shipping experience, though it would have seemed to appeal to the ordinary intelligence that that was a most essential qualification, for a man serving in so important a position at a crucial time. There was no argument whatever for making up a shipping board of non-shipping members except the argument of prejudice. What was needed was a shipping board to centralize shipbuilding and ship-operating in the hands of a federal agency and to control rates and prices and to enter into arrangements with similar agencies in the Allied countries. American shipping men were the first to recognize this necessity.

The conspicuous failure of the non-shipping board was

on the score of general policies. The board had, for the last half of 1917 and early in 1918, definitely starved the existing ship facilities of the country at the expense of new units which were its own creation. It had fostered competition in the labor market, established immense new yards in the vicinity of old yards, diverted materials to the new yards, and at the same time failed to come to proper financial agreements with the old yards, thus making it difficult or even impossible for them to hurry the work.

But by mid-summer of 1918, with Charles M. Schwab as director-general of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the Administration appeared to get a grip on the labor situation and to prevent the labor turn-over which had been disastrous to shipbuilding and every other war energy at a crucial period in war time.

*The main results of the Administration's shipbuilding policy were, first, less tonnage was launched in America during the last six months of 1917 and early 1918 than would have been launched if the Shipping Board had not been in existence; second, the new units, children of the Shipping Board, were just getting ready to build ships when hostilities ceased, and had proved to be the prime profiteers of the war. Hog Island became a synonym of profiteering.

After hostilities ceased, there appeared to persist the same lack of policy. There appeared to be no reason why shipping men, whose ships had been taken over by the government during the war emergency, should not have their ships returned to them. They went to Washington to ascertain what they might expect. Mr. Hurley had gone to Europe, no one in Washington seemed to be authorized to speak on the matter.

The purpose of the government to place at the disposal of all the forces opposing Germany's raid upon the cause of civilization was nowhere manifested more clearly than in prodigious plans for shipbuilding—such a large scheme of shipbuilding as the world had never before seen

or contemplated. In such enormous, almost inconceivably large, undertakings much must be allowed for errors in the human factor. The American people have always been generous in their estimate of what is accomplished in relation to what is undertaken, whether in war or in peace, but particularly in time of war.

Yet so ample had been the warning given to the American Administration that the United States was almost certain at any moment to be thrust headlong into the war, that the apparent indifference upon the part of the Administration to making adequate preparation for the inevitable conflict will always stand as a stigma upon America's fair name and upon her record for efficiency and energy. Had war been thrust upon America in a manner in which it was thrust upon France and Belgium and Great Britain, there would have been excuse for almost any deficiency in administrative processes. But two years and a half of the terrible conflagration in Europe appeared to be no warning to the national Administration in America. Apologists for the Administration have been quick, when burning criticism was heaped upon Mr. Wilson's failure of accomplishment, to call attention to the blunders of the European Allies, as if they had had as ample warning to prepare for the conflict as America had. The two cases are in no respect parallel or even approaching a parallel.

As a consequence of the tremendous scope of the government's plan for shipbuilding, in the great effort to rush everything at top speed, there were failures that were so inexcusable that they must be set down in history as against American efficiency, though as a matter of fact it was simply administrative incompetency. It was in view of these facts that Senator Calder, about two months after the close of the armed conflict, called attention to the deplorable failure that was unfolded to the American public after the armistice was signed. Aggravating as were these failures, there was no one on the Democratic side of the Senate chamber

capable of or willing even to attempt a defense of Mr. Hurley, except Senator Fletcher of Florida. It was shown that virtually all the shipping that Mr. Hurley advertised as his own accomplishment was laid down in private yards, on private order, and was taken over by the Shipping Board and completed by virtue of the President's order commandeering all shipping.

Leaving out of consideration altogether the gross waste of the people's money in construction of yards and ships, and discussing merely the results from this, the principal part of Mr. Hurley's endeavor, Senator Calder gave this résumé:

Complete failure to deliver ships in time to be of actual use in the war program. Ninety-three were promised, none was delivered.

Failure to the extent of 87 per cent in the number of ships launched. 164 were promised, 22 were launched.

Failure to the extent of 57 per cent in the number of ships placed in construction. 249 were promised, 107 were laid down.

Failure to the extent of 66 per cent in the amount of steel erected and of 74 per cent in the number of rivets driven.

The supply of steel from the mills was nearly up to scheduled requirements and much in excess of the quantity actually used in construction.

The supply of fabricated steel was 35 per cent short of estimated requirements, but always exceeded the actual requirements of the shipbuilders by many thousands of tons.

Senator Harding in a statement on the floor of the Senate in November, 1918, said:

No matter what the policy of the government may be in the future, and no matter how earnestly we all favor the construction of the largest merchant marine in the world, it is inconceivable that the government will go on appropriating money for ship construction at the present rate, which is from four to six times the normal cost.

The shipbuilding costs became so notorious, during the war emergency, as to threaten to become a national scandal.

In the case of a well-managed yard on the Pacific coast in which the number of men increased threefold in a little over a year, a comparison of wages and output with corresponding items of two years before revealed the fact that before the signing of the armistice wages had advanced seventy per cent of the former output. The result was a labor cost 2.4 times that of two years previous. In the case of two well-managed yards on the Atlantic coast the results in the one were: Labor advance, 120 per cent; output, 80 per cent; resulting labor cost, two and three-quarters times that of the former period. In the other, labor advance, 100 per cent; output, 66 2/3 per cent; resulting labor cost, three times that of two years ago.³

In defending the item of \$660,000,000 for the Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation in the sundry civil appropriation bill, Representative Shirley, chairman of the Appropriation Committee, stated on the floor of the House near the end of February, 1919, that while the investment of the completed shipping program would be nearly \$4,000,000,000, the actual value of the ships would not exceed \$2,000,000,000. And he stated:

That there has been great extravagance and waste in many particulars, I haven't the slightest doubt. . . . The only justification was the great need for many ships at a period when it was feared the war would be lost without them.

We authorized the expenditure altogether of \$3,900,000,000 for the ship construction. Of this \$2,800,000,000 was for building ships ourselves, \$515,000,000 payment for requisitioned ships, \$55,000,000 was for yards, \$75,000,000 was for housing at shipyards.

Notwithstanding these dismal failures, whose lesson should not be lost on the future, America planned in the large; and had the war continued another year, her great weight could not have failed to impress itself with irresist-

³ *North American Review*, March, 1919.

ible power. Despite all efforts, the deadly problem of the submarine remained until after this nation began its ample shipbuilding operations.

And the stupendous shipbuilding project of America grew into reality. Hog Island, the greatest plant of the kind in the world, rose like magic where there had been but a desolate swamp. The German leaders discerned the sign, and were convinced that this nation was at length in the war whole-heartedly, and that America's productive power had doomed the mightiest weapon of Prussianism on sea. This gigantic enterprise put fear into the heart of autocracy. The evidence that this country would be able eventually to launch a great ocean steamship every forty-eight hours was as much an inspiration to America as it was a shock to their enemies.

It was on the first Sunday in May, 1918, that the 5500-ton collier "Tuckahoe" went into the waters of the Delaware at Camden, New Jersey. The launching of this boat formed the front-page stories for the newspapers of America and lines for the bulletins of London and Paris and probably interesting news for the consideration of royal eyes in Germany.

This ship was built in twenty-seven days, and never before in all shipbuilding history had a ship of its size been done in that time, virtually a complete vessel in every detail, 330 feet long and 50 feet beam. On May 15, it steamed out of the yards of the New York Shipbuilding Corporation at Camden, ready to take her place in smiting the German pirates.

On the same day, a few miles down the Delaware, there was a double launching at the shipbuilding yards at Chester, Pennsylvania. And from that time on the country was thrilled by the frequent reports given to the public on what was being done on shipbuilding, sometimes true, unfortunately often untrue.

Yet the general trend was in the right direction. It

was not until the middle of 1918 that the country was getting its swing in the shipbuilding operations.

By August 1, 1918, America's great chain of shipbuilding plants was approaching completion. At that time there were 118 fully-equipped yards in the United States and 44 others partly completed. Many of these were built from the ground up, while others were enlarged to so great an extent as to make them practically new plants. One of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation was authorized to add ten new ways at a cost of \$20,000,000, and three more to the same company's yards at another point. The New York Shipbuilding Corporation at Camden, New Jersey, was at that time building five new ways at a cost of \$7,000,000. Of the 118 completed, the Pacific coast had 48, the Atlantic 38, the Great Lakes 16, the Gulf of Mexico 16.

Then came such a rapid succession of broken records in the shipbuilding line as had never been known in all shipbuilding history. On July 25, 1918, Secretary Daniels announced the breaking of the record in shipbuilding at the Mare Island navy yard, California, in these words: "Before the war from 20 to 24 months were required to complete a destroyer. The keel of the "Ward" was laid at 7:30 a. m. on May 15. The vessel was launched at 8:30 p. m. June 1—seventeen and one-half days after her keel was laid. She was put into commission July 24—seventy days after the laying of her keel."

And while men had been pinning steel-plates together for a generation with pneumatic hammers, one who could average more than sixty rivets an hour was a first-rate riveter. But by mid-summer, 1918, there were riveters on the shipbuilding job who could drive 400 rivets an hour and exceed it.

In the early autumn of 1918, building had made so great strides in the United States that the country was then the greatest shipbuilding country in the world, having

leaped from third to first place in a little over a year. At that time the number of ships under our flag was 2,185, with a total dead-weight tonnage of 9,511,915, and there were over 200 yards engaged in construction work, with 1,020 ways.

✱ In the building of her merchant fleet, America was planning first of all, to win the war; after that her purpose was to overcome her own neglect in providing ocean transportation for her own trade.

The outlook of the American merchant fleet as it stood in the first month of 1919, was as follows: Steamers now owned by the United States, 3,000,000 tons; steamers under construction for the United States, 6,000,000 tons; steamers owned by private individuals, 3,000,000 tons; a total of twelve million tons dead-weight.

April 29, 1919, Mr. Hurley, chairman of the United States Shipping Board, announced the cancellation of 2,000,000 tons more of shipping contracts, making a total to that time of 5,500,000 tons.

The low estate to which our merchant marine had fallen prior to the Great War is common knowledge. Americans should feel a blush of shame when they realize that in the golden days before the Civil War 80 per cent of our commerce was carried in American bottoms, and that prior to the outbreak of war in 1914 only 9 per cent of our exports and imports were carried under the American flag. But twelve million tons of ships is another picture.

In the opinion of competent and impartial commentators, there were two achievements of this country during the war that surpassed all others. One was the rapid and orderly registration of 10,000,000 men for military service, under a law which was a complete innovation in American history followed by another of 14,000,000; the other was the sending of more than 2,000,000 troops to Europe within a few months, an unequalled feat in transportation.

Of the 2,079,880 men taken over up to mid-December,

more than 1,000,000 were carried on British ships, which were diverted to that undertaking from the vital work of conveying food.

The performances wrought a decisive effect upon the world's history at one of its great critical junctures. Credit for this movement is assigned in large measure to the Allies, to the British in particular, since approximately half of the troops were carried in their ships. But of the cargo of 5,153,000 tons, less than 5 per cent was carried by Allied ships. Of all the cargo shipped, only 79,000 tons were lost at sea.

Just prior to the middle of December, 1918, the Navy Department gave out the statement that of the men in the army transported from America to France, forty-six and one-fourth per cent were carried in American ships, forty-eight and one-half in British, the balance in French and Italian vessels. Of the total strength of the naval escort, the United States furnished eighty-two and three-fourths per cent, Great Britain fourteen and one-eighth per cent and France three and one-eighth per cent.

It gave the people a rude shock to be informed that most of the transports used to carry America's soldiers were furnished by other nations.

Developments by investigations of wastefulness, profiteering and fraud in connection with shipbuilding, after the close of the war, pointed to the fact that the government should not engage in business that properly belongs to private enterprise.

Socialism must not be permitted to throttle the best there is in American initiative. The capacity is in the average American. Yet, at the end of June, 1921, the government was seeking to dispose of \$300,000,000 worth of shipping and to eliminate the shipping board's monthly deficit of \$16,000,000 for operating purposes.

CHAPTER VI

GOVERNMENT RAILROADING

When, a few decades ago, a Senator on the floor of the United States Senate made the famous motion that, "If the Pennsylvania Railroad Company has no further business to come before this body, I move that the Senate do now adjourn," or words of similar purport, even when spoken ironically, it was implied that the people had at that time come to believe that arrogance and gratuitous assumptions were manifesting themselves on the part of the railroad companies in operating a public utility under a public franchise. It was this intolerable arrogance and these unwarranted assumptions that drove the people to compel Congress during the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth century to adopt regulative measures which became steadily more drastic, despite the strenuous and continuous resistance on the part of the corporations. And some of the States adopted regulations even more severe.

This regulative process became cumulative in volume. So onerous were the resulting restrictions that the roads were hampered in obtaining credits necessary for extensions and improvements. Then came the war with its extraordinary demands, the railroads were found inadequately equipped, the transportation system was unable to bear the strain, and the whole life of the nation was threatened with disorganization. It was at this point that the government stepped in and took over the country's transportation system.

This control began December 28, 1917, and ended February 29, 1920, with a modified control six months

longer. When the federal Administration assumed operation of the railroads, President Wilson announced that it was done for three chief reasons: To enable them to handle more traffic, to save the companies from bankruptcy and thereby prevent a national financial catastrophe, and to solve the railroad labor problem. The claim made by advocates of government operation was that under that policy the railways would be able to handle more traffic and to handle it better than under private operation, that the system would be operated more economically, and that under it labor would be treated better.

William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, was appointed by the President the Director-General of Railroads, a position which placed him in possession of a power never surpassed by that of any manager of any industry, governmental or private, in all the world. One of the most forceful, aggressive and daring of men, Mr. McAdoo, with astonishing dash and thoroughness, proceeded in masterful fashion to administer the operation of the various transportation systems of the country, upon a plan favored by advocates of government operation by first of all unifying operation of the complication of systems.

Not only the railway systems were involved in this control. Besides the 397,014 miles of railroad controlled by 2,907 companies and employing 1,700,814 persons, he swayed with a free hand steamship lines engaged in coast-wise transportation and navigating an inland waterways system which included fifty-seven canals aggregating 3,057 miles, as well as many thousands of miles of navigable rivers, lakes, bays, sounds and inlets. And it was with practically unanimous approval that the public greeted the President's announcement that the government would take over the operation of the country's transportation system. The readiness of all parties for expected results—the labor men and the general public—was evident in the desire to

waive all special preferences in a genuine purpose to cooperate for the common good and for the winning of the war. The public saw the government take over all these systems of transportation and advance almost immediately carrying charges from 25 to 50 per cent, a right which the interstate commerce commission had emphatically refused the companies.

And it was freely stated by Administration officials that from the very beginning Mr. McAdoo had to contend with a practically broken-down transportation system, that the government caught and saved the wreck just as it was slipping over the brink, and that he then had to contend immediately with the worst winter ever known to transportation circles, causing one of the worst freight blockades in eastern territory, with New York City as a center, ever known, with a resulting unparalleled transportation tangle.

Mr. McAdoo declared his policy to be "to humanize the railways and negative the idea that corporations have no souls." He stated succinctly his purposes to be: First, the winning of the war; second, service to the public at the lowest cost consistent with the payment of fair wages to railroad employes and the maintenance of the transportation system as a self-supporting, rather than a money-making, agency. In his report to the President after seven months of government operation he stated that under government control the highest salaries, ranging from \$40,000 to \$50,000 per annum, were paid to regional directors whose responsibilities were far greater than those of the railroad presidents who had been receiving as high as \$100,000; and that the 2,325 officers receiving salaries of \$5,000 and over, aggregating \$21,320,187 yearly, were reduced in number to 1,925, with an aggregate of salaries reduced by \$4,814,889. This was after he had performed one of the most spectacular acts of his administration in dismissing, in the spring of 1918, the presidents of all the large lines

of railroad. Whatever had been the salaries of some of the men dismissed, as President Ripley of the Santa Fe, no sum equaled his value to the road in its upbuilding, his constructive genius taking the road from the clutches of bankruptcy and making a property worth three-quarters of a billion, earning seven per cent annually, and at the same time winning popular support which is only too likely to be hostile to railroads. But Mr. McAdoo was at the head of all the nation's rail systems as a part-time employment and without compensation—and he resigned.

The Administration made large claims in efficiency and expedition in transportation after the passing of the exasperating situation which developed from the congestion of traffic immediately after the government took control. It deserves credit for many suggestions which railroads could, and in some instances did, profitably adopt, both for their own benefit and to the advantage of the public. A poster that became an old familiar friend of everyone about railroad stations and that was well known to all travellers contained many valuable suggestions. It appeared in 1918 in this form:

SAVE A CAR A DAY AND HELP WIN THE WAR

Transportation is a vital necessity and may be the deciding factor.

1. Avoid Congestion.
2. Unload Cars Promptly.
3. Order Only What Cars Can Be Loaded Promptly.
4. Load to Capacity.
5. If Loads Are Light, Load to Cubic Capacity.
6. Ship Direct.
7. Give Shipping Directions in Time to Bill Same Day as Loaded.
8. Avoid Shipping "To Order."

We loaded one million, four hundred fifty-five thousand, three hundred eighty-one (1,455,381) cars in 1917. A saving of half a car a day would equal seven hundred twenty-seven thousand, six hundred ninety car-days, equal to the continuous use of two thousand

cars, and two thousand cars would handle fifty thousand additional car-loads in the same period.

Few additional cars can be obtained. There is more freight to transport. Therefore we must

"DO MORE WITH LESS"

If the commerce of the country is to be moved

YOU MUST HELP.

This was suggestive of methods at all times urged by the government during its control of the railroads. But the autocratic powers which the Director-General exercised should have been entirely effective. His first great administrative act was to sweep away all barriers that savored of competition and to unite all lines into one harmonious whole. By one wave of the magic wand, the law against pooling, theretofore looked upon as the very palladium of the liberties of the people, was cast into the discard; the whole structure of orders and decisions, so industriously erected through the years for the regulation of railroads, was thrown to the winds. After seven months of government operation, he estimated that the elimination of soliciting freight traffic and of exploitation of passenger routes had effected a saving of \$23,566,633. For the saving of time and energy, all freight was routed most directly, regardless of the roads that were to carry it.

At the same time there were given to the public reports of great improvement in freight movement, of cars in supply abundant.¹ For the two-month period of June-July the director of the Allegheny region reported conditions fair and improving, with no congestion, since business to the larger industrial centers and for export *were governed by*

¹The Georgia Fruit Exchange of Atlanta reported that it was about to complete, in the first week in August, 1918, the movement of the largest crop of peaches ever shipped from that or any other state, the largest single day's shipment being 600 cars, and a total to July 17 of 7,432 cars. Similar reports were coming from the West Virginia coal shippers and the Pacific Coast lumbermen.

permits; and that the car supply had been met, with 64,187 cars of anthracite coal loaded in June, as against 59,008 a year earlier; and 191,767 of bituminous, an increase of 22,781 over June, 1917, with a similar increase in July; and that the coal dumped at tidewater was increased by 223,537 tons in June and by 444,916 in July.

And as young men were being drafted for military service, the Railroad Administration opened schools for the training of women to take their places as ticket-sellers. But when complaints began to reach him in August of a lack of courtesy upon the part of the employes that was unknown under private operation, Director-General McAdoo issued strict orders requiring the utmost courtesy at all times. In that connection he invited attention to the increase of operating expenses of over \$475,000,000 per annum because of increased pay.

When the much-heralded efficiency of government operation of railroads is written sight should not be lost of the fact that there was never known in railroad history in the United States such centralization of authority as was possessed by the Director-General. To this the people did not object; but they felt that by virtue thereof they had the right to expect correspondingly better results. Not once did the public feel aggrieved over accomplishment, even in the most direct and drastic form. On the contrary, they approved when it brought results which they knew to be essential to success in the conflict across the seas. Passenger and sleeping-car service were severely curtailed in order to produce speed results in getting food to its destination, in the transcontinental movement of lumber for ship-building,² and in hastening the shipment of munitions material.

²It was no unusual matter along northern routes of transcontinental travel to see residents gazing in amazement at double-headers pulling trains of great length that dashed through their towns loaded with lumber or grain with the speed of limited passenger trains.

To this end every known means was brought into play. Waste was brought to a minimum, but through regulations that cannot govern in the free play of competition. Yet it seemed like good sense to which Director-General McAdoo gave expression in his testimony before the interstate commerce committee of the Senate in January, 1919, when he declared for heavy loading of cars, pooling of repair-shops, unification of terminals, consolidation of ticket-offices, universal mileage tickets, uniform rate classification, high demurrage rates, way-billing of freight from point of origin to destination, and the utilization of water routes for the relief of crowded rail lines. There is probably no civilized nation in the world with so little appreciation of the value of its water means of transportation as the United States.

Though the Administration sought to discourage passenger traffic in order to speed the transportation of war materials and increased passenger fares 50 per cent, passenger traffic during the first calendar year of the war increased 16 per cent. And for the first nine months of 1918, the number of persons carried one mile totalled 32,586,390,878 as compared with 28,513,155,775 passenger-miles for the corresponding period of 1917, a figure largely increased by the soldiers and sailors, as well as very many others carried incident to the war. In August, 1918, the Railroad Administration stated that over 5,000,000 soldiers had been transported on American railroads in fourteen months—half of which time they were under government control. In the district west of the Mississippi the elimination of passenger-train mileage totalled 2,000,000 a year, with further reduction to be made; while in the section east of the Mississippi the elimination aggregated 26,420,000.

Mr. McAdoo was a man of very real accomplishment. Bold, energetic, courageous, he was undismayed in grappling with the largest problems of administration, whether

Liberty Loans or railroads. And his leaving the government service was a distinct loss to the country, the removal of a chief pillar of the Administration.

And yet, what became the general practice of the Wilson Administration of taking credit for accomplishment that did not belong to it, serving to the people in their homes news that was not fact, crept into Mr. McAdoo's department. Later developments led the country to ask whether government railroading was the success people had been led to believe it was. That it should have been was plain. The method was direct. Redtape was cut to bits. The power vested in the Director-General was autocratic. Procedure was aptly described in this fashion by a leading weekly:

Under government control, the Secretary of the Treasury merely dropped in on the Director-General of Railroads, handed out a cigar and a new story, mentioned casually that he would like a billion to meet railroad bills, and walked out with the increased-rate order in his pocket.³

But in time the people were disillusioned. They came to see the real accomplishment in railroading by the government. The Administration had taken over stations, shops, rolling stock, rights of way, rails—all of which had been built up through long years of arduous effort by private enterprise. And when, in January, 1919, Mr. McAdoo was giving his testimony before the Senate committee in favor of continued government operation, Edmond Pennington, president of the Soo system, was asking this pertinent question:

We hear much from the news bureau of the Administration. . . . The talk of economy has not been backed by a single set of figures. I should like to know where the money is coming from to meet the tremendous overhead expenses of the railway administration and the cost of the expensive office force maintained by the Director-General.

³ *Leslie's Weekly*, June 22, 1918.

Within ten days after the adverse elections in the fall of 1918, Mr. McAdoo resigned as Director-General of Railroads and as Secretary of the Treasury. This came as a real surprise to the public. Various reasons were assigned for his action, such as that he had differed with the President over the latter's partisan appeal to the country immediately preceding the election, that he had urged against the President's contemplated trip to Europe, and that he himself had designs upon the presidential nomination in 1920. The reason he gave was that his salary was insufficient. It was not publicly announced that the mountains of debt piling up in government operation of the railroads had anything to do with his resignation; yet there was a strong suspicion in the public mind that Mr. McAdoo did not care to shoulder the burden of the reaction that was sure to follow full knowledge of the situation of the railroads. Upon leaving office, he announced that the total sum advanced to December 31, 1918, by the United States Railroad Administration to all transportation lines under government control was \$689,034,759.

In a long and carefully prepared statement to the Senate committee on interstate commerce, in January, 1919, Mr. McAdoo asked Congress to permit government control for five years, instead of the twenty-one months authorized in the Control Act under which the government assumed control in the first instance. The reasons he gave were, chiefly, that the twenty-one months period was insufficient time to give the matter a fair test, that the war period had required methods that could have little application in time of peace, and that the months immediately following the war were certain to be so abnormal in conditions as to be practically worthless as a test.

This was the signal for the two sides to align their forces, one for government control, the other for private control. Unfortunately for the merits of the matter, Mr. McAdoo expressed his purpose of turning back the roads

at once to private control unless his wish as to the five-year plan were acquiesced in. For this threat brought forth a bill in Congress to prevent this action on the part of the Administration, action that would have tended to entail financial chaos upon the railroad world, if, indeed, it did not bring a financial crash upon the nation. This one stroke on his part unsettled the public's confidence in him as a public administrator.

The prompt action of Congress was probably hastened by a letter from President Wilson in Europe, addressed to Congress, in which he declared that the roads "will be handed over to their owners at the end of the calendar year."

Organized labor as a class had fared so well under Administration auspices that immediately after Mr. McAdoo's five-year proposal, the railroad brotherhoods throughout the country made a drive on Congress to force its adoption. Beginning the very week next after the McAdoo plan was submitted to Congress, a deluge of petitions, resolutions and individual letters began pouring in upon members of both branches of the national legislature. It grew to so great a volume that the Senate committee on interstate commerce began considering the advisability of investigating what source was responsible for this propaganda. There was a notable textual similarity in it all.⁴

On the other hand, at the same time the presidents of one hundred and twenty-five railroads, representing every large system in the country, with the single exception of the Southern Railroad, met in Philadelphia and drew up a list of proposals to submit to the Senate committee as the

⁴ These substantially uniform resolutions coming from all railroad centers of the country began in these words:

"Whereas, The public press is boldly circulating the news that the people want the roads back to private ownership; and,

"Whereas, We consider this to be an injustice, because private ownership has proved a failure in peace as well as in war, it being demonstrated to everybody's satisfaction by facts" . . .

recommendation of the railroads of the country. Among them were these:

1. Opposition to the McAdoo plan for a five-year extension of government control.
2. Refusal to accept a return of the roads in their present "scrambled" state brought about by the Administration.
3. Demand for thoroughgoing remedial legislation that will preserve all the good features of governmental control, with the inclusion of the benefits of private ownership.
4. Inauguration of some form of national control that will permit pooling of stations, ticket-offices, and equipment.
5. Rate revision upward to care for increase of expenses.
6. Combination of the rate-making power with the legislative control over railroads.
7. Removal of railroads from politics.

It was at this time that the Interstate Commerce Commission was taking a firm stand against government ownership or operation of railroads. In its statement to the same Senate committee, it said:

Considering and weighing as best we can all of the arguments for and against the different plans, we are led to the conviction that with the adoption of appropriate provisions and safeguards for regulation under private ownership, it would not be wise or best at this time to assume government ownership or operation of the railways of the country.

This, however, was no simple problem of two and two make four. There were subtractions, divisions, and multiplicity galore. Many diverse elements were involved—fairness to the companies, fairness to individuals, industrial justice, social justice, the destructive forces of radicalism then at work seeking to undermine the whole mighty industrial and governmental structure. To this last, the organized railroad men, wittingly or unwittingly, gave their influence.

And this last was a large factor in determining the problem. The matter of the increase of wages was brought to the front on all occasions. And as a final attempt the railroad unions placed themselves behind the Plumb Plan. The author of this scheme, Glenn E. Plumb, maintained palatial offices in Washington and was supplied with a large fund to care for all expenses. He proposed that the railroad management be placed in the hands of three parties to be equally represented: employes, officials, the public, under government ownership. It was thought the public was in a frame of mind to take the bait. But the public was sitting by and quietly noting events. It had observed attempts at Winnipeg to overcome the public through destroying the railroads; it had noted the desperate attempt to overthrow the Seattle government; it had its eyes on the steel and coal strikes and the defiance of the United States government itself. It was in no mood for further trifling on the part of radicalism, whether found in Administration circles, organized railroad employes, or elsewhere. Moreover, it was making up its mind to "be done with wiggle and wobble." It had its mind set upon steadiness of purpose and back to American tradition. It had seen the railroads manhandled and bedevilled to the limit of endurance, and was ready to demand their return to their owners and with new demands for improvements.

And it began to appear to the great public that the persistent demand of the railroad employes for an increase of wages out of all proportion to the demands of others who were receiving much smaller pay had some ulterior motive. The facts seemed to warrant the suspicion. The brotherhoods were insisting that they must be paid more to meet the increased cost of living. But such demands had been met under private management. In 1907 the average wage of the rail worker was \$641 per year, while in 1917 it was \$1,003, an increase of 56 per cent. This kept pace with the increased cost of living. But under government control,

the workers insisted that the pay was not keeping pace with living costs. In 1916 the payrolls of rail employes totalled \$1,470,000,000, which grew to \$1,739,000,000 in 1917, to \$2,500,000,000 in 1918 and to substantially \$3,000,000,000 in 1919, and, had the demands of the workers been yielded to, they would have received \$3,800,000,000 in 1920. At no time was the United States Railroad Administration free from controversy and threat of a strike to enforce a higher scale of wages, though the amount had to be made up out of the pockets of the people receiving less than half the pay of these organized men who had never lost any time or spent any money, as had teachers of the country and many others, in learning their business; but on the contrary were being paid while learning railroading.

When radicalism was asserting itself in mid-summer of 1919 among these organized railroad men, Director-General Hines, who had succeeded Mr. McAdoo as head of the Railroad Administration, reporting to the President on July 30, declared that a deadlock existed over the demands of the shopmen, and that the granting of their demands and of the others to follow involved another increase of \$800,000,000 a year, and at a time when the railroads were already piling up an enormous deficit every month.

President Wilson was ready with the simple expedient of loading the burden onto the already overburdened public; and the very next day asked Congress to create a body to determine all railroad wage questions. Congress as promptly rejected his suggestion upon the ground that he was already invested with full power to deal with the matter.

In all this controversy it is well to note that the President was now confronted with the growing fire which not only he lacked the courage to stamp into and extinguish in 1916, but which he at that time actually fanned into a blaze; that these demands were not the demands of the great public who had for months been beseeching the President

unavailing for relief or recognition; and that the organized labor of the railroads declared its purpose to enforce these demands upon the government and the public by a nation-wide strike that would compel the American people on their knees to beseech organized classism to spare them the agony of freezing and starvation.

For it was the Winnipeg experience to be repeated. Mr. Hines' report to President Wilson and the latter's appeal to Congress to be rid of a threatening matter at the very moment that he was preparing to give his undivided attention to laying his League-of-Nations scheme before the people, were followed immediately by the threatened railroad strike in August, 1919, jeopardizing transportation and the lives of the people in southern California, Nevada, and Arizona. And now Director-General Hines took a firm stand, such as Director-General McAdoo had taken in a similar crisis during the war, making it plain that no further mutiny against the United States would be tolerated. He gave warning that in those states he would undertake to restore complete railroad service at a specified hour and that all who did not return to work by that time would be out of a job; and that any one undertaking to interfere with or to impede the use of railroad property would be dealt with as having committed an offense against the United States. His firm stand was backed by the American public. The days of the "rubber-stamp" Congress had already been written into history. Organized classism was losing ground, though the railroad men felt that they had chosen a most propitious time—when the country was in the grip of an unsettled state following the war and at the moment when the President's chief concern was to obtain support for the Covenant. It was on this occasion that a member of the President's own party in Congress declared: "The brotherhoods got a taste of power when the Adamson law was passed under whip and spur, and they have been intoxicated by it ever since."

And in referring to the Plumb Plan, to which the railroad brotherhoods were now turning, one public journal stated the situation in brief when it said:

Most of us feel that the interests of a hundred million people are of greater importance than the interests of either railroad owners or workers. For either of these two groups to endeavor to secure some permanent advantage at the cost of permanent advantage to the body of the nation would be wrong and unfair.⁵

But all through the war and during the reconstruction days, the leaders of organized labor and a few select groups, as the railroad brotherhoods, manifested as thoroughly a selfish spirit as did the capitalistic groups, and with more classism attaching to its conduct.

Whatever other cause may be assigned, it is probable that, in large measure, the Administration's failure in railroading must be laid at the door of this class spirit which puts the selfishness of its group above the public good and above the government itself. But did the Administration fail?

Before government operation was adopted, advocates of the policy held that under it the railways would be operated much more economically than when operated privately. Do the facts bear out or support this theory?

Government operation reduced the quantity of freight handled per car daily and failed to increase the amount of freight per train in any degree approaching the proportion of increase under private operation—a fact which accounts, in large measure, for the increase in expenses. In fact, there was practically no increase in the freight moved; yet there

⁵ *Times-Union*, Rochester, N. Y.

Plumb was the general counsel of the railroad brotherhoods. On August 2, the president of the four brotherhoods and the head of the Federation employes' department stated that their unions "were in no mood to brook the return of the railway lines to their former control"; and that economic disaster would follow unless the Plumb Plan was adopted. And on August 3 the president of the brotherhood of locomotive engineers said the Plan would be made an issue in the next congressional campaign. The public accepted this as a threat.

was an increase of 11 per cent, almost 200,000, in the number of men employed. It was chiefly because of decreased efficiency in operation that there was so great an increase in operating expenses. Under private operation the railways had increased wages during the ten-year period of 1907-1917 by over \$600,000,000, in face of the fact that freight and passenger rates were lower in 1917 than in 1907. But the companies did not accumulate a deficit. It became a passing remark, in referring to a railroad man under government operation, that "he was wearing out the seat of his overalls in looking for something to do." Yet at the time the roads were returned to private operation, the employes were claiming advances in wages aggregating another \$1,000,000,000.

In his statement to the Senate committee, in January, 1919, Mr. McAdoo expressed the hope that there would be no considerable deficiency in government operation. The event did not justify the hope. With all the advantages of pooling, which privilege was forbidden the companies by law, the first year of government operation cost the sum of \$4,007,000,000, an increase of 40 per cent over that of 1917. True, war was a disturbing factor. But the next year, when the war was past, it had increased to \$4,420,000,000. And while a large part of this was in wages alone, \$1,200,000,000 from 1917 to 1919, yet wages had been keeping pace with living costs under private operation.

When Congress, in the Control Act, gave the Administration the power to increase rates to cover operating expenses and the returns guaranteed the companies, it obviously meant that the rates should be made sufficiently high to cover all by rates to be paid by those who used the transportation, without laying any portion of the burden upon the taxpayers of the country. And in June, 1918, the Railroad Administration increased passenger rates to three cents a mile, an increase of 50 per cent; and freight rates by 25 per cent, in addition to the increase granted

the February previous, making a total in freight to that time of $32\frac{1}{2}$ per cent higher than had been allowed under private operation. Thereupon, Mr. McAdoo issued a statement that it was expected that the increased earnings would cover all increases in expenses, basing his estimates upon the returns actually made by the roads during the three years ending June 30, 1917.

Yet, the first year of government operation fell short of this estimate by almost \$240,000,000, the deficit officially admitted by the Railroad Administration. And upon his surrender of his office at the end of that year, he estimated that the roads should earn a surplus over the guarantees of \$100,000,000. But after paying expenses, including taxes, there was a deficit of about \$360,000,000 for the year 1919; and for the last two months of government operation, January and February, 1920, the deficit was \$103,000,000.

When government operation ceased on March 1, 1920, Director-General Hines estimated the total losses to the government during the twenty-six months of its operation at \$904,000,000, in his statement submitted to the House committee on appropriations. But the committee found other items which he had omitted, and stated that before the accounts were closed "the total loss to the government chargeable to federal control and operation of railroads would amount to \$1,375,000,000." This was loaded upon the taxpayers of the country. And Mr. Hines asked for an appropriation of the people's money to see the roads through the year 1919 in the sum of \$1,200,000,000; on June 10 Congress gave him \$750,000,000.

Much of the beginning of government failure in railroading was attributed to the extreme weather in its second month of operation and to the scarcity of coal. But the corresponding month of 1919, when freight rates had been materially increased, coal was plentiful, and the weather was extraordinarily mild and pleasant, was a worse month for the railroads financially than the direful February,

1918. For in the later month the net operating income of the roads was \$2,225,000 less than for the disastrous February of 1918. While rates were increased fully 25 per cent, the income decreased 14 per cent and with slower service. And there was a progression of deficits. During the year 1918 the monthly average of deficits was \$17,000,000; the first quarter of 1919, they averaged \$37,000,000. And Mr. Hines' request of Congress for \$1,200,000,000 to the end of that year, suggests a very great increase.

Were these great deficits due to better service under government operation? Scarcely had the Railroad Administration given to the public the statement that traffic of all kinds was being handled with expedition and with cars in abundance to spare, when it became known that there was an acute car shortage in the central northwest. On September 4, 1918, the grain elevators were closing because they were full, with no cars available to carry the wheat to the great markets of the east. In 1917 the railroads of the country handled 10 per cent more freight than in 1916, in which latter year it was of much greater volume than in any previous year. In freight traffic the increase alone of 1917 over that of 1916 was 135,000,000,000 ton-miles—substantially equal to the combined total of all the railroads of Canada, Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany and Austria for an entire year.

Nor was the tremendous deficit under government operation the whole of the story. The Administration inefficiency was demonstrated further by the condition in which the equipment and traffic were found when the companies received the roads back from the government. On March 1, 1920, there were over 90,000 loaded cars accumulated in the various terminals awaiting movement. The following months came the railroad strikes and the number soon ran up to 300,000. In July of that year the Railroad Labor Board rendered an award granting employes advances in wages aggregating \$625,000,000. During the last month

of government operation, though there was a great deficit and the business was greater than ever before handled in any February, the Administration had not adequately maintained the properties, laying upon the companies the immediate necessity of largely increasing their maintenance expenditures in tracks and equipment. After seven months of returned private control, the number of loaded cars awaiting movement was normal, or about 50,000.

And the railroad executives had already taken steps to improve the service, in spite of the "outlaw" strike in April, agreeing that the matter of first importance was an increased daily average in the movement of freight cars, an increase in the average loading, and a reduction in the number of cars in bad order.

To this end they turned every energy. The greatest average freight mileage per car per day ever attained was in 1916, when it was 26.9 miles. Under government operation, this mileage had decreased to less than 25 in 1918, to 23 in 1919, and at the time the roads were returned on March 1, 1920, it was only 22 miles. Every increase of one mile per car per day is equivalent to the addition of 100,000 cars to the available supply. In July, 1920, the average for all railroads had increased to 25 miles and the executives agreed to attempt to reach 30 miles. Increase in loading, urged strongly by the United States Railroad Administration, was also urged by the companies when the roads came back into their hands; since an increase of one ton in the average car-load is equivalent to increasing the available car supply by about 75,000.⁶

With the roads the government took over 129,000 freight cars in bad order, or 5.7 per cent of the total. When it returned the properties it reported 153,727 bad-order cars, an increase of nearly 25,000, or approximately 20 per cent. Moreover, the cars were scattered all over the

⁶"The Railroad Situation to Date": an address by Samuel M. Felton, president of the C. G. W. R. R., before the Central Manufacturing District Club, Chicago, September 29, 1920, p. 3.

country;⁷ and when returned home, the number in bad order was found to be much larger than the Railroad Administration reported. It was estimated that to meet the demand of the freight traffic of the next two years 800,000 new cars were needed; and so greatly was the greatest railway system in the world neglected under government control that these cars had not been ordered when it was turned back to private control.

But there was a more appalling deficit than the financial deficit or that in maintaining equipment. One of the most disastrous effects of government control was the undermining of the railway organizations and of the discipline of the employes. One leading newspaper of the Atlantic seaboard, after showing how government operation had depleted the railroad equipment and after citing the decreased production per man with greatly increased wages, said:

But the most damaging result was that it destroyed the morale of the workers and sowed discord between them and the managements. By urging all the workers to organize under the union rules, the government helped to transform the railroad brotherhoods from the most conservative, contented and loyal labor organization in the country into an aggressively radical machine, which is now in open competition with the managements for future control of this great industry.⁸

The Administration's method of government, which found ready expression in its railroading as in other directions, produced a greater deficit in the morale of the people than the financial deficit, whether in airplanes, shipbuilding, munitions of war, or railroading. It taught the spendthrift habit by the most open and notorious concrete examples, in utter disregard of the first principles of business management. Staggering as the figures are in dealing with

⁷It was not unlike the situation in which the shipping men of the country found themselves at the close of hostilities. They could find neither their ships nor any one at Washington who could tell them where they were, or when or how they could get them back. See chapter on "Shipbuilding."

⁸Philadelphia *North American*, March 5, 1920.

railroad operation, it is scarcely a matter of wonder that the American people are charged with spending annually \$22,000,000,000 on non-essentials.

The Act of Congress restoring the railroads to private operation and control, insured the railroads against bankruptcy and collapse; assured labor of no reduction in wages for six months and the companies an income for the same period, and instead of penalizing pooling as in the past, it was encouraged. The Act forbade any increase of wages during the six months, a feature of the bill that brought a storm of protest from labor organizations. A prominent feature of the law related to the adjustment of wages and the conditions of labor, creating a board of appeals consisting of nine members: three representing the roads, employes and the public each. This board was to reach a decision by a majority, including at least one representative of the public. It was made compulsory, under penalty, for both sides to submit their dispute to this board. But a remarkable fact is that neither party was required to accept the decision and the board was given no power to enforce its findings.

Pleased to have the government take over the railroads, the public was more pleased to have them returned to private control. Inefficiency and the attempt to play politics with the thing created a violent reaction in public sentiment touching government operation. Said one newspaper that has always stood firmly for working people's rights:

Never did the pendulum of popular judgment on any economic question swing so far in so short a time—from virtually unanimous approval when the lines were taken over by the Government twenty-six months ago, to virtually unanimous relief when they were given back.⁹

Indeed, there was practically nothing to be said in favor of government operation after the Administration had tried

⁹ Philadelphia *North American*.

it for over two years. The public was not at first permitted to know the facts concerning the monumental deficits that were loaded upon the people. And when the light was permitted to shine out from the dark corners, the Administration, in answer to the outcry, felt obliged to explain. This Director-General Hines undertook to do before the members and guests of the Chamber of Commerce and Traffic Club of Philadelphia in June, 1919. But the figures later given out indicated that the situation was far worse than he at that time permitted the public to know. The gross figures later showed that the last year before the government took over the roads, operating expenses aggregated \$2,957,000,000. And though there was notable failure to maintain the properties at the standard at which taken over, the operating expenses the year the government ended control totalled about \$5,350,000,000, an annual increase of about \$2,400,000,000, of which some \$2,000,000,000 is chargeable to labor. And with the total operating expenses and taxes aggregating \$5,600,000,000 per annum, while the total earnings for the year 1919 were \$5,200,000,000, there was a shortage of \$400,000,000 merely to meet expenses, with nothing on investment. The employees in September, 1920, were receiving more than twice as much in wages as in 1916.

The people were gradually learning the truth. On the floor of the Senate on December 5, 1919, Senator Kellogg stated that federal operation of the previous two years had demoralized the railroad service and impoverished the railroad properties. He cited the fact that in the last nine months of 1917 the roads, under private operation, handled virtually as much business as during the same months in 1918, and more than for the corresponding months of 1919; and that they did it with 190,000 fewer men and at a cost less by \$1,500,000,000. And that notwithstanding the increase in rates from 25 to 50 per cent, the Government was losing in operation at the rate per year of \$350,000,000.

Thus had the Administration written another chapter in the history of its operations during the Great War. But it did not end with that. When the roads were returned to private management in March, 1920, the law perpetuated the system of adjusting the relations of the workers through a board, now in the Railroad Labor Board, to fix the rates of wages the roads should pay, and the system was made nationally applicable. In July, 1920, an increase in freight rates from 25 to 40 per cent and in passenger rates of 20 per cent was granted. This, it was estimated, would yield an additional revenue of \$1,500,000,000. It did not materialize. Wages remained the same, while revenues decreased. At the beginning of 1921 it was evident that the lines were facing financial straits, and in April the Railroad Labor Board abrogated the national rules effective July 1. And early in June it granted the request of the roads that there be a cut in wages approximating an average of 12 per cent, effective July 1. Thereafter the roads were on a safer basis. But in the late summer of 1921, the amounts due the roads from the government for the obligations incurred during the war were still unpaid and the lines were hampered for the want of this money.

As a logical result of the Administration's policy in showing favoritism to a strongly organized class beginning in 1916, this same class, "big four" brotherhoods of railroad employees, to which was added a fifth, the switchmen, undertook to play the game that was played in Winnipeg two years previously—starving and freezing the people into submission to their demands by refusing to move trains. The strike which they called for October 30, 1921, ostensibly a strike against the railroads, was in fact a strike against the people and the people's government. With no popular support, the strike order was cancelled by the leaders three days before it was to become effective.

The transportation system of the country, the best in the world, is the main artery of the nation's progress. And

the radical element of society must never be permitted to gain control thereof. The President or other official attempting to sell the nation's birthright for a mess of political pottage deserves the execration of his countrymen.

CHAPTER VII

SECRETARY BAKER AND MR. CREEL IN WAR

As delightful a gentleman as any one could care to meet personally; as studiously scholarly as any in the land; as rich in experience as one could wish along certain but ill-defined lines; a pacifist of pacifists—such is the man whom President Wilson, of his own accord, selected for the all-important fighting branch of the government's service in the greatest war of recorded time, displacing Secretary of War Garrison, who was a real fighting man.

It was when the Germans were making great headway in their terrific March drive against the Allies in 1918 that Mr. Baker made a notable address that was heralded throughout the country and the world; for the War Department had been excoriated in Congress and by the people for its failures at the crucial time, and the world hung breathlessly upon the words of the nation's war head.

This address to the publishers in New York is an instance of what he was confidently seeking to lead the American public to believe. He spoke well of our soldiers, "men prepared to make the supreme sacrifice in order that we who remained behind and those who come after us may be free from a philosophy too hateful to govern the world." As to our own country, he said: "Long live the United States—not a place on the map, not a system of political institutions hemmed in by the seas, but a living moral influence in the world, liberating the spirits of men and preserving the freedom of opportunity for the children of men."

Then Mr. Baker concluded his address with an impressive and characteristic reference to the magnitude of our

task as indicated by the alleged fact that the warehouses planned for American use, "now in France and projected to be there," would cover a tract of land fifty feet wide by two hundred and fifty miles long—his imagination unequalled except probably by the actual production of one airplane whose arrival in France had not yet been heralded to the world, when 20,000 were promised.

George Harvey put it thus:

This is substantially all that Mr. Baker had to say,—the same old slush about things too beautiful to perish; the lulling of our people to sleep upon the theory that the French and English can win without our aid; the virtual intimation that we should be most careful not to tread upon German toes; the plain declaration that we are in the war only to keep free from a hateful "philosophy"; the easy putting aside as of slight importance the breaking of the vital battle line, the inferential but no less certain loading of the whole burden upon our stricken Allies; the cautious avoidance of distinguishing between the causes for which the two forces were striving with might and main and the very hearts' blood of millions of men, women and children. . . .

Not a word about the war itself; not a suggestion of warning; not a shadow of appeal for help from the people in hurrying forward, "for God's sake," the work of succor and relief; not a syllable of denunciation of the barriance; not a sound above a whisper in praise and appreciation of our brothers in arms; not a hint of peril to the mother and sister countries and to our own; not one clear bugle note to rouse and thrill a mighty people into overpowering action; nothing, nothing under heaven but piffle—piddling, pacifist piffle from an *American* Secretary of War, basking in the sunlight of his chief while hundreds of thousands of those left at home, no less surely than the best of our manhood who have gone and are going, sit in the shadow of death.

Can one wonder that, after having seen and heard such a representative of our great and fearless Nation, our Allies began to look askance at America, and even to murmur their doubts and misgivings? For more than a year they have held their breath in suspense, in hope, in unparalleled generosity and considerateness, and for policy's sake. How they have felt during the past few months, many of us,

to our humiliation and shame, know only too well, but it took their own death agonies, accentuated by the smiling smugness of our Secretary of *War* to fetch utterance of their disappointment and despair.¹

It is doubtful whether a better idea of the two views at that time prevailing in the country is obtainable than in this characteristic speech of Mr. Baker and the comment of George Harvey—the one the Administration view, the other the popular view. The one is given to glittering generalities; the other to pushing the war preparation to the limit, both in men and equipment. The one is intended to soothe the people; the other to arousing the people to the critical situation and to the fighting spirit. If each is extreme, each best represents the views then current.

If it seems strange that two men as unlike as George Creel and Secretary Baker are linked together in recording events of the Great War, it must not be forgotten that three outstanding facts bring them into this connection: Both were members of the federal Committee on Publicity, of which Creel was made chairman; both were imbued with the so-called liberal spirit and of definite pacifist taint; each believed he was better able to endure difficult situations which their beliefs had engendered than were the great public, for which reason each believed it was right to mislead, even grossly to deceive, the public, and in his own way this each sought to do.

The extent to which this was done will be revealed only when the records of all departments of the government shall be made accessible to the world, records which were then hidden away from the public for fear of the result had the people been permitted to know the exact facts concerning the failures of the Administration in its efforts to make it appear that it and its partisans had conducted a great war to a successful conclusion.

¹ *War Weekly*, May 4, 1918.

The Great War brought into popular use some new words that are likely to become living parts of the language, as Bolshevik, camouflage, over the top, Hooverize. The last named is used fondly at every table. There is one, however, that is not used to conjure with, but which has gotten for itself a place rather of obloquy than of affection. It is the term *Bakerize*, which came to symbolize official deception, official promises without fulfillment, shiftiness. And there is its near relative, *Creelism*. Though each has but a brief history, it is not known whether the verb or the noun came first into being. The latter means all that the former does; but though it has less of official flavor, it is a slightly stronger term, a senator from Missouri intimating that it meant licensed lying.

Nor is it strange that these two men should thus characterize the two words. To Secretary Baker the nation owes the creation and operation of an elaborate system of official deception designed to protect incompetence, conceal failure, and mislead the public. Close examination showed that the prepared statements which he made to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs were wholly untrustworthy, while his communications to the public were almost always descriptive, sometimes mere fabrication. Creelism was his conception—a system of propaganda using the war powers of the government to compel the local press to spread official misinformation.²

More discouraging to millions of Americans than all the rest of his failures was the fact that Secretary Baker continued his efforts to deceive the public after exposure. It seemed that he did not, and could not, learn; that repeated exposure of mendacity and duplicity on his part taught him nothing; that his conception of the important duties of his office was camouflaging and deceiving the American public, rather than making the performance of his

² See chapter on "The Press and Public Opinion."

department conform to the expectations of the people and the necessities of war.

When Mr. Kahn, of California, was obliged to assume the duties of Chairman Dent, of Alabama, to carry forward the work of the chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of the House because Mr. Dent was not ready to turn in to help drive the crusher of civilization out of business—when Mr. Kahn artlessly asked whether the statement made by the War Department in 1917 that we would have 20,000 airplanes in France by July 1, 1918, was not responsible for this tendency in all branches of the government service to exaggerate, he put his finger on the exact spot. The department's aircraft statement, and a dozen other incorrect statements, were distinctly responsible for the evil tendency toward exaggeration during the entire career of the Administration in the war. The War Department was the source of more and worse exaggerations than came from any other quarter. It became the father of exaggerations.

It was along many lines and in regard to many situations that Secretary Baker sought to mislead the public and to cover up the facts. The people came to accept it as a fixed habit of his thought. And the partisan newspaper organs, to avoid embarrassment for the Administration, aided wherever possible. When Governor Allen of Kansas, who had been on the front lines, spoke from personal experience and unquestioned knowledge as to the casualties, Mr. Baker replied by stating that it was not excessive at some other time than that to which Governor Allen referred. When the Associated Press dispatches were telling the country that the fighters were coming home penniless and dependent upon charity while the government was owing them for months of service, Secretary Baker replied by referring to certain camps which were free from the condition charged and stated the men were paid in full up to the time of leav-

ing Europe. This statement led the *Boston Transcript* to say:

The impression conveyed and, as we believe, intended to be conveyed, by this cunningly deceitful official declaration, is that there is no truth in the reported return to this country of soldiers whose penniless condition is due to their failure to receive the pay due them for periods ranging from one to ten months; no truth in the report that such soldiers have arrived at Camp Devens, Camp Sherman, Camp Funston, and various Army hospitals; no truth in the report that General McCain, General Wood and one or two other courageous divisional commanders have, upon their own personal responsibility, without awaiting any authority from the War Department, ordered these returning heroes to be paid forthwith; no truth in the report that the Red Cross had been lending money to some of the more seriously wounded among these penniless defenders. But all these reports are true, and the condition is even more disgraceful than the reports published describe.

Likewise, when charged with dilatoriness in the work of the War Department in connection with the Archibald Stevenson affair, Mr. Baker promptly abolished the particular branch of the Military Intelligence to which Mr. Stevenson belonged and then wrote to Senator Overman that no such man as Stevenson belonged to that branch of the service—which was technically true when he so wrote.

He carried through the same principle when, in regard to the severe criticisms of his department, he wrote concerning the very efficient Edward Stettinius:

It is within his province to keep track of the capacity and production of contractors. Mr. Stettinius will also watch closely the transportation and shipping situation in order that the production and deliveries of war materials may properly proceed. In other words, Mr. Stettinius, a business man and purchasing agent of vast experience, may figuratively be called "the surveying eye of the Director of Purchases and Supplies."

Mr. Baker very well understood that the duties which were to devolve upon Mr. Stettinius were simply advisory, he

having no authority to compel execution. But he hoped it would serve its purpose of quieting the disturbed public.

When Mr. Gutzon Borglum undertook to uncover the facts in the airplane scandal, in the winter of 1917-18, the War Department connived at an attempt to blackmail him into silence. The files of the department were searched, and an unsubstantiated series of allegations charging Mr. Borglum with attempting to sell his influence with the President were handed to one of the Administration's trusted press agents. They were printed far and wide. The evidence appeared to be damning. But Mr. Borglum scorned it all and insisted on telling the truth. Time has vindicated his character and proved his charges.

Who were the men powerful enough to use the War Department in an attempt to blackmail Mr. Borglum into silence? Every man whom the Senate committee found responsible for the failure was appointed by Mr. Baker.

One of the most marked characteristics of the Administration during the war was deliberate evasion of responsibility, failure to measure up to the demands of the occasion. This was particularly pronounced in the head of the War Department. It was on the fifth day of December, 1917, that he said:

From the moment the "Lusitania" was sent to a watery grave by the hand of the assassin, the United States had only two choices. The United States could have crawled on its knees to the Hohenzollerns, crying out that their frightfulness and military efficiency were too great, that we submit and become their vassals, or as an alternative we could fight. We chose to fight.

The "Lusitania" was sunk May 5, 1915. Two months later the field secretary of the National Security League reported that Mr. Baker, then Mayor of Cleveland, "refused absolutely to co-operate with the League because he said he was a pacifist and opposed to the agitation for preparedness," and then declared that "of all the mayors I

interviewed Mr. Baker was the most pronounced opponent of preparedness." At that time, therefore, and with full understanding he preferred that his country should crawl on its knees to the Hohenzollerns rather than fight them. He also turned aside the idea that his nation should be equipped for acceptance of what he knew to be the only alternative open to a self-respecting people. He declared on December 28, 1917, in his New York address that "this nation has shown that in time of war a peace-loving, progress-making people, when the time came had but to watch the magnet of the spirit to defend itself." But the idle dream and more idle talk were immediately dispelled by the rude shock of the Senate's investigation. "A gentle egotist commissioned as the vice-regent of Mars. Pacifism twirling its thumbs while hellish Mars was wrecking the universe. Murder, rapine, and sudden death, horror piled upon horror, the world feverishly burnishing its armour while a lamb-like little gentleman, serene in his security in the triumph of morality sat like a monk in his cell, unvexed by gross passions rubricating the golden rule!"³

As if the fatuous policy of unpreparedness when the war burst upon the land had not been sufficiently impressed upon the nation, Secretary Baker appeared to be always looking for a way of escape from the consequences of his policy of delay and evasion. He always found a story to account for the responsibility of delay and shifting. When his department was receiving a gruelling in the beginning of 1918 for the results of its delay, evasion, and incompetence, he told the country it was idle to draw men from industrial pursuits for training in France when there were no ships to carry them, and urged the absurdly inadequate restriction of ages from 21 to 26 years for army service. Six months later, on July 4, he stated, when the country insisted upon the most ample army possible to crush civilization's enemy, that he desired "to learn the effect upon vital industries."

³ *North American Review*, March, 1918.

Eight days later he appeared at the capitol and stated that he was opposed to any change in the draft ages, without revealing to the astonished Senate the cause for this complete change of front. And then he regaled the country with a statement that shows the turnings and twistings of a mind that seemed to warrant the conclusion that it was incapable of straight-forward utterance, declaring that the War Department was "constantly anxious to expand its military program" and was "now very actively considering an increase, if that increase is possible"; and that after the senators would return from their recess in September he might recommend further appropriations for men and measures. At the very time he was making the lack-of-ships argument, Chairman Hurley was promising ships to the limit, whatever might be the number of men to be transported.

Mr. Baker continued:

The War Department has from the beginning been expanding its military program. We are many months ahead of what was our original hope in regard to the transportation of men. We are constantly seeking ways to expand that, and we are in the midst of a plan now to expand it again. Should we so expand the program it may turn out that we will need an increased number of men and it may turn out that the best we can do won't require it. When we have determined what is best we will then ask congress to provide additional money and men. For the present there is no such necessity.

As put by George Harvey in his *War Weekly*:

This was the same old song! The war may be over! Schwab may not produce the ships! We may all be dead! Anything, anything for an excuse for doing nothing.

Senator Wadsworth depicted the situation succinctly in these words:

Can we not get out of that habit of mind which leads us to endeavor to meet emergencies after they overtake us, in this country and in the management of this war at large, not only by ourselves but by

our Allies? Can we not anticipate emergencies before they overtake us? . . . It passes my understanding how those responsible for the conduct of the military preparations of this great republic can solemnly advise us at this day that for the time being nothing more is desired.

One of the glaring outrages of Secretary Baker was his attempt to throttle the press that was not willing to do his bidding. This was exemplified in his treatment of the newspapers which, without any notice from him or his department not to do so, printed the *official* report of the committee of the United States Senate on the airplane failure, the first summary of which was given out by the committee for the evening papers of August 22, 1918. After the report had been given to the news agencies of the country, had been printed in the *Congressional Record*, and was given full liberty of the press anywhere in the world, Mr. Baker forbade copies of the American newspapers carrying the report to leave the country. But the papers were already in the mails, and on the way to the soldiers in Europe, hundreds of thousands of whom had paid their subscriptions thereto, with postage prepaid.

When the second installment of the committee's report was ready two days later, Mr. Baker sent a confidential warning against using it for overseas circulation; and immediately thereafter a second confidential communication to the effect that it did not make so much difference whether the part of the report dealing with the aircraft failure went abroad, provided the newspapers would see to it that the overseas editions contain no hint of the disclosures made in the report of the committee of the program which Mr. Baker was preparing for the following year. In fact, this time it was practically the "official denial" in advance.⁴

⁴The three great agencies carried as their introduction to this portion of the report on the appalling failure, this paragraph: "America's aircraft program for the great army that is counted on to win the war next year allows for 350 complete squadrons of planes, and the main part of the program already is ahead of the schedule, with 3,000 trained pilots."

There could be no pretense that it was necessary to the military success of the United States to keep the Senate report out of the American newspapers. It was an official document and was already sent abroad and in the hands of the Allies, neutrals and enemy alike, a fact which Mr. Baker's censorship already knew. He appeared to believe that by harassing the newspapers of the United States he could intimidate the press into suppressing vital facts and make of it a reptile press. But it was regrettable that the same censorship did not see its way clear to prevent Mr. Creel's pure fabrications, to which the Senate's report was giving the lie. Said the eminent writer, George Harvey: "Surely truth should not be handicapped and hamstrung in her effort to overtake falsehood."

Each time an investigation to determine the progress of the war program was proposed, Secretary Baker blocked it. And as the startling truths leaked out he, in keeping with his habitual practice of misleading the public, made use of the official denial, knowing that the public would prefer the denial that anything was wrong to believing the almost unbelievable facts concerning War Department shortcomings. The investigators went off the stage branded by his Department officials as friends of Germany bent upon giving "information of value to the enemy." President Wilson sustained this attitude when he undertook to brand Senator Chamberlain, who first fully opened to the public the deplorable situation in January, 1918.

One of the phases of Secretary Baker's war activities was his effort to save the slacker who became known as the "conscientious objector." Treated more fully elsewhere,⁵ this matter cannot properly be wholly passed over in connection with its chief exponent in high circles of the Administration.

That there were organized efforts to encourage draft-dodgers in refusal to obey military orders when inducted

⁵Chapter on "Disloyalty."

into camps was but common knowledge to Secretary Baker. Conspicuous among these efforts was the National Civil Liberties Bureau of New York, which issued, two months prior to Secretary Baker's "Confidential" Order, a confidential pamphlet which stated:

We see no reason to change our policy of handling this matter quietly, without any publicity. Secretary Baker has been and is giving the whole subject personal attention, and nothing would be gained by our going into the press where hostile news notices and damning editorials are certain. We have far more to gain, both for the men themselves and for the cause itself, through Secretary Baker than through the newspapers.

While there are those who are conscientiously opposed to war, such as the Quakers, they have been conscientious through the centuries, and did not become so over night as a war threatening the nation's integrity approached.

But these "conscientious objectors" who feared public opinion and counted on Secretary Baker's support, were far from the Quaker type. And if they did not know of his "confidential order" two months before it was issued, they could not have better written their own confidential pamphlet if they had known it. The records are crowded with instances of Secretary Baker's expressions of warm sympathy with the scoundrels ready to stab the nation in its day of distress.⁶

At the end of his first year's work, Mr. Creel asked Congress for \$2,000,000 with which to carry forward his scheme for the ensuing year. He was granted \$125,000 by the House measure, only because the President had declared the work of the Committee on Public Information as a means of winning the war. Said one keenly analytical editorial comment, solid to the core in its Americanism:

⁶ A valuable contribution to the literature of this subject is found in Basil M. Stevens' "With Kindly Consideration" in *The North American Review* for January, 1920, p. 57.

The real purpose of the propaganda in which Creel is the most active figure is to overlay the facts of history with studied inventions, in order to build up the reputation and influence of President Wilson and his Administration. The official utterances that are being sent throughout the world are calculated to make it appear that from the beginning Mr. Wilson was for war, but could not act because the American people had not reached his heights of discernment and moral inspiration.

False in substance and implication, this propaganda under the present circumstances is an especially atrocious thing. For Washington authority behind it causes it to find reflection in the press of the Allied countries, which pays glowing tribute to President Wilson for having overcome the reluctance and stimulated the patriotism of his countrymen, so that they were at last aroused to defend themselves and civilization.

It is discreditable enough that public funds should be employed to serve partisan political interests. But it is shameful that this means should be employed to pervert history for the benefit of a blundering statesmanship by traducing a loyal people; and it is indecent that because of this campaign American troops on the way to the battlefield should meet the suggestion abroad that they represent a nation of slackers regenerated by President Wilson's leadership.⁷

The cost to the country, it developed when the official report came before Congress almost a year after the armistice was signed, of the operation of the Committee on Public Information was about \$6,600,000.

Like so many other matters touching the relations of the Administration to the Great War, the appointment of George Creel as chairman of this committee of vast importance during war has always been a deep mystery to the American people, unless they regard it as an expression of Wilsonism; then it becomes plain. He was a "liberal," and with that class President Wilson seemed desirous of aligning himself, though it developed that they were the dangerous element of the country, and very far

⁷ *Philadelphia North American*, August 28, 1918.

from liberal. Mr. Creel's views on public questions, and particularly upon constitutional government, if known to the Administration when appointed to his responsible position, were damning to the Administration itself.

His attitude to German propaganda was not less dangerous. He wrote the introduction to the book "Two Thousand Questions and Answers About the War," declaring that in his view it "constitutes a vital part of the national defense," a book which the National Security League, a patriotic organization, pronounced "a masterpiece of Hun propaganda," declaring that the German government itself "could not have devised anything more insidious, more calculated to destroy our faith in our Allies and to insinuate into the American mind excuses for Germany." And an indorsement, such as Creel's, gave the work almost an official character, making it particularly dangerous. His known sympathies with syndicalism and various radical programs, even before the war, created such an incongruity in his appointment to become the chief of American propaganda for democracy as to become ludicrous, except for the seriousness of it. He used his official position to give wide publicity to writings whose tendency was to weaken the national cause. That politics was at the bottom of the whole of it is hardly questioned. His resort to distortion of the truth and the fabrication of official "news" brought from Senator Reed, after citing typical Creelisms, the title of "licensed liar," so named after his aircraft inventions.⁸

When, at Christmas time, 1918, Mr. Creel announced at Paris that he had severed his relations with the United States government, as the news reached America it came as a refreshing breath of pure air after a night of dense-ness, with the prospect of his complete extinguishment as

⁸ A crushing editorial exposé of his mendacity is contained in the *Philadelphia North American* for September 25, 1918.

a public character and official. There was a sense of relief from a heavy burden in the land.

All the distortions of fact, the wrenching of truth to conceal blunders piled upon blunders mountain high, the covering up of the need of a man with a plan at the head of the War Department—these were ample to warrant the contortions of Mr. Creel and Secretary Baker when they lacked the courage to permit the public to know the facts. The situation was appalling and almost beyond human conception.

The nation richest in material resources and in genius for accomplishment, as well as having had amplest time for thorough preparation, when the great German drive began, on March 21, 1918, had been at war almost a year, with a stubborn warning of a full year-and-half before that we were practically certain to enter the war before its conclusion; and when the Allies had been worn down by the continuous pounding the greatest war machine the world had ever seen could administer to them on Belgian and French soil, we had two regiments engaged somewhere in the line—two regiments of American soldiers and there were a million men on each side. It was just two regiments from a nation of 100,000,000 people, too, “making the world safe for Democracy,” against the mightiest and most ruthless war machine of recorded history,—and they were railroad engineers.

Secretary Baker's department produced the two outstanding scandals of the whole war, hardly exceeded in magnitude by those due to the corruption and incapacity of Russian bureaucracy under czarism. The one billion dollars devoted to aviation did not place the first squadron of American fighting machines at the front until sixteen months after the declaration of war, and the program as a whole was a disastrous failure. With billions appropriated for ordnance, the department did not place at the front, in

time to be used, a single American gun of 6-inch caliber or over, nor a single high-explosive shell larger than the 3-inch.

The ordnance collapse in the midst of the greatest exertions of the fiercest battling on the front in Europe was astounding. But those on the inner side were particularly careful to keep the facts from public view, some of which will be read with amazement by future generations: Total appropriations to September 24, 1918, for facilities and munitions were \$4,837,044,550, of which slightly over \$600,000,000 went for facilities, leaving a good margin over \$4,000,000,000 for artillery munitions alone.

What the American army in France was urgently demanding and not getting were 8-inch guns and 9.2-inch guns with which to blast the enemy out of his position. The appalling facts were that from the time the independent American army began its drive toward the strong German front up to the end of the war, there was not received in France from the United States one shell, either shrapnel or high explosive, for a 4.7-inch, a 5-inch, a 6-inch, an 8-inch, a 9.2-inch, or a 10-inch gun. Not a finished gun, with a complete round of ammunition, of a caliber above 6 inch, was ever shipped from the United States to the army in France up to the time of the signing of the armistice.

Complete and utter failure to deliver American artillery and shells to the fighting front marked the floundering of the ordnance bureau; and as late as the month when the armistice was signed, General Pershing, after repeatedly calling for proper material, virtually demanded the reorganization of that bureau.

When the cabled demands of the American commanders became insistent, the War Department replied that our rate of fire was too high—they were sending too many shells at the Germans. The fact is our ordnance bureau did not supply the American troops in France with ammunition adequate in size or in quantity; and that its troops

had to win their battles by sheer courage, and the expenditure of blood and by means of supplies they obtained from the French.

At a time when the First American Army was engaged in its greatest effort, ammunition was supplied only by the most strenuous efforts. It had no reserve supply, and it was officially reported that troops could not be sent forward because of the shortage of guns and ammunition. The definite statement was given out in September that 155-mm. guns (6-inch) were shipped to France; and as late as October 16, 1918, word came from the supply bases in France that no such guns were received, nor the ammunition to fit them.

Two months after we entered the war, Mr. Baker issued an official bulletin in which he admitted the "difficulty, disorder, and confusion in getting things started, but," he said, "it is a happy confusion. I delight in the fact that when we entered this war we were not, like our adversary, ready for it, anxious for it, prepared for it, and inviting it. Accustomed to peace, we were not ready."

In the following October he announced with undisguised self-satisfaction: "We are well on the way to the battle-field." This was too much for Roosevelt, who wrote: "For comparison with this kind of military activity we must go back to the days of Tiglath-Pileser, Nebuchadnezzar and Pharaoh. The United States should adopt the standard of speed in war which belongs to the twentieth century A.D.; we should not be content with, and still less boast about, standards which were obsolete in the seventeenth century B.C." ⁹

On December 31, 1917, General Crozier, head of the Ordnance Department, testified before the Senate committee on military affairs that in the first seven months in the war contracts for \$1,500,000,000 had been let. "All the huge machinery of the War Department has been going at top

⁹ *North American Review*, November, 1919.

speed for months. The work accomplished is something of which the people may be proud," he declared.

On January 10, 1918, Secretary Baker told the committee of contracts totaling \$1,677,000,000 out of an appropriation of almost twice that amount. On the next day under cross-examination he stated: "Our initial needs have been met, every man in France has full equipment." On January 18, Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the committee, declared in a public address: "The military establishment of America has fallen down." On January 21, President Wilson characterized this as an astonishing and absolutely unjustifiable distortion of the truth," and declared: "The War Department has performed a task of unparalleled magnitude and difficulty with extraordinary promptness and efficiency. . . . My association and constant conference with the Secretary of War have taught me to regard him as one of the ablest public officers I have ever known."

January 24. Senator Chamberlain, replying on the floor of the Senate, said: "America today is unprepared so far as ordnance is concerned. France is furnishing our troops with heavy ordnance and machine guns. If we relied upon the Ordnance Department to supply our troops with heavy ordnance, the war would be over before the guns got to the front."

January 28. Secretary Baker testified before the committee: "The American army in France, now and to be there is provided (by the Allies) with artillery of the types they want as rapidly as they could use it. Our own manufacture is in process. Deliveries of some pieces are already begun, with a rising and steadily increasing stream of American production."

March 26. (Five days after the opening of the German offensive) Senator Lodge declared: "We have no guns in France except a few old coast guns for which the French are making cartridges."

May 8. Following a minute investigation, the Senate

committee declared: "The condition respecting ordnance is comparable only to the failure of the aircraft program." Members said that production of 6-inch, 8-inch, and 9.2-inch Howitzers, the three vital pieces of heavy artillery, was "pitifully small." Of the largest, they said, not one would be delivered in France this year and of the others the deliveries would be "negligible."

May 11. Said an official statement from the Ordnance office: "The Ordnance Department has thus far met every demand imposed by the new program for over-seas shipment of American troops. Tonnage is a limiting factor in the shipment of ordnance. Sufficient supplies of artillery—French 75-mm. and 155-mm. and American heavy railway artillery—are already in France to meet the present demand."

May 17. After visiting many ordnance plants, the Senate committee reported: "The first 8-inch Howitzers were delivered this week, and the 9.2-inch Howitzers are in an advanced state of manufacture. But during the present year we shall be compelled to depend very largely, as heretofore, on France for our small field guns and to some extent on Great Britain for our large field guns."

June 28. Secretary Baker wrote to the House Military Affairs Committee: "The artillery program is now approaching a point where quantity production is beginning."

July 2. A New York *World* dispatch from Washington states: "The American-built 155-mm. Howitzers are moving to France. One American firm is turning out Howitzers at the rate of ten a day. These are of an approximately 6-inch bore, and are the heavy barrage guns which support infantry advances into intrenched positions."

At various times, also, the committee on public information issued bulletins and photographs respecting the shipment of American guns.

On November 20, 1918, General Pershing, making an official report, said:

Among our most important deficiencies in material were artillery, aviation and tanks. We accepted the offer of the French government to provide us with the necessary artillery equipment of 3-inch and 6-inch guns for thirty divisions. There were no guns of the calibers mentioned manufactured in America, on our front at the date the armistice was signed. The only guns of these types produced at home thus far received in France are 109 75-mm. (3-inch) guns. In aviation, we were in the same situation. We obtained from the French the necessary planes for training our personnel, and they have provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observation and bombing planes. As to tanks we were also compelled to rely upon the French. Here, however, we were less fortunate, for the reason that the French production could barely meet the requirements of their own armies.¹⁰

After the severe drubbing given the War Department in the early part of 1918, not only by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, but from all unbiased sources and from all sections of the country, there was a spirit of work and co-operation developed that produced marvelous results in some directions though not in all. One of the bureaus most severely criticized was that of ordnance. It took a new stride, the entire Administration having felt bitterly the attack that was being made upon it from all sides—and knowing the criticisms were well based. It resulted in a marked showing of improvement soon after the year was half over. In mid-summer, 1918, a report was authorized by the War Department showing that upwards of two billion cartridges had been put out by that time, the average daily approximating fifteen million which, however, would be only fifteen for each man of an army of one million for all kinds of arms: rifles, pistols, machine-guns. And the total number of rifles made was then 1,886,769, about one for each man in the service, but none to replace the fearful destruction of modern battles, as compared with the almost nothing of five or six months earlier. This improvement,

¹⁰ Confirming this deficiency is André Tardieu's "Truth about the Treaty," p. 35, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1921.

however, but strongly brought into relief the fearful shortcomings of the entire previous period of the year and a quarter that the nation had been in the war.

Not only was the American soldier now armed with a weapon superior in range and adaptability, but capable of from 30 to 50 per cent greater quickness in action. That is to say, two men could fire approximately as many bullets in a given space of time as three men using inferior rifles.

In the summer of 1918 there was established an American assembling plant for tanks in France, and contracts were let to English, French and Americans for about 500 tanks each. When, in a short time, the thousand tanks contracted for in France and Great Britain had been delivered and assembled, the parts of not one complete American tank had arrived. The War Department program provided for the contract for 4,400 tanks in this country. On September 1, just eight tanks had been completed. There was prospect, it was officially stated to members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, that the total of 40 tanks would be delivered during that month. Months previously a tank training-camp was established in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. On September 1, not one tank had been delivered at the camp, and the men who had enlisted for and been assigned to tank service were being trained with blue prints, paper representations of the machines they were supposed to master.

The United States was capable of turning out more tanks in a given time than England and France combined. When members of Congress asked Secretary Baker about the collapse of the tank program, his reply was that it was "military information not proper to disclose."

At first an attempt was made by the War Department to deny that no American-made gas in an American shell was ever fired by the American forces overseas. A little later, however, General William L. Sibert admitted the failure of the War Department in this respect. General

Sibert, who took charge of the chemical warfare service in the summer of 1918, when it was in a deplorable state, made it efficient by the time the war ended.

Some of the ardent friends of the Administration, particularly apologists for Secretary Baker, doubted that he ever made the statement that the war was 3,000 miles away, when seeking to excuse the dilatoriness of his department. On page 1615, of Part III, of Senate public documents, in a hearing before the committee on military affairs, are these words:

SECRETARY BAKER: The War was not on us in the the sense that the enemy was at our doors. He was 3,000 miles away.

And on the next page was this:

SECRETARY BAKER: I ask permission to call your attention to the fact that the battle front was 3,000 miles away.

SENATOR WEEKS: I want to say that, to my mind, it does not make any difference practically whether it was 10,000 miles away or one mile away. Our obligation was the same.

When the criticism of the War Department was at its height, following the celebrated speech of Senator Chamberlain in New York, in January, 1918, Secretary Baker started in upon the theory that his patchwork reorganization of his department would placate public opinion. Perhaps the best single example of the way his plan was working out is shown by his method of letting contracts, at that time five different branches of the War Department bidding against each other for leather, this sending the price rapidly upwards and the government buying at the top price.

In September, 1918, there were millions of fully-loaded shells on this side of the water waiting to be shipped to the front. Most of them lacked some essential part. Others, which had been manufactured for Russia, were in perfect condition, but the ownership of them was in question. Orders for twenty million small caliber shells had been

placed in Canada, and they were not delivered; for the Canadian manufacturers seemed to be in doubt as to whether they were to manufacture the shells complete or simply build them in parts and ship them to the United States to be finished. Also a firm in Indiana had a contract for some ten million parts. It was expected that it would be producing about 20,000 of these parts each day beginning months before the armistice was signed. But after some thousand of them had been finished, it was discovered that they were made wrong, they were worthless. Delay followed delay, there must be correction of fault after fault, while precious days and weeks and months were lost in the crucial days of 1918, and finally production was begun again just as the conflict closed. The entire trouble from beginning to end of the war, so far as the Administration was concerned, was an entire failure to co-ordinate.

Said a member of the United States Chamber of Commerce, a business man, as a witness before the investigating committee:

There is no central control or planning. What is needed is someone who shall have power or responsibility for making decisions. The difficulty in getting decisions in Washington to-day is apparent to every one. It is an extraordinarily difficult thing to have any matter definitely and positively decided. The thing that we are trying to impress upon you is that the experience of business men has been universal, that without central control and responsibility no enterprise, large or small, could succeed.¹¹

"President Ferguson, of one of the large ship-building plants that were relied upon to put out the ships necessary to carry forward the war, told how there was no head work in the preparation of places in which to carry forward the great plan. He told how in one little town where they could not get water in the shipyard, though he was ordered to hasten the ship-building work, the army had 15,000 horses all using water and 20,000 soldiers all using water, and that in the same week he had instructions from either one of two government departments to give its work priority. And he stated:

"We cannot get hard coal, for which our houses are built with latrobe stoves, yet the army has put a lot of hard-coal stoves in their camps which might as well have burned soft coal. I took this matter up with the Secretary

And it was at this point that the very personality of the war secretary due to his mental attitude created the chief difficulty.

The record is crowded with examples of failure to co-ordinate, to plan ahead. The Secretary of War appeared to have no appreciation of the size of his job. Up to January 1, 1918, there had been ordered over 21,000,000 pairs of shoes. That was more shoes than had been ordered for the very much larger British army during the entire three and one-half years of war. At the same time, the army was short by several hundred thousand of the number of overcoats needed. Clothing in the navy was so worthless that the sailors had to pay out of their own slender pay about as much to replenish them as the whole was supposed to cost in the first place. Our shortage in several lines of arms and ammunition was serious, one alarming shortage being in powder, our shortage in production for our own use at that time being about a million pounds a day when we were supposed to be also supplying the Allies, and orders for the new buildings to increase our powder supply were not given until December, 1917, though the great shortage was already alarming by the middle of 1917.

What Secretary Baker cost the country in money and lives will probably never be known. Some of his statements, however, may suggest it. When, early in 1918, Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, declared that "the military establishment of America has fallen down;" and when, a few weeks later, of War, and wrote him a letter, and discussed it with everybody in Washington I could discuss it with, and the Secretary is investigating, and, I understand, proposes to put up some temporary quarters for the soldiers and the regular officers."

Then followed this colloquy:

SENATOR JOHNSON: "That indicates lack of management and utter lack of co-operation.

MR. FERGUSON: "It is due to the fact that the people have the power to arbitrarily give orders without knowing the consequence of the orders they give.

SENATOR JOHNSON: "And without knowing who else gives orders?"

MR. FERGUSON: "Yes, sir."

Senator Hitchcock, one Democratic member of the committee, arraigned the department for "confusion, red tape, and incapacity," and supported his charges with an extended summary of delay and neglect in equipping the soldiers, they were letting the country know something about the disasters which were certain to befall as a result of this utter confusion in the War Department, and that Mr. Baker's failure to place men with a just sense of proportion, at the head of important bureaus, was the chief cause.

To the soldiers across the sea, failure to receive their pay was a matter secondary to failure to hear from their loved ones at home. While many of these poor fellows were lying sick or wounded in hospitals, to their physical suffering was added the mental torture of not being able to get a line from the folks at home. They were kept in the dark as to whether fathers, mothers, wives were dead and buried. Tons of these precious letters which they were longing for were being dumped in great masses in France, until the pathetic missives were boxed up for reshipment to the distracted souls back in the old home who, on their return, were unable to learn from the War Department as to whether and how their sick and wounded ones were. It was one of the shameful things which attended the incompetence of the War Department in its direct dealing with American soldiers.¹²

¹² Representative Mann, on the floor of the House, read a batch of these letters both from soldiers and from soldiers' wives and mothers bearing on this unhappy state of affairs. Some of these missives from the soldiers to the home folks were fairly heartrending in their pitiful appeal for tidings of any sort from those dear to them. On the other hand, he read letters from agonized mothers and wives here who knew their soldiers were wounded and ill somewhere, but who could get no information other than this maddening fact from the War Department. In one such case Adjutant General Parker told the applicant for information to write to the Red Cross in Washington. Commenting on this, Mr. Mann said:

"Here is a man wounded severely in the service of the United States on the firing line in September last. His wife has been informed of the injury, and, as I shall show later, with other letters, is probably unable to get into communication directly with the soldier and writes to the Adjutant General's office to inquire about him. Now it would be just as cheap for the Adjutant General's office to cable to France as it is for the Red Cross to do it. I can conceive no meaner disposition on the part of the

Cruel was the infliction of suspense and anguish through deception and delay in publication of the casualty lists. Before election Mr. Baker had assured the country that a total number of killed and wounded would not exceed 100,000; after election the estimate was raised to "more than 200,000," then to 262,000 and late January, 1919, it was disclosed that the lists might not be completed until the following September. Final announcement was made on Armistice Day, 1919, showing a total of casualties of 293,089 to the American forces, the wounded in action numbering 215,489.

Great criticism was leveled at the War Department for its failure in reporting casualties as they occurred. The Red Cross, not a government service, had the confidence of the men in the service as well as of the people at home who knew their method. Why the Red Cross should be able to get information as to what had happened to a boy at the front more quickly than the regular Government channels of the War Department was never explained but the fact is that people learned to have confidence in the one and to distrust the other. The latter forbade the former to send home lists and this ban was not removed until September 27, 1918.

The negligence of the War Department service responsible for the announcement of casualties in the American forces was admitted December 9, 1918, by Assistant Secretary of War Keppel to the Senate committee on military affairs.

The very first day that Congress was in session in the year of 1919 an attack was made upon Mr. Baker for his carelessness, if not deliberate method, in notifying parents as to what had happened to their sons on the European battle front. Senator Weeks declared that the War Depart-

Government than to tell a wondering and grieving wife, "Your husband was severely wounded nearly four months ago, and if you want to know how he is, communicate with a private party."

ment information as to casualties had been wrong. He stated that during the week ending December 14, 1918, the Red Cross had received an average of twenty letters a day from parents who had been advised by the War Department that their sons had been killed on a specific date, and that in every one of these cases the parents wrote that they had received communication from their boys subsequent to the date of death given by the War Department. Referring to the Red Cross methods, Senator Weeks said that agency in August located in French hospitals 200 American soldiers reported missing by the War Department. And he stated that they believed that through it their relatives would learn of their condition; but that information was never transmitted because of the order by the War Department prohibiting the mailing of such letters.

When Senator Chamberlain made his attack upon the failure of the War Department in taking care of disabled men after the armistice was signed he stated: "Take the number of men on the battle front and the casualties—the dead, wounded and missing—there has been practically 17.6 per cent of the boys on the front killed, wounded or missing." Then he stated that what he criticised was the fact that we have not the hospital facilities. "If the War Department," he declared, "had paid half the attention to preparation for receiving these boys as they are to getting legislation through Congress in order to protect contractors who made contracts for war supplies over the telephone and in violation of law, this matter would soon be settled."

No satisfactory reason was ever given for the gross misrepresentation of the nation's losses and the shocking delay in making known the names of the victims. But the matter of greatest moment was the high percentage of casualties, nearly three-eighths of the force being put out of action. It is true that American divisions were heavily engaged and severe losses were to be expected. But what makes the figures significant is the disclosure that to the

very end of the conflict the American forces were imperfectly armed; that they had to go against the German defensive, bristling with machine-guns, insufficiently supported by artillery and with supply of ammunition dangerously inadequate.

Although forced to abandon the Red Cross home-communication's service, Governor Allen pointed out that the system of personal letters was being used by the British without any interference with war office reports. Colonel Davis retorted:

Because one army wears red pants is no reason why our army should wear red pants.

Secretary Baker felt called upon to issue a statement in reply to criticisms of the unpublished casualties after the armistice was signed, declaring none had been held back.

The rapidity with which the American troops were transported to Europe in the summer of 1917 and until the American army had reached the proportion of a million and more men was characteristic of America's method once she got down to real business. It was as much as the most optimistic could hope for.

The greater part of these troops, however, was taken over in ships of the Allies. While the efforts of the navy were laudable in the extreme, we were simply short of the necessary means of transportation. In returning the troops there was a different situation. They were returned with all the speed that any one within reason could have asked, and far beyond the expectation of a great majority of the people. They were returned at about the same rate at which they were sent over. Of the 320,000 troops brought home from overseas during May, 1919, vessels operated by the cruiser and transport force of the United States Navy carried more than 300,000.

In the spring of 1919, the country was stirred by the dispute between Secretary Baker and General Ansell over the

court-martial system of the country, resulting in the demotion of the latter to his pre-war rank of lieutenant colonel. It brought Senator Chamberlain again to the front in defending those whom the position of Secretary Baker permitted him to castigate in what he denominated the interests of discipline. It was well known that Mr. Baker sanctioned the intolerable terms of the system upon some all but innocent youth, while he was making use of all the prestige of his position to favor worthless scoundrels known to the War Department as "conscientious objectors" to military service to their country in time of war. Under the system he accepted the sentence of a half-witted youth "to 99 years at hard labor for absence without leave, desertion, and escape," while Captain Samuel H. Hodgson, of the United States Army, tried on charges showing him favorable to the Germans at a time when his country was at war with Germany, and particularly to Germans in Mexico, sentenced to dismissal from the army and confinement to hard labor for two years, all finally commuted to a reprimand by the general commanding the camp in Porto Rico.

The New York *World* described the system as "lynch law for the army," while the Washington *Post* declared that "there is sometimes justice in a court-martial, but it is purely accidental." Writing Secretary Baker concerning the injustice of the system and the Secretary's attitude toward those with whom he might differ, Senator Chamberlain pointedly stated, on March 20, 1919:

On March 10 you were blind to any deficiencies in the existing system; as indeed the evidence abundantly shows, you have been deaf throughout the war to complaints about the injustice of this system, complaints which should at least have challenged your earnest attention, rather than provoked your undisguised irritation.

And then again:

You elbowed aside the one officer who even then had the courage to condemn the system and the prevision to point out its terrible re-

sults—General Ansell—and took into the bosom of your confidence a trio of men who are pronounced reactionaries.

And he pointed out to the Secretary of War circumstances indicating that the Secretary's position was not taken in good faith but simply designed to allay public apprehension and inquiry by the appearance of doing something, and added:

The existing system does injustice—gross, terrible, spirit-crushing injustice. Evidence of it is on every hand. The records of the judge advocate general's department reek with it. . . .

You have taken a terrible stand upon a subject which lies close to a thousand American hearthstones. The American people will not be deceived by self-serving, misleading reports and statistics. Too many American families have made a pentecostal sacrifice of their sons upon the altar of organized injustice.

A group of lawyers who held commissions during the war and were assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Department joined in giving out a statement to the press which declared that:

Our court-martial system has been inherited from English law as it existed prior to the American Revolution; it had its inception in medieval days when soldiers were not free citizens of the flag under which they served, but were either paid mercenaries or armed retainers of petty lords. Those were times when armies were made up of men who constituted the dregs of society, or were no more than the chattels of military commanders. England, France, and other democratic countries have changed and liberalized their military codes so as to insure justice to their soldiers; but our armies are still governed by this brutal, medieval court-martial system which has survived outside of the United States only in Germany and in Russia.

But these were the things, not only which the pacifist Secretary of War tolerated, but which he insisted upon when it came to punishing the peccadillos of real men wearing their country's uniform and ready to lay down their lives. But when it came to the contemptible cowards who saved their hides by sneaking under pleas that they were

"conscientious objectors" then the pacifist secretary was all tenderness and consideration. "For a real soldier caught smoking a cigarette and refusing to obey a petty order, 40 years at hard labor with no appeal to a reviewing court. For a cowardly cur openly refusing to wear a uniform, refusing to obey any military orders, openly defying the whole authority of military law—for such as these, considerate treatment and no punishment until the Secretary of War had passed upon the case!"¹³

Similarly, when the demand for a universal draft became so great that General Crowder was called before the Senate committee, and he there showed the compelling and immediate need for enlarged man power, Secretary Baker and General March took an opposite view. General Crowder's advice was followed, and the great army which was sent across the seas came as a result.

But General Crowder's patriotism was his undoing. Secretary Baker and General March could no more endure his activities than they could those of General Wood. Accordingly, General March ordered General Crowder to his office and reprimanded him for having encroached on the duties of the general staff; yet Crowder was wholly responsible for the men until they were actually sworn into the service. But the reprimand was stamped on General Crowder's record, and the Secretary of War did not lift a finger to stay the unjust act against this soldier, this officer who had never blundered when the whole war machine of the War Department was blundering; who hewed to the line when the Secretary of War was wobbling; who had prepared, perfected, and executed the mechanism for a draft which had done more than any other single thing in our history to make a great army possible.

There is a large element in the consideration of Mr. Baker's elevation to his high place. Judge Garrison, from the day he took office, devoted himself zealously to strength-

¹³ *Harvey's Weekly*, February 22, 1919.

ening the national defenses, and as the shadow of coming war darkened the country's path he redoubled his efforts to promote preparedness. Then came the inadequately explained resignation of Secretary Garrison. When President Wilson, in the first months of 1916 made a series of addresses in New York and the middle west in behalf of the policy of preparation for the inevitable conflict, the President went so far as to urge that the United States should have "incomparably the greatest navy in the world." After the President's return, Secretary Garrison called at the White House to express his loyal enthusiasm and to say that preparedness was to be forwarded. To his amazement, the response was an expression of disapproval, the President declaring he would tolerate no agitation or activity in this direction until after election—the presidential election of the coming fall, when the issue, as it later developed, was to be, "he kept us out of war." Hurt and bewildered, Secretary Garrison remarked that their ideas seemed to be at variance; he was told that they were. He suggested that his resignation might be acceptable. President Wilson said promptly that it would; moreover, on his western tour he had selected Mr. Garrison's successor, a man who would not embarrass the Administration with schemes of preparedness.

Such was the manner and inspiration of the appointment of Newton D. Baker, avowed pacifist placed in charge of the defense of a nation that was being driven irresistibly into war. His function was to strangle preparedness and cultivate the pacifist sentiment of the country until after the election in 1916. He had, besides, other valued political qualifications—influence with the radical element and a readiness, as was shown, to use even the laws against sedition and espionage to promote the Administration's political interests. And he was retained, in the face of a record of incompetence written in the waste of colossal wealth and unnumbered lives, because he served those interests and re-

flected secretly the spirit and purposes of the Wilson régime.¹⁴

The editor of *Harvey's Weekly*, facetious at times, denunciatory almost beyond endurance at other times, freely told its readers how it had misplaced its trust in one member of the cabinet, and did it in this fashion:

Oddly enough, the one member of the Cabinet in whose favor we were most strongly prepossessed was Mr. Baker; we valued his brains as a sort of oasis in a comparative desert. But he quickly proved himself to be utterly incapacitated by surpassing egotism for the performance of his great tasks and consequently was a positive menace. Anything more dangerous than his attempts to lull the American people into a sense of false security or more damnable than his perpetual evading, sidestepping, deceiving and, when cornered, actually lying, we simply cannot imagine.

Never again should the American nation permit pacifists to be in control of the government when the country's life is threatened.

¹⁴ Philadelphia *North American*, January 31, 1919.

CHAPTER VIII

THE POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT

From some forms of distemper, President Wilson's administration made fairly good recovery; but never from the blight which fell upon the Post-Office Department.

By some it was called incompetence in Washington, by some inefficiency throughout the country; some said it was failure, others that it was wreckage. All agreed that the Department was not functioning—this one Department that comes closest to the American hearth, this one service of the government that freely enters the home daily.

For its letter-carrier walks the crowded street and ascends the tower-like office building whose head is buried in the cloud; or hastens with his car into the thrifty forty-acre farmer settlements of Jersey or of the Keystone State, and back home for dinner; or glides along the western trail which, as a huge serpent, stretches itself from the Great River away to the snow-capped Rockies; or more slowly with horse and cart threads his way to the secluded home among the mountain passes—this carrier who bears the heat of summer and faces the blistering blasts of winter, who drags his weary way through sticky mud and flounders through unbroken drifts—he who brings the expected or the unlooked-for message of love or sadness, of joy or sorrow, of hope or disaster; this man whose step or cart or car is eagerly watched for, and whose coming sets the heart a-throb or brings depression to the spirit—this man is always welcome. And he failed not.

Under such circumstances it was very fitting that the first criticism directed against this great Department of the

people should be on the social side, rather than on the material. It squares best with America's idealism.

This early criticism was aimed at a pronouncement made officially in the Administration's beginning days, declaring that its old employes, when they became aged and infirm from long service, were entitled to no further consideration from the government. The official statement further announced that the people would never consent to civil pensions, and with a self-assurance suggestive of the final word on the matter. Yet it is the irony of history that before the ruthless incumbent left his place of power, civil employees in his Department were not pensioned, it is true, but were retired on part pay with the greatest favor shown to them of any in the government service. He poorly assessed the public temper when he assumed the position that as the eye became dim and the hand shaky these faithful servants who had given the best of their years to the government on a salary insufficient to lay aside anything for the uncertain day, were to be tossed to the scrap-heap, placing the government in the class of the soulless employer who used men and women only as cogs in a machine. The Department's procedure of that day was described as "a mighty mean policy."

This social side bore a close relation to the material side. It was induced by Postmaster-General Burleson's desire to make a showing for economy. Its tendency was to weaken the morale of the entire force. Protest after protest was entered until it was piling Ossa on Pelion. Officials became hardened to the process and gave little or no heed. As complaint after complaint came in, their reply became a stock: "Oh, well, I guess a few complaints, more or less, will not make much difference."

The criticism grew in strength and scope, involving every feature of the Department's activities. It would have been more severe but for the fact that war activities diverted the

thoughts and energies of the people. A subservient Congress did nothing to uncover the blight. Secrecy was the final official word in this Department, as in many of them, throughout President Wilson's incumbency. It was impossible for the people to get the light.

The treatment accorded drove the railway-mail men into the American Federation of Labor for protection against the ravages of the Department. Immediately thereafter came the unionizing of every department and bureau of the government service as a protection of the employe against the government itself. The Administration sowed the wind; the nation will reap the whirlwind.

Business men, as well as others, fully aware of the degeneration of the postal service, used what means they commanded for getting the facts to set before the people. The Department refusing all information, as though the public has no right to know about its own business, they set out to gather facts showing the truth of the matter. To this end the New York Merchants' Association conducted an investigation in 38 states, through 165 business agencies, representing 119 cities, giving substantial basis for a report upon the deficiencies of the service as found up to the middle of 1918. The essential facts thus developed were these:

That mails were not dispatched with former frequency.

That they were not fully worked in transit.

That in consequence much "stuck" letter-mail was turned into the terminal stations and there materially delayed.

That inferior mails moved with extreme slowness.

That train delays were not a principal cause of slowness in the mails; but that

Insufficiency in the number of railway postal cars, their withdrawal from a great number of routes throughout the United States, and the reduction of the crews on the railway postal cars appeared as the main causes of the condition shown.¹

¹In eighteen months there was either total abolishment or heavy curtailment in the sorting of mails on 1612 trains. Railway-mail clerks well

That space rental on trains, instead of charge by weight, was a fertile cause of inefficient service.

Of 9,612 letters sent out by business men as a fair test, to and from all parts of the country, 56 per cent were delayed from a day to weeks in delivery. Local-delivery letters bearing special delivery stamps were subject to the same delays. During the year 1919, there were mailed from New York 119 letters at an hour when proper service would have delivered them the same day, and 81 of them were not delivered until the next day.²

Curtailement in the sorting of mails on the trains was one of the economies upon which Mr. Burleson prided himself. In his 1918 annual report he stated enthusiastically that during the preceding year postal revenues exceeded expenditures by something over \$19,600,000. Was the government in the postal business for the purpose of making money regardless of how it was made? The reduction of the human mechanism to the position of mere machinery, resulting in human wreckage and wastage, and a loss of morale resulting in loss in efficiency and service, is a matter of greater consequence to the nation than the saving of one cent every eighteen days of the year for each person. Through his effort to get credit for cutting expenses he earned the title of postal-service wrecker.

In the same report he further stated that there were formerly "frequent and unnecessary dispatches of mail;" but those paying for the service did not think they were

knew that, owing to the reduction in their forces in face of a largely increasing mail volume, between important terminal points, as Chicago to the Twin City or Chicago to Omaha, mail was worked to the extent possible and the rest was left to be worked on the trip back or left to its own devices, thus carrying it back and forth indefinitely before reaching its destination.

²When complaint was made by publishers of weekly newspapers in New York that they were four-and-half days reaching the homes of subscribers in Washington, the Department stated that the cause was the unprecedented rail congestion. Questioning and testing this reason, a number of the papers were taken to Washington and there deposited in the post-office just before midnight Thursday, and were delivered in that same city, within two miles of the post-office, the following Monday, some not before Tuesday.

unnecessary. The fact is, no date was permitted to be stamped on some of the inferior mail, and if it was delayed a month no one was the wiser.

It was a theory of Mr. Burleson that the cost of delivery of newspapers and magazines was too great for long distances. Accordingly, upon his recommendation the country was divided into eight zones, effective July 1, 1918, with a higher rate of postage for each successive zone farther from the place of mailing. This created opposition among publishers of such papers. Others knew little of the matter, though it was really they who suffered, for in many instances the additional cost was placed upon the reader.

In this proposed method of saving, the Postmaster-General sectionalized the nation, establishing a system obnoxious to the whole plan of government under the Constitution. It was bringing back the system under which the government under the Articles of Confederation had failed, the plan so opposed to the American's sense of the fitness of things that no one ever objected to paying the same rate of postage for sending a letter from New York to Brooklyn as from New York to Seattle.

The direct reply to this theory of the too great cost was that the method of the Department's bookkeeping was so defective that it was impossible to determine, with even approximate accuracy, the cost to the Department of the various branches of its service.

It was further observed, and with more point, that the system worked a discrimination against the man or woman of the distant, outlying and sparsely-settled sections of the country; for while enduring the hardships of pioneers, they were thus penalized for seeking the best in the way of current magazine literature; when, as a matter of history, the government had always theretofore conceded to the pioneer the privilege of having the best obtainable as well as he whose abode was near the centers of wealth and popu-

lation and of publications.³ Said one weekly of the highest standing: "In this eight-zone system, what could the brain of man devise that is more unbusiness-like and more unscientific?"⁴

Another favorite plan of Mr. Burleson was to rest control of the wires of the country in his Department. On so important a matter, the Senate did not like to yield hastily; it blustered for a week with the declaration that it would not be forced into hasty action. Its committee was making preparation for extensive hearings in the early hours of the day, July 10, 1918; but when the order was given from the White House, Senate leaders were convinced that it was time to take a vote, and on that day capitulated, not even members of the committee having opportunity to express their views. One senator in picturesquely describing the swiftly developing situation said: "The whip has been cracked and the Senate will jump through the hoop just as the House did last week." Accordingly, by order of President Wilson the government took over control of all land wires on August 1, 1918, placing them in the hands of the Post-Office Department.

In taking control, Mr. Burleson issued a public statement in which he said:

I earnestly request the loyal co-operation of all officers, operators and employes, and the public, in order that the service rendered shall be not only maintained at a high standard, but improved wherever possible. It is the purpose to co-ordinate and unify these services so that they may be operated as a national system with due regard to the interests of the public and the owners of the properties.

With what loyalty of compliance on the part of any, will be seen presently. In his 1918 annual report, prepared

³ In the spring of 1918, the author personally witnessed on the great ranches of Wyoming and Montana, scores of miles from any railroad, magazines of the highest class in the homes of humble herders, the ranch-houses on wheels ready to be moved from place to place where pasturage could be found for the flocks, among them *Harper's*, *Leslie's*, and *Scientific American*.

⁴ *Scientific American*, New York, June 15, 1918, p. 542.

but a few weeks later, he disclosed his desire for government ownership of these utilities when he stated:

The experiences as a result of the present war have fully demonstrated that the principle of government ownership of the telegraphs and telephones is not only sound but practicable.

Soon after he had taken over the wires, his procedure was described as having reduced all competitive systems to a state of chaos; as having changed the best telegraph and telephone systems the world had ever known to one of the worst; while running the latter at a loss of millions of dollars which he loaded upon the taxpayers, besides loading telephone users with heavily increased rates and a greatly depreciated service.

On December 6, 1919, Chairman Steenerson of the House Committee on Post-offices and Post-roads, having before him the annual report of the Postmaster-General, then but recently issued, criticised on the floor of the House, Mr. Burleson's mismanagement of the telegraph and telephone wires, declaring that he had gotten out of the taxpayers of the country \$9,000,000 to make up deficits, in addition to \$30,000,000 in increased rates; and he sharply questioned the figures by which the attempt was made to show the savings in his Department, declaring that while the report showed a net surplus of \$35,000,000 in the previous seven years, it was not true in fact and was misleading to the public, and in all probability claims for losses and increases for carrying the mail would wipe out the entire alleged net savings or more.

While Mr. Burleson undertook the next day to reply to this statement, he did not undertake to deny the enormously increased cost of inferior service to the public. And on the 23rd of the same month, the Interstate Commerce Commission rendered a decision whereby on space-rental plan on trains, compensation for carrying the mail was increased 33 per cent from November 1, 1916, and 50 per

cent from March 1, 1920, which, as Assistant Postmaster-General Praeger stated in the Senate hearings, amounted to between \$30,000,000 and \$40,000,000 a year, at 50 per cent. And in discussing the necessary appropriation, Mr. Steenerson on the floor of the House declared on April 15, 1920, that the space rental would cost about 8 per cent more than the old weight-rental method, amounting to between \$4,000,000 and \$5,000,000 a year on the slower space-rent plan.

Chairman Steenerson knew whereof he spoke. So did Mr. Burleson. Announcement by the latter that there would be a reduction in telephone rates under government control was immediately followed by an increase ranging from 14 to 36 per cent. So sharp was this increase from the various states that it brought vigorous protest from practically every section of the land.

North Dakota found that her increase approximated 30 to 33 per cent, and resented interference on any such basis. Ohio gave deliberate publicity to the fact that any attempt to increase rates in that state by the Post-Office Department would be resisted by the State. In Minnesota, Massachusetts, and other states, the public service commissions served notice of rigid scrutiny at points of interference with local regulations, with promise of contest should the government attempt to override rates fixed by local authorities. Some one declared that Mr. Burleson's state was about the only one in the union whose rates would not be about doubled; and even in Houston the city council refused to put the new rates into operation, and at a largely attended meeting of business men the council's action was warmly endorsed. Surely Mr. Burleson was getting a taste of the State Rights doctrine.

In Illinois there was actually started a conflict which assumed a serious aspect. Following the order of Postmaster-General Burleson fixing a schedule of rates in excess of those then in force, an action brought by the Attorney-

General of Illinois resulted in a decision rendered by the Superior Court whereby the State refused to be bound by the action of the Postmaster-General, and whereby the telephone companies of the state were restrained from increasing the toll rates.

As further illustrating the method during Mr. Burleson's incumbency, a well-known weekly, referring to the delivery of night letters assuming to be sent by wire, when under government control, recites this episode:

THE CLERK: That will be all right; we are not telegraphing night letters to New York; we are sending them by mail. 35 cents please.

MYSELF: You are going to send this telegram by mail and deliver it by mail?

THE CLERK: That's so.

MYSELF: And can you tell me why I should pay you 35 cents to deliver a letter when I can put a 3-cent stamp on it and get the same result?

THE CLERK: Well, that's the way it's being done these days.⁵

Nor was the increase in rates the sole objection to the Post-Office Department's wire management. Soon after it assumed control, strikes and threatened strikes became the daily news served to a patient public. Of them all, probably the most serious was that of Boston and vicinity, threatening the welfare of all New England. In this, the incapacity of the Department's head was acknowledged when, after a good deal of bitterness, he agreed to leave the matter to the managers of the properties and the operators; then a settlement was quickly reached.

So far as the public knew of his order of December 2, 1918, as to courtesy on the part of wire employes, warning that indifference to the public would not be tolerated, it was but to smile. Users of telephones in those strenuous days of strikes and threatened strikes, became accustomed to waiting fifteen to forty-five minutes to get the operator and

⁵ *Harvey's Weekly*, New York, February 1, 1919.

then meeting withering insolence from the operator or the unblushing statement that the line was busy.

As if these things were not enough for the public to endure at the hands of government operation of the wires, when hostilities were at an end and the silence of arms reigned supreme the President ordered that the cables be taken over as a war necessity—for which purpose alone the authority had been invested in the President—and placed them into the hands of the Postmaster-General. It is probable that there was no single act of the Administration for which both officials were so severely condemned. It was looked upon as a self-assumed authority, autocratic, arbitrary, unwarranted. The discussion on the floor of the Senate brought out the fact that there was some strange and unwarranted manipulation in the matter of the signing of the order of the President taking over the wires, assuming to have been signed November 2, nine days before the signing of the armistice, but incomplete because not countersigned by the Secretary of State. After inviting attention to this unusual course, Senator Kellogg stated:

The law authorized the President to take over the cables and telegraph lines as a war necessity, and not a senator on this floor or anywhere else dreamed that we were giving the Postmaster-General power to force on this country government ownership whether the people wanted it or not.

And Senator Hitchcock, Senate leader of the President's party, declared that even if the order had been signed on November 2 and was regular in every other respect, it was yet a breach of faith with Congress; for by the terms of the resolution granting the power and by the reiterated assurances of its advocates when it was up for consideration it was explicitly set forth that only in case of danger from war to the country's security was the authority to be exercised. And it had not been found necessary to exercise it until after war had ceased. It was bitterly denounced in the

Senate as an attempt to foist socialism upon the nation by executive order and the President was freely charged with playing to the radical element.

In taking over the cables, the President said the necessity for the act lay in the need of keeping two cables open between France and the War and State departments in Washington. While Mr. Burleson declared:

There never was a time in the history of this war, for which this joint resolution was passed giving the President the right to control the wire and cable systems, which calls for such a close control of the cable system as to-day, and which will continue during the period of readjustment. The absolute necessity for uninterrupted, continuous communication should be apparent to all.

He stated further that the cables had been insufficiently managed during hostilities.

It was asked why, if this were true, no action to remedy the evil had been taken until hostilities ceased. And the public wondered why the necessity arose November 16, five days after the armistice was signed, when the President's order was published, and at the same time that the President made known his intention of going to Europe as a member of the Peace Congress, and why they were placed in charge of the man known to be the politician of the Administration.

But caustic criticism met the President's statement, coming from every section of the country and from every complexion of political view, denouncing the President for duplicity in his treatment of Congress and the people. If his reason were valid, they wanted to know why, after the war was ended, he seized fourteen or fifteen cables between America and Europe and all the cables from the Pacific coast to China, Japan, the Philippines and Hawaii, as well as those to South America, Central America, and the West Indies, including all of the Gulf-of-Mexico lines—all this that there might be two clear cables between Paris and

Washington. The people saw through it as the sole purpose of keeping from them knowledge of what was transpiring at the World's Peace Congress at Paris—the center of the world's interest.

With the postal and the wire services of the country in the hands of a politician and both deteriorating in usefulness, with the President in a European capital instead of at the American, with reconstruction problems pressing for settlement at home and no one to give them direction—with these matters and others of imposing stature forging to the front, the outburst of the people became so violent in the spring of 1919 that the President, stung to action by the criticisms heaped upon himself and the Postmaster-General, directed that the wires be returned to private control. So virulent and insistent became the strictures upon the Administration that, though Mr. Burleson announced that the land wires would be returned as soon as Congress should make provision therefor, the country was surprised the very next day, May 2, by his turning them back on that date without awaiting further "provision;" and the cables were returned more than a week earlier than the announced date.

The most vitriolic of these attacks upon the Administration came from the President's own party, one group of whom cabled the President at Paris demanding that Mr. Burleson be immediately relieved of his office.

The two main reasons for the inveterate attacks upon the Administration's wire control were inefficiency of service and attempted political manipulation, including government ownership. But the immediate cause was the refusal of telegraph officials, under government control, to transmit a message from the New York *World* offering other newspapers an article in which Mr. Burleson was criticised. Said *Collier's Weekly*: "The newspapers are making a fight for self-preservation." And the veteran journalist of the Southland, Henry Watterson, declared:

That war involves autocracy I understand well enough, but in the field, not in the White House; over the international situation, not over our domestic affairs. . . . I reject, loathe and spit upon the plea that, because of war, the press should abdicate its duty to the people.

Mr. Burleson undertook to answer the complaints at a meeting of representatives of business organizations and of postal service, held in Washington in April, 1919. But it was only when the wires were taken out of his hands that the wrath of the people subsided.

It is a matter of historic interest that postal air service was established in the most pressing of war activities, on May 15, 1918. The first route lay between New York and Washington. This route was later discontinued, because it was said mail between the two terminals was delayed rather than hastened by the service.

The War Department at first operated the mail planes; but on August 12, 1918, the transfer of the equipment and flying operations of the aerial mail service to the Post-Office Department was effected. The New York-Chicago route was inaugurated the following December, and in three legs: New York to Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, 215 miles; thence to Cleveland, 250 miles; the last, to Chicago, 323 miles. Each had a midway emergency station. In December the War Department turned over to the Post-Office Department one hundred other airplanes, it having been found feasible to carry mail by air. These included large bombing planes capable of carrying a ton or more.

Though there had been doubt among aeronautic authorities as to the ability to maintain the service in all kinds of weather, the Post-Office department demonstrated its practicability. During the second year of its service, postal airplanes covered 498,664 miles, carrying 538,734 pounds of mail, with a reported average of 87 per cent perfect performance, including all conditions of weather. This is far higher than the train service, which is placed at 62 per cent on time.

America's best ideals must be saved to the world, and demagogic performances smothered. The nation has put too much into its Post-Office Department, and its operation comes too close to the daily life of the people to have it turned into a politician's paradise.

CHAPTER IX

THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION

One of the undimmed glories of America is the liberty of the press and freedom of speech. This is an enduring heritage from her foundation, and it shall continue to the last roll-call of her free sons and daughters.

If ever it shall be lost, then America of noble tradition is lost, replaced by an alien America. If ever it shall wane or grow dim, it will be because of sinister influences seeking, not America's honor, but personal aggrandizement. It can be brought about only by some stupendous cataclysm, when a seeming danger may close the eyes of her citizenship to the real danger.

There was suggestion of this during the Great War. There was evident at the very fountain-head of the government an autocratic assumption of responsibility for public opinion. The nation came to be governed by organized opinion. It was a result of this system that the American people were kept in ignorance as to the conduct of the war which they fought, for which so extravagant a price was paid.

As a means of getting to the public such information as it was deemed proper for the public to have there was established a daily newspaper, under the control of the government, edited and managed by the committee on publicity with George Creel at its head. This was the *Official Bulletin*. While this assumed to give out orders and statements that were deemed proper from the various branches of the government service, it was turned largely into a publicity political bureau to bring the President into favorable light, by the shading and coloring that were given to much

that appeared in its columns. Hence, despite the fact that the committee's publicity matter was supported by the Government, it soon fell into discredit. The New York *World*, an Administration organ, declared the President of the American Newspaper Publishers' Association demanded that the "incompetent and disloyal" head of the committee be let out. Stung by criticism, Mr. Creel himself admitted in a public meeting in Philadelphia, that the ostensible purpose of the committee was a failure. He stated: "The fundamentally important news of the war for the enlightenment of Americans has been available, but not one paper in a hundred has had the brains to publish it." He referred to the *Official Bulletin*.

There were three classes of American public opinion at the outbreak of the war in Europe: A powerful minority, clear-eyed on the fundamentals of the issue; a viciously pro-German, unscrupulous, determined, and abundantly financed class; and that composed of persons who knew nothing about the issues raised by the attack of the German people upon civilization, and who cared less, known as "neutrals"—the class who inspired timid statesmanship with a fear at the ballot-box. It was at this time, when the Administration should have been outspoken and should have aroused the American people to their danger in clarion notes, that the nation was deliberately permitted, if not actively encouraged, by the Administration to drift or to be carried away with pro-German propaganda put out by such men as Dernberg. The nation thus faced the home problem, as serious as that across the water. And while the newspapers felt it to be necessary to deal with it by drastic methods, they found themselves already shackled by the Administration forces. Learning of dangerous happenings beneath the surface, they dared not print them. It was practically impossible to use facts in a way to benefit the country by speeding up the war. The newspapers, by assisting in the lynching of public opinion, had created such

a disordered state of mind in the country that if they themselves had raised their voices to full strength in protest against inefficiency they would have been denounced as "pro-German." That fear hung over the head of everybody. The very incompetents who should have been shown up and thrown out sought refuge behind this psychological barrier. Newspapers above all things dreaded that German-propaganda charge, and rightly. The country was so worked up that any newspaper might have been ruined by falling under that suspicion, however baseless. The trouble was that the public, that was getting its denatured news from the government news factories, had nothing upon which to base an intelligent and honest opinion. Congress itself was all but terrorized.¹

How far American newspapers would have sunk in this slough into which the Administration had driven them, had not they received encouragement from some strong man in a commanding position, it would be difficult to say. Roosevelt in stentorian tones was proclaiming Americanism at all times. Senator Chamberlain, chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, in his New York speech charged that in some branches the War Department had almost ceased to function; and he gave courage to some of the more daring newspapers in the investigation of the War Department which he conducted and which did so much to speed up the war. His boldness brought forth a volley of denunciation from President Wilson. The titanic struggle brought to Washington Theodore Roosevelt who declared he cared less what they were saying about him personally than he did as to what the Administration was trying to do to Senator Chamberlain. The issue was immediately formulated between the Administration forces seeking to cover up reckless squandering and more reckless benumbing of the American conscience on the one hand, and on the other the forces that were urging America's utmost in getting into the war,

¹ George Rothwell Brown in *North American Review* for June, 1919.

represented by such men as Roosevelt and Chamberlain. It gave the thoroughgoing American newspapers a new courage and a new dignity.

The arrogant methods which were actually applied to American newspapers by the Administration, and to which the American newspapers out of a sheer feeling of patriotism submitted, out-distanced anything that the American mind could conceive in advance. If anything appeared in some newspaper more fearless than the rest, that was displeasing to the Administration press agent, the editor would receive a haughty communication, stating: "please make a correction and send us a copy of the paper containing it!" It is almost unthinkable that self-respecting newspapers would ever be compelled to submit to such autocratic imperialism. But the few Washington correspondents during the war, who revolted at the surrender of a noble profession, and who still undertook to write frankly the truth as they found it in occasional undefiled channels, were threatened and insulted.

The situation became unbearable. In consequence of the Administration method there was a steady decline in the morale of newspaper men in Washington. Their conferences with responsible heads of departments or bureaus degenerated into farces, and correspondents who had been proud of their profession lost that pride and all but their self-respect. The situation became so bad in Washington during the war period that practically every little minor official had a press agent of his own for his own personal glorification.

It was this system that worked so well so long as the American people knew nothing better. Denatured news which turned the noble and highly responsible calling of news gathering to doing the will of incompetent or headstrong officials, was all that the American people were allowed to receive. It was this kind of news that told the people, and led them to accept as fact, the story of a mar-

velous sea battle on July 4, which was never fought, and made possible the Liberty Motor hoax; the kind of news that caused uselessly many lives to be lost because American soldiers had to fight hand to hand with the veterans of the German army in the Argonne Forest, looking anxiously into the skies for the fleets of Yankee airplanes which they had read about in every deceived American newspaper, but which never came to their aid because they did not exist.

A form of control exercised over newspapers defied all but an official inquiry. To quote the editor of a daily in Portland, Maine:

Two editors of my acquaintance have been called to the phone recently by local government officials who notified them that if further material of the nature mentioned was published their papers would be suppressed.

This occurred just previous to the Maine election early in September. The matter referred to was solely Republican political matter, and its only bearing on the war lay in the fact that it aimed to prevent the election of Democrats in the place of Republicans of sound war record.

When the President sought to obtain from Congress a drastic censorship law, there was one time that Congress refused to become a rubber stamp in his hands. The remorselessness with which the censorship could be used by the Administration was clearly manifested in the fictitious manufactures that were sent out from Paris while the World Congress was in session. It was also shown how it could be abused when Washington was giving out that the total of American losses in the war would not exceed 100,000 at the very time when it was well known that they would exceed 250,000. And this was after the armistice was signed when the Administration felt that the American people could not stand the truth about our battle casualties.

Early in August, 1918, Mr. Burleson announced that, in order to "provide for the press the most efficient wire

facilities under government control," he purposed taking over the news wire. The intent of this was plain to all newspaper men, for the "news wire" had long been known as the best organized part of the entire telegraph service. It had been given preference over market and commercial wires, and was always the first wire up after disasters such as the Galveston flood, the San Francisco fire, or the loss of the "Titanic." It was always as nearly perfect as anything human could make it; and it was less in need of attention than any other mechanical device in the country.

The fact of the matter is that Mr. Burleson's bringing the news service under his control and the political interests he represented was to mean a censorship of all news—not by the usually frank method of the blue pencil, but by the winding method of official delay, holding it up until its news value was lost. It was easy for Burleson and his associates to say to correspondents handling material obnoxious to him, that "the pressure of official business" required the full capacity of the news wires.

When the New York *Nation* was suppressed and oppressed by the Post-Office Department, it threatened to establish its rights by carrying to the Supreme Court the case of its disbarment from the mails. In this manner it succeeded in having the Post-Office Department remove the ban against its circulation.

Referring to its experience with Mr. Burleson it stated:

Obviously, what happens to the *Nation* itself is, despite its fifty-three years of honorable and patriotic service, of little importance compared to the principles at stake. . . . Freedom of dissent is a true national safety valve; more than that, it is a mark of true democracy without which in war time any pretension to democracy lays itself open to the charge of hypocrisy.

It was apparent to all intelligent observers that Mr. Burleson was no longer merely seeking to prevent sedition and treason, but he aimed more to control public opinion.

The one central will which dominated the powers of government in Washington was that one in the White House. Gathering into his own hands all the powers of press and legislature, he parceled them out according to his pleasure, to bureaus and extra-governmental boards and commissions. It was impossible for one man to keep track of and to disseminate all the news, though all was retained in his grasp. The news agent developed. He became an important figure in Washington—to newspapers of the country he became a dominant figure. Two institutions sprang into existence fatal to the free press—the press agent, and its corollary, the official denial. These two were inseparable. The institution thus developed, the press agent became a pernicious factor in the formulating of public opinion. It developed, during the war, into the like of which this country had never before known. The “denial” by a government official was as essential to government-owned publicity as was the press agent himself. The purpose of the denial was to strike the venturesome newspaper that would seek to uncover official fiction by invading the forbidden fields of fact. Both publishers and news gatherers, in many instances, felt it to be a patriotic duty to close their eyes to what was obviously going on, and accept the output of the official news factories and send it broadcast, accepting the theory that in so doing they were performing a conscientious duty.

It became evident, after a little close observation, that the activities of the Administration in suppressing newspapers were directed not solely against pro-German publications. The *Christian Science Monitor* of Boston, a newspaper in no way radical in its editorial policy and very conservative in its news policy, was denied circulation for three days as a punishment for its publication of the aviation report and comment thereon. The *Detroit News* was barred, for the same reason, from circulation in Canada,

where it circulates 30,000 copies. The absurdity of this action was seen in the fact that its direct competitor for the Canadian circulation, the *Montreal Star*, published the committee's report almost in full and, of course, without punishment. The *New York Times*, never accused of divulging military secrets, suffered the penalty of having its foreign edition containing the report suppressed without notification.

Commenting on these facts Senator Lodge, in an authorized interview, said:

The purpose of the government is plain. If material appears which the government says cannot be sent abroad, that will tend to make every newspaper refuse to publish that matter. The effect of this governmental order would be to prevent the publication of anything relating to the aircraft situation in the newspapers by refusing the mails to them to go abroad. All important newspapers send more or less copies to Europe. If the publication of any matter will prevent their going abroad, cost them money, involve the loss of postage and all of that, of course, they will omit such matter altogether, and it will never reach the American people. . . .

In addition to all this, reports have come to me that many small newspapers throughout the country fear to make any independent report of, or any independent comment on, the news of the day because of coercion, and the attitude taken by most of them is the easy one of preferring existence on the government's terms rather than the surely hazardous one of attempting to perform a difficult duty toward their readers. . . .

If it is possible to prevent the full text and meaning of such a report as that of the Senate Sub-Committee on Aviation from reaching all classes of American citizens, then how are our people, who deserve to know the truth about their war, for it is emphatically their war, to be sure that any of the information being served them is reliable? If the corps of specially trained writers accustomed to serve the newspapers from Washington and other chief centers is to have its opportunity for expression choked off, then who henceforth will have confidence in the dry official reports, relieved only by the questionable interpretation of an official press bureau?

The effect on the people was inevitable. Deprived of fact, they often ran into fancy, forming erroneous conclusions upon misinformation. Public opinion was lynched. Freedom of thought for the first time in American history was suppressed. Only a few brave voices were heard in the land.

The evidence of the abject servitude of the Associated Press was made notable by a fulsome eulogy of the wonderful results of the diplomacy of Edward M. House abroad which was spread all over the country in an Associated Press dispatch from Paris under date of November 25, 1918. It undertook to establish the fact that upon his arrival there he "found little disposition among American and European friends to accept as a totality the framework of peace as expressed by President Wilson." And making it plain that through his efforts the desired object of the Administration was fully realized.

With the Associated Press and other press agencies under its authority, the Administration not only distributed but manufactured the news of the day to suit its own exigencies.

Shortly after the beginning of the war, the various news agencies, such as the Associated Press and the United Press, voluntarily announced that they would send to their clients only such material as would conform to government requirements. While the attempt was made to have this appear as a restriction to prevent the circulation of information of value to the enemy, in effect it became a political control denying circulation of all facts which it was proper that the American public should know, but which certain agents of the Administration might desire not to have known. Such an instance was that of the report of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on aircraft conditions. This was a matter of momentous import to the American public. Yet only one newspaper, the *New York Times*, carried it in full. The Associated Press sent out a

relatively small amount of it, and that made up largely of generalizations and evidently a dispatch previously submitted for official approval. The reason given was that the papers feared to publish what the Administration desired to have kept under cover. The reason officials gave was they did not wish it to reach the enemy, as it would reveal the military secrets of the United States Government.

Senator Lodge very truthfully stated on the floor of the Senate: "Our enemies know the contents of the report, our Allies know the contents of it, and the only people who do not know about it are the people of the United States." It would hardly be denied that the people of the United States were the ones who had the most right to know what a committee of their senators had to say after a full investigation of the aircraft situation.

Had the newspapers submitted to the outraged sense of decency in the action of Mr. Baker in refusing newspaper distribution containing the Senate committee's report on the aircraft collapse, it would have meant the end of a free press. It would have marked the beginning of the decay of American manhood. It would have foreshadowed the killing at home of the American freedom for which the nation made sacrifices so many and so great on the fields of France.²

Already the cry was raised by the more alert American newspapers, Are we to have a reptile press? And with abundant reason, in view of the methods pursued by the Administration in seeking to create a public opinion through the news columns that would exalt and magnify each official under Administration influence and who had his own press agent.

Theodore Roosevelt's exposé was the first complete view given the public of how the Administration favored powerful papers that fawned upon its acts. Yet it was well known to intelligent editors who publish throughout the

² Philadelphia *North American*, September 9, 1918.

country that the Administration sought control of the press through rewards of favor and threats of punishment.

One of the first demands made by President Wilson, after the declaration of war, was the enactment of a law that would have empowered him to suppress arbitrarily any critical publication. To its credit Congress declined to accede to this. There was, however, a measure enacted sufficiently drastic to intimidate many papers that did not flatter the Administration. Often the position of the public press was humiliating and intolerable for loyal American papers. The Administration undertook to supply information deemed proper for the public to have, and issued daily great masses of official statements, not only reciting alleged facts, but urging Administration aims and policies. In large part, the statements were inaccurate, misleading, and conflicting. Newspapers disseminating this material knew that in so doing they were often helping to deceive their readers. But there was nothing else for them to do if they were to continue as newspapers. It was sent to all alike; and if any of the flagrant official misrepresentations were modified or omitted, the offending newspaper laid itself open to the charge of not "supporting the government." Few newspapers had sufficient command of the facts to make it safe for them to risk a controversy by challenging statements they knew to be untrue. The method was simple but deadly.

As a whole, the system brought the American press under a reign of terrorism, few of the newspapers daring to challenge the displeasure of an Administration which had shown that it did not scruple to use the postal service and the Department of Justice to exact servility. Few of them had the strength or the courage to risk such an assault as President Wilson made upon Senator Chamberlain when he undertook to tell the nation the truth.

One Philadelphia newspaper, a keen analyst of the Administration's acts and one that stood notably at all times

for unadulterated Americanism and always firmly against the murderous tactics of Prussianism, whether in Europe or under the sea or on the sea or in the air or in the German propaganda in America, had an experience that is worthy of permanent record, though a shameful one for the Administration.

The case is not isolated or singular. It is typical of the entire Administration method in dealing with that class of papers which was so independent that it would not fawn upon Administration officials, and was so thoroughly American that it would not lower its standard for any false propaganda, German or other. Because of this the story is recorded in substantially its own words:

In discussing editorially, February 4, 1918, the Liberty Motor, it remarked that soon the original model "was found to be obsolete" and "was scrapped and the name adopted for a new and radically different model." A few days later the newspaper received an insolent letter from one Robert C. Benchley, written on the letter paper of the chairman of the aircraft board, stating that the newspaper had "put itself in the position of American representative of the *Berliner Tageblatt*" by spreading such "rumors." There had been only the "normal" change, said the writer of the letter, from eight to twelve cylinders, and he bitterly denounced the suggestion that that meant the original model had been found "obsolete." A newspaper less sure of its facts might have been alarmed by this "official" rebuke, with its impudent charge of disloyalty. The newspaper simply kept on telling the truth until, on May 15 (more than three months later), the War Department, in a formal description of the Liberty Motor, itself employed the very word the newspaper had used, when the report said: "The first sample was an 8-cylinder model. This, however, was never put into production, as advices from France indicated that demands for increased power would make the 8-cylinder model obsolete before it could be produced." Again, on March 25, the same newspaper printed over the day's account of the great German drive a 7-column headline in more conservative form than the dispatches, reading: "British Line Bends, But Holds," and on the same page a 2-column head, strictly accurate, reading: "Germans

Capture Peronne: Berlin Boasts of Victory." At midnight, newsboys selling the paper were threatened by a secret-service agent; who later took into custody the office employé in charge of the boys and conducted him nearly to the federal building before he would state what charge he intended to make against him. When he said that the newsboys were giving "aid and comfort to the enemy" by calling out that the Germans had captured a town and added that this was a part of the *North American's* pro-Germanism, the preposterous charge, once stated in words, appeared to frighten him, he lost his nerve, released the employé, with a warning that the newspaper would hear from the Department of Justice. When the newspaper undertook to ascertain who the agent was, the department declined to permit his name to be known.

Einer Barfod, of the staff of the same paper, is of Danish birth. His passionate loyalty to America is equaled only by his detestation of Germany. Yet from government circles there emanated an insinuation that he was a German spy employed by a German sheet. Reginald Wright Kauffman, a former correspondent of the same newspaper at the front, a member of the vigilantes, a group of writers standing for Americanism above all else, and standing for it when the Administration was truckling to German frightfulness, and whose utter devotion to the cause of the United States and the Allies was so well known that he had confidential relations with Lloyd George, Mr. Bryce, high French statesmen and General Foch,—because he questioned the wisdom of some Administration policies the whisper was sent out against him that he was pro-German, and agents of the Department of Justice were instructed to examine his record. The system of intimidation was so villainous that even the name of the editor of the newspaper, Van Valkenburg, was seized upon with the false suggestion that he was a German, though it is no more German than Wilson and Baker, and his ancestors had been in America 250 years before some of the Bolsheviki who fawn upon the Administration had set feet on American soil.

The revolting disclosures respecting the system is that seditious utterances against the United States might be safely made by newspapers which adulate the President, while truthful and helpful criticism of the Administration had become dangerous for publications which were wholly and devotedly loyal to the country, and it was shown that the price of immunity was undiluted servility. Just criti-

cism of governmental blundering and inefficiency mortally offended the authorities which tolerated downright disloyalty from journals which flattered the President.³

Perhaps in all the developments that the Great War produced there was none more sinister in character than the lowering of the American press to idealize an individual, cloud an issue, confuse public opinion, as seen from the point of view of American institutions of liberty. It bred subserviency, disguised failure, clothed incompetency with the plumage of efficiency. Back of the wall of secrecy and deceit, reared by the agile manipulators of public opinion throughout the war, blunders were made without exposure and repeated the frightful course because of that very lack. Gold was dissipated without detection, fictitious personages were created out of nothingness and pigmies magnified to the stature of giants.⁴

The plan of the Administration was merely aided by the surrender of Congress itself. Congress had no press agent, had no need for any under conditions that existed. As a consequence, congressmen were as ignorant of what was going on in Administration circles as any one else. The only real source of news was an inaccessible figure who terminated his intercourse with newspaper men shortly after proclaiming the policy of "pitiless publicity," and who resumed those relations only after his return from Paris when he found the country in an uproar over the League of Nations.

As illustrative of the method in vogue, Mr. Taft's advocacy of the League of Nations through news channels was given the widest publicity. Although long a private citizen, as an advocate of the President's program he had a wider use of newspaper columns than he could have obtained when

³ Philadelphia *North American*, May 30, 1918.

⁴ A very enlightening contribution to the literature of the war upon the method adopted by the Administration for the purpose of formulating public opinion in covering up its own defects which it did not dare to permit to come to public notice, by George Rothwell Brown in the *North American Review* for June, 1919.

he was President, except in interviews and signed statements.

As a result of the thoroughness of the Administration in securing control of the news channels, by fair means or foul, there came to exist in the United States a control of the press and a suppression of vital news and public discussion which it would be difficult to parallel in English-speaking countries except to go back 300 years.

On the great issues of the war with Germany the American newspapers were almost universally right. Loyal to the government, they were far in advance of the Administration in upholding the views of liberty and proclaiming the duty of America. There were perhaps not to exceed a half-dozen that failed to exemplify the principles of democracy and international justice.

Never shall a free press loyal to free institutions be stifled for political partisan purposes or personal aggrandizement.

CHAPTER X

LIQUOR AND VICE

An invariable accompaniment of war has been the social evil. And the social evil accepts and demands intoxicating liquor as its constant companion and partner. It were not just to President Wilson to charge that he in any manner or degree supported the former. But as indicated elsewhere,¹ it appeared to be a marked characteristic of his to be found on the wrong side of important matters affecting the great public; so he was found on the great matter of dealing with the latter.

But members of his cabinet who had to take care of the interests of the fighting boys of the nation and to look after the morale, not only of these boys but of the nation at large, accepted the challenge and met the issue squarely for the nation's interests. It was a matter of large concern to the millions of homes whence these boys came; it was a matter of grave interest for the nation's future.

For decades the liquor problem was becoming more acute as a political problem; for it had entered the political arena under the guise of the old political parties which, in large measure, it controlled, the liquor power seeking to keep itself hidden from public view. But the activities of this real power were being uncovered just before the Great War; and when the war forced to the front the necessity of conserving the nation's man-power and its fuel and food supplies, and of its utmost efficiency in workmanship in war preparations, the opposition to using any of these to accommodate the political and commercialized liquor traffic became more emphatic. And when the Senate's investigation

¹ Chapter on "Wilson and Wilsonism."

of the pro-German propaganda bared the fact that liquor's interests were inseparably intertwined with that propaganda, the opposition became an avalanche.

As to the social vice, it is a matter of history that Congress had taken cognizance of it as an interstate affair some years previously in the Mann Act; in war time it took drastic action in dealing with its associate evil. For war imparts new life and new energy to both; and it was realized that at such a time both must be handled with energy, the training-camp being a particularly fruitful field for their nefarious trade at the time when the best that is in man is demanded for the increased burdens. Said the eminent Englishman, Lord Haldane: "If the country were free from tuberculosis and venereal disease, the nation would have strength and vitality to undertake almost any burden." And the British Royal Commission, seeking to overcome the recognized handicap, declared that venereal disease was responsible for more than fifty per cent of the incapacity of the race to have children. It aims straight at the power of the race to perpetuate itself. Likewise, Surgeon-General Gorgas of the United States, in urging measures that were later successfully adopted to control venereal disease within the American army during the war, stated that if it were possible to get rid of either all of the wounds or all of venereal disease he would prefer to be rid of the latter.

The first attack upon the social evil during the war was made by the Council of National Defense and the Commission on Training-Camp Activities. It was a hard fight against the forces of evil organized for selfish purposes even against the boys who were to do the fighting and against the very morale of the nation. The success of the crusade is shown by the fact that one hundred and ten cities abolished the "red-light" districts. Laws and regulations were adopted in the various states requiring physicians to report all such cases, as other communicable diseases were reported.

The local draft boards had everywhere uncovered the ugly fact that about five times as much venereal disease existed in civil life as was found proportionately in the army. This determined the army and navy to carry its fight into civil life. In doing so it might have met opposition, had not wide circles of civilian life, which otherwise would have remained ignorant and complacent, become as thoroughly aroused at the conditions thus uncovered as did the army. And what Great Britain and the United States undertook in the way of fighting this fearful thing came as a result of this unwelcome discovery. The fight carried on by the United States Public Health Service after the war became a matter of utmost importance.

But this grievous state of affairs was a sad admission of inefficiency in American municipal government. The evil power had gained the upper hand largely because of co-operation or connivance on the part of the local authorities. Great cities, when called upon by the federal authorities to close these places of infamy, at the beginning of the war, declared that it could not be done, that the police forces were incapable of it. Secretary of the Navy Daniels informed, first the local, then the state authorities, that unless they were able to abate the evil, he would either withdraw the men from training at those places, or else would take possession by the strong arm of the navy. It had become a question whether these corrupt and corrupting forces were mightier than the municipal and state authorities, and had become so powerful as to dictate to the national government in time of war.

It was this unyielding attitude toward these twin vices that brought down upon his head the malediction of powerful interests and powerful newspapers. His efforts to save the men under him from these evils caused vituperations to be heaped upon him which one would think would have been heaped rather upon the evils he was seeking to be rid of. It was the very old story over: selfishness seeking its

own, at no matter what cost in money, health, self-respect, and morale for the sake of the nation.

But while war is the prime opportunity of these evils, it is also the opportunity to organize against and to combat them. In a public statement touching this phase of the matter, Secretary Daniels declared:

One of the compensations of the tragedy of the war is the fact that an enlightened opinion is behind the organized campaign to protect the youth against venereal disease. The campaign begun in war to insure the military fitness of men for fighting is quite as necessary to save men for civil efficiency.

And future generations of those who had a peculiar interest in the sailor boys, many of whom came from Christian homes, will rise to bless the Secretary for his determined action in seeking to rid naval stations of these training dens of vice that sprang into existence as if by magic as soon as training stations were opened when the country entered the Great War. The nation was placed under a great debt for his faithfulness to the trust reposed in him.

Secretary of War Baker likewise took advanced ground in this important matter. It had ever been declared that the evil was an inevitable accompaniment of war; that where armies were gathered, there it was sure to be found; that it could not be resisted. Secretary Baker declared not only that it could be prevented, but that it must be prevented. In a letter to mayors of cities he plainly stated:

The only practical policy which presents itself in relation to this problem is the policy of absolute repression. This policy involves, of course, constant vigilance on the part of the police.

Thus he was strongly backing up the Council of National Defense and the Commission on Training-Camp Activities, and Secretary Daniels was in hearty accord.

Yet the forces of unrighteousness continued their efforts to thwart these measures; and just prior to the middle of

August, 1918, as a police regulation badly needed, and its enforcement no less required because of the incompetence or indifference of the police of the various cities where camps were located, there were issued by both Secretary Baker and Secretary Daniels, the result of conferences held by representatives of their departments with the Department of Justice and the Training-Camp Commission, orders against prostitution within a radius of ten miles of any army or navy camp, station, post or fort, and against the aiding or abetting of it in any way.

In the same manner an effort was made in good faith to break up the sale of intoxicants in the vicinity of camps and to those in the camps; and stringent measures were taken to enforce the orders. Special care was taken to seek to instil into the minds of the men in army and camp the value of a clean life, not only while in the fighting forces of the country but for success after the war should have concluded. It was well expressed in a crude manner by a somewhat crude mind: "If the man in the army cannot mind what he learned there how to take care of himself after he gets out, it is all the worse for him; I'll say they learned me somethings I didn't know about."

One of the important results attained by the unceasing efforts in behalf of the men made during the war was this looking to the future welfare. It set civilian agencies at work that had been dormant. Said Chairman Fosdick of the War Department Commission on Training-Camp Activities, in his report to the Secretary of War in 1918:

It has been our purpose to keep the man in uniform healthy and clean, physically and mentally, by safeguarding him against evil influences and surrounding him with opportunity for sane, beneficial occupation for his spare time.

And after stating that the army section and the navy section were so closely related in method and material as to be treated jointly, he adds:

Their purpose is to give to every soldier and sailor in the service of the United States such essential facts regarding the nature and prevention of venereal disease as will contribute to the protection of his health and to the efficiency of his services as a fighting man.

These activities began in August, 1917, under the direction of the Council of National Defense, and were transferred, early in 1918, to the Commission on Training-Camp Activities. And it was the more than 50,000 letters written to citizens in 700 communities requesting them to investigate local conditions and to urge new legislation in support of the government's program against vice and liquor, that brought the communities into full co-operation with the army and navy.

The annual reports² of both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy for 1918, stress the conditions under which the men trained for the Great War, both in the army and the navy; and state how men that had formerly been turned away because affected by the vile disease were now accepted into the service and cured. Secretary Daniels called attention to the establishment of the interdepartmental social hygiene board in the effort to abate and prevent vice conditions throughout the country.

In furtherance of this general clean-up plan, fraternal organizations and commercial bodies wrote the Surgeon-General that they were ready to stand by him shoulder to shoulder in the work. And medical journals and physicians everywhere enlisted in the fight; as did employers in industry by awakening their employes to the gravity of the danger. And the United States Public Health Service entered upon a campaign of education for the public, immediately the war ended. In December, 1918, among other things it stated:

Whatever the cost of this campaign, whether that cost is counted in terms of money, scientific striving, self-sacrificing, educational

² Both of these reports are full of food for reflection on this vital matter.

effort, or wise restraint in personal conduct, it will be immeasurably exceeded by the gains.

The efforts of Secretary Baker and Secretary Daniels to keep the army and navy free from the damning influence of intoxicants were seconded by Director-General of Railroads McAdoo in an order of wide influence issued August 12, 1918, wherein he stated:

The sale of liquors and intoxicants of every character in dining-cars, restaurants, and railroad stations under federal control shall be discontinued immediately.

In the midst of all this effort to keep the fighting boys in the best possible trim and to return them to their home as free from the liquor taint as when they were taken thence to fight the nation's battles; and in the midst of all the effort to conserve man-power, fuel, food, and efficiency to carry the war to a successful conclusion, there is one instance in which President Wilson made an order that appears to be against the liquor business and in favor of the boys. It was issued June 27, 1918, promulgating regulations prohibiting the furnishing of liquor to officers and men of the army anywhere in the United States, even in private homes; and establishing dry zones of a half-mile within any camp where as many as 250 men were stationed for more than thirty consecutive days where there was a city permitting the sale of liquors, and five miles in all other places. And this order was issued upon recommendations by representatives of the Attorney-General, the Judge Advocate General of the army, and the War Department Commission on Training-Camp Activities, and not upon the President's initiative.

On the contrary, Secretary Baker continued to the end to plead for the fighting men, even on December 6, 1918, appealing to friends of the returning soldiers for assistance in discontinuing the giving of intoxicating liquors to the men as a part of home-coming celebrations:

A drunken soldier is a disgrace to his uniform, an insult to the flag, a shame to himself, and a danger to the community. . . .

I appeal to the friends of our boys at the front to discourage this abuse of hospitality. Our army in service has made a record for cleanness and sobriety of which the country has the right to be proud. I appeal to that pride to help the men to live up to their record.

This was the first effort on a large scale to reduce to the minimum the evils of drink and the social vice in time of war. Yet even in this effort, the voice of the head of the Administration in support of the liquor interests, when the acute stage was reached during the struggle at arms, found ready echo in all parts of the land. It gave encouragement to the saloonists and the lawless elements they represented. This was true of the lamentable situation that arose at the great naval station at Newport, Rhode Island; of the worse situation that developed at Chicago; of that in Philadelphia, where the governor of the state had to inform the mayor that unless the local authorities could cope with the situation the state troops would be used. Even little country towns in the inland Middle West felt this baneful influence.³

It was this consistent attitude on the part of President Wilson toward the liquor interests of the nation that encouraged them in the hope and opportunity of waging a campaign against war-time prohibition long before it was authorized by Congress. After Congress had authorized him to declare war-time prohibition, he delayed as long

³The small village of Blooming Prairie, Minn., is so typical an instance of this influence that the main facts are cited. In mid-summer, 1918, the saloonmen of this village, backed by some stronger but unseen hand, became the nucleus of lawless bands. The state commission of public safety found it necessary, owing to this condition in war time, to order the saloons closed. Open defiance of this order caused the governor of the state to station troops in the village to enforce the commission's orders. The saloonists going to a state judge, a man of the creation of their own element, undertook to hale the governor of the commonwealth, commander-in-chief of the state's military forces, into court, in time of war, to answer the charge of contempt of court on his part for not telling the court why it was necessary to enforce the orders of the commission touching the dangers of open connivance at law violation at such a time!

as it seemed possible. Before action by Congress, he interfered with every move to discontinue the manufacture of liquor from the beginning of the war. Immediately after the country entered the war, both houses of Congress, regardless of party lines, went on record for the suppression of the liquor traffic as a necessary means of conserving the nation's resources and energies for the conflict. Sentiment throughout the country backed this action. Hostile orders from the White House prevented. As early as June, 1917, the sentiment was so strong that the House passed, by a vote of 365 to 5, an amendment to a food bill, forbidding the use of foodstuffs in the manufacture of intoxicants during the war. President Wilson intervened and had the Senate adopt a compromise which stopped the making of distilled spirits and empowered the President to limit the alcoholic content of beer. From the time this bill became a law in August, 1917, the President had the power of life and death over the liquor industry. It was from this time on that the campaign of the liquor forces became more vigorous than ever. They now knew that the President was with them. It was not difficult to account for the outbreaks of disorder and the resistance to the orders of the state commissions of public safety in war time.

The intelligence of the nation could not understand the President's conduct in this matter. The pound of coal required to make a pint of beer he was unwilling to have saved to warm shivering children, to heat school-houses and churches so that they might be kept open, to save three million tons a year for legitimate purposes. Moreover, reports indicated that the twenty-five per cent increased output of fuel requested by the national fuel administration was promptly forthcoming in the states in which prohibition of the liquor traffic was already enforced, while the other states had to report that it was impossible to get out the desired increase. The President's action was understood only from one possible angle—he was angling for the liquor

vote, with the hope that he might win thereby the labor vote. At all events, it was not till September 16, 1918, that he issued his proclamation under Act of Congress of August 10, 1917, forbidding the use of foods to produce malt liquors after November 30, 1918, a few months before war-time prohibition became effective. And he let it be known that his action was taken after a conference with the Food, Fuel, and Railroad Administrations and the War Industries Board. Had it not been for his determined opposition, suspension of the liquor traffic would have ceased nearly two years earlier than it did. It was June, 1918, that an irrepressible movement for war prohibition began. White House Intervention postponed action until the end of August, and it was November 21 (after the armistice was signed) that the President signed the emergency food bill with an amendment making the whole country dry for the period of the war and demobilization.

Here again the President used his influence and the power of his official position to defer suspension of the traffic. An overwhelming majority in Congress wanted the act to become effective at the end of 1918; President Wilson, without stating any sufficient reason, urged postponement to the end of 1919. This would have given the liquor business another extension of twelve months. It was finally agreed that the time limit be fixed at June 30, 1919. This constant favor shown the business by the President led Homer W. Tope, superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League of Pennsylvania, to criticize President Wilson's stand as "a discrimination in favor of the liquor interests for which the Hearst papers and the German-American Alliance have been fighting for years."

While the important measure known as the war-time prohibition bill was but a rider to the emergency agricultural appropriation bill, it became the chief measure, the agricultural feature being wholly forgotten. In the controversy, the two forces, those representing the liquor in-

terests and those against them, showed the old "line-up of booze or bread; between special privilege and war efficiency; between waste and conservation; between instinctive whole-hearted patriotism and alcoholic patriotism," as put by one leading newspaper. The fact is, the President maneuvered until he succeeded in having lodged in his hands all power to commandeer all stocks of distilled liquors and to control or stop the production of beer. From that time on the traffic continued only by his permission. And a large propaganda was put forth to blindfold the people—a customary practice of the Administration when it had something to bring forth that would not bear investigation. It was on this occasion that Mr. Hoover gave out his statement that the diversion of a mere 40,000,000 bushels of grain annually to the brewers was negligible, though he had been sedulously instructing the housewives of the land to save every ounce of flour and that the winning of the war depended upon it. These wives of the country sat up and took notice. Mr. Hoover also gave out the opinion that the troops might be debauched with whiskey and gin, if not allowed beer, though that matter was fully in the hands of the President.

So insistent was the Administration head to have liquor continued that it was declared that efficiency in shipbuilding required it. Bainbridge Colby, formerly a Progressive and who had held to saner views, declared for liquid efficiency in shipbuilding; he had only opinion to offer, but that opinion was that efficiency might be expected to drop 25 per cent without the stimulant. But this was good material for extensive liquor advertising and it was used to the utmost. Postmaster-General Burleson, the politician of the Administration and seemingly the direct representative thereof, an ardent pro-liquor advocate, was against prohibition on the ground that it would "cause a fight in every congressional district." Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, found in the union

sixty thousand bartenders, and he was also against it. And as President Wilson had declared that he liked "to lay his mind along side" of that of Mr. Gompers, it was not difficult for the two Presidents to think alike on this matter. Mr. Hurley, of the Shipping Board, also was of opinion that efficiency demanded liquor. But these were chiefly opinions.

On the other hand, Fuel Administrator Garfield informed the brewers that they need not expect to be allowed more fuel than actually required to "utilize the materials in the process of manufacture, including malt already manufactured." This was taken to mean the end of the brewing business whether Congress acted or not. And while the President approved it, it was believed he did so in order to snatch the credit from Congress; it was in great contrast with the Administration's opposition to the House rider on the ground that it would put the country on a "whiskey basis." In his order of July 3, 1918, Fuel Administrator Garfield prohibited the use of fuel by brewers in excess of fifty per cent of the average they had used 1915-1917.

To make matters hard for the efficiency plea of the pro-liquor members of the Administration, there came, on July 12, 1918, the declaration of the National Coal Association to the fuel administrator that "immediate nation-wide prohibition is absolutely necessary if the extra hundred-million tons of coal a year needed by the country in its war on Germany is to be mined." This association represented the bituminous operators, producing 400,000,000 tons of coal yearly.

The same month that the shipbuilders were seeking to retain the liquor traffic for efficiency's sake, an inspector from the quartermaster's department of the federal government was sent to Kenosha, Wisconsin, to ascertain the cause of failure to keep up with the war contracts with the government. He reported that the delay was due to the wide-open and law-breaking saloons; that after spending

Sunday in carousing, many of the men did not report for duty Monday. Immediately the manufacturers, local authorities, and saloonists entered into an agreement whereby saloons were to close Saturday evenings and not open until the men had gone to work Monday morning, rather than lose the hundreds of thousands of dollars in contracts.

It was an open secret that the President's action upon matters touching the liquor traffic reflected the fact that his three trusted advisers in political affairs were three men who stood well with the liquor forces of the nation: Postmaster-General Burleson, Samuel Gompers, and Private Secretary Tumulty. However, his attitude had little influence with Congress, which body was hearing from the "folk: back home." It is probable that there was never a presidential veto handled with so little respect for the vote power as was President Wilson's veto of the bill to enforce constitutional prohibition.⁴ In spite of the efforts of the liquor people, it required the House a scant two hours to pass it over his veto by a vote of 176 to 55; and in still less time for the Senate, on the following day, to pass it by a vote of 65 to 20.

The extraordinary vacillation of the Attorney-General in the execution of the prohibition, whether the war-time prohibition act or the constitutional amendment, was in conformity with the whole procedure of the Administration in dealing with the liquor problem. One day the policy announced was that there was no governmental machinery for enforcement; directly after, the country was served with notice that stern prosecutions would follow violation of the law. And to the end of the Wilson Administration there

⁴In his veto message, the President stated that the measure "has to do with the enforcement of an act which was passed by reason of the emergency of the war and whose objects have been satisfied by the demobilization of the army and navy." Yet in his message to the coal strikers he had declared just two days before: "The country is confronted with this project at a time when the war is still a fact, when the world is still in suspense as to negotiations for peace." (Message of October 25, 1919.)

was constant, open, and notorious violations of law, so common, even in prohibition states, as to become a national scandal.⁵ And it is a remarkable fact that at the time when President Wilson was taking his last strong stands for the traffic and his Attorney-General was wobbling on the matter of execution, the Senate's investigations had already disclosed the intimate relations between the brewery interests which the President was seeking to save and the thoroughly disloyal German-American Alliance.⁶

The outstanding facts of President Wilson's relations with the liquor traffic during the war are summarized as follows:

1. His vigilant opposition prevented adoption by Congress, but a few months after America entered the war, of prohibition when the country was eager to eliminate the waste of fuel and grain at a time when the nation was gathering its energies for the final struggle.

2. Regardless of party, Congress promptly responded to this sentiment. When the House caucus of the President's party voted to promote war-time prohibition, the White House immediately declared that no legislation was

⁵When President Wilson declared his purpose to take the ending of war-time prohibition into his own hands in 1919, his action led the head of the New York Anti-Saloon League to declare: "By throwing a monkey-wrench into the enforcement machinery, President Wilson is running true to form on the liquor question. In 1917 it was the prohibition forces and not the brewers that he asked to quit. In 1918 he suggested that the operation of war prohibition be postponed a year. Last month he tried to prevent its going into effect at all, even though he had signed it, and he now gives the liquor traffic to understand that he will come to its rescue if it can hold on in the meantime. His assurance that he will do away with the law entirely at the earliest possible moment will be taken by the brewers as an implied invitation to violate the law in the interim. His suggestion will tend to paralyze the enforcement machinery; no official can have any heart in enforcing a law which he knows may be wiped out at any minute. The responsibility for any disorder or confusion due to violation of war prohibition is now located with the President."

⁶As early as December 11, 1918, Major E. Lowry Humes, of the Judge Advocate's office, conducting the Senate inquiry, read into the record communications showing the relations of the Alliance and the Protective Bureau of the National Wholesale Liquor Dealers Association. His records disclosed that this Bureau had expended \$1,168,071, which had been deposited to its credit in two Pittsburgh banks; and he charged that it was the political agency of the Association.

to be considered that he did not initiate. The caucus action was rescinded.

3. A little later the Senate added to the espionage bill a provision forbidding the use of grain in making liquor. The President objected and the amendment was stricken out.

4. On July 23, 1917, by a vote of 365 to 5, the House added to the food-control bill an amendment that no food-stuffs should be used in the manufacture of alcoholic beverages. Under strict orders from the President to the Senate leaders, this body receded from its clearly defined purpose to accept the House measure.

5. From the day the food-control measure passed, in August, 1917, the President had in his hands absolute power over the liquor traffic, and he permitted it to flourish undisturbed.

6. The growing insistence of the people for conservation of food, fuel, and man-power became so strong that it could no longer be ignored. Then the President served notice that there must be no prohibition riders to appropriation bills, though he well knew that this meant no action at all.

7. It was at this time that he and Mr. Hoover were so in accord on this one great issue that Mr. Hoover intervened with the statement that 40,000,000 bushels of grain were a negligible item; and members of the Shipping Board declared that liquor was a necessary item in acquiring efficiency in building ships.

8. But the answer of the country was so firm and pronounced that the measure would have become a law July 1, 1918, had not the President managed to delay consideration until the end of August.

9. Then Congress and the country were so overwhelmingly in favor of the law taking effect January 1, 1919, that that would have been the result had not the President insisted upon a year later. A compromise then made it effective July 1, 1919.

10. He cabled an urgent request from Paris that the law be repealed.

11. Failing in that, he sent a further message stating that when demobilization should be completed "my power to act without congressional action will be exercised."

12. This was, in effect, notice by the President that enforcement of the law would be lax. Liquor-selling continued with virtual paralysis of enforcement.

13. Every Administration influence was exerted to prevent legislation looking to the enforcement of the act.

14. Congress, yielding to the overwhelming demands of the country, rather than to White House dictation, passed the enforcement measure on October 16 by a very large majority, becoming operative October 28, 1919, with a drastic provision defining intoxicating liquors as those containing more than one-half of one per cent alcohol. The liquor interests had already announced their readiness to obey the law, when the entire country was amazed to learn that the President had vetoed the bill on October 27. The bill had been withheld from him, on account of illness, from October 16 to October 27, though a pro-liquor organ, a leading newspaper supporter of the President, stated that "he inquired about it almost daily" and then requested that it be brought to him.

15. This veto constitutes one of the remarkable state papers of the President, whether considered in its tone or its reasoning. He indicated a willingness to create a situation in which a law of the United States, with its violation invited, would become a mockery.

16. With scant courtesy for the President's reasons, this enforcement measure became law over his veto, administering what was, up to that time, probably the most decisive rebuke ever given to any chief executive of the nation.

17. From that time on, President Wilson manifested no interest in the enforcement of that law up to the time

the constitutional prohibition amendment became effective, January 16, 1920; and no more in the enforcement of this prohibition by the basic law of the land after that date.

That the dealers were hoping that the business would be revived was indicated in the various signs posted, many written in a humorous vein. Everywhere there was evidence of the confident belief that prohibition would fail because of resentment. One complaint of the dealers was that the vote had been taken when the soldier boys were absent from the country and had no opportunity to express themselves. This, however, amounted to no more than a wrong idea of what these soldier boys wanted, as was shown in their ready acceptance of the new condition upon their return from abroad. When war-time prohibition went into effect, virtually all the hotels of the land discontinued the sale of liquors at their bars and in their restaurants. And while the saloons generally remained open, only a few sold strongly alcoholic beverages; the others relied on soft drinks or else "2.75 per cent" beer to keep their business going. And much to their chagrin, they soon discovered that the American public manifested no resentment at the closing of the liquor traffic.

Many notices were given to the public by the liquor craft to stock up before July 1, 1919, some indicating that all hope was gone of ever opening again. Said one notice by one of the largest dealers in the country, in an expensive sign placed high on his building and in characters large enough to be readily read some blocks distant:

"BONE DRY FOREVER. STOCK
UP NOW FOR THE REST OF YOUR
LIFE. STOCK UP BEFORE JULY 1."

And on July 1, could be read these notices posted on saloon doors as one walked up and down the street: "For rent," or "Closed"; while another advised the people, "Closed

until further notice"; and yet another, "Closed; we have gone fishing."

This was six months before constitutional prohibition went into effect, all of which time the war-time prohibition was operative, but the traffic went on in great volume, owing to lax enforcement of the law. While in most places the sale was surreptitious, in many cities it was open and unhindered. Said the pro-liquor and pro-Administration *World*, of New York, on Saturday, January 17, 1920, the first day of constitutional prohibition:

Many places were openly selling everything from wine to whisky at sky-high prices yesterday afternoon and up to midnight. The subways were full of men and women heading for Broadway with suitcases and parcels full of liquor. Some were taking the stuff home, some taking it from their homes to hotels and restaurants. In the afternoon many bars and cafés were crowded. . . . Liquor flowed freely in Broadway places . . . till midnight. It was a hard-drinking indoor spree, rather than an outdoor affair. . . . Besides the oceans of liquor sold and drunk yesterday, a tremendous amount was unloaded surreptitiously. During the last few days, hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of wines and whiskies have been sold in New York.

National prohibition, under an amendment to the United States Constitution, went into effect at midnight at the end of Friday, January 16, 1920, barring manufacture, sale, or transportation of liquor in the United States.

One of the last official acts of Attorney-General Palmer, just as the Wilson Administration was passing out of existence, was a ruling that beer might be prescribed as a medicine—using his official position to nullify, in large measure, the clear intent of the fundamental law of the land. This climaxed the Administration's method of enforcing the law, in many instances by men selected from lists prepared by Wilson politicians, men who had been engaged in the liquor traffic and who were inveterate enemies of prohibition. In the summer of 1921 Congress remedied this defect caused

by Mr. Palmer's ruling, by a more stringent measure than had ever previously been considered.

The nation must be kept clean for future efficiency; and no liquor-pro-German alliance can be tolerated if the nation is to be kept safe.

CHAPTER XI

RUSSIA AND BOLSHEVISM

Russia is the land Wonderful. With its vast area, its variety of climate, its boundless material resources, its rivers and lakes and seas, the appeal to the imagination is irresistible. But the splendid idealism and spiritual aspirations of its people make it most wonderful.

Then why did not Russia stand true in its fight by the side of the Allies against Prussian autocracy? Russia, in her rulers, had an autocracy of her own. This autocracy was saturated with Prussianism in men and purposes. The men from the Russian masses fought with the courage of men imbued with a holy idealism and were slaughtered like cattle until their battle front became a shambles. But treachery lurked in the ruling powers above, and the fighting men could not longer endure the attacks of the enemy in front and a worse enemy in the rear.

Then came the revolution of March, 1917, overthrowing the autocratic government of the czar. This was the joint product of all political parties in Russia, whose ultimate aims differed greatly. On March 11 the revolution broke out spontaneously, the soldiers joining the citizens, army and people together turning on the government which had betrayed them and sweeping it out of existence in a five-days' battle.

Now followed a race between the Parliamentary Party, warmly pro-Ally and representing the great middle class, and the Revolutionary Party, leading the ignorant and inflamed masses, proclaiming all kinds of wild social theories and openly scorning any kind of international obligation. The popular government was organized with Kerensky at

its head. The Duma, the representative body in session, stood its ground in refusing to disperse upon the czar's order.

The Anarchist party did not cease its efforts. Germany, seizing the opportune moment, thrust in a wedge in the astute Lenine. Throughout the summer of 1917 the struggle between Kerensky and Lenine seasawed up and down, while Russia disintegrated ever more rapidly into a state of anarchy. In October the Anarchists successfully directed a counter-revolution in Petrograd, sending Kerensky into exile. This ended the brief period of the only representative free government Russia experienced. Directing with vigor the situation thus developed, Germany succeeded in bringing about at Brest-Litovsk, a treaty whereby Russia was betrayed into the hands of Germany, the champions of the social revolution in Russia agreeing with military autocracy in signing away their country's birthright of freedom. Lenine stood for anarchy—the destruction of the existing social order, not only in Russia but throughout the world, as a preliminary to the construction of a new society. He was enthusiastically supported by all those elements ready to enter blindly into the reaction against the existing order.

History can scarcely do less than ask the American Administration to show cause why it should not be charged with the defection of Russia from the cause of the Allies in March, 1917, because too slow in entering the Great War, and the resulting treachery at Brest-Litovsk just a year later.

While invariably declaring that the social revolution should not be interfered with, it is a fact that Lenine called Colonel Raymond Robins, then active in Red Cross work in Russia, into conference in the expressed hope that some assistance might be obtained from the United States that would assure Russia's standing with the Allies. For days, while Colonel Robins awaited reply to his cablegrams to Washington, Lenine held the diverse elements by his speech,

meanwhile meeting Robins repeatedly. No word received, Lenin and the forces back of him were lost to the cause of the Allies, and the fatal treaty of March 3, 1918, at Brest-Litovsk, resulted. And as a resulting disaster to the world, the destructive force known as Bolshevism was erected on the wreck of incipient free government in Russia.

When the Senate committee was conducting an investigation of this new phase of the social order, David R. Francis, United States ambassador to Russia, called as a witness, testified that he had told Raymond Robins to say to the Bolsheviks that he would recommend a *modus vivendi* if they would organize an opposition to Germany; and he stated it as his opinion that if Russia had remained in the war it would have ended a year earlier than it did and millions of lives would have been saved, then added: "Russia lost more men in the war than any other country although she quit the war a year before it ended."

It was strange that President Wilson repeatedly called this counter-revolution the revolution, as if it were that which had overthrown czarism. Either he was confused in his ideas or else in the use of terms. His confusion of purposes seems to indicate that it was the former. Had the democratic governments of the world maintained their first attitude in standing by the revolution which overthrew czarism and Germanism in Russia, Europe could have been saved the terrorism that reigned after the end of the Great War. The Allies, regarding the menacing rise of Bolshevism as a temporary phenomenon, failed to see in it a danger to the peace of the world. They thought that at worst it could harm only Russia. Though the warning given by clear-visioned men was ample, the vision of the statesmen occupying the world's stage was limited.

Chief among these was President Wilson, who went before the world with a special message on this new thing. As early as May, 1917, it had been made so clear to keen observers from the evidence of events that the Bolsheviks

were atrociously undemocratic that a warning was sounded. This warning went unheeded. The President, when, in November, 1917, it usurped the powers of government in Russia, hailed this new autocracy as the manifestation of the new day. He had ample warning that it was no democracy in action but a movement of "zealots incapable of patriotism and whose conception of democracy is a travesty upon the name." Early in 1918, when these rulers in Russia were betraying their country to Germany at Brest-Litovsk, he declared that they were working "in the true spirit of modern democracy" and that theirs was the "voice of the Russian people," which was giving expression to their ideas of right "with a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind."¹ Just eight days after the Brest-Litovsk infamy, he gave to the world a special message on the occasion of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets, in which he assumed that Lenine's militaristic government in Russia would "free themselves forever from autocratic government."

With the evidence before the world at the time he was making these statements, it seems incomprehensible that President Wilson, with his opportunity to know the facts, could believe what he was then saying to civilization.

In September, 1918, President Wilson declared that the rule of the Bolsheviks was a "campaign of mass terrorism," and called upon all civilized nations to "register an abhorrence of such barbarism." Their record was summarized by Herman Bernstein, an American investigator whose sympathies were with the supposed ideals of the Bolsheviks, when, after seeing the results of their course, he stated:

They demoralized the Russian army; they unchained the mob spirit; they incited civil war; they signed the treaty which dismembered Russia; they paralyzed the industries; they encouraged looting, terror and murder; they muzzled the press; they abolished the courts

¹Address to Congress, January 8, 1918.

of justice; they dispersed the Constituent Assembly by force of arms, and set up a brutal dictatorship.

This new power rising in the East was not Russia, nor was it the voice of the Russian people. The first principle of its creed was the repudiation of nationality. It declared that it represented a class, not a nation; and it spoke of a class in France, Britain, and the United States as well as Russia. Yet, in the early days of the world's Peace Congress there was the weakening of the assembled statesmen to the point of giving it representation in a conference called to meet on one of the Prince's Islands in the Sea of Marmora, which became known as the Prinkipo Conference. And to this conference President Wilson appointed a delegate who had written of him in these glowing words:

Woodrow Wilson has dared to believe divinely; and his faith that a federate world is possible, and the challenge of that faith to the nations, is the most creative collective act since the French Revolution. By his faith he has set a goal from which mankind can never take its eyes; he has sent forth the word that can never return.

This delegate, George D. Herron, a former Congregational minister of the gospel and teacher in an Iowa college, was dismissed from both positions for his discreditable personal life. Of this appointment one eminent American citizen said:

We have become accustomed during these past six years to the President's fondness for surrounding himself with intellectual and political midgets; but we have heretofore been spared anything so shocking as this appointment.²

And in his official capacity, a noted American prelate gave utterance to these words:

The case of George D. Herron, under appointment of the President of the United States as representative of this Christian country to Prince's Islands for conference with the Bolsheviks, is the most disreputable appointment ever made in the United States. . . . The

²Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University.

attack in his appointment is on the Christian home, which is the core of the American life. Without it, America might be Bolshevik. There is no republic possible where there is not God and where there is no Christian home.³

Of the many things done by President Wilson while in his high office, which demanded constant explanation by his friends and apologies by those who would like to be his friends, it is probable that his course with the Bolsheviks was the strangest and the character of his appointments as representatives of Americanism was most strange of all. Accepting the fact that the appointment of Mr. Herron had not the least basis for even an excuse, his commissioners, Lincoln Steffens and William C. Bullitt, were markedly strange representatives of America to show Bolshevik Russia what America really is. They were probably made upon the principle that "it takes a thief to catch a thief"—in this instance, a Bolshevik to catch a Bolshevik. The public was never offered any other reason. It was apparent on the surface, however, that numerous of the President's like appointments were of men who had been fulsome in speaking the President's praises. Notably among them were William Bayard Hale and Norman Hapgood. And it is a remarkable fact that all of these men, to the list of whom should be added George Creel, were men whose large aim was to overturn American tradition, perhaps pushing to one side the Constitution itself.

It was recognized that at the Prinkipo Conference there would come from Russia's 180,000,000 people representatives from none but the 40,000,000 under Bolshevik domination, and that none but that "bloody and disorderly tyranny" would have representation; for in all that vast region of aspiring peoples democratic expression was stifled by violence. And this was the people in whom Wilson saw the rising hope of the world. The Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, in large measure warm toward Bolshevik doc-

³ William A. Quayle, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

trines both in Russia and the United States, published from its Paris correspondent, a recognized authority on European affairs at the time of the armistice and a particularly well-informed commentator on Russian affairs, these words referring to the situation as it developed in late January, 1919, at the Paris Conference of the world's statesmen:

The decision has definitely extinguished all hope of settling Russian affairs through the medium of the peace conference. The invitation was a fatal mistake, both in form and substance. The unkindest cut of all is to abandon the staunch friends of the Allies to their inhuman butchers.

And in the same public journal, Vladimir Bourtzeff, an ardent revolutionist, declared in unmistakable terms:

Premier Lloyd George and President Wilson, in the name of England and America, are doing much, we believe unwittingly, for the development of the Bolshevik scourge throughout the world, and especially in Russia. Their responsibility before history is great.

In the sinking of Hungary into the Bolshevik chaos was witnessed the fulfillment of warnings often repeated. One of the least excitable of experienced European observers of the time had warned the whole world but a little while before:

The spectacle of European ruin is simply appalling. Nineteenth century civilization has broken down. I do not mean merely that famine and pestilence are creeping over Europe, but that there is a collapse of human moral energy, a revival of the primitive, barbaric instincts, and the fierce endeavor to have one's little private will by force. . . . Up through the European chaos is surely creeping the menace of Bolshevism—that Bolshevism which is the revengeful shadow of reckless modern materialism.

While loyal Americans will applaud the stern indictment which the Administration framed, in the early autumn of 1918 immediately after declaring that there would be no negotiation with undefeated Prussianism, calling upon civilized nations to "register their abhorrence of the organized

official massacres in Russia," history will not forget that it was but a few months before that these creatures, the blood-stained persecutors of the Russian people, were represented in Washington "as high-minded champions of peace and justice, whose generous idealism was a reproach to the imperialism of the Allies and a summons to American recognition." And now, in the Peace Congress, President Wilson once more turns to dally with the foul thing, in sending representatives to meet it in the Prinkipo Conference. Fortunately there was a collapse of the planned meeting and America was spared the further humiliation of negotiating with this insensate brute of proletarian autocracy. It was Clemenceau who had the vision to see and the grit to declare the move to be a "contract with crime." It was President Wilson who was looked upon by the Bolsheviks as their advocate. A few days before the matter came up in the Peace Congress, the former Bolshevik ambassador at London said: "It is not President Wilson's fault that our government was not represented at the Peace Conference." And the President's declaration that the democratic governments "recognized the absolute right of the Russian people to direct their own affairs without dictation or direction of any kind from outside" recalled his former famous statement that "with the causes and issues of the war we have no concern."

Outside of a few groups, as the Bolsheviks in Russia, the socialist and pacifist sympathizers almost everywhere, and those who looked upon it as a well-meant device that might be worth trying in a perilous situation, the proposal was unsparingly denounced. In England characteristic comments were: "hopelessly weak," "politically hazardous," "ethically wrong." In France, except among organs of socialism, stronger terms of dissent designated it as "strange," "perilous," "insane," one paper charging it to "ideology, ignorance, and electioneering politics."

In his determination to recognize the Lenine govern-

ment, President Wilson, in this third position he assumed toward Bolshevism, leaned heavily upon men of pronounced Bolshevik tendencies. This is why it was declared, by men in responsible positions, that if it would be known where the strength of the Lenine despotism lay, the trail to the Hotel Crillon was the right trail. Nor does any wonder when one of the President's commissioners, Mr. Herron, could write these ghastly words found in his previously published works:

I have no expectation that the present kind of civilization can be amended—it can only be ended. . . .

It is already too late to reform society in America. It is no longer a question whether you will have a socialistic revolution. It is only left to you to decide what kind of a revolution you will have.

The teachings of this personal representative of the President of the United States conform to the edicts, and his practices no less, of Lenine and Trotzky. Discarding one wife and seeking another, and compelled to flee the country because of his relations with the fairer sex, he was also a full-fledged internationalist and a budding Bolshevik, warm in his praises of President Wilson's internationalism, and ready to treat, in the name of America, with Russian Bolshevism, the very negation of democracy.

That history may be kept clear, it should be made matter of record that it was January 22, 1919, that President Wilson wrote his Prinkipo memorandum. When presented to the fighting factions in Russia, one after another declined to accept, contrary to the President's expectations, his proposals. Then it was discovered that the French Foreign Office had been in communication with the Ukrainian and other anti-Bolshevist governments, assuring them that if they refused the proposals the French government would support them.⁴ It was thus that America was spared the deeper humiliation, and spared through the efforts of France

⁴William C. Bullitt, in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, investigating Bolshevism.

and in spite of the deadly efforts of President Wilson's purposes.

The fourth position of the Administration toward the Bolshevik régime in Russia was similar to the second. There is ample evidence that the note expressive of this attitude was the production of Secretary of State Colby, and not of the President. But it expressed the views of the latter. It was written in the period of Poland's gravest danger from Bolshevism's fiercest drive of armed forces in August, 1920. It emphatically reversed the former attitude of the Administration and gave expression to America's judgment. It came at a time when most needed. For England, forced by the radical labor element, was committed to peace at any price with the Bolsheviks; and it strengthened the hand of France, which, in spite of Great Britain's position, had announced her intention of supporting General Wrangel in his South Russia scheme of fighting Bolshevism at home—France, again the pioneer in democracy, to which the American Administration was a good second.

In this new and fourth position, the American Administration said:

That the present rulers of Russia do not rule by the will or consent of any considerable proportion of the Russian people is an incontestable fact. . . . The Bolsheviks, although in number an inconsiderable proportion of the people, by force and cunning seized the powers and machinery of government and have continued to use them with savage oppression to maintain themselves in power.

And then the note stated further:

In the view of this government there cannot be any common ground upon which it can stand with a Power whose conceptions of international relations are so entirely alien to its own, so utterly repugnant to its moral sense. . . . We cannot recognize, hold official relations with, or give friendly reception to the agents of a government which is determined and bound to conspire against our institutions.

This looked like irrevocably committing the Administration, as some keen American journals declared, against Bolshevism. But in his personal appointment of George D. Herron, to the American people "so utterly repugnant to its moral sense," the President was not deterred. And the language is so like that used by the Administration toward Germany in the Metropolitan Opera House less than two years previously, and then almost immediately forgot his own words, when he declared that Germany and the United States "do not speak the same language of agreement."

At all events, in this fourth position the Administration was, in a measure, wiping out the great stain of the diplomatic absurdity and the moral atrocity of its attempt, in the early days of the World's Peace Congress, to admit to the Prinkipo Conference on equal terms the Moscow terrorists and their victims; and which abortive attempt of the President did so much to bring about the Red conquest of all of Russia. And it was of the utmost importance for the influence it had upon the sweep of events at the moment. England and Italy were ready to recognize the Russian Soviet Government. France, as ever, was steel-faced against Bolshevism. As in the face of the great German drive in the spring of 1918, so now, in the face of the great Bolshevik drive at Poland, there was division of counsel among the Allies. The note from the American government had a steadying effect. That in the Bolshevik plan of subjugation Poland is but a way station is evident. Germany and all of central Europe were the real goal. In the fall of 1917 Lenine had boldly declared: "Germany forms the most important link in the revolutionary chain; and the success of our world revolution depends to the greatest degree upon Germany." This was the plan for conquering France and reaching England. Already, for nearly a year before this American note of August, 1920, Bolshevik propaganda was active in Asia, reaching eagerly toward India to stab England in the back. Next to be

attacked was America. For Italy had already succumbed in mid-September, 1920, later partially recovering.

Indeed, it was in Milan, the hotbed of Socialism in Italy, where President Wilson reached the pinnacle of his popularity. His friends declare that it was there that he was worshipped as a god by those who set his picture by the side of the crucifix. There he declared:

Here in Milan, where I know so much of the pulse of international sympathy beats, I am glad to stand up and say that that pulse beats also in my own veins.

He had just stated that the working classes, "by their consciousness of community of interest and spirit, have done more, perhaps, than an other influence to establish a world which is not of nations, but is the opinion, one might say, of mankind." This was his announced internationalism as against nationalism. It is a foundation doctrine of Bolshevism that there must be no nationalism, no nation. It caught in Italy while the President was there. But as soon as he touched Italian pride in the matter of nationality over Fiume, his popularity toppled to the dust, and Orlando, their premier, fell because he failed to measure up to their demands of nationality, not because of his disagreement with President Wilson, as writers in support of the President like to say.⁵

To charge that President Wilson brought Bolshevism to America, as some do openly, does not accord with the facts. But history will lay a severe charge to his account in this one count. Before sitting in the great World's Peace Congress, he went up and down Europe, with an imposing retinue, turning loose the anarchistic elements against orderly organized governments at the very time when stabilized society was the first demand. Statesmen should have sought to show uncertain, restless elements a better way. It was these same radicals, whether in Europe or America, who later set

⁵ Particularly Ray Stannard Baker in "What Wilson Did at Paris" and George Creel in "The War, the World, and Wilson."

the pace which President Wilson was compelled to meet. He unchained the tiger which he was never able afterward to restrain. He released the monster which later showed its ugly head in America. He was as helpless to meet the menacing situation in America as he was to meet the appalling disaster which he had invited in Europe. Originating in the perversion of the developing revolution in Russia which he had failed to recognize in its real character, it swept eastward and southward into farther Russia and Asia, sank Hungary in the slough, grasped Italy in its tentacles, struck at Poland, sought Germany, aimed at France and England, and reached out toward America. The attempt to starve and freeze Winnipeg to its knees; the attempt to overthrow civil government in Seattle; the plan to starve the people of the United States in the "outlaw" railroad strike and to freeze them into submission in the coal strike; the steel strike directed by a horse-shoer who had never worked at a steel plant; the planned dynamiting of the home of the attorney-general of the United States and many others in nine eastern cities at one time; the constant demand for higher wages among highly-paid employes regardless of the burden it placed upon the shoulders of those outside of their particular class; the fostering of class spirit, particularly of the obstructionist or destructionist class—these were symptoms manifested during President Wilson's incumbency that had never been seen before in like manner in the history of America. Its blow was aimed at so-called capitalism and at the very foundations of civil government itself.

Nor were these solely outgrowths of the Great War. Indeed, in the splendid economic condition in which the country found itself at the conclusion of the war, there was no reason or excuse for this destructive tendency. People were never better fed, clothed, or cared for after a great war; wages were exceptionally good, money was plentiful,

there was no unemployment. America was unscathed by the Great War. Yet the President, after the shifting of responsibility and the delays characteristic of the man, became aroused to the dangerous situation at a late day, and in his annual message to Congress in December, 1919, stated in regard to Bolshevism:

Let us be frank about this solemn matter. The evidences of the world-wide unrest which manifest themselves in violence throughout the world bid us pause and consider the means to be found to stop the spread of this contagious thing before it saps the very vitality of the nation itself.

It was the poisonous serpent stretching its ugly self to America out of the noisomeness of the European pestilence created by the delays incident to a wilful persistence in seeking to arrange a super-government for the world in the Peace Congress.

"Let us be frank about this solemn matter." The sinister symptoms in the United States already mentioned were preceded by the celebrated Mooney trial in California. Thomas J. Mooney, a Russian, was convicted in the California courts on the charge of a most atrocious crime—setting a bomb on July 22, 1916, so placed and timed as to inflict the greatest degree of suffering upon the innocent. The occasion was the preparedness parade in San Francisco when the streets and sidewalks were crowded with people and other thousands were in the parade. Ten persons were killed by the terrific explosion and about fifty others were mutilated or maimed. Mooney was deeply interested in *The Blast*, a newspaper started to oppose preparedness.

The trial began January 3, 1917, and he was convicted by unanimous vote of the jury on the first ballot on February 9, and on February 24 was sentenced to death. Said the attorney for Billings, charged with the same crime:

We have had a fair trial. . . . This jury was impanelled by a member of the district attorney's staff with absolute fairness and impartiality.

Mooney himself at his trial was represented by the choice legal talent of the country, including W. Bourke Cochran, the silver-tongued orator of New York and former congressman. There was an enormous fund of money at his disposal. On the other hand, the prosecution had scarcely sufficient to pay the expenses of getting essential witnesses to the place of trial, a teacher in Hawaii having to lose his own time without pay.

After every recourse known to civilized legal procedure was exhausted, including appeal to the Supreme Court of his state, to the Supreme Court of the United States, and to the Governor of the State, an appeal was made to President Wilson outside the course of legal procedure. Grave charges were set up against the courts of California, particularly against the county attorney of San Francisco who conducted the trial, perjured evidence was submitted against him; and by means of the most persistent and widespread propaganda of falsehood carried on by the International Workers' Defense League, than which there is no more radical organization in the world, with money at their disposal running to upwards of \$1,000,000, the people were made to believe that the courts of California were corrupt and that, perhaps, Mooney had not had a square deal. This propaganda was carried on, chiefly in the important industrial centers of the East, by Alexander Berkman, since deported as an anti-American and whose very name is a stench in the nostrils of decency in his relations with Emma Goldman, deported with him. In conducting his propaganda, he always applied this rule: "No importance is to be attached to the guilt or innocence of the accused." The country was plastered from center to circumference with the little stickers printed in red: "Remember Mooney." The vigor of the propaganda, backed by such men as W.

Bourke Cochran and Felix Frankfurter, gave it momentum and standing; and some sections of organized labor were led to believe that an attack was being made upon labor by the California courts. That was the purpose of this million-dollar propaganda put out by American Bolshevism.

President Wilson had appointed a Mediation Commission to settle labor disputes during the war. Directed by its chairman, Secretary of Labor Wilson, to inquire into the Mooney case, it took quarters at a prominent San Francisco hotel, where it heard the Mooney side of the case. But no one was called to give the people's side, and its report was made up wholly from material offered by the defense, was written by Stanley Arnold, a San Francisco attorney, and with date of January 16, was published in full in the *Official Bulletin*, a government publication, in its issue of January 28, 1918. This report, giving only the side of the man convicted as indicated above of the most atrocious of crimes, stated that "from Russia and the Western States protest spread to all the country until it has gathered momentum from many sources"; that "the liberal (Bolshevik) sentiment of Russia was aroused"; that "the liberal sentiment of the United States was aroused because the circumstances of Mooney's prosecution, in the light of his history, led to the belief that the terrible and sacred instruments of criminal justice were consciously or unconsciously made use of against labor by its enemies in an industrial conflict." About the same time that this report was put out, another member of the Commission and its attorney, Felix Frankfurter, issued statements that were widely circulated through the public press "that a desire to appease the liberal element in Russia was paramount in the minds of the Commission."

This action on the part of United States officials, who appeared to be anxious to save the neck of a vile criminal who was willing to kill many and mutilate and maim for life many more innocent people who were interested in a

patriotic parade, led the attorney who tried the case to comment upon the Commission's report in these withering words:

The Commission in their conclusion moralize upon the duties we all owe to the cause of democracy. We venture to suggest in this regard, however, that democracy has no worse enemy than the man or set of men who, upon the unsworn statements of interested persons and without considering both sides of the case, undertake to set aside the verdict of two juries, which said verdicts have been sustained by the trial and appellate tribunals, in order to satisfy the demands of anarchists on a different continent whose views are entirely out of harmony with democracy as well as with any other kind of organized government. Anarchy and murder will never assist the cause of democracy, nor will an effort to overturn the Constitution and laws of our country to save murderers and anarchists increase the regard for democracy entertained by honest and patriotic citizens. . . . Making the world safe for Mooney and his ilk will not make it safer for democracy; neither will it stimulate patriotism nor inspire respect for our institutions.⁶

Prior, however, to the report of this Commission and prior to Mooney's trial, while anarchist Berkman was conducting his propaganda in the East, deceiving the labor unions and the uninformed public, he hired George P. West, who had deceived the public by his propaganda in the McNamara cases, to prepare a report in behalf of Mooney, the purpose being to set out to the public that the Mooney case was a labor case pure and simple. West was employed as an investigator by the Industrial Relations Committee, of which Frank P. Walsh was chairman, later joint chairman of the federal War Labor Board. And West's report was put out in the name of the federal committee, though its author received \$300 for it from Mooney's most intimate associate in his anarchistic activities, including publication of

⁶ "Review of the Mooney Case," page 65, by John M. Olin, Madison, Wis., 1919—a most thorough study and faithful digest of this whole matter by a trained mind.

the destructionist paper, *The Blast*.⁷ It was because of the fact that the public kept the Industrial Relations Committee in mind as a federal body that its name was used by the propagandists to influence public sentiment.

Theodore Roosevelt, writing to Felix Frankfurter relative to the matter, as brought out in the Commission's report, said:

I answer it (his letter) at length because you have taken, and are taking, on behalf of the Administration an attitude which seems to me to be fundamentally that of Trotzky and the other Bolsheviki leaders in Russia—an attitude which may be fraught with mischief to this country. . . .

The reactionaries have in the past been a great menace to this republic; but at this moment it is the I. W. W., the Germanized Socialists, the anarchists, the foolish creatures who always protest against the suppression of crime, the pacifists and the like under the lead . . . of the Bergers, and Hillquits, the Fremont Olders, and Amos Pinchots and Rudolph Spreckels who are the really grave danger. These are the Bolsheviki of America, and the Bolsheviki are just as bad as the Romanoffs, and are at the moment a greater menace to orderly freedom. . . . When you, as representing President Wilson, find yourself obliged to champion men of this stamp, you ought, by unequivocal affirmative action, to make it evident that you are sternly against their general and habitual line of conduct.

After the report of the Mediation Commission, John B. Densmore, nephew of Secretary of Labor Wilson, was appointed by this cabinet official to make further investigation. After six months, during which he received instructions from time to time, he submitted a report in which he stated that he had "continued a secret and altogether informal inquiry into the Mooney case," a report submitted as Director General of Employment under the Department of Labor. And prior to his connection therewith, he was an agitator in behalf of the noted McNamara case, in which the accused admitted their guilt of the atrocious crime

⁷ Id., p. 69.

charged against them, when real labor awoke to the fact that it had been hoodwinked by men of the stamp of Densmore, West, and Arnold. Thus, there was submitted a second secret report by Administration officials in which the people were not permitted to be heard, though it cannot be conceived how anarchists, criminals, traitors in time of war or any other time, such as Berkman, Mooney, and their kind could have any more right to be heard than the people who were innocent. Only those who were enemies of the people and whom the people had convicted in the regular process of court procedure were permitted to know what was being done. The methods of Catiline were not exhausted in the days of Rome's beginning decline. The notorious International Workers' Defense League knew the contents of the report and had made arrangements with the editor of the *San Francisco Call*, edited by Fremont Older, to print 25,000 extra copies containing this report, for which \$750 was paid, before the report had reached the Department in Washington. But the reviewer of the Mooney case was never able to obtain an official copy of this report, even for the purpose of setting out before the people the true state of facts; and to-day this report remains an unconfirmed, unsubstantiated government document based upon the utmost perversion of fact. A writer who has gone thoroughly into the substance of the Densmore report and what was back of it, sums up his views thus:

Densmore was in former years a supporter of the McNamara murderers and agitator in their behalf. His relations with various reds was close. He went out at the expense of the United States and is said to have had in his employ some thirty detectives, including some of the men employed by the friends of anarchist Mooney. . . . He and his gang tapped the wires between the district attorney's office and the United States Naval Intelligence office, the Army Intelligence office and United States Marshal's office and stole various documents and gave the information so obtained to reds and disloyalists who were subjects of investigation and prosecution by United

States and state authorities. Then choosing a . . . paper, . . . edited by . . . Fremont Older, who is a friend of the reds and had publicly entertained Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman, he published a scurrilous attack upon District Attorney Fickert. . . . Then after Densmore was subpoenaed as a witness in the United States Court and was wanted by the grand jury, he fled the state and in spite of all efforts on the part of the Governor and the district attorney to get him back, he is still a fugitive from justice.⁸

But it remained for the grand jury, which went into the matter with conspicuous thoroughness under the personal direction of the attorney general of the state to make the most complete and overwhelming reply to the padded Densmore report:

It was expected that as these charges had been made in a published report by an official of the United States Government, the grand jury would be assisted in its investigation by such official and those of his subordinates who might have been employed in procuring the evidence upon which the report was based. . . . Mr. Densmore departed and refused to answer the subpoena of the grand jury.

And all appeals to William B. Wilson, head of the Department, by the Governor of California, by the mayor of San Francisco, by the presiding judge of the superior court, and by the foreman of the special grand jury were equally unavailing, although Secretary of Labor Wilson, under date of November 27, 1918, wired the Governor: "I am instructing Mr. Densmore to put into your hands a complete copy of his report to me and I am also instructing him to place himself entirely at your disposal." A few days later the Governor replied that it was desired that Mr. Densmore report to the attorney general of the state. He did not report. Secretary Wilson then appointed William Denman, the man who came in conflict with General Goethals over ships, and he declined to represent him. And after then appointing G. Stanley Arnold for the same purpose, Mr.

⁸ *Id.*, p. 92, quoting "America's Greatest Peril—The Bolsheviki and the Mooney Case," by Francis R. Welsh, Philadelphia.

Arnold informed Governor Stephens, on December 23, that he was directed by the Secretary of Labor "to state that he will not at this time direct either Mr. Densmore or his assistants, Messrs. McCarthy and Parsons, to return to San Francisco." And William Armstrong, another of Densmore's assistants, declined to testify before the grand jury on the ground that he might incriminate himself. For over a month this grand jury had been led to believe that the author of the unfounded official government report or some one else representing the Department of Labor would appear before it to get at the facts in the case; but no one appeared. It was evident that Densmore did not dare to face a grand jury under oath.

The International Workers' Defense League, within two weeks after Mooney's arrest and even before the defense had decided upon its counsel, began its propaganda work. Men, like West and Densmore, who had poisoned the public mind in the case of the McNamaras, brutal murderers who afterward admitted their guilt in blowing up the *Los Angeles Times* Building, resulting in the death of twenty three persons, were engaged to carry through the same methods in the Mooney case, in utter disregard of courts and the methods of procedure of orderly society.

Also came the President of the United States disregarding the efficacy of courts, even courts of the last resort and the power of executive review. In January, 1918, the Governor of California received from President Wilson "the urgent appeal," asking whether it would not be possible "to postpone the execution of Mooney until he could be tried upon one of the other indictments against him." The very suggestion seems almost too preposterous to be credible. On March 27, the President wired the Governor, "if you could see your way to commute the sentence of Mooney, it would have a most heartfelt effect upon certain international affairs which his execution would greatly complicate." Again on June 4 he wired the State executive: "I would not

venture again to call your attention to the case did I not know the international significance which attaches to it." Very properly Governor Stephens refused to take action while the case was pending in the State Supreme Court, which disposed of it August 23. And an appeal to the United States Supreme Court was disposed of November 18, 1918. For the Governor of the State to take the case out of the court would have been an unwarranted interference with the course of justice in any case and would have shown him fitted to be a tyrant. If he made a mistake, it was in yielding to the importunities of President Wilson, to whom Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, had been urged by many resolutions engineered through labor organizations by radicals in sympathy with Mooney and his fellow anarchists, to make an appeal.

Said a careful and fair reviewer of the Mooney case :

This is the first time in the history of this country that an organized movement has been made to prevent the enforcement of decisions of our courts. If this movement should be successful, then the days of this Republic are numbered. So long as laws regularly enacted by the people are fairly and honestly enforced through the decisions of the courts honestly rendered, this country will be safe from any attack within our borders.⁹

The national Administration, as a result of the efforts of radicals working through Samuel Gompers and the Department of Labor, was constantly interfering with the operations of the courts in the Mooney case, many radicals being then employes of the Government. Just why President Wilson was so bent upon saving the life of this desperado, destructionist, traitor, was never revealed. But it was not the only instance. He besought Governor Spry of Utah to spare the life of another duly convicted anarchist, Joe Hillstrom, who, in cold blood, had murdered a seventeen-

⁹ *Id.*, p. 4.

year-old boy and his father. In that case Mooney, as secretary and treasurer of the International Workers' Defense League, wrote Governor Spry a threatening letter. Replying to President Wilson's second appeal, in the Hillstrom case, Governor Spry made this manly, straightforward reply:

I feel that a further postponement at this time would be an unwarranted interference with the course of justice. Mindful of the obligations of my oath of office to see to it that the laws are enforced, I cannot, and will not lend myself, nor my office, to such interference. Tangible facts must be presented before I will further interfere in this case.

Hillstrom was executed in accordance with the law. The attempt to blow up the home of Governor Spry was discovered in time to avert the disaster.

Mooney was interested in other cases, notably those of Suhr and of Ford, anarchistic murderers, to the extent of threatening the life of Hiram Johnson, then Governor of California, unless he interfered to spare them.

These cases are cited to illustrate the general scheme resorted to by the International Workers' Defense League, which is made up entirely of the extreme radicals from the Socialist Labor party, the anarchists, the I. W. W.'s, the International Radical Club, the Free Discussion League, and some extreme radical members of labor unions. They are cited for the further purpose of indicating still further how the Administration was as intimately interwoven with radical internationalists and anti-nationalists as it believed the Covenant of the League of Nations to be with the Paris Peace Treaty.

And this would not be complete without referring to the relations of the Administration to Robert A. Minor. If the Department of Labor, with William B. Wilson at its head, was responsible for Johannsen, a well-known anarchist and I. W. W., friend of anarchists and dynamiters

Caplan and Schmidt who stopped at his home when making their purchases of dynamite with which to commit their dastardly deeds for which they were convicted with the McNamaras—if he received his appointment as federal Mediator of Munitions Strikes by the Department of Labor over the protest of federal officials, while under indictment in the United States courts for complicity with the McNamaras in blowing up the *Times* Building, Los Angeles, and while attending the Haywood trial as an I. W. W. delegate, yet some one else or some other Department was responsible for Robert A. Minor, son of a Texas federal judge. Minor was editor of two anarchist papers, *The Blast* and *The Masses*, contributed to others, was an associate of Berkman, Emma Goldman, Johannsen, and other notorious Reds; testified that he wished to overthrow the American government and institutions, and in his public addresses and his writings advocated violence to that end; was the author of much inflammatory and infamously untruthful literature that did much to incite the Bolsheviki in Russia against the United States; was denied passport by the State Department upon the recommendation of the Department of Justice; and yet, through some mysterious processes of the powers at work at Washington, was sent to Russia as a representative of George Creel, though all of these facts had been called to the attention of the appointing power. There he served well in the cause of Lenine and Trotzky, head of the Bolshevik autocracy. He was the successor of Mooney as secretary and treasurer of the International Workers' Defense League, when Mooney was arrested for the San Francisco bomb explosion. It was under his leadership that the nation-wide propaganda campaign was begun that misled the public; immediately Mooney was arrested. And it was while the Reds were marching in New York in the interest of this campaign of falsehood, on November 12, carrying red flags above the United States flag, that some

of the loyal boys who had returned from overseas handled one of these anarchists, J. Edward Morgan, roughly,—the same Morgan who, when arrested in California, was found in possession of a letter from President Wilson's private secretary, Tumulty, authorizing him to travel over the country as a Mooney propagandist.¹⁰ As the loyal soldiers and sailors did not see it from Secretary Tumulty's viewpoint, carrying red flags on New York's streets was forbidden thereafter.

There is a yet more serious connection between this anarchist Minor and the Administration. It was on June 8, 1919, in a Paris café, while chatting with Lincoln Steffens, friend, confidant, and Russian adviser of President Wilson, that Minor was asked by a French secret service agent to accompany him to police headquarters. There he was promptly placed under arrest by waiting members of the American Military Intelligence and taken to Coblenz to the commanding officer of the Third American Army. Steffens went to the Hotel Crillon, which was President Wilson's headquarters, and informed friends that this time Minor would certainly face the firing squad.

Ten days after the arrest, the Military Intelligence of the Third Army presented to the Judge Advocate at Coblenz evidence to establish against Minor charges that he had been employed at Petrograd by Lenine and Trotzky to publish an English-language paper to be circulated in the American and British armies for the purpose of creating mutiny through the dissemination of Bolshevistic doctrines; that this plan failing because of the armistice, he moved to Berlin where he was associated with the Sparticides, the German Bolsheviks; that yet later, he moved to Coblenz, shortly after the American army crossed the Rhine, where he was caught publishing and seeking to circulate a Bolshevik pamphlet designed to foment mutiny in the Ameri-

¹⁰ "America's Greatest Peril," pp. 11-12.

can ranks. But he could not be arrested within the German lines.

Two days later a commission was set to try him on these grave charges, which he made no attempt to deny. The officers in charge of the case were confident of a speedy verdict, when, on the eve of the trial, a peremptory order was received from General Pershing's Chief of Staff that no further action be taken pending a report upon an investigation by the Judge Advocate General of the Expeditionary Forces. It is readily understood that General Pershing's only interest in a notorious military criminal would be to administer certain and severe punishment. After an investigation, however, the Judge Advocate reported that Minor was "charged with as serious an offense as a man can commit" and that he "thoroughly believed him to be guilty" but that because of the great desirability of securing a conviction, the trial should await the arrival of witnesses in the hands of the French and British. The American, British, and French were working together on the case, and witnesses were en route to Coblenz, when Minor was released on General Pershing's order.

Minor was hurried to Paris when permitted to go, and he proceeded to America where he next appears at the head of a mob of Reds seeking to make a demonstration on Fifth Avenue, New York, until dispersed by the police. And next he is found back in his old haunts with the radical agitators on the Pacific Coast.

When Minor was arrested, his father hurried to Washington. Whom he saw there the records fail to disclose. But anarchist Minor was a friend of Secretary of War Baker and of George Creel, both members of the federal Committee on Publicity during the war, the latter editor of the *Official Bulletin*. Evidently Lincoln Steffens saw some one high in authority at the Hotel Crillon; and Minor's father saw some one high in authority in Washing-

ton. And when Secretary Baker was asked to reopen the case, he refused on the ground that it was a matter of the Department of Justice—a statement which he knew was not true, since the country was still at war with Germany, and Minor could have been sent back for trial.¹¹

It is doubtful whether any investigation could ever reveal the devious ways of the Wilson Administration in dealing with slackers, disloyalists, and destructionists.

Nor did it appear to be necessary. For Ludwig C. A. K. Martens issued a statement on March 19, 1919, in New York, to the effect that he was the official representative in the United States of the Lenine-Trotsky government, his credentials being signed by George Tchicherin, Minister of Foreign Affairs and bearing the seal of the Russian Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. He was not recognized by the State Department, when he demanded recognition; but he opened offices in New York as the official envoy of the Soviet Government, with various departments and an official staff, including a Bolshevik disseminator of Soviet information, and prepared to open trade relations with the United States on behalf of his Government, with a guaranteed deposit of \$200,000,000 in gold. On April 2, he preached Bolshevism at Hunt's Point Palace to an audience of 3,000 people. This brought a protest from the curator of the New York Zoological Park addressed to the Attorney General of the United States. Six days later the Union League Club of New York City unanimously adopted a resolution calling upon the Government to take immediate action to put an end to the activities of Martens as Soviet representative. But these activities continued uninterruptedly. Large quantities of Bolshevik literature were distributed, a great mass of which came through the office of Martens in New York. His declared purpose to open trade relations between this country and his had a two-fold object: To appeal to the assumed cupidity of America and

¹¹ *Harvey's Weekly*, New York, May 1, 1920.

blind the people to the deeper design of propagandizing America. Whether the I. W. W. boast is true or not that the Russian counter-revolution, which sent the real revolution under Kerensky to its death when the Constituent Assembly was dispersed by armed forces, was planned in Seattle at the time that Lenine and Trotzky were in that city on their way to Russia, it is yet true that tons of Bolshevik literature were distributed containing the most incendiary appeals. And in October, 1919, the Attorney-General of the State of New York, after a careful survey of radical publications in New York City, made a report in which he stated that these reports were, in large measure, subsidized by the New York parlor radicals, and declared that they

are, in general, the same people who subsidized the pro-German propaganda and furnished the money for the pacifist, peace-at-any-price campaigns, and contributed to the cause of the conscientious objectors;

the central idea advocated being "the overthrow of the present system of Government, the abolition of the wage system, and dictatorship of the proletariat."

And this system of propaganda was in operation on American soil from the time Lenine and Trotzky took over the Soviet Government in Russia. Even while this nation was engaging all of its energies in preparing for and prosecuting the Great War, Bolshevism had a far-reaching organization at work directed by the trained agents of Lenine and Trotzky. Even as early as the middle of 1918 the national headquarters of the propaganda were made known to the United States Secret Service, which then obtained the names and addresses of 1,200 members of the Philadelphia branch, these latter embracing 15 soviets operating under the direction of the All-Russia soviets of America in New York. The movement and its propaganda were not haphazard, but were conducted by experienced revolution-

aries to whom democracy is as hateful as czarism or Prussian autocracy. Destruction in America is as much a part of their plan as it is elsewhere. Said the noted Socialist writer, William English Walling:

Nothing could be more untrue than to exonerate the Bolsheviks of the anarchistic taint. Their doctrine is rather a socialistic anarchism than an anarchistic socialism.

When this propaganda had been operating for some time, it was recognized that the leaders must strike, lest the psychological hour pass. The Winnipeg strike, the Seattle attempt upon the life of that city's government, the great steel strike, the coal strike, the attempt to force the Plumb plan upon the country by the organized railroad men, the "outlaw" railroad strike, the dynamiting outrages in nine large eastern cities and upon the lives of prominent men and government officials—these are some of the results of the previous propaganda. And an eastern newspaper of wide influence declared:

The Fitzpatricks and Fosters, the Plumbs and the Lewises—supported to some extent even by the Gompers group—are really engaged in a movement whose aim is to establish in this country the philosophy of Lenine and Trotzky instead of the principles of Lincoln and Roosevelt, to substitute classism for democracy and Americanism.¹²

How this was worked out, at least in part, by writers who received their inspiration from the Bolshevism of Russia was told by G. A. Simonds in his testimony before the Senate committee on February 12, 1919, as it was investigating Bolshevism. For many years and until compelled to leave in October, 1918, he was head of the Methodist church in Russia. He informed the committee that Bolshevism was being proclaimed in the United States by means of speakers, pamphlets, and articles in newspapers and magazines; and he named writers who had been closely

¹² The Philadelphia *North American*, October, 30, 1919.

affiliated with the Bolshevik government in Russia, and pointed out publishers of Bolshevik literature in the United States.

Indeed, in the very month that he was giving his testimony to the Senate committee, there was held in the national capital, and almost within the shadows of the place where Congress meets and of the White House, a largely attended meeting at which the soviet government in Russia was enthusiastically defended.

Trotsky knew whereof he spoke when he said to Colonel Raymond Robins:

Listen to me carefully. Follow me step by step. We have started our peace negotiations with the Germans. We have asked the Allies to join us in starting peace negotiations for the whole world on a democratic basis—no forcible annexations, no punitive indemnities, and a full acceptance of the principle of the self-determination of all peoples. The Allies have refused to accept our invitation. We still hope, of course, to compel them.

Surprised, Colonel Robins was desirous of knowing more and asked, in simple monosyllable, How? Trotsky replied:

By stirring up the comrades in France and in England and in America to upset the policy of their governments by asserting their own revolutionary socialist will.

An official order of Lenine dated December 13, 1917, showed an appropriation of 2,000,000 rubles, slightly over \$1,000,000, for the spread of Bolshevik propaganda. And Roger Simmons, representing the United States Department of Commerce in Russia, in his testimony before the Senate committee, which began its investigations of the attempts of Russian Bolshevism upon the United States in February, 1919, stated that Lenine had declared that "the power that had crushed Germany is also the power that, in the end, will crush England and the United States."

And this was the power at first insidiously, then more

openly, that was threatening just as surely, if in less tangible form, the integrity of the United States as was Germany. It did it through Berkman and Johannsen and West and Arnold and Densmore and Mooney and Minor and thousands of others, many of them in official positions, and others, to the end under the protecting care of men very high in authority under the Wilson Administration. And whenever President Wilson lifted his voice or used the influence of his high office to shield anarchists, Bolshevists, traitors to the country of the stamp of Mooney, Hillstrom, and Minor, he was unworthy any more favorable consideration than any other man who did the same. And some departments of the government under his Administration were abundantly loaded with men of Bolshevist taint. To quote him again, "Let us be frank about this solemn matter." It was not President Wilson who saw the danger and warned the country. As usual, he trailed.

Said Lieutenant D. C. Van Buren, of the Army Intelligence Service, in October, 1919, in his testimony before the Senate committee investigating the steel strike, that during the summer of that year the Russians in Gary, Indiana, started a movement to organize a Red Guard in preparation for the revolution which they then saw for this country. They sought to get all of the former soldiers in Gary together and drill and equip them; at the same time agitators were telling the people to prepare to manage and operate their industries—just the thing that happened a year later in Italy. The witness stated further that the situation had become such that it was necessary to find a man with a bomb in his hands before the immigration officers would act.

By this disclosure the Administration officials were stirred to unwonted activity; and on the morning of November 8, newspaper readers were met with large headlines telling that there had been a general round-up of destructionists in various industrial centers of the country: 200 in

New York, 175 in Chicago, and smaller numbers in other cities, and that 50 would be deported. The officials hastened to say that this action had been in contemplation for several weeks.

A man who was American to the core and who had been through the thick of the fight with Bolshevism in its most glaring form stated the Administration's policy very aptly in these words:

Many of the I. W. W.'s were arrested during the war and some were punished. The Government started, stopped, started again, conciliated, pandered, and generally pursued a skimmed-milk policy. Argument was tried, kindness, public statements appealing to patriotism, and this to a class of men who know but one argument, force; who think kindness is weakness, and who have no patriotism."¹³

This was but a manifestation of a pronounced characteristic of the Wilson Administration: "Watchful waiting"—shirking a responsibility until the urgency became so great that it could not longer be ignored and in some instances until great damage had resulted. In this instance, forced by the situation which developed as a result of the Administration's coddling this monster within the nation's fold, aroused at last by a public sentiment which it felt no longer able to resist and by open manifestations of hostility to the Government, Secretary Baker, in a public address at Cleveland a year after the end of the Great War took a position that heartened real Americans and that dampened the ardor of the destructionists at whose machinations the Administration had been conniving. He said:

Our newspapers are daily filled with accounts of violent agitation by so-called Bolsheviki and radicals, counseling violence and urging action in behalf of what they call "social revolution." The American people will not exchange the solid foundations of their social order for any of these fantastic programs.

¹³ "Americanism versus Bolshevism," by Ole Hanson, published 1919-1920, by Doubleday, Page & Co., New York.

This time it was more than words. When Ole Hanson, mayor of Seattle, asked for United States troops to save the overthrow of that city's government, they were promptly sent. Secretary Baker notified the Governors of all states in which disorder threatened to get beyond local control to call upon the armed forces of the United States for assistance; at the same time telegraphing each army department commander to respond instantly to any call from any Governor who found himself unable to cope with disorders and to enforce the laws.

In marked contrast with the faltering and paltering course of President Wilson and those directly under his authority were the inspiring words of Vice President Marshall:

I believe that America belongs to American citizens, native and naturalized, who are willing to seek redress for their grievances in orderly and constitutional ways; and I believe that all others should be taught, peacefully if we can and forcefully if we must, that our country is not an international boarding house nor an anarchistic café.

NOTE.—The treaty between Germany and Soviet Russia, signed at Rapallo, April 16, 1922, substantially abrogated the treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 3, 1918. Coming at the end of the first week of the Genoa Conference, to which Germany and Soviet Russia were admitted, called to re-establish Europe economically, this agreement, with the apparent intent of combating, in large measure, the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty and of challenging Western Europe, caused deep resentment among the leading nations, which felt themselves tricked, and severely strained the integrity of the Conference.

While the United States was yet a neutral, President Wilson had suggested to the belligerent powers that a statement of acceptable terms of peace was considered desirable by this government. The following day, Lloyd George, speaking for Great Britain, referred to "restitution, liberation, and guarantees against repetition." This was made the basis of the Allies' formal and detailed reply to Wilson's request the following month, on January 10, 1917—a year before the promulgation of the Fourteen Points. In this reply, the essential terms of peace were named. But Mr. Wilson had also before him the statements of the Special National Labor Conference in London published less than two weeks before announcing his Fourteen Points, as well as the speech of Lloyd George delivered at the Trade Union Conference on man-power three days before the President stated his Points. As Mr. Wilson declared at the time, these were both fresh in his mind on January 8, 1918. And Lloyd George, in an address to Parliament, stated: "Before the war was over we stated our peace terms. . . . A few days later President Wilson proposed his famous Fourteen Points which practically embodied my statement."

In his address before Congress, January 8, 1918, President Wilson declared his distrust of the German rulers and demanded to know for whom the negotiators at Brest-Litovsk spoke. It was on that occasion that he enunciated the Fourteen Points which are substantially these:

1. Open diplomacy.
2. Freedom of navigation in peace and in war.
3. Removal of international economic barriers.
4. Reduction of armaments.
5. Impartial adjustment of colonial claims, the interests of the populations concerned having equal weight with governmental claims.
6. Evacuation of all Russian territory, and such settlement of questions affecting Russia as to give her opportunity for determining her political development and national policy.
7. Belgium to be evacuated and restored.
8. Alsace-Lor-

raine restored to France. 9. Adjustment of Italian frontiers. 10. Peoples of Austria-Hungary accorded freest opportunity for own development. 11. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro evacuated and restored, Serbia to have access to the sea, and the political and economic independence of the Balkan states to be guaranteed internationally. 12. Turkey to be assured sovereignty of Turkish portion of Ottoman Empire, but those of other nationalities under Turkish rule to have autonomous development, Dardanelles to be free for all nations under international guarantees. 13. Independent Polish state. 14. A league of nations.

One writer upon the League of Nations pointed out that a day or two after President Wilson had stated his Fourteen Points, Lloyd George, in answering the same call as to the terms of peace, "made a statement which was practically an Anglo-French declaration. It was, in substance, identical with President Wilson's."² The inference might well be that Lloyd George was following President Wilson's lead; when, as a matter of fact, the reverse was true. And, as pointed out by George Harvey in an analysis of the genesis of Mr. Wilson's fourteen principles, not more than one originated with him.³

But they were thrown into his phraseology and the people generally came to regard them as the product of his intellect. All forgotten by a busy world, they then sprang suddenly into prominence when the President himself revived them in his conversations during the German peace drive in the autumn of 1918.

An unfortunate feature about them was that they were no sure guide to peace. After declaring them to be "the

²Kallen, "The League of Nations Today and Tomorrow," pp. XIV-XV.

³The *North American Review*, February, 1919.

And for a marked similarity between the Russian Soviet's peace terms and President Wilson's Fourteen Points, the former announced nearly three months earlier than the latter, see pages 260-263 of Edward A. Ross' "The Russian Bolshevik Revolution," The Century Company, New York, 1921.

only possible program of peace," he dismissed them as "only a provisional sketch." And the next month after formulating them for the nations, he offered to negotiate upon four abstract principles.⁴ And though given very great publicity, as a set of principles they scarcely survived the armistice, and in the peace treaty were practically ignored; while the thirteen principles submitted by Lord Northcliffe, eminent English journalist and shaper of public opinion, as indispensable to peace, received little publicity and were accepted by the peace congress, substantially in full.

When President Wilson proposed his terms of peace, including the Fourteen Points as the condition of an armistice, there was an outburst of protest in the United States and there arose a loud cry for unconditional surrender as the only acceptable preliminary of peace. Americans and Allies alike were startled when the President insisted that it must be accepted by the democratic nations without amendment. The first complete acceptance of his peace program came from Germany. On January 24, 1918, Count Hertling, speaking before the Reichstag for Germany, and Count Czernin, speaking before the Reichsrath for Austria, replied to the addresses of Lloyd George and President Wilson.

Between the time of these early statements of peace terms and the autumn enemy peace drive, there was issued a statement that is worthy of being writ in gold. It is that of the committee of British workingmen in charge of the Labor and Socialist demonstration held in London, July 14, 1918, containing these notable words:

Let it be known to the democracy of America that, come what may, even if Paris should fall and the channel ports be taken, the people of Great Britain are resolved to support the Allied Nations to the fullest extent of their energy and power.

⁴ Address to Congress, February 11, 1918.

This meant that the British workingmen purposed to fight the war to a victorious finish and to crush Prussianism before there could be so much even as consideration of peace. And the resolutions add: "What would follow peace negotiations with the Central Powers victorious can be judged by the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest." It gave a bracing to America's workingmen; and, perhaps chiefly, served as a warning to her statesman who had declared for making the world safe for democracy. It was a strange irony that should bring this warning from a European monarchy to the America which had always been the outstanding democracy of the world.

There is of record, however, at an earlier date, an American contrast with the President's uncertain course during these crucial months, that is refreshing. It was the certain and wholesome notes, in May, 1918, that came from the Philadelphia convention of the League to Enforce Peace. It was determined upon winning the war for permanent peace. In this convention were two dominant notes: One, that in the struggle then on we were in opposition to a nation conclusively proved to be a criminal at the bar of history and humanity; the other, that in the contest with this guilty and vicious enemy the war must be fought to an overwhelming finish. At that time President Lowell of Harvard University said we must be on our guard against an inconclusive peace to which we were likely to be tempted any day; and Senator Williams of Mississippi declared that we could not even talk peace with Germany; and former President Taft told the audience, in words that expressed the sentiment of the gathering, that since Germany's character was at that time fully revealed, the slogan must be stern, implacable war, and exclaimed: "Shall we not be open to the shame of history if we do not carry this thing through to the limit?"

The developments of the next few months showed that the basis of President Lowell's warning was substantial.

When President Wilson, without consulting the nations with which America was allied in the Great War, undertook his conversations with the enemies of the country for peace proposals within two months after the warning from the British workingmen and in less than four months after the warnings from the Philadelphia convention, the better thought of the nation was led by such men as James M. Beck, who declared that the President's peace proposals, at the very time when he was using all the prestige of his high office to control, for partisan purposes, the state election in Wisconsin on the ground of loyalty, were paralyzing the will of the American people. And his wavering raised a question as to what kind of Americanism he represented.

The President's idea of peace appeared to be different from that of the nations with which we were allied in carrying on the Great War. They had been through the death struggle from the beginning; and their idea of peace was a cessation of hostilities after complete defeat of the enemy. President Wilson's idea appeared to be to take the Germans in to aid in fixing the terms of peace—a negotiated peace instead of a dictated peace. He entered the danger zone of diplomacy when he opened the doors of conversation with the enemy in the great peace drive directed by Germany.

His minister to The Netherlands had a distinctly different view when he stated:

The duty of the present is to fight on beside France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Servia, Roumania, and, we hope, Russia, "to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war."

To talk of any other course is treason, not only to our country but to the cause of true peace.⁵

The President's supporters declared that he stood for unconditional surrender. But there was the avowed peace

⁵ Henry Van Dyke in "Fighting for Peace," p. 212, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1917.

program of the first serious effort at the peace drive, begun by Baron Burian, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister. It was what became known as the September "peace offensive." Beginning early in the month with vague and unofficial statements to newspaper men, it continued until the fourteenth, when an official invitation was extended to the Allies to send delegates to a secret conference for an exchange of terms to be binding on none. That refused, the effort culminated on October 5 in a note proposing, through President Wilson, to conclude with him and his Allies a general armistice on land, on sea, and in air; and to begin, without delay, negotiations for peace, these negotiations to be based upon the President's address of January 8, including the Fourteen Points, and his subsequent addresses of February 12 and September 27. This was generally understood to be merely a "feeler" put forward by Germany. The next day brought to the newspapers the text of a note from Germany, asking President Wilson to take in hand the restoration of peace, inviting the Allies to send plenipotentiaries "for the purpose of opening negotiations." Thus the issue of peace or continued war was presented to the nations.

Whatever the real reason for this action of the enemy, it is not flattering to the greatest world democracy that its President was so much more in sympathy with the brutalizing forces of autocracy and with the game to slaughter civilization than were statesmen of other nations, as to be selected by Germany in carrying forward her peace campaign. It created unpleasant, something of uncanny, feelings in the American bosom to have this country made the mark by the arch enemy of civilization for this distinction.

Nor was this feeling mollified by what became known as the general German plan and attitude, whether before or after the armistice was declared, an attitude indicated by a series of resolutions adopted, after the signing of the armistice, by the chamber of commerce of Cologne, one of the Rhine cities held at the time by the Allied armies of

occupation; resolutions embodying the hope that "the destruction of French and Belgian industries would allow a rapid recovery of German commercial power." These brutal calculations sought a peace, using the United States as a medium, that would give the unsubdued enemy the advantage of a long start over the victims of her crimes. They were seeking to bring their diabolical plan of wholesale destruction of these industries and the equally wholesale murders of the civilian population of invaded territories to bear upon the United States in order to have its President intervene in their behalf, that their own country might be spared invasion and destruction of its industries.

The persistent assumption that the President of the United States, a member of the court writing the judgment upon Germany's crimes, should descend from his place and appear before that tribunal as her counsel probably seemed to the German a subtle form of flattery; and the President's course, it was generally admitted, invited the doubtful compliment.

In all, it was very promptly recognized that the main-spring of the German peace policy was to separate the United States from its Allies in the settlement. Autocracy had lost the war; its only hope was to save itself and some of its power by skilful negotiation. The most obvious device was to make all possible out of the fact that President Wilson's policy was ostentatiously independent; that he had criticized and rebuked the Allies for their alleged failure to serve the ends of justice; and that he had declared a peace program to which he demanded allegiance from all belligerents. Prussianism accepted his terms, thereby binding him to seek a like acceptance from the Allies.

The Austro-Hungarian note of September 14 was delivered to the State Department in Washington at 6:20 in the evening of the 16th. President Wilson had prepared his reply upon the newspaper text that had been available all day. As soon as the official note arrived and was com-

pared with the newspaper account, his reply was made public—within a half-hour after the invitation was formally received. The reply stated:

The government of the United States feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian government. It has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace, and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain.

This was perhaps the shortest and least rhetorical of all of the state papers of President Wilson during the war period, as well as one of the most momentous. It thrilled the nation. It struck a very responsive chord throughout the civilized world outside of the enemy countries. If the fine and lofty idealism of some of his other declarations were inspiring to the world, this terse repudiation of the German plan was electrifying. And in this famous reply there was no delay, no hushed speculation as to what policy was to be imposed upon the nation. It looked as though, at last, the President had taken his stand with the people.

It was what the people had desired. It seemed at last the long-looked-for leader had appeared and was fully equipped to lead them from the morass of doubt into which he had permitted them to wander. The devastating swiftness of it all almost took the people's breath, while it crushed with astounding force the elaborately-built structure of the Prussian peace plan, its stern brevity leaving no chance for misunderstanding or rejoinder. It cut the ground completely from under autocracy's feet, threatening its utter confusion and destruction. The swiftness and bluntness of the reply are said to be without precedent in the annals of diplomacy. Never was government given more convincing proof of its strength and decision, and never did President Wilson display higher qualities of leadership than

in thus expressing the unalterable judgment of the nation fighting in a righteous cause.

On the same day Mr. Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, said: "I cannot see the slightest hope in these proposals that the goal we all desire, a peace which is something more than a truce, can be obtained." And Premier Clemenceau of France said: "We shall fight until the enemy comes to understand that bargaining between crime and right is no longer possible."

Eleven days after his swift and certain reply to the Austrian note of September 16, President Wilson continued the enthusiasm which it created by making in the New York Metropolitan Opera House an address that expressed ideas wholly in harmony with his reply, irrevocably confirming the outlawry of autocracy. This address contains a passage worthy of a place with the finest of American tradition. Speaking of the perfidy of the Central Powers he said:

They have convinced us that they are without honor and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest. We cannot come to terms with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement.

The address was somewhat confusing in its effort to harmonize its author's previous stand with his new position. As to the supreme issues of the day he stated: "They perhaps were not clear at the outset but they are clear now." Possibly this is as near to confession as one may expect; yet the one incontrovertible fact respecting the war is that the basic issues stood clearly defined in its first month. He also stated concerning the war: "We came into it when its character had become fully defined and it was plain that no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its outcome." Upon this statement it was April, 1917, that the

meaning of the war became so plain that America's participation was necessary; yet only a few weeks before, Mr. Wilson was insisting upon a compromise between right and wrong in his declaration for a "peace without victory."

No higher tribute could be paid to the utterance of the President in that notable address than the universal recognition that it was worthy of the occasion. No statesman ever had a greater audience or a more inspiring subject than he in addressing the nation upon the essential terms of peace. It was now the voice of American democracy that spoke the soul of the nation; not the weak and craven voice which said America was "too proud to fight," when might was trampling upon right. It was not now the voice that viewed the war against law and liberty as "none of our concern." Speaking with the serene sureness which came from conviction established in demonstrated facts, he spoke also with the authority derived from the will of the great nation which he represented.

No one should have known better than he why, in his phrase, "the air every now and again gets darkened by mists and groundless doubts and mischievous perversions of counsel"; and it was through his own vague quest that the country was brought to the point of dividing on the issue which he himself raised in response to Germany's peace drive.

In this connection, it is worthy of note that on the same day that President Wilson obscurely hinted that the issues of the war were not clear to him at first, another member of the Administration was uttering a robust avowal of error. This was Vice-President Marshall, who, in a public address in the same city, boldly declared:

I come here partly to make an apology, an apology for my attitude during almost two years and a half of that fateful conflict; an apology that a God-fearing man in the twentieth-century civilization could have dreamed that any nation, any people, or any man could be neutral when right was fighting with wrong.

When Germany saw that her overwhelming military defeat was certain and sought a way to avoid the inevitable consequences, she directed her peace offensives toward Washington. This course was logical: First, President Wilson had undertaken to dominate the peace settlement; second, This government was the only one of her opponents not pledged against making a separate peace; third, President Wilson had proposed a set of terms, every item of which was open to various interpretations and to controversy, and Germany's acceptance of them would bring her into closer association with him and might impel him to demand like acceptance from the Allies. The correspondence into which they drew the President went far toward accomplishing these ends. In every note issued from Berlin and Washington, the Fourteen Points were emphasized, and were linked inseparably with the suggestion for an armistice.

It was just eleven days after his notable New York address of September 27 that President Wilson made his faltering reply to Germany's request for peace terms, consisting of a statement and two questions. In this note of October 8, he stated that, owing to the "momentous interests involved," he deemed it proper to make some inquiries as to the intent of Germany in seeking his assistance. This is the famous note:

Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January last and in subsequent addresses, and that its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?

The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of

an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those Powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answer to these questions vital from every point of view.

It was with mingled astonishment, rage, and dismay that the souls of men were possessed when the news of his reply was published after what he had led the nation to expect as results of his address of September 27. This was evidenced by unvarying murmurs of "It is what we have feared all along." The German Government, knowing that a war was never won by talking peace, engaged the American Government in talking peace. The division of sentiment was instant, whereas it had been solidly back of the President the day before. It led to James M. Beck's declaration that the President's wavering course was "paralyzing the will of the American people." The day before the President's reply, Senator Lodge had pledged his unequivocal support to the President's declared policy of refusing to have anything to do with German peace except through victory. The country was united. The leaders of the two great political parties were in hearty accord on Monday, while on Wednesday they were as far apart as the antipodes. The President had changed and the people were disappointed.

This division in public sentiment was shown in the two resolutions offered in the senate. That by Senator Lodge:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that there should be no further communication with the German Government upon the

subject of an armistice or conditions of peace, except a demand for unconditional surrender.

That by Senator Lewis of Illinois was in these words:

Resolved, That the United States Senate approves whatever course may be taken by the President of the United States in the matter of his replies and in his dealings with the German Imperial Government and the Austrian Imperial Government and the allies of either or both, in response to the demand of either for peace or armistice.

Smarting under the criticisms of his first temporizing note to Germany, he essayed to issue, through Senator Pittman of Nevada, a direct challenge to his opponents, in this language: "The test in the coming election is inevitable between the policies of Woodrow Wilson and the policies of Henry Cabot Lodge." He uttered a great truth.

Notwithstanding Mr. Wilson's capacity for fine phrasing, some of his state papers, which should have left no possible scope for difference of opinion, were obscure in the extreme. And this first reply to Germany, containing fewer than 250 words, was so susceptible of differing constructions that the various interpretations given to it filled many columns, some of them wholly in conflict with others. A thoroughgoing American newspaper stated: "Once more the American nation, eager for leadership, found itself confronting, instead, a question-mark." And when the outcry against the President's reply became too loud, Secretary of State Lansing explained to the public that the President's note was only a preliminary inquiry. That this was mere pretense was shown by the inspired interpretations issued from Washington describing it as the most powerful and decisive document of the war, and which declared it to exhibit "subtle dialectic skill," "majestic simplicity," and "the force of an ultimatum." But when the President, yielding to the enraged protest, changed his position and referred the entire matter to the Allies, where it belonged,

in his next note to Germany, the nation was delivered from a grave menace.

In his reply of October 8, he was led into what the Germans desired—conversations by an individual nation in the hope of winning that nation from its Allies. And had it not been for the sound American sentiments which sounded the alarm with an outcry that was exceeded by none during the war except that in the airplane scandal and the failure of the war department to function after the years of the do-nothing spirit, there was a fine prospect of its success.

The German government seizing the opportunity, with swift and deadly precision on October 12 answered fully the President's two questions and in almost his exact words. Forced by the articulate rage on the part of America, to say nothing of the courteous protest of the European Allied statesmen, he then, on October 14, informed Germany that, "The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America . . . justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision with regard to the communications of the German Government of the 8th and 12th of October, 1918." And he further stated that "it must be understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments."

Germany acceding to these conditions and asking for an armistice in its reply of October 20, the President replied by stating that he had referred all to the Allied nations.

The peace conversations between President Wilson and the enemy powers are well summed up by a leading eastern newspaper as follows:

1. Germany to President Wilson—We request you to bring about an immediate armistice, and a peace conference with your terms as a basis of negotiations.

2. President Wilson to Germany—I will not propose an armistice so long as your armies are on invaded soil. Do you mean that you accept my terms, and wish to discuss merely the details of their application? Is your government still an autocracy?

3. Germany to President Wilson—We have accepted your terms and principles and wish merely to discuss their application. We are ready to evacuate invaded territory, under an armistice arranged by a mixed commission. We speak in the name of the German government and the German people.

4. President Wilson to Germany—Conditions of an armistice must be decided by the military advisers of your opponents jointly, and must safeguard the military supremacy attained over you. Cessation of illegal and inhumane practices is first required. Your government is still arbitrary and autocratic, and it is within the choice of the German people to alter it. We must know with whom we are speaking.

5. Germany to President Wilson—We again request an armistice, the terms based upon the actual standard of power on both sides in the field. We trust you will resist any demand injurious to the honor of the German people. Charges of illegal war practices are denied, but those guilty of such acts are being punished. You are dealing with a government free from any arbitrary and irresponsible influence and supported by the German people.

6. President Wilson to Germany—Upon your assurances, I have transmitted to the Allies your request for an armistice, the understanding being that the terms would prevent your renewing hostilities and enable your opponents to enforce the details of the peace to which you have agreed. Extraordinary guarantees are required because your government is not yet satisfactorily made responsible to the German people. With veritable representatives of the people a negotiated peace is possible; if we must deal with militarists and monarchical autocrats, our demand must be for surrender.

7. Germany to President Wilson—This is a government of the people, and it controls the military authorities. It awaits proposals for an armistice, as a step toward peace on the Wilson terms.⁶

⁶ *The Philadelphia North American.*

That is the documentary record, including an ultimatum to the Allies in number 6.

In the Allied countries, the President's note of October 8 to Germany was praised; but the indorsements were cautious and they soon gave way to frank dissent. An official representative of Great Britain in Washington declared: "We cannot win this war by talking peace." The *London Chronicle* said: "It is expected here that President Wilson will stipulate, instead of asking rhetorical questions." For four years Lord Northcliffe's positive instructions to his English newspapers were that there was to be no criticism whatever of President Wilson in his newspapers. But under the stress of the President's reply to Germany his patience yielded and his *London Times*, chief of the papers, said:

We all have the greatest confidence in President Wilson, but we think it would have been better if, instead of attempting any negotiations, he had stated straight out that any peace offer from the Central Powers must be presented to the Allies as a whole.

And another dispatch said: "It was hoped in Britain that he would not be actuated by any desire to appropriate an undue share of responsibility in answering Germany." There was no word of approval from the great English journals.

The only prominent man of the Allies in approval was the English pacifist Lansdowne. It was all deep silence from every European statesman from the democratic nations. Propaganda given out from Washington undertook to show Sir Eric Geddes, of the British admiralty, as giving "unqualified approval" of the President's course. But what he said was this: "We cannot win by talking peace. To get us talking of peace is just what Germany wants. Let the Kaiser talk while Foch shoots." And Premier Lloyd George would speak only of the brilliant success of the Allied arms against the common enemy.

Immediately after President Wilson's alarming reply

to the German note requesting an armistice, Mr. Bonar Law, government spokesman in the British House of Commons, made an announcement in Parliament sounding the alarm and giving warning to the civilized world that it would be very unwise for any of the Allied governments to make any statement as to the terms likely to be imposed upon Germany, before an armistice should be granted.

In France the sentiment concerning President Wilson's move was that there was developed among statesmen an influential body of opinion which would be more practicable if Mr. Wilson had said less. *Le Temps*, a semi-official newspaper and the most powerful in France, said: "Germany appears to believe that President Wilson intervenes as an arbiter to put everybody right." On the same day that the *New York World* was presenting on its first page the evidence of the enthusiasm of the Allies over Mr. Wilson's move, there came from Paris this news:

Paris, October 9.—While Paris waited for President Wilson's reply to Germany, the French press contented itself with printing long accounts of anti-armistice speeches in the United States Senate and a full symposium of American newspaper opinion, which, as it appears here, was unanimous against an interruption in the fighting. In fact, the reports of the debates in the American Senate share first pages with the news of the great military victories on the west front. Senators McCumber, Nelson, and Lodge are as highly thought of in France today as are the American generals. No news of the outcome of any battle was ever awaited with more eagerness than was the reply of the American President to the German Chancellor.

While there was among the Allied nations, as among Americans, a disposition to accord to President Wilson the fullest measure of recognition in his effort to bring about a just peace, they were resolved that the fate of autocracy should not be committed exclusively to the judgment of one arbitrary wavering will.

German newspapers, on the other hand, were rather partial toward President Wilson's attitude. The first impres-

sion was a feeling of dismay, due to a misapprehension of the President's position. The *Tageblatt* stated that a rumor spread like lightning through Berlin that he had rejected the German offer. It said: "The emotion which followed was indescribable. It seemed as if a terrible catastrophe had descended on the city. Gloom and sulkiness prevailed"; and that when a correction of the erroneous report lifted the pall, unconfined joy supplanted it. In Strasbourg the first report was that "the President had replied favorably" and "at once glaring posters were put up announcing the glad news, and thousands gathered in the streets to give wild expression to their joy." While the *Post* of that city asked the people to "await the reply of the President of the United States with dignity and calmness. The only hope lies in the fact that our Note was not entirely rejected."

There were those who believed that President Wilson's question addressed to the German Chancellor, asking whether it was the German Government or the German people who spoke, was a master stroke. But sight was not lost of the fact that his inquiry was directed to a source which everybody knew and which he had then but recently declared was an autocracy, "without the capacity for covenanted peace." Yet he invited it to write its own certificate of character, enabling it to write into the record a declaration that the German Imperial Government was a democratic and responsible institution—a declaration completely responsive to Mr. Wilson's challenge. It extracted all efficacy from his repeated declarations that "we cannot take the word of the present German government" and "we do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement."

Amidst all the fluctuations of public opinion during the Great War, one thought remained permanent with the people: That President Wilson's pre-war pacifism would gain the upper hand and lead him into an inconclusive peace, into

peace at an inopportune moment. It was a deadly fear. There was no fear on the part of our soldiers and sailors of the most destructive guns or the pirate submarine or the sharp bayonet or the poisonous gas; no fear in the heart of the red-blooded American father that his son would come home to him a helpless cripple for the rest of his life or that a grave in France might claim him. Clearly and without hesitation the newly-married wife declared that she did not fear the worst that German bullets could do; she demanded that the war be fought to a conclusion, that future generations be safe. His program was declared acceptable to Germany, and it was not wholly acceptable to the Allies. "Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit" were the words of our President in April, when he was reflecting American advanced thought; they should never have been forgotten, never repudiated, never discounted or modified in October.

Had the President been a man whose mind was open to suggestion, he would have been glad to consider the warning of his minister to The Netherlands as quoted above. But warnings of the impending danger could not affect Mr. Wilson's mind. They were, therefore, directed more to the enlightening and shaping of public opinion to be applied when the supreme test should come, and they came from the most diverse sources.

When, as early as August, 1918, Senator Lodge declared unequivocally on the floor of the Senate that this nation would never agree to a negotiated peace, he voiced the sentiment of the American people. The same warning came to the nation from other sources. In the early part of the September drive, a prominent American prelate stated the American point of view in this fashion:

Germany has ravished the women of Belgium, Servia, Roumania, Poland, Armenia; Germany murdered the passengers of the "Lusitania" and struck a medal to celebrate that German triumph, dating it two days before the horrible occurrence; Germany has ruined

cathedrals and cities in sheer wanton fury in such fashion as has not been done in all the wars waged in Europe since the days of the building of cathedrals; Germany has poisoned wells, crucified inhabitants and soldiers, burned people in their houses, and this by system; Germany has denatured men and boys, has wantonly defaced the living and the dying and the dead. An eye-witness tells of seeing women dead at a table with tongues nailed to the table and left to die. Germany has stolen things little and big; playthings from children, finery from women, pictures of incalculable worth, bank deposits, railroads, factories; Germany has sunk hospital-ships, has bombed hospitals and Red Cross camps; Germany has disclosed neither decency nor honor from the day they started war, nor has a single voice in Germany to date been lifted against the orgies of ruthlessness which turn the soul sick and which constitute the chiefest barbarity of history; Germany remains unblushing and unconscious of its indecency; Germany's egotist still struts like a kaiser; and to climax its horrid crimes, Germany has inflicted compulsory polygamy on the virgins of its own land. What must decency say to this? That is not war; that is murder. Germany has slain and debauched more people in this war than all the heathen hordes have since Nero.

Stern justice is what should be meted out; and unless it is, there will be shameful injustice meted out to a world of ruined bodies and befouled souls and bodies.⁷

The peace leadership, loyally recognized and gladly confirmed to the President by reason of his office, was cancelled from the day he opened alone his peace conversations with the common enemy. The nation's instant and stern repudiation of Germany's attempt to make its chief executive her attorney to plead her cause with the other nations and of his apparent acceptance of this new function, signaling the nation's reply to his device of making what he called an inquiry, was swift, clear, and determined; and the outcry was so loud and spontaneous that it stood condemned from the first publication.

While he excelled in stating the fundamental issues of

⁷ Bishop William A. Quayle in *Northwestern Christian Advocate*, Chicago, September 18, 1918.

the conflict, he so egregiously and so often misrepresented the American spirit that he was repudiated at home. The Associated Press was asked to say from Washington on Sunday, the day after the receipt of the German note, that "the Government asks the American people to withhold their judgment of Germany's note until President Wilson has had opportunity to consider it." It was similar to a later request, when he was returning from Europe, that the Senate withhold discussion of the League of Nations Covenant until he should present it to that body in his own way. Refraining from the discussion of the German note was not what the American people would do at that time. They discussed.

It seemed that his peace efforts would prove disastrous to the loan then being asked of the nation. He felt impelled to go to the people to help save the new loan. On that occasion he said:

Recent events have enhanced, not lessened the importance of this loan, and I hope that my fellow-countrymen will let me say this to them very frankly. . . . Nothing has happened which makes it safe or possible to do anything but push our effort to the utmost. The time is critical and the response must be complete.

Other inspired statements were given out to ease the desperate situation into which the Administration had plunged itself and the country in its peace move. Secretary Baker stated that the war department was pushing forward as rapidly as possible. The President's Private Secretary Tumulty gave out this statement at the White House: "The Government will continue to send over 250,000 men, with their supplies, every month and there will be no relaxation."

Said one paper in the central northwest, the *Duluth News-Tribune*:

It might seem too much even to hope that the President would ever decline to debate with Germany; that he would ever discover

that the Great War was not merely with the German Government, but was with the German people.

With characteristic ingenuity, Berlin sent by wireless, in advance of its official transmission to the President, its reply. Thus blazoned from unnumbered millions of newspaper pages the whole world read:

"GERMANY ACCEPTS PRESIDENT WILSON'S TERMS";
 "GERMANY MAKES UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER";
 "GERMANY BEGS FOR ARMISTICE."

But the suppression of Germany's reply by the Administration in Washington, with the explanation that it was in the nature of propaganda which might have an ill effect upon the people, was so like the suppression of the Senate's report on the aircraft investigation, when all the world knew it, that it was placed in the same category—that the Administration thought itself more nearly proof against the wiles of the enemy than the American people had proved themselves to be.

Dr. Henry van Dyke, who rendered such excellent service to the cause of freedom, writing upon peace more than a year before the armed conflict closed, gave further advice which might profitably have been heeded by the President. Referring to the German Government, he stated:

Until that government is disabused of the delusion that it has won, is winning, or will win a substantial victory in this war, it is not likely to say anything sane or reasonable about peace. A *pax Germanica* is what it is willing to discuss.

But that is just what we do not want. To enter into such a discussion now would be both futile and perilous.⁸

When President Wilson was furthering Germany's interests by writing notes, in the summer of 1918, the wag's toast, proposed in a cloak-room in the capitol in Washington carrying a savage significance, was not illy expressive

⁸ Henry van Dyke, "Fighting for Peace," p. 235.

of the American view of the President's leadership: "Here's to the Czar, last in war, first in peace, long may he waver!"

Mr. Wilson had been seeking to drive a wedge between Austria and Germany. Whether he succeeded will depend upon the point of view from which the matter is examined. That Austria, acting upon the initiative of Germany, opened the September peace offensive is hardly open to question. Germany immediately followed. From that time, the two nations apparently operated in full harmony.

Thus, when, on October 28, 1918, Austria asked an immediate armistice it is probable that she did so with Germany's full knowledge and consent. On that date, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister instructed that a note be sent to Washington, of which a part is in these words:

Austria-Hungary accepting all the conditions the President has laid down, for the entry into negotiations for an armistice and peace, no obstacle exists, according to judgment of the Austro-Hungarian government, to the beginning of these negotiations.

The Austro-Hungarian government declares itself ready, in consequence, without awaiting the result of other negotiations, to enter into negotiations upon peace between Austria-Hungary and the states in the opposing group and for an immediate armistice upon all Austro-Hungarian fronts.

It asks President Wilson to be so kind as to begin overtures on this subject.

This was the beginning of the end of the great struggle. From this on Germany's only effort was to be directed to securing the best possible terms with her superior enemies.

November 5 the German Government was advised through the Swiss minister in charge of German affairs in this country that the President had the Allied reply, namely:

The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications

which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent address.

The Allied governments then made exception to the condition relative to freedom of the seas, until it was clearly defined. And then this other exception, which was of far-reaching importance, as later developments showed:

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damages done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.

The President then stated that he was "in agreement with the interpretations set forth in the last paragraph in the memorandum above quoted." And then the formal closing that the President requests the Swiss minister to notify the German Government that Marshal Foch had been authorized by the government of the United States and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited representatives of the German Government and to communicate to them the terms of the armistice.

Sometimes the question was asked, who surrendered? Who was the German party to the armistice? We entered into no terms and no compact with the Imperial Government of Germany. The President himself had so declared. It was true. The armistice was in fact not a treaty or a compact, but a surrender. The word of no German authority was taken in anything, nor was faith placed in anything of German authority. We simply gave Germany a certain number of days in which to deliver over her military power and to make a partial restoration of stolen goods to

her victims. The correspondence was carried on with "the German Government," and was so concluded in the armistice of November 11, 1918.

The greatness of the event probably warranted two seasons of rejoicing over the conclusion of the armistice. These the country enjoyed.

On the afternoon of November 7, 1918, news dispatches from France were received in New York erroneously reporting that the armistice had been signed. All over the United States the people received the news with spontaneous outbursts of joy, and the supposed end of the war was deliriously celebrated for several hours before official denials from Washington checked the popular enthusiasm.

After the country had been notified and convinced that the armistice had not actually been signed when the first false reports spread throughout the land, it settled down to await the news that signing had actually taken place. When the news did reach this country and was telegraphed to every village and city, it reached every cross-roads in mountain and valley, on prairie and in the deep forests; it penetrated every nook and corner of the land. But it was in the cities and larger towns that the wild delirium of joy broke forth in such an uproar of enthusiasm mingled with confusion that would have set in wild-eyed wonder an individual who might have dropped into its midst without previous notice.

Trucks carrying young men and maidens beating upon drums improvised from large tin cans, old tin stoves, water tanks, or what not, yelling and shouting themselves hoarse over the general expressions of joy; offices deserted without any order or communication from heads of the concern; factories evacuated by their employes without any formality or notice; streets crowded and jammed with men and women who seemed to vie with each other and with the younger portion of the population in keeping up the interminable racket; automobiles of dignified business and official men

with parts of stoves and tin cans chained to them rushed up and down the streets hither and thither to add to the clangor and uproar—these were but some of the features indicating the noisy demonstrations of the celebration in America of the signing of the armistice. On many street corners the Kaiser was hanged in effigy to the lamp-posts; this same effigy was noticed in some business places or was hanging out over balcony, and was given a place of prominence wherever prominence would attract public attention. In fact, in this form the Kaiser was honored by joy-rides on automobile trucks, in fashionable automobiles, on drays drawn by old horses or mules or oxen. It is probable that never in the nation's history was there so spontaneous and so complete an abandon on the part of the populace in general to an exhibition of unqualified outbursts of delirium as was witnessed in the United States November 11, 1918.

When President Wilson announced his intention of going to the Peace Congress, the announcement was met with a storm of protest throughout the country, in which his most ardent supporters joined.

The wisdom of one man never equalled the combined counsels of many; and "in the multitude of counselors there is safety." America must be kept free from the power of one willful President to misguide and bind.

CHAPTER XIV

THE WORLD'S PEACE CONGRESS

Up to the time of the President's personal appeal, on October 24, 1918, for the country's support of his party, the sole issue was support of the Government in the prosecution of the war. At that point the President changed it. He made the issue: The American people to declare whether they would leave wholly in his hands the policy of peace, would give him authority to demand acceptance by the democratic nations of his official program, until then never passed upon by the country. If that judgment should be adverse, he said he would abide by it. The judgment, as expressed at the election, was decisively against him. He then overrode an expression of public opinion which he had himself requested and which he pledged himself to obey, in going to Europe. Upon this, the New York *Tribune* remarked: "He goes abroad a rebuked and discredited leader in his own nation."

It was immediately after the signing of the armistice that reports from Washington were creeping into the newspapers that President Wilson was planning to attend the Peace Conference as one of the American delegates. When the first studied hints went out from the White House, the general attitude was an amused incredulity.

On November 18, however, formal announcement was made that the President would sail for France immediately after addressing Congress at the opening of its regular session on December 2. It was said that he did not intend to remain long at the conference but "his presence at the outset is necessary in order to obviate the manifest disadvantages of discussion by cable in determining the greater

outlines of the treaty about which he must necessarily be consulted." This announcement produced a ferment of discussion throughout the United States, and much opposition developed. Some details of the subsidiary organization of the peace delegation were made public, and on November 29, it was announced that the delegation would consist of the President himself, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Colonel Edward M. House, a Texas politician, former Ambassador to France, Henry White, and General Tasker H. Bliss, formerly chief of staff of the army, who had been in Paris as a representative of the United States since he retired as chief of staff.

He had been very reticent as to his trip to Europe, and there was notorious propaganda from Washington to prepare the people for what he had in view for a full year previous.

A political writer, in a series of criticisms in the *New York Sun*, referred to the propaganda as issued from the White House as "resolving themselves into a polite imputation of growing megalomania and selfishness of motive."

After the news was let out in a definite way that the President had determined upon going as a member of the peace commission, the distrust of the plan throughout the country was shown in the protest of public opinion. As an answer to this criticism the President went before Congress and the country with a statement of his purpose in going to Europe. This was a direct concession to the storm of public opinion which voiced itself against the movement, in the greatest diplomatic action of the country's history, by one man with silence on his lips and his plans under his hat.

Upon the all-important subject of the coming Peace Conference, there was no word of information in his annual address to Congress. He merely declared that he considered that his personal attendance in the Conference was a transcendent duty, that he went to interpret, and to press the adoption of, the terms and principles stated by

him in public addresses, to see that "no false or mistaken interpretation" was placed upon his ideals as announced, and "no possible effort omitted to realize them." The status of his program was admittedly obscure. When he sought authority to interpret and enforce it according to his own judgment, the people rejected his plea with an overwhelming answer.

He said to Congress: "I shall be in close touch with you, and you will know all that I do. . . . I am servant of the nation. I can have no private thought or purpose of my own. . . . I shall count upon your friendly counsel and encouragement. I shall not be inaccessible, but available for any counsel or service you may desire of me."

In every account of what occurred while he was delivering that message to Congress one could read such words as "sternly set faces," the "coldly disapproving looks," the "unconcealed resentment," the "ominous silence" in which these statements were heard.

Apologists for the President's enterprise attempted to dismiss the antagonism, which he had created, as a discreditable exhibition of partisanship. The explanation did not stand scrutiny. Said an Administration organ: "The whole atmosphere of the capital was redolent of estrangement between Congress and the President." Another friendly paper reported that "nearly every Democratic senator kept his seat during the brief period that the demonstration of approval was in progress." Said a third account: "President Wilson met the strongest rebuff it is in power of Congress to give."

The statement, "You will know all that I do," was an assurance which he studiously and completely ignored, not only throughout all the negotiations at Paris, but after his return to America with the Treaty in his hands.

The most imposing corps of experts ever gathered together for such a purpose as the President had in view in going to Europe had been quietly at work at Washington

for more than year in advance charting every village, every mile of ground in the belligerent countries of Europe and western Asia, digesting every phase of history and tracing the nationality of every affected community since the beginning of recorded time. The material thus gathered was so indexed as to be available at a moment's notice. One hundred and fifty experts were at work quietly digging on the task from November, 1917, all unknown to the world. Tons of maps and documents were to tell the truth about every hamlet and hillside from Havre to Teheran. Besides, the American delegation at the Peace Conference had a retinue of three hundred specialists and assistants. They made an impressive array of college professors, technical experts, ethnological experts and the like. Their particular subjects related especially to European matters.

But the Senate of the United States, whose duty under the Constitution requires it to pass upon the treaty, was not represented. In all former peace conferences in which the United States was a party, the most eminent men of the nation were chosen for the performance of that solemn duty, if we omit reference to the treaty concluding the Mexican war. They represented both political parties, were regularly confirmed and commissioned by Congress or by the Senate, and in each instance care was taken that each branch of the treaty-making power was represented. In the case of the Spanish treaty, President McKinley took particular care to give representation not only to both political parties, but selected the ablest man he could find in the United States Senate of the opposite party for that responsible trust, George Grey, an international lawyer of wide reputation. In the making of that treaty two members, a cabinet secretary and an ambassador, represented the executive branch of the government, while the three others were from the Senate, that body being a part of the treaty-making power. President Wilson, characteristic of the man, ignored not only precedent, but he appointed men

with apparently no fitness for the great task before them. Aside from Secretary Lansing, it is doubtful whether in all the country's history so weak a body of commissioners was ever appointed for even a much smaller task. None, even of the President's most ardent partisans, undertook to defend him in thus ignoring the nation's entire history.

Immediately these details were attended to, friendly warnings from the Allied nations to one another began, probably prompted by President Wilson's single-handed undertaking in the peace proposals. Later they ran dangerously close to the hostile, beginning with the first preliminary meeting. This first meeting of delegates preliminary to the Peace Conference took place in London on December 3, 1918. All of the Allied principal nations were represented by their premiers and foremost statesmen. The United States was not represented.

The State Department at Washington promptly informed the Associated Press "that any action looking to a demand upon Holland for the extradition of William Hohenzollern will be held in abeyance until President Wilson reaches Europe." Mr. Churchill's declaration immediately followed the conference, to the effect that "we do not intend, no matter what arguments and appeals are addressed to us, to lend ourselves in any way to any fettering restrictions that will prevent the British Navy maintaining her well-tried and well-deserved supremacy." This statement the New York *World* correspondent regarded as being "addressed especially to Woodrow Wilson." The purpose of it was probably to save Mr. Wilson for the humiliation of asking for something which under no circumstance would be granted.

A singular preparation for his diplomatic mission was his repeated assertion that he alone held the keys to a peace of justice, and that the Allied statesmen were intriguing for a peace of loot. Before he sailed, and while he was on the ocean, and after landing in Europe, he let no

occasion pass to declaim against the alleged imperialism of the democratic governments of Europe and their hostility to "the common thought" and the aspirations of the "plain people." It was this attitude of the President of the Republic that caused, soon after it was announced that Mr. Wilson was to attend the Conference, Lord Northcliffe to rejoice "that Mr. Wilson is to be brought personally into contact with men who can convince him that the spirit which he denominates unselfishness necessarily resolves itself into 'give and take.'" And Mr. Balfour highly regarded a League of Nations because the United States would have to "bear a large share in the work it involves." It thus became apparent that the prospective negotiations between President Wilson and the Allied Governments were coming so early in the proceedings to be regarded by the British as trading propositions.

Before the President sailed, a Washington dispatch declared that this nation's naval program "will be a factor in the discussion concerning the freedom of the seas"; and "the size of the American navy, actually and potentially, is to be used in support of the argument the President is to make." And from the President's vessel carrying him to the Peace Congress was wirelessly the message to the whole world: "Should the present world policy of competitive armaments continue, the United States could do more than hold its own."¹

The substance of the President's demand was that Great Britain should surrender her position as the leading naval power of the world, while it was a recognized fact that it was Great Britain's naval power that saved civilization against the onslaughts of Prussian autocracy.

Whether the disposition of the American people would authorize such an unknown factor appears not to have been

¹ A happy contrast was President Harding's call for a conference of the leading nations to be held in Washington, November 12, 1921, and the prodigious program outlined by Secretary Hughes, head of the American delegation, on that date, surprising the world, on disarmament.

taken into consideration. The British view appeared to be that the United States had the undoubted right to build as many dreadnaughts as her people were willing to pay for; and that such an enterprise would increase, rather than diminish, the safety of the world. Both the English and the American people smiled at the President's open threat.

While the President was on his way to Europe, it was casually announced by the secretary of the preliminary conference that it had been there decided that Premier Clemenceau should preside at the sessions of the Peace Congress at Paris.

On January 18, 1919, the Peace Conference of the world held its first formal and plenipotentiary session—an occasion to become memorable in humanity's interest. Apart from the merits of the matter, the President's diplomacy up to this point was singularly unfortunate. For while making one purpose of his journey the proposal to deprive the Allies of the chief weapon which enabled them to destroy the German menace, persistent secrecy regarding his purposes raised doubts and fears, while employing threatening intimations hardened suspicion into bitter judgment.

Moreover, before going to the Peace Congress, he made a tour of Italy, France and England, addressing vast throngs, appealing to the masses as against their rulers. For this he was temporarily paid homage by the masses such as had never been accorded any human being. For this he was severely criticized, not only in his own country, but throughout the democratic nations of Europe. Later, he was anathematized by the very masses who had rendered the greatest applause, and upon the question of nationality.

But at length the Peace Conference had begun and that was the paramount fact in the world at that day. There had been unwarranted and mischievous delay. There had been what was described as jockeying for position.

Five important resolutions were adopted by the Peace Congress at its second open session. Two that were perti-

nent and practical were the appointment of a commission to determine the responsibility of the authors of the war, and the punishment to be imposed for the crimes which were committed. Another was the appointment of a commission on reparation.

In his touring of Europe, even while urging his interest in "men everywhere," the President was sowing the seeds for dissensions in the Peace Congress. Without making his own purpose and intent plain to the understanding, he committed himself and assumed to commit the nation to a vague scheme of a league comprising all of the nations of the world to be formed concurrently with the making of peace and not after it. It was said even then that there was no probability that so amazing a proposal would meet the approval of the United States Senate. As a matter of fact, and as was very fitting, the challenge came first from that nation which had chiefly borne the brunt of the war and which by long and bitter experience had learned the character of the Prussian autocracy. Georges Clemenceau, before the French Chamber of Deputies, said:

There is an old system which appears condemned today, and to which I do not fear to say that I remain faithful at this moment. Countries have organized the defense of their frontiers with the necessary elements and the balance of power. This system appears to be condemned by some very high authorities. Yet if such a balance had preceded the war, if England, the United States, Italy, and France had agreed that whoever attacked one of them attacked the whole, the world war would not have occurred. There is in this system of alliances, which I do not renounce, I say it most distinctly, my guiding thought at the Conference, if your body permits me to go there.

He stated to them that if they desired a change of pilots that was the time to change. "Are you with me or against me? Speak now or forever hold your peace." The chamber spoke with a voice of nearly three to one in approval of the policy.

President Wilson was prompt with retort. Speaking the very next day at Manchester, England, undoubtedly with the French Prime Minister's words in mind, he said:

If the future had nothing for us but a new attempt to keep the world at a right poise by a balance of power, the United States would take no interest, because she will join no combination which is not a combination of all of us.

Thus the issue was joined. Clemenceau had referred his policy to the popular chamber of the French Congress for its judgment and received approval by a tremendous majority. President Wilson never even ventured to submit his scheme to either house of Congress; but when he asked the nation to approve his undefined course, he was turned down by a majority of more than a million votes.

While the masses in Europe did not understand the Wilsonian world-confederacy, they did fully appreciate the blessings he seemed to bring of release from the burden of conscription, and thus the poor took the gospel home. As stated by a leading French paper, the *Petit Parisien*:

Our sons are no longer to be taken off to barracks and our daughters shall not henceforth weep over slain sweethearts. Parents will not live in daily terror of impending military crisis. Taxes will not crush. These things are in the thoughts of the masses as they hail Wilson in great cities and put his portrait above the fireplace.

No peace congress had ever faced so many intricate problems, problems on whose wise and equitable solution the whole future of the world depended—making permanent peace, creation of a League of Nations, reconciling conflicting boundary claims of many nations, setting up new states within the truncated areas of the vanquished powers, the insuring of their liberty and unimpaired integrity, the assigning of mandates over millions of humanity in Asia and Africa, the creating of legislative machinery to improve conditions of labor in all civilized nations of the world.

And in the midst of it all, never did it seem that this na-

tion had so great need of the stimulating voice and steadying counsel of the leader who left, in Theodore Roosevelt, in January, 1919. Never were the sanity, the far-seeing statesmanship; the splendid Americanism and sturdy common sense of Theodore Roosevelt more to be desired than in the hour when he was called hence, when the American people were facing the most critical decision in their history, and when their judgment was bewildered by conflicting appeals inviting partisanship, patriotism, idealism and internationalism.

The supreme need of the world was the earliest possible settlement of the issues of war. That Mr. Wilson prevented. His program, such as it was, demanded as the first requisite the support of informed American public opinion; that he spurned. The next requirement was that the people of Europe should have confidence in the democratic governments forming the foundation of the League; that he very largely destroyed. It was above all things desirable that there should be unity of sentiment among the Allies, including the United States; that he undermined. And it was absolutely necessary for success that he should have a concrete program behind his idealistic generalizations; that he never possessed.

As a result of the delays upon which the President insisted, when he found the treaty draft complete upon his return to Europe from America in mid-March, 1919, France, the frontier of civilization, was suffering fiscal prostration and was restrained from the supreme work of restoration; Great Britain was suffering an economic and industrial crisis of indescribable gravity; Germany was in throes of civil war and danger of general anarchy; and Bolshevism had taken charge in Hungary, and was insolently challenging the western governments. It was truthfully charged that "he kept us out of peace."

Berlin and Vienna greatly rejoiced over the schism in

the Peace Congress. It was regarded as cause for regret and shame that an American President should have been foremost in providing them with this reason for exultation.

The Inner Council of the Peace Congress—President Wilson and Premiers Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando—were meeting daily in a small room, after the President's return to Europe, from which even stenographers were excluded, in an endeavor to speed up the peace terms to avert the peril which the delay had invited.

The question of peace-making is a question between the victorious and the vanquished belligerents and between them alone, and should have been accepted and acted upon as such. But about every other day in the Peace Congress a task that threw its shadow over the deliberations, and for the moment made everything else less important, was the task of coping with Bolshevism. So severe had become the charges of unnecessary delay, as due to the President's insistence upon the League of Nations scheme being interwoven with the Peace Treaty, that Premier Lloyd George came to his rescue with the statement as to how much more rapidly the Peace Congress was moving than did the Vienna Conference of over a hundred years previous. President Wilson feeling the blows that were aimed at him, gave out a statement, after his return to Paris in March, that he believed the time was opportune for a statement which would allay apprehension over the delay, and show that the revision of the Covenant of the League of Nations had proceeded at night sessions without any interruption to the disposition of the other main questions. As early as February, *Harvey's Weekly* put it in this fashion:

The gravest menace of the world today is in the futile fiddling of the Peace Congress. Red herrings are being dragged across the trail of justice, the essentials of peace-making are being delayed, the agonizingly urgent work of reconstruction in France and other countries is being blocked, discontent and Bolshevism are being fostered

even in our own land, and the Blond Beast beyond the Rhine is being encouraged to lick his bloody chops and snarl at the world with renewed threats of war.²

The perils due to the delaying of peace for the sake of a headstrong policy became more manifest and more menacing, with a result that the President's arbitrary mission diminished in importance. The vital parts of the peace to be imposed upon Germany were framed in his absence, and he returned to the Conference to find that the settlement was carried further toward completion than during all the weeks of his personal activity.

On March 12, 1919, Secretary Lansing stated:

Two words tell the story—food and peace. If the present state of chaos continues and political power continues to grow weaker, there will be no responsible German government with which to make peace; there will be no government strong enough to carry out the conditions of the treaty. There is no time to be lost if we are to save the world from the despotism of anarchy, even as we saved it from the despotism of autocracy. We ought to make, we must make, peace without delay.

On the next day Frank A. Vanderlip, described as "unemotional a banker as ever reduced human problems to figures," gave this startling picture and warning:

I doubt if America has begun to comprehend the appalling situation which confronts Europe and the wreck which the whole fabric of civilization may be facing. America was once told there should be peace without victory. What we have is victory without peace. Production has ceased, and unless production can be speedily resumed chaos may ensue. The great productive machine of Europe must be started, or the world will be confronted with disaster such as no experience has recorded.

The Germans made a great outcry against the terms of the Treaty of Peace as presented to them for their signature. It would have been well for them to compare the

² February 15, 1919.

document thus presented to them with that which they prepared at Brest-Litovsk which deprived Russia of a region covering one-third of her railway mileage, three-fourths of her iron, nine-tenths of her coal, and nearly her entire industrial territory, together with a population of fifty-six millions, and required an enormous indemnity besides. That treaty was enthusiastically endorsed by the nation which came to Paris crying out against far less drastic terms.

Said Herr Ebert, speaking for the Germans, to the Associated Press correspondent: "If the American democracy actually accepts the present terms of peace as its own, it becomes an accomplice and abettor of political blackmailers; it surrenders the traditional American principle of fair play and sportsmanship," which leads a keen New York weekly to observe:

This perjured violator of the most solemn pledges; this ravisher of girls and kindergarten children; this wholesale murderer of aged men, of priests at the altar and of women with babies in their arms; this creature who at the point of the bayonet drove off tens of thousands of men to slavery and of women to enforced debasement; this common thief and incendiary; this dynamiter of hospitals wherein lay the sick, the maimed and the dying; this skulking assassin of the high seas; this international brigand who in cold blood and of calculated purpose made a shambles of the world to gratify his beastly greed for plunder and power—this unspeakable Caliban of nations, now rendered impotent, has the unspeakable effrontery to whine about American "fair play" and American sportsmanship.³

The French, to whom the treaty as drawn represented the minimum of justice, stood for absolute rejection of the enemy counter-proposal; but President Wilson favored modification of the terms. The long delay in making peace enabled the forces of pacifism and internationalism to organize in all the Allied countries. This gave ground for the declaration that President Wilson was standing for terms,

³ *Harvey's Weekly*, May 24, 1919.

not that would satisfy justice but that would satisfy Germany.

The President's arbitrary methods, with the acute controversies and long delays occasioned thereby, gave the Germans renewed hope; and as they saw the Allies divided, their confidence grew to arrogance. They planned to challenge every item in the treaty that did not satisfy their own interpretation of President Wilson's various statements; to widen every breach that had been created among their opponents; to incite, by appeals and propaganda, the pacifist, Bolshevik, and radical Socialist element which existed in all countries.

When there was severe criticism of the Peace Congress, and particularly of President Wilson, in the spring of 1919, for his delays in getting the Peace Treaty completed, the propaganda put out was that the League of Nations was not causing the delay. It was put out that other things were causing this delay. At the outset, however, before the Congress opened, President Wilson had stated that there should be no peace until the League of Nations could simultaneously be formed. The President gave almost his entire attention to the matter of the League, yet he was unable to get the Constitution in shape to present to the Peace Congress until just a few hours before he started on his return trip to America. And nearly, if not quite, all of the other issues which were alleged to be responsible for the delay never arose until after the League Constitution had been pushed to the fore; and some of them could never have arisen at all if the Peace Treaty had been made promptly; they arose because of the delay. And to those who were not bound by the President's view, it became clear that if it had not been for his insistence upon putting the League of Nations before everything else, the Treaty of Peace would have been made, signed, and ratified months before it was even presented to the United States Senate, and the nations would have been far on the way in their

work of restoration—a work of the very greatest civic, social and economic importance. Moreover, these other issues which were falsely alleged to be the causes of the delay would have been disposed of long previously, if indeed they had arisen at all.

President Wilson's famous demand for freedom of the seas was cited as sufficient reason to justify his trip to Europe. Yet when his attention was called to the fact, in the notable White House Conference after his return from Europe, that under the League of Nations there would be no neutrals, and therefore no question as to freedom of the seas, he admitted that his insistence upon the point was something of a joke upon himself. By and by all the Fourteen Points, which the President had declared as the only possible basis of peace, had gone into the discard except the last—which was the League of Nations. He was willing to yield everything to save this one.

When the Senate found itself wholly ignored by the President in making up his peace commission, it knew it would be called upon to consider in detail the terms of the Treaty. When senators found themselves shut out, they took the only course that was open by placing themselves on record. Speeches were made on the floor of the Senate attacking the engagements to which the President was committing the country in the League Covenant. It served notice on the Peace Congress that the Senate, under the Constitution, was a part of the treaty-making power of this nation.

And all the world was crying out for peace, for a prompt settlement that would close at the earliest date the dreadful chapter of war and permit the exhausted, famine-haunted nations to resume the productive, restorative processes of peace. But this idea President Wilson spurned. His decree was that the rebuilding of Europe should be postponed until the future of the whole world had been arranged. During all his activities he contributed nothing

to the actual making of peace; on the contrary he obstructed it by his demand that it should be deferred until the League-of-Nations question had been settled.

A desperate effort was being made by the end of March, 1919, to spread the belief that the delay in dealing with Germany was due to British indecision, to Italian imperialism, to French vindictiveness. Large propaganda was put out from the American press bureau to support this view. It was stated repeatedly by writers who were friendly to the President and who were ready at all points to give the President a clean bill. It was pressed by Mr. Ray Stannard Baker.⁴ But the record was too clear for this propaganda to prevail at the time it was issued.

In his speeches in Europe President Wilson took the view that the most important thing was not peace but the permanence of peace, and he spoke with something of impatience, almost with scorn, about those who were intent on the details of the peace that was to be made during the ensuing months at Paris. As he stated in his public addresses, prior to sitting in the Conference, it was not merely with America, not merely with one nation, not even a group of nations, but with humanity as a whole that he was concerned. Yet there is always the problem of determining the precise boundary where a statesman's concern for humanity and the world at large should end, and his concern for his own people and his own country should begin.

The President's attitude toward France drove her into virtual isolation, since his exclusive concern was to create a League of Nations. Great Britain's dominant aim was to form some sort of alliance with the United States. Thus the American and British delegation worked in harmony to minimize the claims of France and to defer their satisfaction. For weeks all the energies of the conference were devoted to the League project and discussions of remote

⁴ "What Wilson Did at Paris," copyright, 1919, by Doubleday Page & Co., pp. 56, 57, 58 and 65.

territorial issues, while the supreme problem of France's restoration and Germany's penalties were neglected.

On March 30, 1919, it was announced from Paris that the commission on responsibility for the war had decided,—

First, solemnly to condemn the violation of neutrality and all the crimes committed by the Central Powers.

Second, to urge the appointment of an international tribunal to charge all those responsible, including the former German Emperor.

But Secretary Lansing submitted a separate memorandum in which Wilhelm's culpability was to be considered from a legal point of view. While the overwhelming majority of the commission contended that the Kaiser was responsible largely for the acts and violation of the rules of war committed by land and naval forces, Mr. Lansing took the ground that what was done in his name was sustained by his own people, and that for that reason he could not be held legally culpable.

The British Premier Lloyd George was merely echoing the demands of his nation when he declared:

The Kaiser must be prosecuted. The war was a crime in the way it was planned; in the wantonness with which it was provoked; in the manner in which it was prosecuted. The men responsible must not be let off because their heads were crowned when they perpetrated the deeds. The government will use its whole influence at the Peace Conference to see that justice is executed.

Misleading propaganda was put out upon almost every conceivable topic from the world's Peace Conference of Paris. This was no less true in regard to the damages suffered by the various nations than in other matters. It was made to appear that the United States stood third in suffering the costs of the war. In actual money that was true, as a real fact it was false. But it was put out for the purpose of showing the commanding position that the United States should take in the great Conference. But when it

came to the relative wealth of the various nations, it was found that the war had cost Serbia more than 53 per cent of her total wealth, Great Britain more than 50 per cent, Italy about 50 per cent, France 45 per cent, Russia 30 per cent, and the United States less than 10 per cent,—the United States standing, instead of third, at the very bottom of the list, getting off by far the most cheaply of any. And if there was to be anything of justice in the peace settlement, the nations which were so greatly impoverished by Germany's ruthless attack should have been reimbursed to the limit, and those nations should have had most to say in the settlement of damages.

Germany was required to accept responsibility for all the losses and damages inflicted upon her adversaries by the war, although not to guarantee full payment. The inter-Allied Reparation Commission, appointed by the Peace Congress in its second open session, was to determine the total obligation to be met by Germany; this it was to do within two years. Then it would present a schedule of payments to be made covering 30 years, reparation payments to be a prior charge upon her revenues. This commission was to consist of delegates representing the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Japan, and Serbia. While those of America, Great Britain, France and Italy were participants in all proceedings the members for Japan and Serbia would vote only on questions affecting those countries; and the Belgian delegates would take part except when Japanese or Serbian issues were under consideration.

In response to President Wilson's request that the Senate approve provisional appointment of an American representative on the reparations commission to be created under the Peace Treaty, the foreign relations committee of the Senate adopted a resolution declaring that until the Treaty was ratified, "no power exists" to carry out its provisions, an objection well taken, in view of subsequent developments.

The British view was that all damages must be paid by

the aggressor, meaning that Germany should be compelled to pay the whole cost of the war, including the expense to the Allies of raising, equipping, transporting and maintaining their armies, as well as reparation for wanton damage. The French view was that reparation should include all that England would demand, requiring Germany first to settle bills for destruction in violation of international law, and pay the other bills later as she could. The American position was that reparation from Germany should cover only such damages as could be included in wanton destruction and violation of the laws of war and of nations.

The conference committee on reparation estimated \$120,000,000,000 as the amount which the enemy countries ought to pay the Allied nations. For many days the question of indemnities continued to be one of the most troublesome before the conference, the chief issue becoming not what Germany should pay but what she could pay. Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau had promised their constituents that Germany would be made to pay the full amount of what the war had cost the Allies. This was estimated by the British at one hundred and twenty billion dollars and by the French as high as two hundred billions. The financial experts of the conference, however, concluded that the payment of any such sum by Germany was impossible. In May, 1920, the amount was fixed at \$30,000,000,000⁵

⁵In late April, 1921, the Reparations Commission fixed upon the sum of approximately \$33,000,000,000 for Germany to pay, it having until May 1, 1921, to conclude its work. The amount determined in January was a great reduction from the \$67,000,000,000 agreed upon in the previous July. Yet in March, Germany submitted counter proposals offering about one-third of the sum the Reparations Commission had fixed upon, and sought the intervention of the United States in their behalf. But the new Administration had come into power, and it very promptly declined to act upon the suggestion. Thereupon the German ministry resigned. The amount finally agreed upon was of the present sum of \$21,000,000,000, which, spread over the forty-two years allowed for payment, totalled \$56,000,000,000, including interest.

As the fateful May 1 approached, both sides mobilized their military forces, France having declared that no more trifling would be permitted on the part of Germany in fulfilling her obligations under the Treaty, by the terms of which Germany accepted "responsibility for causing all the loss and damage" inflicted upon the Allies, and undertook "compensation

—about what the war had cost the United States. None of this, however, was to be paid to this country.

The treaty of peace contains an article whereby the Powers “publicly arraign William II. of Hohenzollern for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” And “a special tribunal to try the accused,” with five judges from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, is provided. While the American commissioners at the Peace Congress gave partial assent to the position of the majority standing for criminal prosecution on the charge violating the usages of war, led by Mr. Lansing they protested against including violations of “the laws of humanity.” This position of the American commissioners has found support among international law experts. An Italian parliamentary commission found:

Crimes attributed to the former kaiser were not contemplated in any penal code. Nobody can be called to answer, and be punished, for acts which, when committed, did not constitute a crime contemplated by law. It is impossible to ask Holland to extradite her guest for political crimes not within the purview of present treaties.

On January 15, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Allies made a demand upon the government of Holland for the surrender of William of Hohenzollern, former emperor of Germany, that he might be tried for the crimes of the Great War.

To this demand, Holland's reply, on January 23, was a peremptory denial. The reason given was that Holland could not admit, “in the present case, any other duty than that imposed on it by the laws of the kingdom and national tradition.” And that the former emperor was entitled to the benefit of the country's laws and of the traditional right of refuge for the vanquished in international conflicts;

for all damages done to the civilian population and their property” in Allied countries. England was ready to back up the stand of France, and with the United States refusing to take a hand in aiding Germany, there was but one thing for Germany to do—meet her legal international obligations in the matter of reparations.

and that the sacred duty of justice and national honor demanded of the government of Holland that it do not withdraw from this refugee the benefit of its laws and this tradition.

And it stated that "It rejects with energy, all suspicion of wishing to cover with its sovereign right and its moral authority, violations of the essential principles of the solidarity of nations; but it cannot recognize an international duty to associate itself with this act of high international policy of the Powers."

The original One Hundred, selected to give guidance to the Peace Congress, gave way to the Council of Ten; and that in turn, in April, 1919 to the Council of Five, including Japan; then Japan was dropped from the inner circle, and Premiers Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, and President Wilson, known as the Council of Four, carried on the discussions on the most important issues of the conference among themselves. Later Premier Clemenceau and Lloyd George with President Wilson, constituted the inner circle. These came to be known as the "Big Five" the "Big Four" and the "Big Three."

Instant approval followed the suggestion that the Peace Congress hold open sessions. Such a proposition was in harmony with the open-air diplomacy urged by President Wilson. It was a part of the new and accepted order of things. It was, therefore, with a shock that created a shudder when the suggestion came to the people that not only were the Americans to be deprived of direct and immediate knowledge of the peace proceedings but that they were to be furnished with such garbled information as the plan of President Wilson demanded and the unworthy ingenuity of Creel could supply.

Increasing secrecy characterized the actions of the inner circle as it became smaller. Very few decisions were given out officially, and this led to speculations on the part of correspondents, while discontent prevailed generally at

Paris over the news embargo. Articles attacking the Conference for its secret diplomacy; charges that the proceedings were unduly protracted; rumors of "dissensions," "crises," "ultimatums" were numerous. It was during this period that President Wilson's action, ordering his ship, the "George Washington," to France was interpreted as a threat to coerce his fellow delegates. There were other wild rumors afloat as to Clemenceau's resignation and Italy's premier breaking away ready to make a separate peace with Austria.

With Mr. Wilson's first of his Fourteen Points for "open Covenants of peace openly arrived at," attacked in the Conference it seemed to be the first to be definitely and completely nullified. He and others sought to blame the Allies but the Paris correspondent of the *New York Tribune* gave a different explanation:

Judging from the New York newspapers arriving in Paris, the impression prevails in America that President Wilson had made a fight for his first point against the Allied delegates. This is hardly correct. He has been throughout one of the most determined opponents of full publicity. He promptly agreed to closed sessions of the conference. He has repeatedly protested to the other delegates because of the information they had given to the press.

Before President Wilson left America to enter the Peace Congress at Paris he gave out the statement to the effect that there would be no censorship of news passing from the Peace Conference to America. Suddenly the newspaper men in Paris became aware that every word they wrote was being read by both French and American censors and that on occasions some of it was held up, deleted, or entirely censored. One of the ablest of American correspondents found it necessary to adopt the formula which he had used during the war when the only censorship was in the hands of the French—the device of always putting into the first ten lines of his dispatches some allusion to "the

glorious French." Another correspondent arranged an understanding with his people in America to the effect that his editors should "always look for the real story in the fourth paragraph."

Strange as such devices may seem to Americans at home they were practiced by two of the ablest American correspondents in Paris. It was necessitated by the resolution adopted in one of the preliminary conferences of the five powers forbidding any delegate to the Peace Conference to talk to newspaper men. And this secrecy was the precursor of all kinds of garbled and manufactured news going out from Paris. The irritation at the secrecy which enveloped Mr. Wilson's negotiations abroad grew rapidly after his arrival there. It broke out in the Senate in something like open revolt. The last days of January and the first of February, 1919, were noted days for assault upon the secrecy in both the Senate and the House, in which both political parties, the majority then being the Democratic, engaged.

In the Senate the attack was upon the president himself so far as he was responsible for the utter darkness in which he saw fit to keep the country with reference to engagements to which he was said to be committing the nation in the Paris negotiations. Mr. Wilson's obsession for secretiveness, for cloistered seclusion, apparently took the form of a fixed delusion that the affairs of the American people were things with which the American people had no right to meddle.

On April 7, 1919, the Chicago *Daily News* Peace Conference Bureau at Paris gave out information that there was great popular resentment against President Wilson because he failed to tell the people what he was doing.

A prominent writer in one of the leading American weeklies, after declaring that Paris had become a whispering gallery, stated:

Secrecy has given Germany the handle with which to spread the news that serious breaches are being made between the nations allied in war. Secrecy has cloaked the vacillating policy which first suggests that the Lenine government in Russia is unspeakable, next proposes conferences with its representatives at Prinkipo, considers invasion of Russia, counts its endless costs and rejects it, and finally allows an American emissary to go to Russia, for a talk with Lenine—and hopes that the public won't find out that he has been sent. Secrecy has made the peace a long way from a people's peace.

This secrecy on the part of the President had a tendency to grow, causing him to lose favor with the large American public. It manifested itself in a pronounced degree in his dealing with the United States Senate after his return from Paris. On August 11, 1919, he declined to comply with a request of the Senate foreign relations committee that he furnish it with desired information as to the proceedings of the Peace Conference.

Harvey's Weekly for May 3, 1919, stated, what was probably a well substantiated truth when it said: "We must doubt if ever there was a great international conference conducted with less frankness and openness, or with more of furtive secrecy and subterranean intrigue, than this has been under the President's domination."

What the American people desired above all else during the days of the Paris Peace Conference was the truth as to what was going on in Paris. Nothing damaged their faith in the President more than the suspicion, however ill-founded, that the news that was let out from Paris was not the truth, but only something that was permitted to pass the censors. This suspicion was increased by the knowledge that the cables were controlled by a violent partisan, Postmaster-General Burleson. It should have been made plain, and carried out to the letter, that the strangling of news at its source was not to be permitted by willful subordinates. The unfortunate thing about it was that the adopted method fell in with the President's purpose.

On April 14, 1919, President Wilson announced that in view of the nearness of the completion of the whole work of the conference, it had been decided to invite the German peace plenipotentiaries to come to France on April 25.

After three months had elapsed from the signing of the armistice the overshadowing urgent issues of the war remained virtually untouched, while the energies of the conference had been devoted to experimental innovations. Belgium and France awaited the righting of wrongs they had suffered, the terms to be imposed upon Germany had not yet been framed, and the threatening Russian situation had been put aside with an evasion, and the whole economic recovery of the world had been retarded by continued uncertainty, while expecting really vital settlements.

Owing to this acute situation there was an outcry against unnecessary delays from every part of the Allied regions. In the United States it took the form largely of placing the blame upon President Wilson for delaying the treaty by insisting upon his drafting of the League of Nations. It was known that during his temporary absence in the United States during the latter part of February and early March great progress had been made on the treaty. Delay followed immediately after his return. Lloyd George assumed to speak for the conference, knowing that President Wilson's explanation would avail nothing, and declared that matters were moving rapidly as compared with the great Vienna Conference during which eleven months were consumed in drafting the treaty. Lloyd George, however, omitted to state that the world was moving much more slowly in the time of the Vienna Conference than at the time of the Paris Conference of 1919. Then there were no telegraphs, telephones, automobiles, railroads and the numerous other contrivances that the world has come to regard as common acquisitions since that far-away time.

No. 14 in the President's Fourteen Points providing for "a general association of nations," represented the single

definite accomplishment of President Wilson's peace mission to Paris.

His demand of the "impartial adjustment of colonial claims" resulted in annexation of the territories in question by the powers which wanted them, under a nebulous system of mandates. While invoking "self-determination" to keep Danzig from the Poles, he was suspending it to award Shantung to Japan and repudiating it in forbidding Italy to possess Italian Fiume.

From the time the President departed on his mission to Europe in December, 1918, the chief theme of wondering writers was his commanding influence over the nations and their leaders. Pictured as a benevolent dictator whose wisdom and vision had captivated Europe, whose words made peoples forget their traditions and desires, whose lifted finger could be the signal for the overturning of thrones and governments, he was represented as the inspired champion of justice and idealism against the forces of Allied intrigue, ambition, and rapacity; but for his intrepid idealism, the world was daily informed in moving accents, the lofty purposes of the war would be swept away in the currents of national passion and greed; and unless a "Wilson peace" were made, militarism would triumph and all the sacrifices of the struggle would have been in vain.

Yet when the treaty's terms were revealed, they were found to bear scarcely a trace of his handiwork. The newspapers, which for five months had been celebrating the intervention of Mr. Wilson as the one safeguard of mankind against a "peace of imperialism and loot," discussed the Treaty with solemn approval and without mention of his name. They found the terms "moderate," "even lenient," marked by "cold, passionless justice," leaving "no rankling wounds." The terms of the Treaty, however, are in virtually every detail those which were laid down by the Allies two years previously in answer to President Wilson's demand for "peace without victory"; they are the identical

terms which the Administration organs constantly denounced as grossly imperialistic and hostile to the spirit of the age, terms which the President had to go to Europe to combat, as the spokesman of higher ideals of international right and human liberty.

That Germany should acknowledge responsibility for her crimes and pay for them to the limit of her capacity,—this most important feature in the Treaty was put there by the Allies against the President's opposition. He opposed the provision for trial of the former kaiser, and that went in. He wanted the German fleet sunk, and that failed. He declared that the League-of-Nations Covenant should not be amended, and it was changed in the particulars most vital to this country. His theory was that Germany should be admitted at once to the League of Nations, but severe probation was imposed upon her. Perhaps his most emphatic declaration was that America would enter "no combination which is not a combination of all of us." "There can be no leagues or alliances within the common family of the League of Nations," was his decree. Yet he came back to America and asked the Senate to ratify an alliance with Great Britain and France requiring the United States to give instant aid to France if she was attacked by Germany.

In fact the list of casualties among the principles put forth by Mr. Wilson make a formidable list and explains the silence of those who had predicted a peace dictated by him. He did win some substantial victories: he compelled the Peace Conference to offer virtual recognition to the Bolshevik terrorists, and so he is described by a recent writer, a confidant of the President and head of the Press Bureau, as the "real liberal"; he forced a delaying of the Peace Treaty by adoption of the League Covenant; he prevented the naming of Brussels as capital of the League, because, as he explained, the Belgian city "incarnates the enmity between races."

Mr. William C. Bullitt testified before the Senate For-

eign Relations Committee that the English statesmen, Lloyd George and Balfour, had as their confidential representative constantly with Colonel House and President Wilson, Sir William Wiseman, through whom was arranged the plan, later made a part of the Treaty, whereby the United States agreed to recognize the British protectorate over Egypt, which "took only a few minutes." On this point *The Nation* asks, "How is it that the British Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary were able to keep this insidious janizary, this 'extra-confidential Foreign Office' constantly with Colonel House and the President? . . . what an ending of the Fourteen Points, after setting the best instincts of America aflame, after getting the response they had from every democratic element the world over! The poor, disowned, tattered . . . unmentionable in the polite society of the Peace Conference, . . . brandished at last in the unscrupulous hand of the British Foreign Office as a mere scarecrow to frighten its maker into a docile and unquestioning obedience to the will of economic imperialism! Really, except for the poor Egyptians, was there ever an incident as comical as this in the whole history of international affairs?"⁶

It is difficult to understand why Belgium of all nations concerned should have had to suffer the pangs of neglect and suspense, and should have been compelled to threaten rejection of the Treaty in order to get approximate justice from her friends. Challenged suddenly by an overwhelming power, forced to choose between surrender with safety and resistance that meant a living martyrdom, Belgium did not for one instant hesitate; she met with her own flesh and blood and her dauntless soul the onrush of the enemy, and sank, overcome but unconquered, into four years of slavery. The whole world rang with the glories of her fidelity and heroism, and all mankind was stirred to new conceptions of faith and courage by the spectacle of her supreme

⁶ *The Nation*, New York, September 27, 1919.

devotion to duty. The name of Belgium enlisted armies, brought brave men hastening from the ends of the earth to avenge her wrongs and made secure the civilization she had saved by her sacrifice; the suffering of Belgium wrung the hearts of humanity and turned to her such an outpouring of sympathy as history had never seen; the honor and valor of Belgium were the themes of statesmen and poets, and her deliverance an inspiration of a mighty crusade.

In every statement of war aims by the adversaries of Germany, the rescue and restoration of Belgium held first place. Great Britain proclaimed that until her wrongs were righted the empire's sword should never be sheathed; and after the war had raged eighteen months Great Britain and France and Russia united in the solemn pledge: "The Allied Powers declare that when the moment comes the Belgian Government will be called upon to take part in the peace negotiations, and they will not end hostilities without Belgium having re-established her political and economic independence." Even President Wilson, who had previously argued that with such things as Belgium's fate America had "no concern," finally declared for her restoration thus: "Without this healing act the structure and validity of international law is forever impaired."

Yet, with the Conference of the nations assembled to frame the decrees of justice and reorganization, Belgium was slighted. There were allotted to her only two seats in the Council of the peace delegates, while Brazil had three, and this flagrant discrimination was corrected only after urgent protest had been made.

The whole world had expected that her needs would be the first considered. But weeks of secret deliberation produced no help for the prostrate nation, no assurance that justice would ultimately be done. The cloistered statesmen in Paris preoccupied themselves with problems of the Balkans, of Central Europe, of the enemy powers, of turbulent Russia. Contention rose and fell over the disposition of

African colonies and Asiatic concessions and islands of the remote Pacific. Above all there was debate over the League of Nations, that would have to administer the affairs of the world after peace; but for plundered, impoverished Belgium there was nothing but vague intimations that eventually her rights would be established according to the ideas of the controlling groups from which she was excluded.

Her condition was desperate; yet it was nearly six months after the ending of hostilities before her pleas found adequate response. She had counted most, perhaps, upon the championship of President Wilson, whose solicitude for the smaller nations had been so eloquently expressed.

Yet the Belgians were to learn that precisely because they sacrificed themselves for international law and justice, they must be dissociated from the institution created to make them secure. In the situation the needs for financial and economic support were so urgent that the Peace Conference appointed a special commission on February 15, to report on the matter. Delay followed delay. The situation became so desperate that at the end of March, King Albert went to Paris to make a personal appeal, in which he stated: "The time for promises has passed. If Belgium is to live the Council must act." So flagrant had become the neglect of Belgium that the *London Chronicle* made this bitter comment: "While other subjects are passionately debated, this one, on which no debate ought to exist, is allowed to go by default." At the end of April, the issue still unsettled, the premier and other members of the cabinet made another appeal to the Council for an assurance of justice and for an immediate advance of five hundred million dollars from the indemnity. On May 3, the delegation from Belgium was instructed not to sign the treaty, and this in response to a nation-wide petition which declared: "It would be better to risk having nothing rather than to abdicate our right to the reparations and guarantees prom-

ised by most solemn assurances." And it was not until May 5 that the Peace Conference awarded to Belgium full reparation and priority of claim, which the whole world immediately recognized as an act of utmost justice. Yet it was President Wilson who declared in one of his peace principles: "The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just." And "the treatment accorded to Belgium seems to have been dictated by this singular rule of conduct, an expression of idealism so lofty that it forbids any distinction between aggressor and victim." ⁷

If the President's course puzzled Americans, it puzzled European statesmen more. Americans knew perfectly well that he had gone to Europe in the first instance without any authorization—indeed had gone in defiance of the American verdict given at the election in November, 1918. But the fact that he was there led European statesmen to accept him as the representative of America in fact. And the position in which they found themselves in relation to the only head of a nation in the Congress was not only puzzling but exasperating with his lost prestige.

One of the rocks upon which President Wilson settled as a firm foundation for the structure that he intended building for the world was that of self-determination for the smaller nations. When Venizelos, the statesman from Greece, asked for an application of his principle of self-determination, even after Greece had stood true to the cause of democracy and at the cost of civil war, he still had to face the stubborn hostility of President Wilson who had arbitrarily prevented an American declaration of war against Bulgaria, Greece's bitter enemy and a vassal of Germany. For when the Greek statesman undertook at the peace council to reward that country with territory populated by Greeks, President Wilson, disregarding his alleged

⁷ Philadelphia *North American*, May 8, 1919.

principle of self-determination, in every way possible undertook to thwart the purpose, going so far even as to insist upon delivering part of Grecian Thrace to the Bulgarians and demanding that they have a strip of land leading to a port on the *Ægean*—this queer strip to be called *Wilsonia*. But the San Remo conference in April heard Venizelos and acted without regard to President Wilson's utter disregard of his own principle of self-determination and ruled otherwise.

The gravamen of the astounding revelation made by the publishing of the Treaty was that Great Britain, to secure Japanese support for her claims to the German islands in the south Pacific, and France, to draw China into the war to obtain the German vessels interned in her ports, entered into an agreement with Japan to despoil China when the time came to adjust conditions and territorial lines at the close of the war. If this was a guilty and unspeakable act, America was a party to it, as developed in the Peace Conference. In what position we are left by the signing of the peace pact by President Wilson, and his enthusiastic endorsement of the Treaty which he described "as nearly perfect as humanly possible" is shown by the fact that Mr. Wilson traded off all he had in order to secure a League of Nations which he afterward killed by his obduracy. For he had nothing to compromise, no "common counsel" to enter into with the Senate or his countrymen.

When President Wilson told the American Congress that it was necessary for him to be at the World's Peace Congress at Paris to see that proper interpretation was given his self-enunciated principles, for which, he assured the world, America had fought for the first time in Europe, the country did not understand him. But what became clear as the months of discussion of the League of Nations lengthened, was discerned at once by the shrewd statesmen of Europe—his dominant purpose of returning to the United States with a League-of-Nations Covenant. With

this knowledge, they had in their hands the key to the situation, and they used it to the full throughout the Conference. To get the Covenant, President Wilson paid the price demanded by sacrificing his principles one by one, as he traded off what he had. Mr. Lansing, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that the Fourteen Points were never discussed by the Conference—a statement for which President Wilson never forgave him.

As the debate progressed, the determination of America not to become entangled in the affairs of Europe strengthened and the League Covenant proportionately declined in favor.

One of the President's definite statements made in the early stages of the Peace Congress was that the United States "will join no combination of power which is not a combination of us all." It stands against the equally frank declaration of Premier Clemenceau for the principle of the "balance of power." Thus upon this vital point there was a clear conflict of purpose.

Premier Clemenceau stated it very pointedly, toward the end of the Peace Congress, as the President was about to return to his own country in these words:

Now when peace is signed you are going home across the sea. The English are going home, too. But France stays where she is.

Marshal Foch has told you that France is the barrier protecting civilization, and so France and civilization must be protected.

You gentlemen have seen the character of the Germans along the Rhine. You know there is no democracy in their hearts. You know that their fawning attitude is as false as it can be. And so I say to you, France wants no such people in her republic.

We don't want to annex Germany up to the Rhine, but we do intend to see that the German military machine stays behind the river. That is what Marshal Foch meant, I believe. If we don't have that protection, France must maintain always an enormous army to guard civilization.

With our great loss of life in the war that would be a terrible burden for France. We must have a natural barrier or else it would be madness to demobilize our army.

I hope that Americans will see it in the same way. I hope that the soft words of the Germans will not convince the Americans that the leopard has changed his spots. So far I am unconvinced that the Germans of today are not the Germans of yesterday, the foes of the ideals of America, the ideals of France, the ideals of civilization, the foes of all that is desired in the hearts of mankind.

A Paris dispatch of April 23, 1919, stated: "In a statement issued by President Wilson today he declares that Fiume cannot become a part of Italy." And he "points out that every condition concerning the Adriatic settlement has been changed since Italy entered the war upon the promises of the pact of London, the Austro-Hungarian empire having disappeared. He notes that new states have been created for which Fiume is the natural outlet to the sea. . . .

"When Premier Orlando received President Wilson's statement, he immediately called a full meeting of the Italian delegation, which prepared a statement on the situation addressed to the Italian people."

As the conflict was developing between President Wilson and Premier Clemenceau when it was felt that Clemenceau was right and his position unshakable, not only in the eyes of France but in the eyes of enlightened thought everywhere among civilized nations, and it was apparent that President Wilson was attempting to meddle in foreign affairs, particularly in France which had suffered so greatly, while Americans had suffered so little, the efforts at propaganda sent out from Paris by the American delegation and its press bureau, was stifling in the fact that it attempted to belittle the ideals in France, urging her grasping disposition and the greed of her statesmen in seeking a conclusion of peace after *America had won the Great War*. And this propaganda, the American people having no better guide

at that moment, went far toward poisoning the minds of Americans against France. The *Paris Matin* published an open letter to President Wilson from Harry de Jouvent, spring of 1919, in which he maintained that if there was to be a League of Nations, it should guarantee reparation from Germany. He declared that France did not exact reparation for herself alone, and continued: "Today as yesterday France interprets the hopes of the nations. She is their voice." And he asks the President to sheer away from those who would say that reparation was impossible and then states: "If it were impossible that Germany, which is as safe as before the war, can repair the crimes which she has committed, it would be even more impossible for her victims to do so. In that case there would be nothing left but to despair of humanity."

And on this matter the *Philadelphia Ledger* stated:

False to the terms upon which the armistice was signed; and false therefore to her own plighted word and that of her Allies and her enemy, is the demand of France that the peace treaty shall authorize her expansion into the Saar basin. The principle upon which France, with the nations that helped to save her, agreed to make peace is antagonistic to such trickery as that by which France now seeks to grab the Saar basin.

This latter is a mere suggestion of what the propaganda put out from Paris by the American press bureau was accomplishing in seeking to develop American thought against even suffering France.

Perhaps one of the hardest things for her to bear was the admonition, coming from America through its President, that she must not irritate the sensitive Germans.

The injustice of it all was intolerable, but the folly of it was worse. The pleas of France were counting less with President Wilson than the threats of Germany. It is doubtful whether statesmanship ever produced a more fatuous theory than that Germany, stripped of her fleet and her colonies, would plot against a strengthened France or would

regard weakened France with sentiment of fraternity and gratitude. This was not a matter of territorial aggrandizement, but of strict economic justice, which the President of the United States sought to deny war-torn France.

As though it were not enough that France should be compelled to contribute most to the peace, after contributing incomparably most to the war, sustained efforts were being made to create the impression that she was obstructing a just peace by her "greed" and "selfish demands." This campaign of detraction seriously affected public opinion in the United States; and it was supported by influential American newspapers upon inspiration coming direct from the American peace mission in Paris. This propaganda was becoming a powerful factor in American public opinion in early April, 1919. An Associated Press dispatch carried the semi-official statement charging that "French claims are open to construction as meaning something more than military security and as verging upon territorial control."

Dispatches from Europe told, after he had been in the Congress for some time, that "the President's position is immensely stronger than when he arrived" and "it may be authoritatively stated that he is feeling more optimistic today regarding the general situation than at any time since his arrival in Europe," and yet it was as early as the Saturday on which the Peace Council began sitting that the report reached America of "future confirmation that Mr. Wilson is greatly disillusioned" and "already sees the impossibility of realizing all his ideals."

The afternoon papers of April 23, 1919, gave the first intimation of a pending rupture in the delegations at the Peace Congress. This was brought about by the President's position on the matter of Fiume which the Italians claimed under the London convention of 1917 and by President Wilson's own announced principle of self-determination for the smaller states. News began to reach America in a more exacerbated form when it became evident that the Italian

Premier Orlando, after President Wilson's appeal over the Italian Government, was determined to withdraw from the Conference, to return to his nation, and there determine what steps should next be taken. The situation developed into what leading American journals had predicted would happen months before under President Wilson's policy of dictation. The Italians charged that in issuing his appeal to the Italian people, Mr. Wilson made one of the gravest errors of diplomatic etiquette in the history of diplomacy. They charged directly that at 3:30 on the afternoon of April 23 they received from Premier Clemenceau and Lloyd George and Mr. Wilson a proposal which gave them satisfaction on the Dalmatian coast and proposed to make Fiume a free city under neither the Italians nor Jugo-Slavs. And that the next they knew was Mr. Wilson's appeal direct to the Italian people over the heads of their duly accredited representatives in the Peace Congress, instead of making it to the Italian Government.

It would not have required great vision to see what would have happened, had the delegates of some other nation taken that action with reference to American duly accredited representatives at the Peace Congress. American newspapers, not under the influence of the Administration, deplored the lack of judgment and finesse with which President Wilson gave out a decision as he did in the Italian case. The Italian press backed Orlando in his position, while flaying Mr. Wilson for a bad diplomatic break. The French press, more reserved in its expressions, at every turn flayed Mr. Wilson for his inconsistency. A poll of the newspaper comment taken by the *New York Tribune* showed that the press in the United States was divided on the Italian crisis.

The situation that developed in the Conference in the latter part of April, 1919, over the Fiume question, when Premier Orlando withdrew from the Conference, returned to his home and received an overwhelming vote of confi-

dence and then returned to the Congress stronger than before, became the most serious crisis for the Peace Conference up to that time. Not only was Italy involved against President Wilson's dictatorial manner, but the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks and Greeks were indignant that Americans resisted their territorial claims. Indeed, every nation represented had grievances against the United States. England alone remained discreetly silent.

It was President Wilson who undermined the moral authority and the actual power of the democratic governments by traveling over Europe preaching a crusade against them, inciting the peoples to distrust their leaders as men without vision or humane instincts or international honor. But the revolt came later, not against the duly constituted governments, but against President Wilson.

Frank H. Simonds, who had perhaps as firm a grasp upon the situation in the Peace Congress as any newspaper correspondent in the world, gives this view of the great crisis in the conference:

The French Government, regretting that the break seems imminent, is resolved to make no more surrender of the essential security of France to Mr. Wilson, and is determined, if necessary, to endure the evil consequences of his withdrawal rather than yield further.

Lloyd George has abandoned Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Wilson knows it.

Mr. Wilson has a sketch of a separate treaty with Germany, which is his final threat if his leadership does not prevail.

If he insists on going home there will be great disappointment, but, I think, no further concessions. The possibility that he will go home and attempt to make a separate peace with Germany has been threatened here privately for weeks, and has at last been discounted.

Under the circumstances those at a distance could but wonder and speculate.

The Congress of Vienna, though it attained a bad reputation for its intrigues and secrecy, the Congress of Berlin, and the conferences at The Hague, as well as all other

known conferences drew protocols in which could be found the substance of the opinions, the suggestions, propositions and counter-propositions of the various states. Yet in the most notable Peace Conference the world ever saw, that of Paris, 1919, which was supposed to be the most open of any the world ever knew, there was no record kept of any such matters. The Ten, then the Five, and after that the Four preferred not only to discuss in secret, but to leave no trace of their deliberations. They did not have any secretaries to record them. They broached and agitated all questions without putting anything on paper. They resumed on one day what they had settled the day before. They protested against language attributed to them on the outside. As nothing was written they could deny everything and begin all over again. In the state of things as they then existed, neither congresses nor parliaments nor peoples are left with any authentic documents at their disposition, and they had to content themselves with the verbal declarations of their government ministers, and on many important matters no two of them seemed to agree as to their meaning. Some day there will be some kind of a history written from the patching together of the various memoranda and denials of the various members. It will not, however, be an authentic record of the Congress.

America's honor must never be traded off for an individual mess of pottage. America must never be made an appendage to a super-government of the world.

CHAPTER XV

THE TREATY OF PARIS

If the United States is still to be regarded as a nation, then the most notable treaty in all the history of the making of treaties is a matter of prime concern to all Americans, from its very inception to the last syllable of the process of its final acceptance. And who is it, in this day of "the new order," that dares to rise and say, This is no longer the day of nations, but the new day of internationalism which has superseded the other? Only the man who lacks in his system the spark of vital Americanism. The United States is yet a nation, under a republican form of government, with a written constitution limiting the powers of every branch of its vast energy. And this limiting constitution is the basic law of the land.

The basis, then, of this supreme interest of all Americans is the preservation of the fundamental law of the land, that freedom in its highest sense to the individual may be kept safe. And that, after all, is the basis of the freedom granted to human society. The Constitution of the United States is but a means to this end.

It was in obedience to this Constitution that America took upon itself the fateful task of engaging in armed conflict with a dread war machine. It was in obedience to the same instrument that her delegates met with other assembled statesmen of the world to close the direful struggle. At this Peace Congress of the world at Paris these statesmen met to determine upon what terms the conflict should be ended. Some held the view that this was the sole purpose for which they met or could meet. Others declared that they were at liberty to initiate any movement and to formu-

late any program for the government of the world that they might feel an inclination to take up.

It was upon these two simple views that the action of the Congress depended. Accepting the latter view, it labored and brought forth the document which is the Treaty of Paris. It undertook the accomplishment of two purposes in one instrument: Closing the armed conflict of the world and defining for the nations a form of government for the future.

The former, and that only, is properly the Treaty of Peace. The other is known as the Covenant of the League of Nations, and was made a constituent part of the former at the insistence of one of the American members of the peace commission, President Wilson. Thus, when the Treaty was completed and came to the United States the two were combined in one, and the whole instrument was known as the Treaty of Peace.

This document reached the United States outside the usual and regular channels. It leaked to America and into the United States Senate, much to the chagrin of President Wilson; and its discussion there began May 23, 1919, though the President did not present his copy of it in that body until July 10. He had been called upon to submit the Treaty through regular channels when the document was known to be in the country. He refused, though it was on sale in the leading capitals of Europe. Then Senator Borah informed the country that if the paper was to be withheld, he would read the entire document of some 85,000 words into the Senate record. A cablegram from the President was read by Senator Hitchcock, Administration leader in that body, asking a thorough investigation to determine how the Treaty had reached the Senate. This immediately brought Senator Borah to his feet, with the statement that he had the Treaty in his hands, and that he was authorized by those from whom he received it to state how it came into his possession, namely, through Frazer Hunt, a corre-

spondent of the *Chicago Tribune*. He read it into the record June 9 after points of order had been made against it for an hour with a view to its suppression.

The Treaty itself is a remarkable document. The longest ever written, it represents the combined product of over two thousand experts working continually through a series of commissions for three and a half months from January 18, 1919. It was printed in parallel pages of English and French, recognized as of equal validity, though prior thereto the French was understood to be the diplomatic language of the world. It did not deal with questions affecting Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, except in so far as to bind Germany to accept any agreement reached with these former allies of hers. It covered a vast range of matters to which Senator Moses called attention when, on the floor of the Senate, he expressed himself humorously on this wise:

In this Treaty are considerations of many things—of shoes and ships and sealing wax, of cabbages and kings. It roams the plains, sails the seas, delves into the earth and soars into the sky; Huns, horses and huntsmen alike come within their purview; books, boundaries and bullets; guns, goats, guarantees and governments; warships, water-ways, woman suffrage and Wilhelm II—in short, the alphabet and alliteration alike are agonized in an attempt to deal adequately with merely a topical index to this instrument which we are asked to ratify in haste lest we break the heart of the world.

Thomas Jefferson, eminent in the early history of the country, informed President Washington that it was advisable, whenever possible, to consult the Senate concerning a proposed treaty before beginning the negotiations. Ignoring this advice prudent, since no treaty is valid without approval of the Senate, President Wilson created unnecessary opposition in the Senate, as he did in the country, by his secret methods in the Peace Congress as well as when preparing for his attendance thereon. His course thereafter only widened the breach between the executive and the ratifying power, in particular when he refused informa-

tion requested by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee while it had the Treaty under consideration.

When President Wilson submitted to the Senate what he said was the only authentic Treaty, he was described as reading his address slowly and in a clear, quiet voice. His manuscript, typewritten on small pages, he held in his left hand and with his right he punctuated his utterance with an occasional gesture, while before him on the Vice-President's desk lay the Treaty brought by him in person from Paris.

In this message to the Senate the President stated that to reject the Covenant of the League of Nations now would "break the heart of the world"; that many issues intervened to make the Treaty of Peace "not exactly what we would have written"; that the compromises, which were accepted as inevitable, "nowhere cut to the heart of any principle"; that the Peace Treaty as a whole "squares" with the principles that were agreed upon as the basis of peace. He urged prompt ratification and with no substantial change.

When it was declared through the public press that in submitting the Treaty to the Senate President Wilson had fired the opening gun in his fight to force immediate ratification of the League-of-Nations Covenant without reservation, it was also stated that the shell landed short of its mark; that Mr. Wilson's address was disappointing to his friends and encouraging to his opponents; that for the most part it was a repetition of what he had said on former occasions; and that it furnished none of the information that was expected by both sides in the League controversy. It was recognized at the moment, however, that full and complete information was promised later.

It was the first time that the Senate had ever received a treaty from the executive in open session and began its consideration with full publicity. For the first time a President of the United States reported as his own ambassador. In the matter of actions and policies proposed there were innovations of the most far-reaching nature. The situation

was described as unique in that it has no parallel elsewhere. While the Peace Treaty and Covenant were subject to criticism in Great Britain, France, and Italy, there were no such conflicts between the executive and legislative branches of the government—the reason being that in those countries the leaders had made the peace project a coalition agreement and co-operation instead of arbitrary personal direction and partisan management.

The deliberations on the Treaty provoked one of the most bitter and prolonged contests between the Senate and the President in American history, with the controversy centering almost wholly about the League-of-Nations Covenant. At the same time the newspapers of the nation took up the discussion with vigor and the rostrum furnished some of the ablest debaters the country possessed on both sides of the great question.

There are three distinct stages of progression by which the President encouraged the bitterness of this controversy: First, when he passed over the Senate and thus ignored all precedent and history and the advice of the early publicists of the nation, as Thomas Jefferson, who advised President Washington to confer with the Senate before undertaking negotiation of a treaty, since that body must pass upon a treaty before it can become operative; second, in refusing to furnish the Senate information in his possession, and only in his possession, so that it might reach a just and intelligent conclusion in its consideration of the Treaty; third, his attempt to create against the Senate a public sentiment, based upon false foundations, and thus force the Senate to action against its own better judgment.

The Senate's effort to get information from the President when seeking light so as to pass intelligently upon this document of supreme importance to the nation and to the world, resulted in a showing of efforts on the part of the President at concealment from the public that were unworthy of a man in his high position. But in every instance,

it indicated the President's conception of government under the Constitution as revealed in his written works of years previous: That the Senate must approve what the executive should choose to devise and that without question; that the words of the Constitution, "advice and consent" of the Senate were words with some meaning outside the ordinary use of language that could be read into them by the executive.

This is shown in the President's refusal of August 28, not given to the public until September 1, to submit to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee other treaties to which the United States was to be a party, upon the ground that compliance would set a precedent for encouragement of senatorial encroachment upon the presidential prerogative; and upon the further ground that it might create an embarrassment to give out the contents of a treaty before it was ready for final action. Replying to this statement of the President's reasons, Senator Lodge, chairman of the committee, said:

The declaration of the 16th of June was printed some time ago in the *Record*, from the English White Book, the declaration having been submitted to the House of Commons on the 4th of July, I believe. The committee asked for it merely because they thought it would be better that it should be officially before them.

In reply to another request of the committee for information upon an important point, so essential, in fact, that the Senate would have stultified itself in passing upon the point without seeking the information at its source, and derelict in its duty as well, the President replied that as he recollected the business, to use his phrase, no agreement had been reached concerning it when he left France and he had heard of none since. This was concerning the division and apportionment of the war indemnity exacted from Germany. He also stated that he was "not able to bring from Paris a complete file of papers" relating to the Treaty, but

"only those which happen to be in my hands"—a remarkable admission of incompetence and neglect of duty. If the President could treat his Secretary of State as harshly as he treated Mr. Lansing for what he termed his offenses, what terms would he have used to condemn such indifference to the public for an offense such as the President admits he himself committed, in leaving essential records in a foreign land, or what punishment would he have meted out to him? Nor was the Secretary of State able to answer vital questions, his constant reply being that only the President or Edward M. House had the information sought by the committee. The refusal of the President to furnish the committee essential documents¹ and every other avenue of information being closed by the Administration to the committee, the chairman was compelled to announce it would report the Treaty with Germany to the Senate.

And all this occurred after the President had promised explicitly that he would furnish the Senate with all information in his possession. Instead, he suggested the White House meeting of August 18. It was the President's action which kept the Treaty in the committee as long as it was, the period of sixty days, and under consideration forty-five days. No just opinion by the Senate was possible with the information withheld by the President. In violation of his written stipulation with France that he would submit to the Senate for its consideration the special treaty with that nation at the same time he would submit the Treaty with Germany, he withheld it until the Senate refused to proceed further with the latter until the other was submitted.

✓ It was during the stage of proceedings when the committee was seeking information from the President that the

¹ A refreshing contrast to this attitude is that of President Harding in submitting to the Senate, February 10, 1922, the treaties of Disarmament Conference when he said: "It is a privilege as well as a duty to ask that advice and consent which the Constitution requires to make these covenants effective. Accompanying the treaties I bring to you the complete minutes of both plenary sessions and committee meetings, and a copy of the official report made to me by the American delegation to the Conference."

White House Conference of the President with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee took place. It was disillusioning to the committee as well as to the American public and to the world, when he solemnly declared to the committee that he had no knowledge of the secret treaty entered into by the Allies, by virtue of which Italy entered the conflict. There were other treaties to which Senator Johnson invited his attention—the agreement with Rumania, in August, 1916; the several agreements touching Asia Minor; the agreements entered into in the winter of 1917-1918, between France and Russia relative to the frontiers of Germany, and particularly concerning the Saar Valley and the left bank of the Rhine—and the President of the United States declared that he had no knowledge of any of them until he reached the Paris Conference.

Yet, on March 4, 1918, Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons, stated that "President Wilson is kept informed" as to the treaties entered into by the Allies. It was the Russian government that published to the world in November, 1917, the secret treaties. Late in 1917 and early in 1918, the English paper, the *Manchester Guardian*, published almost all of them; and early in 1918 the *New York Evening Post* published many of them. One cause of the downfall of the Kerensky government in Russia was the refusal of the Allies to revise certain of the secret treaties. The secret treaty with Italy, known as the London Pact, was made April 27, 1915; and May 10, 1915, it was outlined to the world by Sir Arthur Evans in a letter to the *Manchester Guardian*. It was given to the American public in various forms and in various publications, long prior to the meeting of the Paris Conference.

And President Wilson was the statesman to represent America among the statesmen of the world in the Peace Congress, where he first knew anything of these secret treaties! Yet, in the armistice agreements the boundary lines were fixed almost as copied from the secret treaties.

He was able to write and sign his statement upon the disposition of Fiume without having seen the secret treaty, as he admitted under the questioning of Senator Moses of New Hampshire.

But if it disillusioned Europeans, Americans even more. Confidence, which crumbled when the President in seeking personal advantage through a Democratic Congress which he asked the people to elect in fall of 1918, was so shattered after the August, 1919, White House Conference that the President found it necessary to tour the country in support of the Treaty he brought home and especially the League of Nations. His advocacy of the matter was fatal, for, as often, he attempted to make things appear what they were not, and his temper did not draw the American people to his cause.

And to all of this was added the adverse features of Secretary Lansing's testimony before the Senate committee; then the statement of William C. Bullitt, and other circumstances that led the people to believe that the President was not giving them a square deal. It strengthened the Senate's opposition to the President's arbitrary and wilful manner of seeking to make treaties and of binding the country to unprecedented undertakings without consulting the co-ordinate treaty-making power of the government.

In all the queer logic used by the President in his conference at the White House with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, on August 18, 1919, none perhaps was stranger than his seeking to answer Senator Brandegee as to the scope of Article X in regard to the express "external aggression" when he stated:

I understand that Article to mean no nation is at liberty to invade the *territorial integrity* of another. That does not mean to invade for the purposes of warfare, but to impair the territorial integrity of another nation. Its territorial integrity is not destroyed by armed intervention. It is destroyed by retention, by taking territory away from it that impairs its territorial integrity.

The logic of the President appeared to be that "external aggression" or "invasion" of the territory does not mean that the League could be effective in restraining it until it came to the council table to arrange the terms, which would mean that it might be invaded by a powerful army, torn asunder, the property destroyed, the inhabitants carried or driven away, or slaughtered; and yet the League of Nations was not to become effective as touching that invasion or "external aggression" until the terms of peace were to be settled, with the aggressor in possession.

A weakness in the committee's report was that it failed to recognize any good features in the Treaty. It did justly demand, however, that this nation "declines to assume, except by action of the Congress," any obligation "to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country, or to interfere in controversies between other nations." It had been declared by the President that this would "cut the heart out" of the League-of-Nations Covenant. The committee report further declared that "the United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to determine what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction," and that "the Monroe Doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone, and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of the League of Nations," clarifying the most vague and most important of the provisions.

It was thus made clear that the Covenant of the League of Nations was the danger from the outset to the Treaty's ratification. And the President's rude and arbitrary treatment of the Senate from the beginning, created a chasm that was never bridged and which he appeared to desire to perpetuate.

In this it is probable that history will conclude that the President erred. In assuming his dictatorial attitude toward the Senate, a body of co-equal constitutional authority in treaty-making, he ignored history, tradition, and the

written Constitution of the nation, to say nothing of the respect and confidence which the people repose in this constitutional body. It all appears to have come about as a result of the President's misconception of executive functions under the Constitution. Either that or an inborn desire to assume autocratic powers for purposes of self-aggrandizement. As a sequel, the Senate's position steadily grew stronger, while that of the President as steadily waned.

As a result of his peculiar conception of executive functions under the federal Constitution, or for some other reason of equal validity, President Wilson appeared to think it a duty that he should, or at all events believe that he could, create a public sentiment that would carry him through, such sentiment based upon false statement of fact; in other words, that he could make people believe what was not true, and simply because he said it. Examples are but too numerous. One will suffice to illustrate his method.

On September 25, 1919, in his tour across the country in support of the League of Nations, President Wilson used this remarkable argument at Pueblo, Colorado:

I had gone over there with, so to say, explicit instructions. Don't you remember that we laid down fourteen points which should contain the principles of settlement? They were not my points. In every one of them I was conscientiously trying to read the thought of the people of the United States, and after I uttered those points I had every assurance given me that could be given me that they did speak the moral judgment of the United States and not my single judgment.

It was on this kind of argument that the President sought to make the American people believe that they had given him a mandate to insist upon his terms of peace as promulgated in his Fourteen Points. He never disclosed, however, who it was that had jointly with him worked out the Fourteen Points to his entire satisfaction. But it was with that kind of logic that the people were made suspicious of President Wilson's right intentions and that discredited

him from the time of his tour across the country as they had never discredited him before.

Upon leaving the country to attend the Peace Congress, President Wilson had assured the Congress of his own country that it should know all that he did. It soon became evident that he did not mean to keep that part of his agreement. Immediately after he had submitted the Treaty to the Senate for its consideration, it became evident that if the people of the country were ever furnished "full and complete" information about the League of Nations and the Peace Treaty, together with a history of the negotiations leading up to them, it would be in opposition to the President instead of with his aid as he had promised. To this end, Administration leaders in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee set out to oppose every move to obtain from the President the reasons back of the Treaty and the Covenant.

When the situation became so grave that he no longer dared face the country with further refusal, the President stated that he would receive the committee at the White House to talk over the great instrument. The Senate, mindful of what had occurred in a similar meeting at the White House in February, declined to accept this invitation of the President, unless it was distinctly understood that it was to be an open meeting and for the use of the public and to become a matter of record, instead of a White House secret conclave, as had been the former meeting. From this mid-summer meeting the President emerged with a good reputation as a casuist, but he lost tremendously as a debater possessed of the rugged horse sense of the average American.

The first decisive vote upon the reservations which the Senate had determined to make to the Peace Treaty was that upon the nation's right to leave the League of Nations. This occurred on November 8, 1919, and the nation's right was sustained by a vote of 50 to 35. This was a severe blow to what had been the hopes of the Adminis-

tration forces that the Treaty might be adopted precisely as President Wilson brought it back with him from Europe during the discussion.

The rejection of the Treaty, with the reservations adopted by the Senate, took place November 19, 1919. There were two distinct propositions before the Senate and on these various propositions from three to ten Democrats voted with the Republicans. When President Wilson was disillusioned as to Senate procedure, he having been previously of opinion that it required two-thirds of the Senate to adopt a reservation, the United States Supreme Court to the contrary notwithstanding, and was made to face the fact that reservations could be adopted by a majority vote of that body, and that they had been so adopted, he sent a written communication to his supporters demanding that they vote for rejection of the Treaty; and two-thirds vote being required to ratify, it was accordingly rejected with the reservations.

After the rejection of the Treaty by the United States Senate in a decisive vote in which the Republicans were joined by prominent Democrats, the interest in the League of Nations was not lessened. It continued to be discussed in assemblies everywhere; votes were taken upon it by religious bodies particularly in urging ratification promptly, many of them without knowing that in so doing they were bartering away American sovereignty and independence; in mid-January, 1920, the colleges and universities of the country took a vote upon the matter, the result of which indicated a considerable majority in favor of reservations. The paramount question then became whether there should be a compromise between the position assumed by the President of ratification of the Treaty as he presented it to the Senate and the reservations which had been adopted by the Senate previous to rejection of the Treaty on November 19. At the Jackson Day dinner in Washington, the President showed the same obduracy that had characterized him

throughout, while his former Secretary of State, William J. Bryan, took the position that the majority in the United States Senate had the right to its own views without being dictated to by the executive and a compromise should be the order of the day. So prominent became this issue between the President and the former Secretary of State, that all the other noted speakers on that occasion were lost in the fog of discussion which followed.

The second rejection of the Treaty occurred just four months from the time of its first failure of ratification. Partisans of the President declared that it was due to the partisanship of Senator Lodge and his following. The fact is the President gave written instructions to his followers to vote against ratification if any change was made in the League-of-Nations Covenant.

During the long discussion in the Senate and over the country of the Treaty, there was no time that it would not have been ratified promptly but for the Covenant, a wholly foreign matter, having been woven into it. There would have been no serious objection on the part of either the President or the Senate. It was the matter of the League of Nations alone that occasioned controversy and created violent opposition, that strained the relations between the United States and the nations associated with her in the war, that greatly endangered the real association for the purpose it was thought the League would fulfill, and which delayed peace and threatened continued disaster to the world.

History will ask, as thousands of Americans had already asked, Who is responsible for the refusal to make peace? Mr. Wilson sought to place the responsibility on the Senate; yet the Senate was eager to make peace and to ratify a treaty of peace that would leave American institutions and freedom of action unimpaired. If the President refused to accept the advice and consent of the Senate as the Constitution requires on a matter of making a treaty, the

question arose whether he would not be responsible for failure.

But he sought to carry the matter away from the Senate and to take it before the country, for which there is no provision in the Constitution. In other words he was wholly willing to ignore the constitutional requirement that he make treaties of peace with the advice and consent of the Senate and to adopt a method outside of the Constitution by an appeal to a vote of the mass of the people.

And yet if there was to be a plebiscite, the President had provided no means by which to force a vote on the simple question, as he would have it passed upon: the Treaty as he presented it or no treaty at all; or the particular Covenant of a League which he brought from Europe or no international organization at all. He sought to convince the people that he was with the people, as the Senate was against the people; just as in an earlier day and in another land Louis Bonaparte held himself out to be the most advanced advocate of democratic ideas in France, won a vote by the people and overturned the Republic. And even should President Wilson be defeated in such an appeal he could easily escape the obloquy of defeat by saying, "I did the best I could, I bow to the will of the people."

But the President showed plainly that his devotion to the Treaty of Peace and to the Covenant of the League of Nations was variable. He clearly told the Supreme Council at Paris that unless his authority was recognized and his decisions complied with he would withdraw the Treaty from the Senate, and that he would relieve himself of all responsibility if his will did not prevail in the dispute between Serbia and Italy. He did not hesitate to say this, even though he would have to "face the unthinkable task of making another and separate peace with Germany" and though, to quote his words, he would have to "break the heart of the world."

When the President's proposal for a "great and solemn referendum" was made, as stated in his Jackson Day letter, it really meant this question: "Shall the President of the United States conclude treaties without advice and consent of the Senate?" And once that question is answered, another President with the same characteristics as Woodrow Wilson might easily take the next step and ask, Shall the President make laws without the sanction of Congress? One is as constitutional as the other. And the President who would undertake to overthrow the Constitution on one point could as readily assume to overthrow it on the other.

Not only Republicans but millions of Democrats agreed with William J. Bryan that the president's rejection of the Treaty was "a colossal crime."

Said Senator Owen, one of the president's staunchest adherents, in making his final speech before the roll was called, on March 19, 1920:

I do not believe there is a single Democratic senator who would not vote for this resolution of ratification if it were not for the belief of such senator that the President of the United States desires them to defeat the resolution of ratification now pending and would regard their failure to do so as a refusal to follow his view as party leader.

And there was no senator in a better position than he to gauge the sentiments of his colleagues; nor did any other senator challenge his statement. The vote was 49 to 35, and its return to the President was ordered by the Senate, and there it remained to his term's close.

There was never any show for ratification in the dangerous form in which President Wilson submitted it to the Senate, July 10, 1919. His refusal to permit any change, even to safeguard the interests of the United States, made ratification impossible. His written instructions that it be rejected if changes were to be made, sealed its fate.

And the event makes sardonic comment on his state-

craft. At Paris he repeatedly sacrificed principle to save the Covenant. At Washington he resisted any concession to the demands for the nation's safety. The *Kansas City Star*, in commenting upon the second failure of the Senate to ratify the Treaty, said:

The Peace Treaty, with the League of Nations, is dead. It has been killed by the President. In the Senate yesterday, including the pairs, there was a majority of eighteen for the Americanized Treaty, but the President refused to release the seven senators whose votes would have ratified the document.

Both houses of Congress then took up the matter of repealing the action whereby war was declared to exist between Germany and United States. On April 9, this measure passed the House by a vote of 242 to 150. In a modified form, it passed the Senate. But the President vetoed the measure, thus continuing technical war of his own will, which he so much deprecated that he urged Congress to take speedy action looking toward peace. It was not peace he sought, but a subterfuge.

It was while the President was withholding from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the important treaty with France, in direct violation of his solemn agreement, that he was urging early ratification by the Senate of the document he brought back with him from Europe, declaring among other things these:

The channels of trade are barred by war when there is no war.

Our full normal profitable production waits on peace. Our military plans wait upon it.

The nations that ratify the Treaty, such as Great Britain, Belgium and France, will be in a position to lay their plans for controlling the markets of the world without competition from us, if we do not presently act.

Every element of normal life among us depends upon and awaits the ratification of peace.

The Monroe Doctrine is expressly mentioned as an understanding which is in no way to be impaired or interfered with by anything contained in the Covenant.

Immigration, tariffs and naturalization are incontestibly domestic questions with which no international body could deal without express authority to do so.

The right of any sovereign state to withdraw had been taken for granted.

The United States will undertake under Article X to "respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league." And that engagement constitutes a very grave and solemn moral obligation.

There can be no reasonable objection to . . . interpretations accompanying the act of ratification, providing they do not form a part of the ratification itself.

In the famous reply of the Allies to President Wilson, on January 11, 1917, declaring the objects for which they were engaged in the war, they stated the principles that became basic in the terms of the Treaty of Peace. It was a solemn declaration from which they never swerved, whether battles were lost or won, until the final victory. To those terms they held when President Wilson was urging a "peace without victory"; they did not change their purposes when Russia withdrew from the war, nor yet when the United States entered it; they put those identical principles into the armistice, and embedded them in the Peace Treaty. The result was a settlement which the organs of the Administration afterward hailed as a product of wisdom and justice.

In speaking of the American colonies, Edmund Burke, the great Englishman, declared: "I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole people." If he were living to-day he might learn from the indictment which delivers the German nation to a moral

judgment from which there will be no appeal now or hereafter. The measured sentences fall upon Germany's self-slain repute like clods into an open grave.

And in this connection it may be observed that it is with strange irony that the words of President Wilson, "a peace of justice," frequently upon his lips, were used invariably as a demand, not upon Germany, but on Germany's adversaries; a phrase which he never employed except as a means of questioning the motives and decrying the policies of the nations battling against the common enemy; the habitual form of his warning and protest against "imperialism" and "vindictiveness" and "greed" which he attributed to the Allies;—strange that these words should enter so vividly into the indictment against Germany, namely:

Justice is what the German delegation asks for and says that Germany has been promised. But it must be justice for all. There must be justice for the dead and wounded and for those who have been orphaned and bereaved that Europe might be freed from Prussian despotism. There must be justice for the peoples that now stagger for those millions whose homes and lands and property German savagery has spoliated and destroyed.

What, then, are the terms? Only a few may be here suggested as pointing to the character of others. The terms of the Treaty were plainly stated and none too severe for the crimes committed against civilization. Germany was to concede the reduction of her territory in Europe from 208,825 square miles to 172,000 square miles. Her population was to shrink from sixty-six millions to fifty-four millions through the liberation of peoples held in unwilling subjection. She was to renounce three million square miles of colonial possessions with their populations of thirteen millions. Her army, which in peace time numbered two million men, was not to exceed 200,000, and after March, 1920, was to be cut to 100,000. She was to dismantle all

fortifications on Helgoland and within the zone of 30 miles of the Rhine. The fleet which she treacherously scuttled after its surrender was not to be replaced, nor would she be permitted to possess military or naval aircraft. Accepting responsibility for the war, she was to assume the obligation of repairing all damages inflicted, and pay therefor to her uttermost capacity under the supervision of an international reparation tribunal. She was to devote her resources for a generation to the work of restitution to the nations she had wronged.

The main points in the Peace Treaty are as follows:

Alsace and Lorraine go to France.

All the bridges over the Rhine, on their borders, are to be in French control.

The port of Danzig is permanently internationalized and most of upper Silesia is ceded to Poland, whose independence Germany recognizes. Poland also receives the province of Posen and that portion of the province of West Prussia west of Vistula.

The Saar coal basin is temporarily internationalized. The coal mines go to France.

Germany recognizes the independence of German-Austria and Czecho-Slovakia.

Germany's colonies are taken from her by clauses in which she renounces all her territorial and political rights outside of Europe. The League of Nations will work out the mandatory system for governing these colonies.

Belgium is conditionally given the Malmedy and Eupen districts of Prussia bordering on Belgium, with the opportunity to be given the inhabitants to protest. The League of Nations has the final decision.

Luxembourg is set free from the German customs union.

All concessions and territory in China must be renounced. Shantung is ceded to Japan.

Germany recognizes the French in Morocco and the British protectorate over Egypt.

German troops and authorities must evacuate Schleswig-Holstein north of the Kiel canal within ten days after peace. A commission

will be appointed to supervise a vote of self-determination in the territory, and the districts wishing to join Denmark will be ceded by Germany.

Helgoland must be demolished, and by German labor. The Kiel canal must be opened to all nations.

The German cables in dispute are surrendered.

Germany may not have an army of more than 100,000 men and cannot resort to conscription.

She must raze all her forts for fifty kilometers east of the Rhine and is almost entirely prohibited from producing war material. Violation of the 50-kilometer zone restriction will be considered an act of war.

Only six capital ships of not more than 10,000 tons each are allowed Germany for her navy. She is permitted six light cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats in addition to six battle-ships, but no submarines.

All civilian damages are to be reimbursed by Germany, her initial payment to be 20,000,000,000 marks, with subsequent payments to be secured by bonds. She must replace shipping ton for ton, handing over a great part of her economic resources to rebuilding the devastated regions.

Parts of Germany will be occupied on a diminishing scale until reparation is made.

Germany must agree to the trial of former Emperor William by an international court for a supreme offense against international morality and to the trial of others of her subjects for violations of the laws and customs of war.

The Allies and Germany accept the League of Nations, Germany, however, only in principle and not as a member.

All treaties and agreements with Bolshevik Russia must be abrogated, as well as the treaty of Bucharest with Rumania.

German prisoners of war are to be repatriated, but the Allies will hold German officers as hostages for Germans accused of crimes.

After months of uncertainty and disunion, this most momentous and far-reaching compact ever drawn was signed by the envoys of virtually all the civilized and stable governments of the earth; and after nearly five years of strife, unparalleled in extent and destructiveness, peace was

re-established by the signing of the Treaty. As President Wilson declared, there was framed for better or worse, "the charter for a new order of affairs in the world."

To the superficial view the Treaty looked like a finality—the nations had counselled together and established peace, and the world, it seemed, was freed from war or the imminent threat of it. Yet upon sober examination it was perceived that this was the least conclusive document of the kind in history. Instead of solving the world's dangers and difficulties, the Treaty merely declares the manner in which civilization would endeavor to solve them. It was really not a settlement. It was merely a program for a settlement, and the test of its value lay in the application of its provisions.

And herein it quickly exhibited its weakness. By mid-October, 1919, it had been ratified by Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. Under its terms, this was sufficient to make it effective upon exchange. There was no immediate exchange of ratification, as it was hoped that the United States would become a party by ratification. Exchange by the ratifying nations took place January 10, 1920, and the Treaty became fully operative among these nations. When news dispatches from Paris, on January 5, 1920, told the country that the United States ambassador to France had requested the Supreme Council to precede future decisions of that body with the formula, "Allied Powers," instead of "Allied and Associated Powers," as formerly used, the French newspaper *Echo de Paris* declared: "This marks the determination of the United States not to participate officially in the decisions to be reached in Paris."

And now came the danger from the weakness of this momentous document. When the Allies, in the spring of 1920, and even before that, were unwilling to exert themselves as a unit to save the Treaty from violation and becoming a mere scrap of paper in the hands of Germany, France stepped in, as she did in the beginning of the world

conflagration, and declared that Germany must observe the terms of the Treaty, at least so far as movement toward the French border was concerned. And Belgium, as she did at the beginning of the world conflagration, boldly stepped to her side, and shoulder to shoulder they served emphatic notice upon Germany that at least that portion of the Treaty was in force. Then President Wilson interposed an objection, and declared France had militaristic aims.² While the fact is, Germany was plainly and openly violating the most essential parts of the Treaty as affecting France, including the requirement to furnish coal to replace that wantonly destroyed, and the reduction of her army. When the statesmen of Europe came together at San Remo, in April, 1920, to take up these matters which affected Europe primarily and almost solely, the matters were quickly adjusted. France's complete reply to President Wilson was, See that Germany disarms, and then we shall disarm. And in this conference, on April 21, Lloyd George stated rather pointedly that the League Covenant was inserted in the Peace Treaty out of deference to President Wilson; and now that President Wilson was to all intents and purposes out of European politics, the time had come to clear the decks of impracticabilities.

In his statement the President is perfectly clear and says that the purpose of the League of Nations is to protect the world against the French government, and not against a revival of kaiserism or the overwhelming terror of Bolshevism. That is to say, to curb the imperialistic ambitions of the French democracy which, for the protection of its own existence and the freedom of the world had lost over a million men killed—57 per cent of the country's manhood between the ages of 19 and 34 years—300,000 more members missing and never recovered; her wounded numbering above 3,000,000, of whom 700,000 were rendered per-

²The most cordial reception given Marshal Foch when he visited the United States in October and November, 1921, went far toward wiping out this unwarranted blot upon the page of Franco-American friendship.

manently helpless. With France's 40,000,000 of a population it meant what would be the equivalent of 3,000,000 of Americans killed with over 800,000 more missing and never recovered, 9,500,000 wounded of whom 2,000,000 would be so maimed as to be permanently helpless. This should be sufficient answer to Mr. Wilson's accusation against France which he singles out particularly to compare with Germany under kaiserism as an unbridled aggressor.

It was proclaimed, however, in a joint statement by the three Allied powers on April 26 that they stood unequivocally for full execution of the Treaty. President Wilson was not present and the Europeans found themselves capable of settling European matters without his hand. Their statement said:

The Allies are unanimous in declaring that they cannot tolerate a continuance of these infractions of the Treaty; that the Treaty must be executed, and remain as the basis of relations between Germany and the Allies; and that they are resolved to take all measures—even, if necessary, the occupation of additional German territory, in order to insure execution of the Treaty. Germany must understand that the unity of the Allies for the execution of the treaty is as solid as it was for war.

Germany, still seeking a way of escape from the penalty for her crimes against civilization, did not promptly comply with these requirements. And when, July 8, 1920, another critical point was reached in the conference of the Allies with the Germans at Spa, in Belgium, Germany was plainly told that the time limit for accepting the Franco-British terms of disarmament was set for noon of the following day, and that the German army was to be reduced to 150,000 by October 1. It was France that had caused the Treaty to be executed, and that in the face of President Wilson's unfounded accusations.

In this connection history must note the fact that from the time President Wilson returned from Europe with the Treaty, embodying the undertakings to which he sought to

bind the country without authority from the people, the Administration was making large plans for a United States army that seemed beyond all proportion to any demands, except for such obligations. While Secretary Baker saw no need of preparation when actual war was confronting the nation and thanked God for lack of it, now when the war was ended and the world was exhausted he was planning for an army of 576,000. It set the country to asking why.

While President Wilson had declared in his New York address, upon his second departure to attend the Peace Congress, that the League-of-Nations Covenant should be so inextricably interwoven with the Treaty that it could not be untangled without destroying the whole document, Secretary Hughes deftly performed the feat and the separate treaty which he prepared was accepted by Germany, and October, 1921, it was ratified by the Senate.

"In the multitude of counsellors there is safety"; but one headstrong man's wisdom may be fatal.

CHAPTER XVI

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

As a policy of the Administration, the League of Nations was given a place overshadowing any other. Upon its success President Wilson declared that his place in history must be based. By it his reputation must be made; without it, it must fall.

Whether it gave any individual or any administration a standing in history is of little consequence. Whether a great policy such as that proposed would advantage the nation or the world is a matter of supreme importance. If it could but put into practice in the world the great principle of social justice, it would be worth all the efforts and all the heart-burnings the throes of its bringing forth required.

And President Wilson was consistent, persistent, insistent upon this one thing, however much he wavered in the other great affairs of state. He held that The League, The Covenant, and not some other, must prevail. He held that the American people had given him a mandate which he must obey, and which he did obey, in bringing from the Paris Peace Congress the instrument at first called the Constitution of the League, which later became the Covenant of The League of Nations. And sight must never be lost of the fact that there is a distinction with a difference between a league and The League. The former is the policy of the nation and the world; the latter, that of President Wilson.

From history's earliest dawn there have been associations of nations. These, in the earliest days, were almost wholly for defensive or offensive purposes in war. In mod-

ern times they have been placed upon a firmer basis, as they have been upon a higher plane. The more advanced thought in the United States provoked and built up the idea of a league of the more progressive nations of the world to enforce peace upon all the nations of earth. Much had already been accomplished in the way of education along that line when the coming of the Great War gave added impetus. Individuals and societies in all sections of the country were giving of their energy to forward the movement. Former President William H. Taft was chosen president of the national organization. Once the new idea of the League of Nations, as announced by President Wilson, was brought forward, Mr. Taft became its enthusiastic supporter; so enthusiastic, in fact, that it was thought his enthusiasm ran away with his better judgment. On the Pacific coast speaking in behalf of the Covenant he went so far as to declare that those who did not support it he would not trust over night. Later he materially modified his attitude, when the dangers lurking in the instrument were pointed out to him concretely.

Very early in the days of the European conflict, Theodore Roosevelt said:

The one effective move for obtaining peace is by an agreement among the great Powers, in which each should pledge itself not only to abide by the decisions of a common tribunal, but to back its decisions with force. The great civilized nations should combine by solemn agreement in a great world league for the peace of righteousness.¹

And this idea grew with him with the years of the European tragedy. He felt that in the group of democracies whose representatives met in Paris to settle the issues of the Great War there was the foundation of the structure, ready built and cemented by the common ideals of government and of law; and that this structure should be strengthened by creating confidence in it. In his last dictated article,

¹ *Philadelphia North American*, October 18, 1914.

but which he had not the opportunity to correct when death intervened, he gave to the world his idea of a real league of nations in the beginning days of the World Peace Congress.

Would it not be well to begin with the league which we actually have in existence, the league of the Allies who have fought through this Great War? . . . The American people do not wish to go into an overseas war unless for a very great cause and where the issue is absolutely plain.²

At the same time he criticized the nebulousness of President Wilson's expressions, so far as they were permitted to reach this country, stating that it was "a serious misfortune that our people are not getting a clear idea of what is happening on the other side," touching a league of nations, while "we all earnestly desire such a league, only we wish to be sure that it will help and not hinder the cause of world peace and justice."

It was not until President Wilson began to grip, as he believed, some international relationships, that he was capable of assuming so advanced a position as the great former President. Before American entered the war, and only four years before he was in his mortal combat with the Senate, he voiced his conviction in these words: "Every man who stands in this presence should examine himself and see whether he has a full conception of what it means that America should live her own life." And referring to the nation's relations with the rest of the world he declared:

We cannot form alliances with those who are not going our way; and in our might and majesty and in the confidence and definiteness of our own purpose we need not and we should not form alliances with any nation in the world.

But during the Great War he came to believe, according to his public statements, that internationalism was greater

² *Kansas City Star*, January 13, 1919.

than nationalism; that the Covenant, as he brought it back from Europe, was greater than the American government. It was by degrees that he reached this stage, and only after association with European statesmen, as witness his various statements; for in his original position his utterances were merely in the negative form.

In his address to the League to Enforce Peace, on May 27, 1916, he declared that "the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations . . . to maintain inviolate the security of the highways of the sea for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the cause to the opinion of the world."

Accepting, September 2, 1916, renomination for the presidency, he declared that "the nations of the world must unite in joint guarantee that whatever is done to disturb the whole world's life must first be tested in the court of the whole world's opinion before it is attempted."

On January 22, 1917, in an address to the Senate he stated that "the peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again."

In his address to Congress asking a declaration of war, on April 2, 1917, he declared that "our object is to set up among the self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will insure the observance of its principles."

To the Russian Provisional Government he stated in his message of May 26, 1917: "The free peoples of the world must draw together in some common covenant . . . the brotherhood of mankind must be given a structure of force and reality."

Stating his Fourteen Points in the address to Congress on January 8, 1918, he announced as the last:

A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants having the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small nations alike.

In his address to the Mexican editors at the White House on June 7, 1918, he said: "The whole family of nations will have to guarantee to each nation that no nation shall violate its political independence or its territorial integrity."

While touring Europe, in response to the address of the French socialists on December 14, 1918, he declared it to be necessary that security against absolutism and militarism "should be supported by a co-operation of the nations which shall be based upon fixed and definite covenants and which shall be made certain of effective action through the instrumentality of a league of nations." And while in Europe he gave his definition of the league thus:

My conception of the league of nations is just this—that it shall operate as the organized moral force of man throughout the world, and that whenever or wherever wrong and aggression are planned or contemplated this searching light of conscience will be turned upon them and men everywhere will ask, "What are the purposes that you hold in your heart against the fortunes of the world?"

A keen analyst in collating these views of President Wilson, declaring that his ideas as given out after reaching Europe were more nebulous than before, commented: "If an enduring league of nations is to be created, the structure must be erected by statesmen who are builders. It will never rise at the waving of an oratorical wand and the utterance of vague formulas of aspirations."³ It was an uncontradicted fact that up to the end of 1918 the man who had made the idea his own and then undertook to establish it as an accomplished reality, was still promoting

³ Philadelphia *North American* for December 30, 1918.

abstract theory and unformulated plan. After urging it for two and a half years, when called upon to present a definite program he was able only to outline vague aspirations. It was this that led Senator Knox to state: "I am entirely ignorant of what the President means by a league of nations"; and a Democratic Senator to say that what he could gather from the President's idea was a world federation to which a large part of the sovereignty of the United States would be surrendered; while a third gave it as his idea that Mr. Wilson sought to have Great Britain and the United States give law to the nations; and yet others took the view that he aimed at nothing but a general entente of governments, based upon precepts of morality and justice.

It was in this frame of mind that President Wilson began sitting with the world's statesmen at Paris to settle peace upon the world. How he delayed the business that was of first importance has been related elsewhere.⁴ The cables having been taken over, the public was kept in the dark as to what was taking place by way of binding the nation in a league. Nor was the nation aware that an American plan for a league of nations was proposed, until the fact was disclosed upon close questioning of the President by senators at a White House conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after the Treaty was concluded. Even then the President did not permit this plan to come to the light. The form adopted was drawn by the British General Smuts and patterned upon the form of government of the British Empire.

Just before President Wilson returned to the United States in February, for the closing days of Congress, he read to the peace conference the League-of-Nations Constitution. This he permitted to reach this side of the Atlantic. So violent and sweeping was the criticism of the program that flared up in the Senate that some eager editors were asking whether, after all, the entire project was

⁴ See chapter on The Peace Congress.

to be wrecked by the nation that had been regarded as its special sponsor. President Wilson had sent in advance of his coming a message requesting that there be no discussion of the League until he could present it to the people. This request was wholly disregarded on all sides. The most violent discussion ensued. Some of the staunchest of rock-ribbed Democrats, as the veteran Henry Watterson of Kentucky, took decisive stand against the constitution; while some of the most prominent men of the opposite party, as former President Taft, took a firm stand for the instrument. Promptly thirty-nine senators signed a statement that they would not vote for ratification of the Treaty with this Constitution as a part thereof. This doomed it to defeat. President Lowell of Harvard University, favoring the Constitution as a whole, thought it faulty in construction, somewhat loosely drawn, and requiring some amendments. Senator Lodge, declaring in favor of the principle of a league of nations to insure the peace of the world, strongly opposed the form in which presented, one of about forty plans suggested. It was felt that the one which President Wilson accepted and brought to America had not safeguarded vital interests of the United States, but he announced that "there is good and sufficient reason for the phraseology and substance of each article." And when he failed to justify or even intelligently explain the new doctrine, there was immediate and fierce attack from all quarters, and the country was being stirred as it had not been since war days.

At noon of March 4 the new Senate began its existence. When President Wilson, on the evening of that day, as he was taking his departure a second time for the Paris Peace Congress, appeared for a public address in New York, he and former President Taft went upon the platform arm in arm. The public interest was at high pitch. Of the 100,000 applications for admission to the place of meeting, the Metropolitan Opera House, all had to be denied except the

3,400 for whom there were seats and an additional 500 whom the law permitted to stand. Mr. Taft spoke first. The President followed. He knew of the statement signed by the 39 senators, namely:

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate of the United States in the discharge of its constitutional duty of advice in regard to treaties, that it is the sense of the Senate that, while it is the sincere desire that the nations of the world should unite to promote peace and general disarmament, the constitution of the League of Nations in the form now proposed to the Peace Conference should not be accepted by the United States.

It cut him to the quick. He looked upon it as an attack upon him and as an intrusion of the Senate upon executive privilege of making such treaties as seemed best to him without suggestion from that body. Braced by the inspiration of what he accepted as popular approval, he lashed the legislative body in a tone of jeering defiance, declaring that Senators displayed "comprehensive ignorance of the state of the world" and that he would hang them as high as Haman, but hang them the other way, and that he "loathed their pigmy minds." It was felt through the nation that such intemperate language was beneath the dignity of the high office occupied by Mr. Wilson; it was felt so all the more since the nation was looking to him to make clear the purposes and undertakings to which he was seeking to bind the Republic; and when they asked for bread he gave them a stone. For on that historic occasion he declared:

When that treaty comes back, gentlemen on this side will find the Covenant not only in it, but so many threads tied to the Covenant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure.

And partisans of the President assailed the protesting senators as enemies of peace, pro-German marplots, and pettifogging obstructionists.

Yet at the very time that these accusations were being

made, the Senate statement was opening the eyes of statesmen of other nations, and causing a change in the attitude of the French press and of the European delegates to the Peace Congress at Paris. And when President Wilson reached Paris he was obliged to face the fact that the Peace Congress had arranged, in his absence, a peace based on practical considerations, with the League separate. He thereupon halted the proceedings until the Covenant was intertwined as a component part of the Treaty. It is a fine part of the irony of the situation that it was Switzerland, and not Mr. Wilson or his associates, that urged an amendment to the Covenant confirming the Monroe Doctrine, so far as that appears in the Covenant. So eager did Mr. Wilson become to secure approval of his position touching the Covenant that other nations, seeing his attitude, took advantage of it to gain their own points. Ruthless he had been in the use of his great prestige in the Peace Congress, ruthless became others in return. He was compelled to engage in trading to gain his point. The Japanese were keen students of his methods, and they drove a ruthless bargain, even with more poignancy than he. On April 2, Baron Makino, head of the Japanese delegation, declared: "We are not too proud to fight, but we are too proud to accept a place of admitted inferiority in dealing with associate nations." As a result of their ruthlessness, the Japanese acquired possession of a province inhabited by 36,000,000 Chinese. And immediately President Wilson returned to America, he was put on the defensive in this deal of Japan, and which an American delegate, Secretary of State Lansing, declared was not necessary to obtain Japan's approval of the League Covenant.

President Wilson appeared conscienceless in his bold statements to the assembled statesmen of the world that he had from the American people a mandate to form a League of Nations. If there was any mandate given it was in the adverse verdict of the 1918 election, and its fair interpreta-

tion would seem to indicate a command that he remain at his constitutional post of duty in Washington rather than taking up an unauthorized post in Paris. He had sought to blindfold European statesmen by taking over control of all the ways of communication between the United States and Paris under the subterfuge that it was a war necessity, and succeeded until the ways of communication were again open and free to the world. It was on April 28, 1919, in referring to the League Covenant, that he made to the Peace Congress this astounding declaration:

If we return to the United States without having made every effort in our power to realize this program, we should return to meet the merited scorn of our fellow-citizens. They expect their leaders to speak their thoughts. . . . We have no choice but to obey their mandate. But it is with the greatest enthusiasm and pleasure that we accept that mandate. . . . We would not dare abate a single item of the program which constitutes our instructions.

There was never a more audacious pretense than that the people had given President Wilson a mandate or instructions to deliver the country unreservedly to internationalism. Like so many of the war powers, it was taken upon purely gratuitous assumption. But its chief evil lay in the fact that it misled European statesmen, who did not feel at liberty to set lightly aside the statements of the only head of a nation in the Congress, even if they knew his statements to be without foundation in fact. Yet, when these same statesmen did permit themselves to be led astray after the warning resolution signed by the thirty-nine senators, they should not have accused the American people, as some did, of dishonor. If they did not know the Constitution of the United States, they should have known it required action by the Senate in treaty making.

After the President's return to Europe in March, the Constitution of the League of Nations became the Covenant. In this country its supporters were termed Cove-

nanters. And while the instrument was given to the public in all the leading capitals of Europe, it was denied the American public. Even the Senate, which must pass upon it officially, the President declined to furnish a copy, and it was first given that body outside of official channels.

But on July 10, 1919, President Wilson appeared in person before the Senate and read the text of the Treaty, which contained the Covenant. Now the fight waxed more fierce than before. Mr. Wilson appeared to use more suave methods, evidently to gain senators to his side of the controversy and to win the people. But both distrusted him. Both sought enlightenment and found it not. The first opportunity that offered, in his Boston speech when he landed in his own country in February with the League Constitution, he ignored. In his later efforts he was but confusing. In his White House conference with the Senate, his logic fared badly under questioning of the senators.

Meanwhile every means known to the propagandist was being used to forestall a correct judgment on the part of the public.⁵ Mr. Taft's statements in support of the Covenant were given more space than he could command while President, except on special occasions. In August, 1919, the joint committee on printing of the Senate and House discovered that propaganda favoring the League Covenant was printed and distributed at government expense.⁶ In a speech in Boston, July 8, 1919, Senator Hiram W.

⁵ It was announced from Washington that arrangements had been completed whereby the Mount Clemens, Michigan, news bureau, the press agency supported by Henry Ford for publicity in his libel suit against the *Chicago Tribune*, would report President Wilson's tour across the country in behalf of the League of Nations free of charge, for it had its own correspondent on the President's train. An announcement sent to editors throughout the country stated that it would supply the President's speeches "in plate form of two or three columns free of charge, transportation prepaid, to such papers as desired them." The estimated cost of this service was \$500,000. The circular offering this free service did not state who would pay the bills.

⁶ Among the publications named were *National School Service*, with a half-million circulation; *School Life*, with 40,000, a semi-monthly; the *Great Lakes Bulletin*, daily, put out by the Naval Training Station at Great Lakes, Illinois; and the *Life Buoy*, at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

Johnson charged that the propaganda covering the whole country was devoted, not to the dissemination of truth but to deceiving the people, paid for by millions of dollars wrung by taxation from an over-burdened people, and concluded: "We have been picking our pockets to poison our minds."

To combat the powerful influence of the Administration with the people's money supporting it, there was organized the League for the Preservation of American Independence, in which prominent men of the country, regardless of political affiliation, became active with a view to setting the essential facts about the League-of-Nations Covenant before the people in their true light.

And the people began gripping the situation. At first apathetic, the several steps, whether of planned deception or of purposed enlightenment, by which the people reached the height stand out clear. And each step gained was but gathering force to hurry the great mass of the people on to the next. In it all, it is a remarkable fact that many ministers, churches, and teachers were misled by the President's sophistry. But the momentum became so great as to carry all before it. The first step was the President's declaration that he would be bound by the decision of the people at the polls in the 1918 election, and then deliberately ignoring his pledge not only, but in violation of his own pronouncement of "open covenants openly arrived at," cutting off all communication with his own nation, sitting in secret conclave to bind his nation to dangerous undertakings. This was followed by his casting aside the first opportunity offered him, in his Boston speech, to explain to his countrymen to what he was pledging the nation. He not only had thus ignored the people, but still more offensively ignored the request of the Senate for information that would enable it to pass intelligently upon the great instrument as required by the Constitution. The next step of

enlightenment to the nation was his calling individual senators to the White House, one at a time, to talk over informally the Covenant, and the views they gave out after they had interviewed the President. But greatly more enlightening was the White House conference⁷ with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when he undertook to state his views of the document; for he had been telling the whole country, in season and out, that he could make clear every point so that no one need hesitate in its support. Until then, many senators withheld judgment; so did many people. Though he had repeatedly deceived them, and they knew it, they willingly heard him yet again. But they were thinking. He had not convinced the Senate. He would now awaken the people to force the Senate to action. When he submitted the Covenant to the Senate on July 10, he asked prompt action. When the Senate asked of him documents to aid in its consideration of the instrument, he failed to furnish any. They called witnesses that seemed to possess knowledge, among them Secretary of State Lansing whose position antagonized the President. Much time was lost in seeking information at the best sources.

The next and final step on the part of the President was to go before the country. He undertook a tour from the

⁷ At the President's suggestion, this conference was arranged and it was held in August, 1919. Asked as to Article X, of which he is said to be the framer, whether it did not bind the United States to undertakings inconsistent with the nation's fundamental law, he said it was not legally binding, but that it had a moral obligation that was more binding than would be a legal. He informed the committee that aside from the Treaty itself there is no record of the proceedings of the Paris Peace Congress. He said: "Each day the matters discussed were summarized and the conclusions reached were recorded as a process verbal"; which means that these records will be kept secret and that the only copies are held by members of the Council. He further stated it as his "confident impression from the debates that accompanied the formulation of the Covenant" that the unconditional right of withdrawal from the League remained in the United States, adding: "That is my interpretation" and "I am confident that that was the view." Yet he opposed putting that plainly in writing into the solemn instrument, willing to hinge America's most vital interests upon his "interpretation" and a "view."

Atlantic to the Pacific and back again, speaking at the more important centers. In the earlier of these addresses, he again stepped a few paces beneath the dignity of his high office when, in referring to the Senate, he termed those opposing the Covenant as "contemptible quitters," and advised them to "put up or shut up." Throngs met him everywhere. The people were eager to know what he had to say of this new thing. His answers but confused the people seeking information. In his Des Moines address he declared: "I have come out to fight for a cause. That cause is greater than the Senate. It is greater than the government. It is as great as the cause of mankind." The sophistry of this did not deceive the people. It stirred them to a deeper study of the great issue between the President and the Senate. Many condemned the Senate. Many good people took issue with the Senate. Many church bodies passed resolutions supporting the President and condemning the Senate.⁸ This, however, did not affect the thoughtful leaders of the churches. It was the Senate that, in that crucial hour, saved the fundamental law of the land, and real leaders acknowledged the fact. In his commencement address on June 8, 1919, Chancellor James R. Day, of Syracuse University, condemned the Covenant as an infamous bargain, declaring:

The fear that should seize the heart of every red-blooded citizen of this country to-day is that the position of the Constitution of the United States is threatened in settlement of world controversies at Paris. I would reject and overthrow everything before I would reject the Constitution of the United States.

And referring to the safeguard of the vital instrument, he said:

⁸ It became almost a fad for some one in such a body seeking a little local notoriety to offer a resolution to that effect; and then to call for a vote. As no one knew much about it, the vote was almost invariably nearly unanimous for the resolution. These were published in the newspapers and it operated as strong propaganda for the cause.

If there is any body of men of whom the American people should be proud to-day it is their senators, standing firmly for the defense of the sacred institutions of our country. Thank God that there is a remnant of statesmanship left standing between America and the imperial quagmires of internationalism.

This position was but typical of independent thinkers. The bodies of men and women who voted for a resolution because some one presented it, and for no better reason, were not typical of the best traditions of the country.

And as President Wilson proceeded on his trip across the continent, he constantly lost ground, while men of the type of Chancellor Day who gave reasons for their faith instead of sophistry for confusion of the inquiring mind were winning. When, as he did at Des Moines, the President declared that "to alter that Treaty is to impair one of the first charters of mankind," he was giving utterance to statements, blasphemous to Americanism, that turned Senate and people, without regard to party, against him and his views. It was on September 14, while on his tour of the country, that the week of celebration of the adoption of the Constitution began, emphasizing the value of constitutional government. One might have expected the President to pause long enough to give some expression upon the importance of such government as opposed to oligarchic, autocratic, or mob government, and of the value which the Constitution and the government founded upon it had been to mankind. But he did not do that; instead, he was urging his countrymen to force their Senate to approve a Covenant which was a theory with him, but which he expounded to them as greater than the government.

The further he proceeded in his discussion, the more the people obtained an insight into the weakness of his position and the unworthiness of his demands. They raised questions as to the instrument which he brought back with him from Paris. He demanded that the nation make the supreme sacrifice "without counting the cost." At Salt

Lake City he was questioned outright, as he had been in less obvious form previously. He was hurt by these questionings. He had not convinced the people, except that he was wrong. He had spent himself. Taken ill from the great strain and disappointment, he was hurried back to Washington, while the whole nation, forgetting for the time his ill-conceived mission, eagerly read about and discussed his critical condition. It is doubtful whether, in all American history, there was a campaign of equal magnitude that was so sterile of result except as it stirred the nation to its danger.

He was immediately followed by Senator Hiram W. Johnson who stirred the people everywhere he went, as far as the Twin City, when he returned to Washington. This was the first revelation of how deeply the people were interested in this rather abstruse and obscure subject. At Kansas City delegations came to hear Senator Johnson from four states, including Oklahoma and Texas.

The great issue, as raised by President Wilson, was between him and the Senate. As stated by an eminent publicist, his attitude was that "at *no time* shall the Senate be permitted freely to perform its constitutional duty, which is equivalent to saying that one man can absolutely determine the future destiny of the United States."⁹ The Senate perforce accepted the challenge. The people became referee. He sought to make it appear that the Senate was against a league of nations, as he confused the people at first when he declared that eighty per cent of the people were in favor of a league of nations. He could as truthfully have said ninety per cent; for very few are not in favor of a league. But to favor some league was one thing; to favor the Covenant which he submitted to the Senate was quite another matter. Therefore, the Senate wanted to change the Covenant so as to meet America's demands. He refused to permit any changes in the instrument itself,

⁹ David Jayne Hill in *North American Review* for November, 1919.

but was willing that clarifying statements might be made by the Senate outside of the Covenant. This would have been of no value, except to confuse, since it would be no part of the instrument. The conclusions reached by the Senate committee majority presented the issue that came before the country in acute form. It said:

The League as it stands demands sacrifices of American independence and sovereignty which would in no way promote the world's peace, but which are fraught with the gravest dangers to the future safety and well-being of the United States. We exact nothing for ourselves, but we insist that we shall be the judges, and the only judges, as to the preservation of our rights, our sovereignty, our safety, and our independence.

President Wilson declared that to change Article X of the Covenant would "cut the heart out of the League." This noted Article is this:

The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.

In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

The crucial test in the Senate's consideration of the Treaty came on November 13, 1919, when, by a vote of 46 to 33, it adopted a reservation to this Article.¹⁰ And though the President in his Cheyenne address had declared that a reservation substantially this he would regard as a rejection, it made no difference in the vote.¹¹

¹⁰ This celebrated reservation is in these words: "The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere with controversies between nations, whether members of the League or not, under the provisions of Article X, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in a particular case the Congress, which under the Constitution has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military forces of the United States, shall, by act or joint resolution, so provide."

¹¹ Mr. Wilson entertained the delusion that a reservation could be adopted only by a two-thirds vote, instead of by a majority vote.

Around this issue waged one of the most hardly contested struggles in all American history. It reached beyond the seas and involved statesmen of other great nations. Because of this Covenant being made a component part of the Treaty, it was rejected by the Senate on November 19, 1919, seven Democrats joining the majority party in rejecting ratification of the unchanged Treaty. Four Democrats voted with the Republicans to ratify with the reservations that had been voted by a decisive majority of the Senate.

Efforts at compromise were then made by such ardent advocates of the Covenant as former President Taft. But President Wilson was obdurate. The official statement of his position was that "he has no concession or compromise of any kind in mind." Prominent men of both political parties, leaders in the League to Enforce Peace, sought a compromise, all to no effect. Indeed, it was a fact nowhere disputed that ratification would have taken place on November 19, had not the President intervened with a letter to his partisans in the Senate to vote down the resolution of ratification with reservations—an attempt to override the will of that body and to paralyze its constitutional powers.

After this action there was a variety of statements as to the President's position. This discussion he ended on January 8, at the Jackson Day banquet in Washington, by a formal statement that rather than permit any modification of the Covenant he would carry it into the presidential campaign by a "great and solemn referendum." On the same occasion William J. Bryan took issue with the President, declaring that it was the Senate's right to adopt reservations as it saw fit. Thus came the cleavage that ran through the fall campaign to the undoing of executive arrogance.

Immediately following the President's Jackson Day statement, more than a score of Democratic senators framed

a plan for a bi-partisan conference with Republicans and began a series of daily meetings on January 15 for threshing out their differences. Mr. Wilson still intervening, stated as late as January 26 that the Lodge reservations would "chill our relationship" with the associated European powers. Unfortunately for this utterance of the President, Viscount Edward Grey, special ambassador from Great Britain to the United States, but whom President Wilson declined to see, made public in England the result of his observations on the situation in the United States. February 1, 1920, he stated that Great Britain should not except to the position of the United States in making reservations to the Covenant. It at once put the President on the defensive. It placed him and his supporters, as their opponents put it, in the position of being even more British than the Britons, since Viscount Grey declared that there could be no objection even to an increase of the vote of the United States to more than one, should it so desire. Remarkable as was the fact that a statement of a foreign ambassador affecting American politics was made and published broadcast without resentment, it was yet more remarkable that it was warmly received by Americans. This was due in great measure to its timeliness, speaking as he did, not only for Great Britain, but for the other Allied nations who had done everything short of official proclamation to indicate their willingness to have the United States make such reservations as it deemed proper.

President Wilson had told the Senate that failure to ratify the Treaty with the Covenant would "break the heart of the world." Yet he prevented ratification on terms satisfactory to the Senate, to the people, and to the nations of Europe. He gave the impression not only to the American public but to the European nations as well, that he was willing that the heart of the world should break unless all would submit to his one arbitrary will.

On the final vote by the Senate on ratification, March

19, 1920, of the 49 voting in the affirmative 28 were Republicans and 21 Democrats—a gain of 14 of the President's party to his opponents since the vote on November 19, 1919. Just before this vote was taken, Senator Owen, of the President's party, and one of his staunch supporters, stated it as his belief that there was not a Democratic senator who would not vote for ratification if each did not believe that the President wanted him to vote its defeat. As a matter of history, every Democratic senator but six voted for one or more of the reservations under the leadership of Senator Lodge. It was not a matter of partisanship with them; it was a matter of Americanism. But partisan newspapers attempted to accuse the leaders against the dangerous Covenant of seeking partisan advantage; and many good people were misled by the baselessness of the charge.¹²

From its lofty inception until eliminated by the final vote of March 19, 1920, the League of Nations constantly lost ground. The reasons assigned were many. Perhaps the most potent was the method by which President Wilson undertook to force the Covenant upon the people in the first place without consideration or discussion; and, when discussion became inevitable, by misleading the people by false and illogical premises to believe the thing was right but which the general discussion disclosed as all wrong from the American point of view and in conflict with the United States Constitution. And it looked as if, when the "great and solemn referendum" was held on November 2, 1920, there was nothing more to be said; that the avalanche of ballots buried it beyond all possibility of resurrection. It will probably be discovered, however, that there is a place for an association of nations such as the American people

¹² A fair example is an article by Samuel Plantz, president of Lawrence College, in the *Northwestern Christian Advocate*, Chicago, December 17, 1919. Such men failed to perceive that it was President Wilson, and not the Senate, who was seeking to pull the wool over the eyes of the people. The Senate was living up to the best traditions of that notable body, as Chancellor Day recognized.

desire. But there is an end of the Covenant such as President Wilson brought from Paris and submitted to the United States Senate on July 10, 1919. It was Wilsonism, and not a league of nations, that brought disaster to the President's political party—a disaster which he himself invited and in the face of warnings from those of his own political faith who had at heart the best interests of the nation and of the world.

The United States Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, and is greater than internationalism; and he who declares the latter the greater is of an unsafe type of American.

The action of President Wilson's successor in July, 1921, calling a conference of the great powers to consider disarmament seems a more direct and more efficient method of helping the world to the path of peace than setting up a kind of world government to which the fundamental law of the land must be subordinated.

CHAPTER XVII

THE ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS

From its beginning, the American nation has successfully maintained popular government. This it has accomplished through definite, well-organized political parties, by means of which all classes of people have been free to express their convictions upon any great public matter. This is the antithesis of class domination as found, for example, in Russia under the czar and in more pronounced form in the present régime, where class rule is supreme, as it was in Prussia prior to the Great War.

Two positions of President Wilson assumed during the two terms he served, while seeming fatally inconsistent with this view are really in accord. A partisan of the more narrow type, he has been regarded as a liberal. As a liberal, however, he has not been found generous toward the most thorough Americanism. In the liberal has been found the man of great position favorable to a class that would strengthen his position as an individual. If this liberalism tended toward internationalism instead of nationalism, that was no concern of his. The chief aim was greater power within the grasp of the President. If that could be attained through a strictly political organization, then that was the channel of operation. If working through a class seemed the more feasible, then that was the chosen channel. A careful study of the acts of President Wilson's Administration beneath the surface and out of view of the public, where he chiefly worked, discloses that every act of the first importance faithfully kept this one aim in view, sweeping from the great circumference straight and rigidly to the center, as the spokes of a great wheel from its rim to the

hub. Never was this purpose lost from sight. And any study of the Administration's politics based upon any other theory will be fatally defective.

Examples of this mode of operation are numerous and glaring. One will well illustrate this view. Others will be found in this chapter. When the President yielded to the demands of the railway trainmen just prior to the presidential election in 1916, he bowed to an imperious class demand. It is probably the most considerable bribe ever offered and paid for the presidency, though put into a form that, on the surface, partook of the nature of an act of virtue. Mr. Wilson was willing to operate through a political party so long as that accomplished his purpose; through any organized class, when that offered him more.

It accords well with his theory enunciated during the years in his study prior to entering upon the presidency, when seeking to express something of his philosophy of American government. He declared that the chief executive engaged much in politics. And when placed on the higher level, this is laudable; when dragged in the mire for any purpose, and chiefly when for personal ambition, it is most reprehensible to America's best thought. The slogan of Jackson's administration that "to the victor belongs the spoils," was excepted to, even in that day. In a measure, it was the practice in the Civil War period and immediately after, when the spoils system again gained the ascendancy. But all this occurred when there was no civil-service merit system in existence. Moreover, it was thought that the nation had advanced somewhat in its view of public office as a public trust between that day and President Wilson's incumbency.

Indeed, prior to his occupying the office of chief executive of the nation, Woodrow Wilson had declared himself repeatedly, and was looked to by civil-service reformers as, a friend and champion of the civil-service merit system. And when he became chief executive of the nation, it was

stated broadly in the land that civil-service rules would be strictly adhered to and the scope of the merit system enlarged. It was announced with large publicity that the post-offices throughout the country would be served by men who had earned their position by their capacity for that kind of service to the public.

Yet the Administration had scarcely ended these announcements to the public when it began its system of flagrant disregard of merit in the postal service. It was the method that obtained throughout the two terms of the Administration of announcing in advance its virtuous purposes and then working to accomplish its concealed designs. An early notable example was the displacing of Mr. Morgan, the capable postmaster of New York City, who had worked his way through the grades to the highest position of the kind in the country, than whom there was no abler or more dependable man for good service, to make way for a man Tammany wanted, the chief organization of corruption in New York politics. This was in contrast with the method of Mr. Cleveland when he came to the presidency. He was large enough a President to continue in that office a capable official whom he found there. But it soon came to be understood that Mr. Burleson was appointed to the office of Postmaster-General for the purpose of building up a strong partisan political system throughout the country. It was discovered that he was using an appointee, covered into the civil service by presidential order, to write political letters to ascertain how a senatorial campaign was progressing in Nevada, through the postmasters of that state. The next day after this activity was divulged to the public, an activity in violation of law and of the civil-service rules, Mr. Burleson, evidently to divert public attention from his own impropriety, issued this statement to the public: "I sincerely regret that certain Republican leaders have thrust partisanship into the congressional contest, which, under our constitution, was unavoidable at this critical period

of the World's War," and referred in a sneering manner to the suggestion of Will Hays, national chairman of the opposition political party, that "We are not Republicans or Democrats; we are Americans" and there should be a united effort to elect members of Congress for their Americanism and not for their political partisanship.

It has been frequently asked why Woodrow Wilson, private citizen, professed so heartily his friendship for the merit system in the civil service, while throwing it so strenuously into the discard when he became President. The question is capable of intelligent answer only as President Wilson's career is studied in the light of his personal ambitions. A study of his acts shows that with him the end justified the means of its attainment. He sought a place of power and notoriety beyond that of any other of human kind. To this end he sought to build up first of all a powerful partisan machine which he sought later to convert into a yet more powerful personal Wilson machine. If his public acts and public omissions be looked upon from this point of view, it will explain many things otherwise mystifying and inexplicable. This will explain Mr. Burleson, who became known as the most incompetent Postmaster-General the country ever had and perhaps the most abject slave to political methods any President ever knew. It is true that he overworked the method until the people protested, but protests accomplished nothing either with Mr. Burleson or the President, either to correct the error of his appointments or to rectify the wrong done to faithful men and women by the execrable methods of the Postmaster-General.

The numerous cards and posters used by the Democratic national committee to secure the re-election of President Wilson in 1916 became familiar to the public at large. What was used in one section of the country was used practically everywhere, except where it was feared their use would alienate votes. Just before the election, the *St. Louis Republic* contained this advertisement which was

similar to those appearing simultaneously in hundreds of newspapers:

YOU ARE WORKING:

—Not Fighting!

ALIVE AND HAPPY:

—Not Cannon Fodder!

WILSON AND PEACE WITH HONOR?

or

HUGHES WITH ROOSEVELT AND WAR?

Roosevelt says we should hang our heads in shame because we are not at war with Germany in behalf of Belgium!

Roosevelt says that following the sinking of the "Lusitania" he would have foregone diplomacy and seized every ship in our ports flying the German flag. That would have meant war!

Hughes Says He and Roosevelt Are in Complete Accord!

The Lesson Is Plain:

IF YOU WANT WAR

VOTE FOR HUGHES!

If You Want Peace with Honor and Continued Prosperity,

VOTE FOR WILSON!

Mr. Wilson was re-elected by a tactical blunder on the part of the opposition in California.

Mr. Wilson not only took a keen personal interest in the primaries and elections in the several states; he took a hand in directing them. Sometimes he wrote letters to the people seeking to govern their action, sometimes his trusted lieutenants went into the states to bring to fruition his plans. In cases in which he was not able to bring under his control the member of the House or of the Senate affected, he sought to displace him with one more tractable. His hand was noticeable in Alabama, in Georgia, and in

Mississippi, as unfailing Democratic states. In some sections, and particularly in Mississippi, his accomplishments were for the betterment of the country. But the method is obnoxious to America's political sense and to a sense of justice. If carried to its logical conclusion, it would build up so mighty a personal autocracy in the presidency that no man, with any feeling of manhood or independence, would dare raise so much as a finger, if displeasing to the President. He sought to control states that were as unquestionably Republican. While denying that he took any direct part in the election in Maine, he did not deny that men close to him and active in Administration circles took an open and pronounced part in the canvass in that state. The President's chief spokesman in the Senate, J. H. Lewis, was active in the New Hampshire campaign. He sought to overturn in his own state of New Jersey the situation for his personal advantage. His senatorial spokesman, Senator Lewis, seeing the handwriting, was desirous of withdrawing from the campaign in Illinois, until the President urged his candidacy. In Wisconsin the President's activity was particularly obnoxious in that it was placed upon the ground of loyalty against disloyalty, the attack being upon Mr. Lenroot, the opposition-party candidate, though the President's candidate, Joseph E. Davies, had never been in a position to vote upon any of the matters pertaining to the war. Even the Vice-President went into that state to support the President's candidate. The loyalist Lenroot's most convincing reply to the President's interference in this state was contained in his speech delivered at Dodgeville, Wisconsin, March 27, 1918, preceding a special election for filling a vacancy, when he said:

If before the war I was disloyal, then President Wilson, too, was disloyal.

Three months before we entered the war, I did not say that the European war must end by "peace without victory." President Wilson said that.

Three days after the sinking of the "Lusitania," I did not say "we were too proud to fight." It was President Wilson who said that.

On the 18th day of January, 1916, I did not say that I was "inclined to think that Germany had a right to sink belligerent merchant ships without warning." It was President Wilson who said that.

Five weeks before we entered the war I did not say that armed neutrality would, in my opinion, be sufficient to protect American rights upon the seas, nor did I then say that I was not then contemplating war or any steps that might lead to it. It was President Wilson who said that.

I did not, on May 27, 1916, say that "with the causes and objects of the European war we are not concerned." It was President Wilson who said that.

If possible, the situation in Michigan threw a somewhat darker shadow on the President's purposes, where the attempt was made to win the election of a man, of the opposition political party, in the person of Henry Ford, the automobile manufacturer. Mr. Ford was known at all times as outrageously and distinctively a pacifist who would do President Wilson's bidding as a member of the Senate. On the witness stand, in his action against the *Chicago Tribune* for libel, he convicted himself of his anti-Americanism and showed that the only possible fact that brought him prominently before the people and to the President's attention was his millions made as a result of American institutions. He had declared that the American flag was nothing but to arouse American sentiment by, and that after the war the flags would come down from his factories never to go up again, and that the American flag would be superseded by the international flag. This is the man who was President Wilson's choice for a seat in the United States Senate, and to secure the election of whom all the prestige of his high office was used.

With the President using all of the power of his great office to gain the election of a man of the Ford type, and using all the influence of the same high office to secure the defeat of Lenroot who had been nominated on the loyalty issue against the influence of the pacifist Senator La Follette of the same state, the question is raised at once as to the type of Americanism President Wilson represented and for what purpose he wanted to use his type of men in the Senate. As all these events occurred during the notable war year of 1918, from early spring until the November election, there seems little doubt that he sought to focus every possible turn of public opinion in the November election with a view to gaining a subservient Congress in both of its branches. Once this was accomplished, the way was clear to carrying out the purposes of his personal ambition. The course of the President himself has permitted history to question his motive, whether his purpose was to seek an inconclusive peace with the backing of the nation, to gain a place of first position in the world's history among others, or to become the dominating figure in world politics. In any event, history will question his loyal Americanism, as well as his purpose.

Early in 1918, on the floor of the Senate, Senator Smoot arraigned the President's partisanship in these true words:

We can only regret that our commander-in-chief in this stupendous war, around whom we rally to a man in his efforts to achieve victory, has not seen fit to abstain from partisan activities in contests for specific political offices and thereby reciprocate in spirit and deed the real non-partisanship so essential to success.

He recalled that whenever criticism was levelled at those guilty of incompetence or worse, the retort was that they were aiding the kaiser, as was true in the airplane fiasco and in the munitions breakdown; and then added, what was also known to be true:

Practically all Republicans of the Senate and House have laid aside party lines since the declaration of war and have voted for legislation asked by the President, though much of it was revolutionary and socialistic in character, and in some cases unjustifiable and unnecessary.

See Late in the summer of 1918, after the President had done everything it seemed possible for him to do to secure the election of men he desired in Congress, except the last eventful throw, he issued a statement declaring that politics was adjourned till the war should end. This seemed too good to be true, in view of what he had seen fit to do in the line of building up a personal political machine from the days the tremendous German drive began in France in March to the time he made the announcement. But once more he was taken at his word, as he hoped to be. For it was a pet scheme of the Administration that whenever it was about to do something that would outrage the American sense of right, it would announce something virtuous. Taken at his word, that politics was really adjourned for the period of the war, Republican national chairman, Will H. Hays, proposed to the Democratic chairman a plan that would minimize party strife during those dark days of the war and promote the election of loyalists. The proffer was evaded. And there was regret among loyalists that the President himself declined to recommend such a course. It did not harmonize with his ulterior plans. He wanted men to do his personal bidding. Accordingly, after Henry Ford had lost the Republican primary by a vote of two to one, he sought election to the Senate as a Democrat. The President's plans demanded that he have control of that body in one form or another.

How much the President meant of his "Politics-is-adjourned" statement, became apparent in October, ten days before the national elections were to take place, when he issued a statement to the country, beginning as follows:

MY FELLOW COUNTRYMEN: The congressional elections are at hand. They occur in the most critical period our country has ever faced or is likely to face in our time. If you have approved of my leadership and wish me to continue as your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express yourselves unmistakably to that effect by returning a Democratic majority to both the Senate and House of Representatives. I am your servant and will accept your judgment without cavil. . . .

The leaders of the minority in the present Congress have unquestionably been pro-war, but they have been anti-Administration. At almost every turn since we entered the war they have sought to take the choice of policy and the conduct of the war out of my hands and put it under the control of instrumentalities of their own choosing.

At the time of this appeal, the campaign was practically closed on account of the epidemic of influenza. This the President knew. And when he added:

I need not tell you, my fellow countrymen, that I am asking your support, not for my own sake or for the sake of a political party, but for the sake of the nation itself—

he raised a large question as to his sincerity by making the appeal under such circumstances. He knew that much he said was not true. He knew that it was his party that had elected as speaker of the House, Champ Clark, who left the speaker's chair to make a speech against the draft act of his own Administration, declaring that to him a conscript and a convict looked much alike, willing to stigmatize the millions of America's splendid manhood that left their colleges and places of business to go to Europe to fight the battles of humanity. He knew, also, that not Republicans but Democrats were blocking effective measures for prosecution of the war; that Claude Kitchen, pacifist of the first order, chairman of the important ways and means committee of the House, failed to put through the necessary measures to carry forward the war to which he was opposed; that S. Hubert Dent, chairman of the House military affairs committee, was so much of a pacifist

that the work of this most important wartime committee had to be turned over to a Republican, Mr. Kahn, of California, in order to get action on the Administration's program.

For months the people were beginning to distrust the President. But it was war time and they stood by him. Now, however, the end of their patience with what they believed to be his camouflaging was reached. He did not state the truth and they knew it. It was impossible to reconcile his recent renunciation of politics with this abrupt substitution of partisanship at the nation's peril. It was all too apparent. It came as a blow in the face of the people that the President could, for personal advantage, descend so far from his high estate. It was for the unmistakable purpose of furthering his own towering ambition and was instinctively felt as a reflection upon the Republic itself. The President recorded mental perversion when he issued his statement; the people recorded clarity of vision at the ballot-box.

Generally speaking, politics was interned at the nation's capital from April 1, 1917, except for the President's activities in a more or less clandestine manner, until he issued this partisan appeal of October. After that there was no end to the outcry and the battle-ground became fierce, chiefly by means of printed matter. He had thrown down the bars to all restraint upon the part of the opposition. On the same day that the President issued this appeal, there came statements from leaders of the minority in both the Senate and the House. Said one:

The voters of Michigan, to take a single example, are called upon to support Henry Ford—notorious for his advocacy of peace at any price, for his contemptuous allusions to the flag, for the exemption of his son from military service—on the sole ground that he will blindly support the President.

Referring to the support the President had received

in war measures, the statement was most damning to the President's appeal:

Although the Republicans of the House are in the minority, they cast more actual votes on seven great war measures than the Democratic majority.

What is the record of the Senate? On fifty-one roll-calls on war measures between April 6, 1917, and the 29th of May, 1918, the votes cast by Republicans in favor of such measures were 72 per cent, while only 67 per cent of the votes cast on the Democratic side were in favor of such measures. Those were the President's own measures.

The result of the election was most heartening to the loyal American. It was not that he cared so much whether Republicans or Democrats were chosen as whether real Americans were chosen to the national legislature. While the most that was looked for by any one prior to the election was that the Republicans might win the House by a small majority, overturning the overwhelming majority of the Democrats, the nation laughed at the large majority received in the House by the Republicans, they also having a Senate majority.

By the end of the first month after the election, there was scarcely any paper of consequence that did not contain a sharp criticism of the President and his advisers, when they found themselves free to speak. Papers which had faithfully supported the President in his policies severely censured his dictatorial interference in congressional contests. The *New York World* saw in it grave dangers, while the *Times* was "more than a little perplexed to find the clue and key to Mr. Wilson's selections, indorsements, and repudiations of candidates."

Some of the local results were particularly enlightening. In Missouri, Champ Clark's state, which was regarded as wholly safe for the President's party, the Republicans elected their candidate to the Senate by a majority of 30,000, and Champ Clark himself was barely saved from defeat. South Dakota, in which state George Creel had

played to the Non-partisan appeal at the public's expense, the Republicans elected the most one-sided legislature in its history. Indeed, one meaning of the election was the elimination of Creelism, with its attempts to stifle honest criticism and to substitute official opinion for public opinion.

It also meant cancelling the "advance veto," whereby the President, by intervention, dictated what bills should be passed by Congress, even what bills should be presented to Congress for consideration. It was a stinging rebuke for the President's attempt to maintain the political dictatorship which he had set up.

Not less surprising, alike to friend and foe of the President's attitude, were the figures which the election returned. No one thought that the President's appeal had stirred the soul of America so deeply until the count was completed. While two years previously the Democratic majority for the presidency was nearly 600,000, now the Republican majorities for representatives in Congress aggregated more than 1,200,000. In 1916 the President carried 30 states and his opponent 18; now the Democrats carried 19 and their opponents 29 states. In the White House absolute silence reigned, on results.

The President, as the people came to believe, willingly played for the vote of a class, even the dangerous class, in his practical politics. The vote of the laboring man should always be prized as that of a man deserving high consideration. But the vote of a class calling itself *the* laboring people merely because they are organized, while a vastly larger number who are unorganized are just as truly laboring people, should not be sought more than that of any other class *as a class*. Indeed, in their destructionist tendency they deserve greatly less consideration unless it be punitive consideration.

And yet it was to the selfishness of this class organization that President Wilson showed himself ready to bow. As director-general of railroads, William G. McAdoo, under

date of October 22, 1918, modified a former order as to railroad men engaging in politics. The new order permitted it in towns where the population was composed largely of rail workers. He had not foreseen the result. Or, if he did, it made no difference. The workers obeyed his edict. They did not directly take active part in organized politics in the 1918 campaign. They employed others to do it, who were not in the active service of the railroads. A circular sent out by the Railroad Employes' Department, American Federation of Labor, Omaha, addressed to "the railroad employes, State of Nebraska," signed by S. H. Grace, an officer of the organization, stated:

The Democratic candidate for United States Senator, John H. Morehead, has, through the public press, in answer to our inquiry, stated that he favors Government operation of the railroads. It is, therefore, to your interest to vote for him if you are of the same opinion.

Making the world safe for Democracy is the duty of all who are interested, regardless of the length of time it may require to do it; and in order to strengthen the Administration of President Wilson men should be elected to Congress at this time who will counsel and work for him.

In view of the benefits already received from the present Administration, we, as Railroad Employes, should show our appreciation and vote for all Democratic candidates for Congress at this time in order to show that we, as a class, are with our President, Woodrow Wilson, first, last, and all the time.

It was first of all to the class spirit that President Wilson appealed. It was not to the laboring man as such, not to the American as such, but the organized crowd with a vote that could be swung to him. This was his appeal in 1916. The response is indicated by the method employed in 1918, as shown in the quotation from the circular, put out by Mr. Grace who was only an employe of the railroad employes.

The politics of the Administration was not satisfied with

these attempted manipulations in the several states and in the nation at large and through the various channels chosen. It extended to the nation's taxing powers. Speaker Champ Clark of Missouri left the Speaker's chair to make a speech from the floor of the House against the draft act, declaring that to him a conscript looked much like a convict. The chairmanships of the two most important war-time committees of the House, ways and means and military affairs, were respectively in the hands of Claude Kitchin of North Carolina and S. Hubert Dent of Alabama. These three prominent men sought to block measures for carrying forward the war.

And it was these, with their sectional associates, who showed marked favoritism to the one great industry of the South. Ready to tax productions of all kinds from the North and West, when a suggestion was made that a maximum price be placed on cotton, as had been done in the case of wheat, there was such an outburst of rage from congressmen from that section that the matter was dropped, though the price of its only competitor, wool, was controlled by the government. These men controlled the legislative machinery of the country and the President feared that if he defied them he might find it difficult to gain his end for the future.¹

Indeed, in view of the fact that under an agreement entered into in August, 1918, the government fixed maximum prices on sixty-six items touching leather, the politics in cotton became so notorious as to border on scandal.

The historian would gladly draw the veil over another episode in the Administration's political activities in a dangerous way in time of the country's peril, and thus close the chapter.

But history will ask about Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt—why the two most notable fighting men in

¹In this matter it is enlightening to compare Mr. Wilson's views as expressed, prior to his entering upon the duties of the presidency, in his "New Freedom," pp. 75, 91, 107, 111, 130-131, and 161.

America were not permitted to fight for their country in civilization's cause.

General Wood had the foresight to grasp the nation's needs long before the country was at war. He planned the Plattsburg training-camp and executed his plan. It appears to have been his chief offense in the eyes of the Administration. Yet it was upon this plan that all of the training-camps brought into being during the war were devised. The Allies knew him, knew his ability, and fully expected him to be sent to Europe with the American forces. Americans, regardless of political affiliation, expected no less. A thorough physical examination by a board of capable surgeons showed the baselessness of the Administration's statement that he was not physically fit. Moreover, he had been in Europe during the great conflict and knew conditions as no other American military leader knew them. His views were so valuable that he was given an audience by the President of France. Heard by the Senate committee on military affairs, President Wilson was then urged to see and hear him. Senator Thomas of the committee and a member of the President's own party personally urged the President to hear the General on a matter of the utmost importance to the entire country.

On the other hand, Secretary of War Baker, the self-satisfied pacifist, refused to hear him. The President was obdurate. General Wood remained in Washington nine days before being ordered by Secretary Baker to Kansas to clean up a camp. But otherwise he was ignored by the Administration, though the President had dates with many others, some of really insignificant relative importance.²

²Harvey's *War Weekly* is authority for a statement showing the President's officially registered appointments during these nine days:

Monday, March 25:

2:00 p. m.—A newly appointed minister from Honduras, Antonio Lopez-gutierrez.

2:15—The Netherlands Minister.

2:30—Senator Hollis.

5:00—Representative Helvering.

5:30—H. E. Wills and F. E. Burgess.

The country was stirred by this conduct on the part of the Administration. The Administration offered no explanation, after the falsity of its statement of his physical unfitness was shown. It was assumed it could offer none. A dignified, highly-respected, and strictly non-political weekly stated:

The attention of the War Department is invited to the fact that its treatment of General Wood carries on the face of it a suggestion of discrimination and discourtesy so palpable and disconcerting that it may well disturb the confidence of the country at the very time when public confidence and public morale are of supreme importance.

For General Wood is not merely an American and a soldier; he is an American of the Americans, and a soldier whose professional career has been an unbroken series of successes—administrative, diplomatic, and military. Not only is he the ranking general of the American army, an officer of proved and universally admitted ability, but by the sheer force of his character and the fine quality of his patriotism, he has become one of those really representative Americans who are as greatly honored in the Old World as in the New.³

Tuesday, March 26:

- 2:30—Cabinet.
- 4:30—Dr. Franklin Martin.
- 5:00—Senator Wolcott.

Wednesday, March 27:

- 2:30—War Council—Chairman Hurley, of the Shipping Board; McCormick, of War Trade Board; Baruch of War Industries Board; Secretary McAdoo; Food Administrator Hoover; Fuel Administrator Garfield; Secretary of Navy Daniels; and Acting Secretary of War Crowell.

Thursday, March 28:

- 4:30—Former President Taft and Dr. Lanell.
- 5:00—Commissioner Harris.
- 5:30—E. W. Scudder, Editor of the *Newark News*.

Friday, March 29:

- 2:15—Charles Denby.
- 2:30—Cabinet.
- 4:15—Acting Secretary of War Crowell.
- 4:30—Representative Howard.

Saturday, March 30: No Callers

Sunday, March 31: No Callers.

Monday, April 1:

- * 2:00—The Archbishop of York.
- 4:30—Governor Guntor of Colorado.
- 5:00—Mr. George Creel.
- 10:00—Marine Barracks—Army and Navy League Ball.

Tuesday, April 2:

Cabinet, A. Mitchell Palmer, and Dr. Garfield.

³ 118 *Scientific American*, 542.

And had the President been capable of rising above the level of partisan and personal politics to that of a great American, he would have found a place in which the greatest living American would have fitted perfectly in carrying forward the great tasks that lay upon the nation in overcoming the destroyer of civilization. Theodore Roosevelt sent to the battle line his four sons, one of whom found his final resting-place in the eternal camping-ground of France beyond the enemy's lines. But the great leader himself was denied the privilege of gratifying his countrymen's expectations.

Keen was Clemenceau's understanding of the needs of the hour when, in May, 1917, the great Frenchman addressed to President Wilson a remarkable open letter in which he said:

At the present moment there is in France one name which sums up the beauty of American intervention. It is the name of Roosevelt. He is imbued with simple, vital idealism. It is possible that your own mind, inclosed in the austere legal frontiers, has failed to be impressed by the vital hold which personalities like Roosevelt have on popular imagination. The name Roosevelt has a legendary force in our country at this time, and in my opinion it would be a great error to neglect the force which everything counsels us to make use of.

I only claim for Roosevelt what he claims for himself—the right to appear on the battle field surrounded by his comrades. With what joy our soldiers have greeted the starry banner! Yet more than one poilu asked his comrade, "But where is Roosevelt?"

In harmony with his treatment of Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt, was the President's practice of eliminating from the nation's service in the time of great need its great men in every line of activity, until the situation became so appalling as to threaten disaster. Then a call was made for such men as Charles M. Schwab and former President Taft.

And so camouflaged was the Administration's system of political activity, that the people were led to believe it

was statesmanship, until the summer of 1918 revealed his purpose. That President Wilson was one of the most consummate maladroit politicians America ever produced, friend and foe alike must admit. He played the game in "keeping the nation out of war," played it in getting the nation into war, played it in keeping the nation at war after hostilities ceased, played with the labor problem and with the liquor problem, played it in sacrificing able men whom he should have retained, as Secretary of War Garrison, and in keeping in the background men whom he should have been the first to send to the front. Men were sacrificed by the ten thousand and money by the billion upon the altar of a personal ambition when forbidding preparation for the inevitable conflict of arms. In 1916 his popularity was high. Then a chief form of appeal by a candidate for congressional honors was: "A vote for William Hanks, Democratic candidate for Congress, is a vote for President Wilson and his policies." Two years later the glamor was gone and the form of appeal was gone with it.

It is probably the most pronounced instance in American history of a man riding on the high tide of popularity who sacrificed an unequalled opportunity to serve America and the world to an insatiable but narrow ambition conditioned upon small politics—and lost.

CHAPTER XVIII

WILSON AND WILSONISM

Wilson, the Man of Mystery; Wilson, the Much Misunderstood—around these phrases and others like them has already gathered sufficient of the myth kind to build up, in the decades to follow, a real Solon or a pseudo-Gracchus; enough mystifying specimens to burden the centuries with the task of unmasking the historical inaccuracies of the present.

President Wilson is just of the human kind—not more, not less; with human capacities, with human frailties. If it were to be recorded as a matter of history that he let go of truth to accomplish his set purpose, it would be regarded as harsh and unbecoming; or that he undertook deliberately to deceive and mislead the public to attain personal ends, it would be resented as a libel upon a large historic figure; or that he had an unconquerable passion to outshine any other of human kind, there would at once follow the challenge for the proof.

Yet, it may be recorded that any citizen who would solemnly pledge his word before the whole world that he “will accept your judgment without cavil” when asking approval at a national election, and immediately the judgment is adverse he deliberately prepares to flout that requested judgment, as in the 1918 election, any such citizen in the ordinary walks of life necessarily forfeits the confidence of his fellows as a common prevaricator, and takes his place in their judgment where he has himself fixed it.

If, then, a consideration of President Wilson's character and characteristics is prefaced with two simple facts, all of the much-declared Mystery-Man disappears and he

appears what he actually is—the Human-Man and the more likable. The old rule of the Latin poet still holds: Never call in the gods to help out of a difficulty until the necessity arises. It is most unfortunate for history that too many “interpreters” felt that the necessity was upon them. And the two simple facts that they so constantly overlooked are, first, that President Wilson had an overweening ambition for personal ends; second, that his own chosen channels for accomplishing his purposes were often outside the limits set by present moral standards of society. Keeping in mind at all times these two facts, much, if not all, of the so-called mystery attaching to Mr. Wilson dissolves as readily as the veil of mist in the bright sunshine. Then much of the otherwise inexplicable is explained and many of the acts of Mr. Wilson that have seemed strange are easily understood.

If, indeed, those who have made him to appear largely as a Man of Mystery, as Herron, Hapgood, Creel, Baker, and Tumulty, had ceased “interpreting” him and his acts for the people, there would have been no mystery; and if President Wilson’s methods had been other than of the clandestine and furtive type, if he had dealt frankly with the people and their representatives, there had been no need of “interpreters” of him and his acts of administration. And these were forced interpretations that were given to the people from time to time, forced by the President’s confirmed habit of seclusion and failure to meet the people openly and squarely. These interpretations put out so laboriously, at first deceived the people in no small measure; but never after the President’s partisan appeal just prior to the 1918 elections. In that appeal the President was disrobed to nakedness before the country with a swiftness and sureness not dreamed of. The interpreters had done their last bit of deception upon the people. With that unflinching insight of the American people into a moral purpose on

the part of men in a position of commanding influence, they grasped the idea back of the appeal and dealt a blow that would have dazed a less obdurate individual. With an audacity that amazed and a contempt for public opinion that baffled the nation, President Wilson proceeded to carry out his previously determined course of personally supervising the Peace Congress in Europe. Taking control of the means of communication with his own country under the pretext of a war necessity after the war had ended, as he himself declared in his address to Congress in Washington, he felt the more at liberty to state to the gathered statesmen of the world that he had a mandate from his nation—with a hardihood seldom found in the annals of statesmanship. And when done with his self-imposed mission there, he returned to his own countrymen and declared that the Covenant which he presented to them and which he demanded that the Senate, a co-ordinate power in making treaties, approve as written, was the “irreducible minimum” which the European nations would accept as a compact for a league of nations, until Viscount Grey visited this country and let the American people know better. It was this utter hardness and perversity to moral obligation on the part of Mr. Wilson repeatedly exhibited to the people that made him the Man Understood, the Man without Mystery. He stood now before the people just as he was—a man who sought to accomplish his purposes through channels outside the moral code usually accepted in modern society. His human frailties overcame his human moral strength. With the mask pulled off by the people, he was seen as his real self. The people turned from him and left him in his self-imposed isolation and seclusion. Assuming to force the hand of the Senate by a presumptuous appeal to the people a second time, the people turned upon him and his misrepresentations with a second blow, this time with a paralyzing effect that astonished not only the country, but

the civilized world. The President was not misunderstood; he was thoroughly understood. The President was not misrepresented; he was misrepresenting.

It cannot be questioned that in his personal relations Mr. Wilson was the acme of honor and a fine personality. Born and educated in the South until he matriculated at Princeton College in 1875 in his nineteenth year, he partook of the qualities of gentlemen bred in the Southland; but he cultivated the habit of seclusion and drilled himself to the performance of difficult tasks. He set himself apart from the people; and while he assumed to speak for the people, it was not as one of them. It was in the abstract. While of splendid idealism, his idealism almost invariably ran counter to the best public thought, because it was in the abstract. While a student in Johns Hopkins University, only forty miles from the seat of government, he could write freely on government without taking the trouble to go to the nation's capital to see the government in operation.

Thus he developed idealism at the expense of practicality. It has been said by his admirers that he reminds one of Lincoln. If he does, it is chiefly in contrast. Lincoln, too, was an idealist; but he came in touch with the people; he was of the people; he came into contact with the harsh realities of life. When he was flat-boating down the Ohio and the Mississippi, he came into actual contact with the horrors of slavery. The conviction that slavery was wrong was burned into his soul by this contact, and led him to declare that if ever the opportunity offered he would hit the thing with a hard blow. With Mr. Wilson it was a matter of abstracting upon government in the study, instead of going to Washington to see it in operation. In the matter of a league of nations he could erect an *a priori* world government without so much as seeing how it would affect his own nation when put into operation.

Cultivating the abstract, he was led to cultivate aloofness from his fellows. Loving government in the abstract,

he loved men in the abstract. He appeared to have no very real belief in the destiny of the United States as a political entity; likewise he spoke freely of "men everywhere," but he did not love men as human beings, as individuals. He had less interest, except as it touched him in person, in national feeling, that jealous affection for the United States as an individual nation, which appeared so strongly in two of his predecessors, Cleveland and Roosevelt; likewise little interest in men as men, except as groups interested him personally, as in the 1916 demands upon Congress in a group that would support him in the election. He could talk well of matters that seemed to be of interest to individuals, but it was to select bodies and his addresses were cold. The response was similarly cold. When he met great concourses of people in his tour westward to place the Covenant before the country, it was chiefly artificial and cold greetings that he received, lacking in the cordial spontaneity that met Roosevelt in any section of the country he visited.

Comparison has been made of Wilson's style and command of English with that of Lincoln. Wilson was college bred and a college professor of English; Lincoln was a rail-splitter and a back-woodsman purely until he reached maturity, when he studied law in the loose easy way of his day. On the fiftieth anniversary of Lincoln's immortal Gettysburg address, Mr. Wilson on the same spot delivered the semi-centennial address. The former, though one of the briefest ever delivered, is a classic studied in the great universities of the world; the latter, though the set address of the day, has been forgotten, if ever it was given a thought afterward. So, also, with Mr. Wilson's short letters. They were commonplace in contrast with Lincoln's letter of eternal life to Mrs. Bixby, which he began by an ordinary reference to the adjutant general's report. Perhaps no finer of Mr. Wilson's style and sentiment is found than that in his address accepting, on behalf of the nation,

the Lincoln Memorial built on the site of the log cabin in which Lincoln was born; and yet it falls far below Mr. Lincoln's best.

The two great men are said to be alike in their spirits, both given largely to introspection. Lincoln, as a boy and young man, was almost the antithesis of Wilson, however. He engaged in and greatly enjoyed the crude sports of the early day in the Ohio valley backwoods. Mr. Wilson, on the other hand, was given to aloofness in his young manhood days, holding himself apart from the common run of mankind, and cultivating the secluded life from his college days to the end of his days in the presidency of the nation. If ever Mr. Wilson saw an evil that penetrated his soul as the sight of slavery which Mr. Lincoln saw as his boat floated down the Mississippi penetrated the soul of the latter, the world never knew it. If, as Mr. Wilson's interpreters declare, he could view the barbarity of German warfare which was sinking helpless women and children into a degradation beneath that of American slavery of a half-century previous, and not have it affect his view of public duty, then there is a great difference between the spirit of Woodrow Wilson and that of Abraham Lincoln as related to God's humanity.

But these instances are sufficient to indicate that whatever likenesses there may be between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lincoln, the contrasts were so wide and so deep as to practically obliterate them. Likenesses are found between any two men. It is the contrasts that differentiate them—not only the personal contrasts above indicated, but contrasts in approaching public audiences. Mr. Lincoln's addresses to the public, including his debates with Douglas, were enlightening. On the contrary, the addresses of Mr. Wilson to enlighten the people upon the purposes of the Covenant have no title to be considered as the addresses of the scholarly statesman intent upon informing the public upon weighty matters of national moment. He sank to the level

of substituting personal vituperation for convincing arguments which he could not command. His railings at the Senate majority which refused to abdicate its constitutional functions in obedience to his imperious will, are perhaps the most humiliating episode our history of the presidency records; and coming from a gentleman distinguished for scholarship and culture but adds to its revolting quality.

Nor is this chargeable to his changeableness, a marked characteristic. His "interpreters" termed this a quality indicative of growth. He himself rather gloried in the quality, declaring that "consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." But the common sense of the common people could see neither sense nor logic in his statement. It raised with them the question of common honesty. In speaking to the Daughters of the American Revolution on April 19, 1915, he uttered these words:

America has a heart, and that heart throbs with all sorts of intense sympathies; but America has schooled its heart to love the things that America believes in, and it ought to devote itself only to the things that America believes in.

If his later declaration, made while urging the Covenant upon the people in September, 1919, that it was greater than the American government, indicated a growth, then it was a dangerous growth, which the people discovered and checked. He had declared that the people of the United States should remain neutral, even in thought; when the "Lusitania" went down, that we were "too proud to fight"; as late as May, 1916, referring to the war, "with its causes and objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore." And yet the causes of the war were as well known at that time as they were on April 2, 1917, when he advised Congress to declare war, not by reason of those "causes," but solely because of the German warfare against commerce which had destroyed

American ships and American lives and was substantially a war against mankind. Yet again, in January, 1918, when the country was in the midst of its war preparations, in putting forth his Fourteen Points as the "only possible program" for our consent to peace, four of the Points related exclusively to those "controversies on the other side of the water," previously denounced by him when action on the part of the United States was urged by those with vision compatible with America's best traditions in statesmanship. And still later, in his Baltimore address of April 6, 1918, the first anniversary of American's entrance into the war, he referred to the occasion as "this moment of utter disillusionment." This is what some termed "growth" of the President—he having reached the stage which the people, as a whole, had reached three years previously. It is but a suggestion of the President's opportunism, which is but another word for seeking present personal or party advantage; and in this case party was but used for personal advantage, the only rational explanation of President Wilson's otherwise strange statecraft.

Notwithstanding this personal relation to his methods, perhaps because of it, there was a personal charm and magnetism that was for the moment winning. But it was felt to be artificial, with the appearance of listening with deference and being governed by the opinion of the listener, until out of sight, when, also, immediately out of mind. He was seldom seen even by cabinet members. He was coldly intellectual, caring little for companionship or counsel. To the great masses of Americans, he was looked upon as unsympathetic, inscrutable, passionless. Those having official business with him transacted their business and left, taking away with them no atmosphere of a great personality, none of the touch that made Mr. Wilson become a part of the lives of other men, such as Lincoln, Roosevelt, Cleveland, almost all Presidents imparted. He wore the gray mask,

and it was never removed. There was no spiritual contact between President and people.

The shiftiness and vacillation of the President, if prompted by opportunism, personal advantage, were then grounded in selfishness. And it has been directly charged that he was selfish. Certainly they were not due to lack of self-confidence, with which he was always abundantly endowed. His selfishness was indicated by his repeated injunction to take "common counsel," and then taking his own counsel; by his ungenerous act in refusing to say to the Senate, or its committee, that he had accepted its suggestions for changes in the league constitution; but making the changes in Paris and seeking credit for them. Indeed, it was seen very early in his administration, in an episode almost forgotten: He accepted the platform adopted in which was urged a constitutional amendment for single terms of Presidents; it declared the pledge in these words: "We pledge the candidate of this convention to this principle." And when the amendment was proposed in Congress he denounced it as "highly arbitrary and unsatisfactory" and declared that any disapproval of his position in the issue was to him "a matter of perfect indifference."

Nor was Mr. Wilson's self-confidence always well grounded. Relying upon his own powers of accomplishment, when he ignored the American people and the co-ordinate treaty-making power of the Senate, in going to the Paris Peace Congress, and there practically ignoring the four commissioners whom he took with him, with all of the prestige derived from the fact that he was the only head of a nation, and that the most powerful nation, in the Congress, he was outwitted; and from the beginning of his unwarranted undertaking, began and continued to lose ground to the end of his official career. His failure in the Congress is noted by a writer who was in the Congress as a member of the British corps on economics:

It was commonly believed at the commencement of the Paris Conference that the President had thought out, with the aid of a large body of advisers, a comprehensive scheme not only for the League of Nations, but for the embodiment of the Fourteen Points in an actual treaty of peace. But in fact the President had thought out nothing; when it came to practice, his ideas were nebulous and incomplete. He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas whatever for clothing with the flesh of life the commandments which he had thundered from the White House.¹

This plain statement explains well why he could not convince the Senate or the people of the United States that his Covenant should be accepted without change—he had not thought out the matter to a final conclusion. As he heard deficient students reply in his college days as student and professor: “Not prepared,” so now he.

Added to this defect was the fact that he lacked leadership, a fatal lack in an attempt to carry out a large plan of constructive work. While he had a consuming passion for power, the only weapon he knew and used freely, never relinquishing any that he could gain and retain, he could not lead men. This was due to the defects in his make-up indicated in the foregoing. He could not meet men as his equals. He was incapable of team work. So long as any one associated with him accepted his viewpoint, all went well. But that was not team work; that was becoming his clerk. And men with vision are not mere clerks. It is needless to name the strong men of his cabinet who left him. Perhaps the most level-headed man associated as such was Secretary Franklin K. Lane; and he is the man who said, when overruled by Secretary Baker, “the people are not interested in cabinet quarrels.” Men of noted leadership, and ready to meet any emergency were displaced by men of small capacity for leadership. His essential weakness as a leader lay in the fact that he failed to discover public

¹ John Maynard Keynes, “Economic Consequences of Peace,” pp. 42-43, Harcourt, Brace & Howe, New York, 1920.

opinion and to understand that America is not an autocracy but a republic ruled by the majority.

He stated that he could do but one thing at a time—that he had a “one-track mind.” While engaged in doing a thing, in that he was absorbed to the exclusion of all else. Some have declared that his was a “one-compartment mind”; that he could reach out and open one compartment of his brain as a systematic man would reach into a drawer and take out a paper, and when done with it return it, forgetting all about it in taking up the next. Everybody wanted to know what was going on in this mind, which was thought to be of the greatest influence on the destinies of the world, when he was at the height of his world power, late in 1918. Haughty, he was intolerant of opposition; wanted people to agree with him, and did not want to be convinced that he was wrong; did not like to have his vision clouded or his confidence in his own conclusions shaken. Said one of his interpreters:

Mr. Wilson keeps himself cloistered pondering the facts. There is something almost uncanny in the man, in his seclusion, his ear deliberately closed to suggestion, sifting and sorting his facts, working on them as a mathematician.²

This writer also states that Mr. Wilson knew that most men reach their conclusions in a superficial way and not giving due weight to facts—a method that is without appeal to Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Wilson's powers are of a type that does not permit him to be the servant of the people. While he spoke much of a mandate from the people, his test of what the people wanted appeared to be what he had determined to do. His type is for solitary rule, not for a government of the people and by the people.

His type is essentially destructive, not constructive. When he appealed to the Italian people over the heads of

²“Woodrow Wilson—an Interpretation,” by A. Maurice Low, p. 290, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1918.

their rulers, it involved the same principle as when he appealed to the people as against the Senate. In neither case did he succeed. On the contrary, both attempts were flat failures. The man who can make such an appeal may not be capable of recognizing himself as an enemy of constitutional government. But if given a free hand, he would, perhaps, not see what he had brought upon the nation until the forces of disintegration had gone so far that no deterrent could be found to save from utter destruction. His example has shown what dangers lurk in granting large and unnecessary powers to a willful executive.

A fatal defect in Mr. Wilson's character was his capacity for creating division when unity was the demand of the situation. He created division in American sentiment prior to America's entrance into the Great War, until by the continued efforts of the pro-Americans as against the pro-Germans the sentiment became so overwhelming as to compel action by the President; he created division in the Paris Peace Congress when harmony on the part of the Allies was a crying demand; he created division in his own party until, early in 1920, it began to slip away from him and became largely a party against him and anything which he favored; again he created at first division in American sentiment on the matter of a league of nations when sentiment was becoming almost solid for such an association, and such division continued until the people began to understand Mr. Wilson's purpose when they became almost a unit against his Covenant. The Wilson myth was shattered in America before it was in Europe; but once the image began to totter overseas, the reaction was more pronounced than in his own country. The people in America accepted many things he said and did in their old-time spirit of raillery—and smiled. With Europeans, to whom he had become a demigod, when they found that their idol was but human clay of a type so different from what they had been led to

expect, the disappointment was so severe a strain that they were furious. He made headway only so long as he was able to maintain the illusion that his demands were backed by America; but once the masquerade ended, the disillusionment in Europe was something terrible. When the nation entered the armed conflict for justice and liberty, the sacrifice made the nation the best beloved in all the world; and when it stood ready to take its full share in rebuilding the broken civilization, the expectations of humanity were the highest. But when he dashed these hopes, here is what the French statesman Brireaux, whom America had the right to look upon as a friend, said at the end of 1919:

Your President came to France fortified by a prestige which he owed to the courage of your soldiers and to the generosity of your nation. . . . At the peace table he asked us to make heavy concessions. We tried to make him understand that he was wrong but he insisted. . . . Recognize this, that our error in having thought that Mr. Wilson spoke for America was excusable. It was the first time that one of your Presidents ever came to Europe. You permitted him to come and we had the right to assume that he had your word in his valise and that he was authorized to say to us: "I speak for America, and I alone."

Thus President Wilson's methods caused, not common, but divided counsel among the Allies after the close of the Great War and until he left the presidency, and placed America in a position of humiliation before the world. The fact that European statesmen should have known what the United States Constitution required as to the making of treaties and what the invariable practice of Presidents had been in conformity with such requirements in great matters did not take away the annoying sting of the rebuff, or relieve of the sense of the division created by Mr. Wilson.

To say nothing additional to what has been said in this chapter as to his political morality, one ground for this constant division of sentiment where it should have been

a determined unit was his constant willfulness in the face of new and untried situations; "common counsel" he thrust to the winds, though he so often urged it. This was well illustrated in his relations to aspiring peoples. Brushing lightly aside counsel from any source, he erred in his judgment that the German people were backing the Imperial German Government only because they were compelled through force; for the German people backed the Hohenzollern Government to the last. Again, he erred in relation to the Czecho-Slovaks, loyal to the last ounce of their manhood to the cause of the Allies and human liberty; for European monarchies and France had already acknowledged their independence when, on September 3, 1918, Secretary Lansing announced that the United States recognized their National Council as a *de facto* government. It was felt as a humiliation that the world's great democracy should be so tardy in its recognition of the aspirations for democratic government on the part of these peoples just released from autocracy's domination. He erred in pronouncing the counter-revolution, headed by Lenine and Trotzky terrorists, the revolution; he had failed to distinguish between the government that rose on the ruins of czarism, and that which crushed the life out of the only semblance of democratic government that Russia had known since the days of czarism began.

And though this may be attributed to the President's error of judgment, whether founded in ignorance or not, sight must not be lost of the fact of the President's mental perversity which is well set out by one of the best-informed observers at the Paris Peace Congress:

President Wilson is conscious of his power of persuasion. That power enables him to say one thing, do another, describe the act as conforming to the idea, and with act and idea in exact contradiction to each other, convince the people, not only that he has been consistent throughout, but that his act cannot be altered without peril to the nation and danger to the world. We do not know which Mr. Wilson

to follow—the Mr. Wilson who says he will not do a thing or the Mr. Wilson who does that precise thing.³

Mr. Wilson's acts were in themselves sufficient to divide public opinion until the people became so exasperated as to unite against him. Among these acts were his defiance of American history, including the right of the Senate to take counsel with him; his absolute defiance of the constitutional right of the Senate in the matter of concluding treaties as sustained by the United States Supreme Court; his vacillation in the face of impending events of great moment and withal his unwillingness to accept advice; his evasions and deceptions to gain a personal or partisan end, after exhibiting great ignorance or extreme carelessness in large matters of policy; his haughtiness and peremptoriness in dealing with his peers or with other nations, creating antagonism where harmony was the chief demand; his insulting epithets hurled at the Senate, a part of a co-ordinate branch of the government and chosen as directly by the people as he, for no reason other than that it refused to sign on the dotted line at his command; his meddling in European affairs that were none of America's after the great conflict ceased, though he wavered and vacillated when Prussian autocracy was sapping the foundations of public opinion throughout the land, and he then declared that with the causes of the war we had no concern—these and multifold other acts and expressions of President Wilson kept the nation divided when it should have been firmly knitted together for the certain conflict, and separated friendly nations when they should have been united in policy, and humiliated America when it should have remained on the mountain top of the world's esteem, and resulted in his own disastrous debasement in the world's best thought after gaining the very pinnacle of power and respect. Leaving the nation leader-

³ "The Inside Story of the Peace Conference," by E. J. Dillon, p. 134, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1920, quoting *The Tribune*, Chicago, July 31, 1919.

less at a crucial hour by going to Europe threatened bewildering consequences such as had never come to the nation after a war. In the words of the eminent writer previously quoted:

When President Wilson left Washington he enjoyed a prestige and a moral influence throughout the world unequalled in history.⁴

But President Wilson seemed bent upon carrying out in practice what he declared in earlier years when writing in the privacy of his study, the morals of which, if he lost sight of, the people with unerring judgment brought to severe condemnation when opportunity offered:

The President's power of compelling compliance on the part of the Senate lies in his initiative in negotiation, which affords him a chance to get the country into such scrapes, so pledged in the view of the world to certain courses of action, that the Senate hesitates to bring about the appearance of dishonor which would follow its refusal to ratify the rash promises or to support the indiscreet threats of the Department of State.⁵

Instead of meeting a matter four-square, this expression indicates his determination to carry a point by fair means or foul. When he was hailed in France, England, and Italy as the hope of the world, it was the result of two false assumptions: That in international policy he was the representative man of America, and that when the Covenant was incorporated in the peace treaty it was America's special contribution to the settlement. By April, 1919, the question was whether he could crystallize opinion in his own country so as to sustain his own point of view of committing the country to a place in the concert of powers. The madness of his course in attempting his domineering method in America failed as it did in Europe. The people would have none of the fair-or-foul method suggested in his written works. It must be fair or none of it.

⁴ Keynes' "Economic Consequences of Peace," p. 38.

⁵ "Constitutional Government," by Woodrow Wilson, pp. 233-234. Compare this threat with Briecaux' statement above.

It is not strange that, in conformity with the foregoing characteristics of President Wilson, he was so often taking the side that the event showed to be wrong and which the better thought of the country felt to be the wrong; though the people, in accordance with the best traditions of the nation, held in abeyance its own judgment out of deference to the Chief Executive until he was shown unworthy of such deference, a fact well illustrated in the case of Theodore Roosevelt who, like almost all Americans, was misled by the Administration at the beginning of the Great War. Instances abound of this undesirable quality of Mr. Wilson's mental processes. When America's moral sense was beginning to feel the stirrings within, he was not concerned with the causes and declared for neutrality even in thought; and when the conflict ceased and the world needed and demanded peace, he refused it to America though he had declared that to do so would break the heart of the world. When the demands of the situation were insistent that he remain at his sworn post of duty in Washington, he took himself to Europe and sought to administer the affairs of the nation from Paris. When the nation expected his oft-proclaimed "open covenants openly arrived at" to be put into operation, he closed all communication between Paris and America by taking over all channels of information *as a war necessity*. When America looked to him for some word of enlightenment on the Paris processes at the earliest opportunity, offered in his Boston address upon his first return to his own country, he informed the people of the impropriety of giving such information; and when he undertook to educate the American public as to the merits of the Covenant in his tour of the country in September, 1919, so turgid ⁶ was the stream of his language that people turned

⁶Notwithstanding Mr. Wilson's remarkably smooth language, often of the most polished style, he displayed remarkable facility in murkiness where the importance of the occasion demanded the most terse and clear expression. Vivid descriptions of his phrasings have been used to characterize his language. A few picked up at random are these: "stimulating rhetoric," "rhetorical persuasiveness," "airy assumptions," "rhetorical rhaps-

away from him in largest proportion where they heard him in largest numbers.⁷ They declined longer to follow the *ignis fatuus* of fine phrases seemingly designed to hide some ulterior purpose.

Can anything be added that will help to define the intangible thing known as Wilsonism? A key-statement of his is that uttered during the 1916 presidential campaign: "I am willing to play for the verdict of history." It was looked upon by the best American opinion as a worthwhile aim; as an expression of the vision that belongs to statesmanship. By that time, his "men-everywhere" idea was gaining a prominent place in public addresses and state papers. His statement of April 19, 1915, already quoted in this chapter, indicates that at that time he held to American tradition. Between that time, however, and the time of his touring the country in behalf of the Covenant, in September, 1919, when he declared that the Covenant was greater than the Senate, was greater than the government, a marked change took place in his views of what America means. At the latter time he had no word to speak in behalf of what America meant or what the Constitution of the nation meant to the world, though it was Constitution week.

This was a gradual change from nationalism, that force which had made America a respected power in the whole world, to internationalism in which America was to be degraded from her lofty position of influence for righteousness among the nations. His declaration of internationalism, "resounding phrases," "pious platitudes," "smug formulas," "tumid rhetoric," "moving accents," "rhetorical generalities," "alluring rhetorical phrases," "polished periods," "stately rhetoric," "poetic and eloquent utterance," "skillful appeals," "resounding generalities," "resounding platitudes," "pure rhetoric," "smoothly eloquent assertion," "rhetorical appeal," "unsubstantial rhetoric," "high-sounding phrases," "platitudes that tickle the ear," "rhetorical utterance," "fatal gift of phrase-mongering," "soaring oratorical flights," "vain and flabby phrases," "seductive rhetoric," "cloudy rhetoric," "vague dissertations."

⁷ While New York and Pennsylvania rolled up such tremendous majorities against Wilsonism in the national election on November 2, 1920, they fell below the proportionate majorities through the west where Wilson was comparatively strong in 1916 and where he made his direct appeal to save the Covenant, September, 1919.

tionalism reached its height when he had gained the pinnacle of his fame. This occurred while in Italy and when he addressed the French Socialists, while touring Europe before sitting in the world's Peace Congress. He proclaimed internationalism with all the force at his command, even assuming that he could back up his statements with the army and navy of the United States,⁸ and appealing to international socialists as against their governments, as against nationalism. From that time to the close of his administration he never made a ringing, soul-stirring address as to the good that real Americanism could accomplish among the sons of men.

This was logical from the bent of his own mind as indicated by the character of men whom he placed in important positions—Creel, Steffens, Herron, Bullitt, Hale, Hapgood, to mention only a few. His return to America witnessed encouragement of internationalism and socialism. The latter became defiant, even of the Government. Some good people failed to see the danger of his appeal, and in diluted form re-presented it to the public, the favorite formula being, "Now, if only our nationalism does not become too strong." And this at the very moment when radicalism, encouraged by the process, was seeking to tear the very vitals from America—radicalism, so greatly encouraged by Mr. Wilson as to become a definite part of Wilsonism. Anarchism was a part of the process. It received definite encouragement from the Administration, as shown in the chapters on "Disloyalty" and "Russia and Bolshevism." When he undertook to frame a world order upon internationalism, declaring that it must be accepted "without counting the cost," he was doing it to the exclusion of American nationalism. And as a result radicalism became so bold that he was compelled to take cognizance of it in his 1919

⁸ See his threatening statement announced but a few weeks before from his vessel, the "George Washington," as he was on his way to meet the assembled statesmen of the world.

annual address. But Italy had already turned away from his internationalism, resenting his intrusion; France and England gave it no heed; and at the first opportunity, America so emphatically repudiated his suggestions as to leave no hope of recovery for his ill-fated foreign doctrines.

Personal government, as distinguished from constitutional government, was a marked feature of Wilsonism. Making his personal representative, Edward M. House, instead of the legally established channels, the means of communication with foreign governments; creating the great issue between the Senate and the people on the one hand as standing for the laws and the Constitution, and himself on the other as standing for personal government and internationalism; undertaking to initiate a peace policy affecting all the Allies without consulting them in the matter; revealing a purpose to transform his legitimate leadership into what was practically a dictatorship by employing, for the establishment of revolutionary doctrines, powers which had been created for or assumed by him for the conduct of the war—these acts and others of the same character were symptoms of the disease.

Only the future will determine into what niche history will place President Wilson. That he has bulked large from the time America entered the world conflict, there can be no dispute. That a sharp and swift decline came as a result of Wilsonism is also a fact cut deeply into current events. That early in his administration a literary coterie of a certain political cult, not orthodox in Americanism, men whom he favored in appointments, began to write him down in a definite place in history, artificial though it was, is well known to those even moderately informed. That his own nation repudiated him and his doctrines in the sweeping majorities of November 2, 1920, is too patent to need further statement. But his vacillation, his evasion of responsibility in making decision when prompt decision was the imperative demand of the occasion, his willfulness

and obduracy—these kept him from attaining the maximum of historic largeness which was within his grasp, which had been flung to him by the swift tide of events. When civilization was turning a critical corner he became the Hamlet in the performance. "Wilson is the most pathetic example of wasted opportunities our history or any other history affords. As a dignified, firm, constitutional President of the United States, remaining at home where he belonged, sharing honors and responsibilities, forgetting Wilson once in awhile, he could have gotten anything."⁹

In view of the foregoing, Wilsonism may be defined as the idea developed by Woodrow Wilson as President of the United States, of internationalism over nationalism; a moderate degree of radicalism bordering on anarchism; vacillation and evasion of responsibility for decision when decision was a clear demand; willfulness and obduracy running to personal government and disregarding written and unwritten laws; seeking to cover from public view grave errors of administration and policy, resulting in duplicity and attempted deception of the public; and the sequel of announcing open counsel and action, while practicing secretiveness and using furtive methods.

The public never lost interest in the notable personality of President Wilson to the last moment of his incumbency. Their sympathy followed his physical weakness as he left the inaugural ceremonies of his successor and, almost helpless, found his way through the capitol to the conveyance waiting to carry him from the final scene of his official career to his private home. Yet no sympathy followed his statecraft.

That he has left a large impress upon the nation is beyond question. That there is danger to constitutional government with certain types of men is evidenced by the processes through which he undertook to lead the people

⁹ Personal letter from Harvey W. Morrow, Omaha, October, 11, 1920.—Author.

to accept a super-government to replace the American Constitution.

Americanism as grounded in the Constitution must be a cardinal principle of any man fit to be President of the United States. Too great a price has been paid for orderly government to permit it to be waved aside upon an untried theory.

CHAPTER XIX

PROFITEERING

Grand, noble, inspiring is the Spirit of America in war. It has ever been so. Mean, degrading, despised of mankind is that other spirit which takes personal toll of disaster. The ghoul is found on the field of the destruction caused by earthquake, hurricane, flood, or fire. For him the extremest penalty imposed by his fellows of the race is none too extreme. In his class is the profiteer, who takes advantage of the destruction of war.

History is always curious and prying after facts in strange places and in strange ways. "Is it possible," it asks, "that there were found men and women so mean and so demeaning as to take advantage of the horrors of the Great War for selfish gains?" And if so, it wants to know further whether these exactions were tolerated by the Administration that looked after the interests of "men everywhere."

Of wrong views and taking untenable positions on almost every great public matter pertaining to the Great War, whether on preparedness, on pushing it vigorously to a final conclusion, on looking toward peace, on peace-making, or on readjustment after the conflict ceased, it is beyond the possibility of charge against the President that in the matter of profiteering he had any personal interest in the deadly game of grab. But how did his Administration function in this great game?

When he was entering upon his first term in the presidency, his pronouncement was substantially this: "Woe be to the business concern or individual that undertakes to rule this Administration or to exact toll from the hard earn-

ings of the common people!" He hurled his anathemas against those who plundered in the Civil War, of which he had read. But this of which he had read was but a miniature of the real plundering that occurred during his own incumbency. It was always well for the bully to talk loud when there was no danger; it was another matter to speak softly and carry a big stick.

One prime cause of the opportunity for gambling with the Government when the country was rushed into the war was the state of unpreparedness in which the country found itself when the cause of civilization called across the waves for immediate action. A chief outcry against the war was that it was forced upon the country by the munition manufacturers because of the opportunity it offered for pelf. Unfortunately for this alarm, it came almost wholly from two classes: The professional pacifist and the ardent pro-German. That the munition-maker had always been a profiteer, the records make clear. That they were such in peace as well as in war, is shown by the figures:

The American Armor-Plate Syndicate sold Russia armor plate at \$249 per ton. The United States could not get it at less than \$616. It ought to be said that the low price to Russia was protested by other manufacturers. The protest led to a conference in Paris and that to an international agreement on armor plate. Three years later the price was lowered to the United States, and from 1896 to 1914 the government bought plate from the trust at \$440 per ton. But, according to the report of the present chief of ordnance, Rear Admiral Strauss, it was making the same plate in a factory of only 20,000 tons' capacity at \$229 per ton. For powder which it makes in its own factories at thirty-six cents per pound, the government paid, in seven years, prices varying from fifty-three to eighty cents.

And this writer furnishes other valuable data touching this matter.¹

¹"The League of Nations," pp. 102, 103, by Horace M. Kallen. Marshall Jones Co.

While these transactions were taking place under the law, others were outside the law. The airplane scandal, the shipbuilding contracts, the almost endless ramification of deals put through in the various branches of the War Department—these made it look like one unified network of grab; it looked as if the Administration was functioning better along these lines than in getting the real war machine into motion. In the middle of 1918, it was disclosed by the Department of Justice, illegal transactions had gone so far as to involve contractors, agents, and manufacturers in soliciting, in Washington, government war orders under agreements to pay illegal commissions. Simultaneously with these announcements, raids were made on hundreds of business offices of manufacturers throughout the United States in search of papers to show the scope of the wanton practice. These contracts made for the government ran into the hundreds of millions of dollars, making a large profit for the commission-fee agent as well as for the manufacturer obtaining the contract.²

The rush and hurry incident to the unprepared state of the nation when war was upon it, after two full years of warning, created the opportunity for the profiteer. It gave no opportunity to select with any reasonable degree of deliberation either the brain or the material forces that were to direct the nation's latent energy for repelling the onslaughts of the mightiest war machine the world had ever known. President Wilson declared with much complacency that the equanimity of his usual course of thought could not and should not be disturbed. It was one of his general statements, without reference to the concrete facts in the

² As illustrative of this type of profiteering in manufacturers' contracts in the war, there is cited the case of a contract drawn up in a Washington hotel, whereby it was agreed that one Bittan was to pay the other party a five per cent commission on a contract for about 100,000 raincoats, and six per cent on all subsidiary contracts. With the statement that the \$5000 cash payment asked was for an official in the Quartermaster's Department in Washington, the assurance was given that they could obtain contracts whenever the government was in the market. Bittan paid the \$5000 and the transaction was completed.

case, that lay at the bottom of so much mischief to his administration. His thought became disturbed. His whole administration was upset. For now something had to be done. At first the people did not know what was being done. Senator Chamberlain, of the President's own party, pretty completely overturned the Administration's equanimity by his charge in his New York speech that the War Department had ceased to function. Among the things to be done was to get guns and anything else that might look like preparation, no matter how or where.³

How far petty and grand profiteering in high places of the Administration became a virus that infected wider circles of the Administration, and yet wider circles of business after the war, can never be determined. That it undermined greatly the moral stamina of the nation there can hardly be a doubt. It was only a few months after the uncovering of the old-guns deal, that complaints were becoming general that rent-profiteering was the rule in the great centers where war contracts were being carried out, such as shipyards. The government found it necessary to stay the process. At Wilmington the workers were notified by the landlords to move out, unless they would agree to

³ In May, 1918, after Senator Chamberlain's New York address, when the War Department was laying before the House Committee on Appropriations its plans for carrying out the ordnance program, it developed that in the schedule was an item for \$450,000 for the purchase of thirty old guns from Francis Bannerman, who had an assortment of old guns, and whose place of business on an island in the Hudson River was known as Bannerman's Arsenal; and that these were guns which the government had sold five years previously at \$87.67, now to be purchased by the government at \$15,000. Until this hearing, there was no publicity to the transaction.

And as illustrating the method of setting in operation the brain forces of the nation, when the emergency was upon it, the instance is cited of Bernard M. Baruch, former chairman of the War Industries Board and later an adviser to President Wilson in the Peace Congress, and John D. Ryan, head of the Anaconda Copper Company and who was placed at the head of the aircraft-production service, two very capable men, who were selected to organize the copper interests of the country to sell copper to the government at prices fixed by the War Industries Board. The *Philadelphia North American* of August 13, 1919, is authority for the statement that, under this arrangement, the copper sold to the War Department aggregated \$153,334,478 in price, the copper interests making a clear profit of \$50,000,000, or over 30 per cent, as shown by the House investigation of ordnance expenditures.

pay a greatly increased rental. The government declared that the landlord who attempted to profit thus at the expense of the shipyard employes or to eject the worker, would be dealt with in a similar manner by the government. At the same time, the government undertook to construct houses for its workers at some of the industrial centers. Other remedies were instructions to the local assessors by the cities to increase the assessed value upon the basis of the increased rent; local committees on rent profiteering being established in thirty cities through the home-registration service to call upon profiteering landlords to show improvements and expenses justifying the rent increases demanded; and, in case of refusal, to publish the facts in full without comment.

This profiteering reached out into every branch and department of civil life after the clash of arms was silenced. It was not because the nation's supplies had been exhausted. America's great resources had scarcely been touched. Now dealers were not satisfied with a fair profit of ten per cent; they advanced prices of goods to make a fifty-per cent profit. Profiteers seeing the great amount of money in the hands of the workingmen, set about to get it; and the great mass of people who had not been fawned upon by the Administration, as had the organized laboringman, in increased pay, stood amazed at the steady flow of money from these people to whom it came easily. And these millions of men and women, paid no more now than before the war, were compelled to pay this additional fifty per cent for everything they had to eat and wear. It was difficult for them not to remember these things when they went to the polls on November 2, 1920.

From the time of the armistice there were ebullitions concerning the government's taking a hand in stopping profiteering. There was nothing visible, to the end of 1918, to support it except talk and note-writing. Yet instances were known and publicly cited in which prices charged by

some distributors of groceries netted them from 200 to 300 per cent, from that time on.

It was the memorandum of the Federal Trade Commission's report, made public August 7, 1919, that removed the mask as never before, showing the system of food hoarding and of profiteering.⁴ It stirred the entire country. A nation-wide campaign was inaugurated to combat the conscienceless pilfering of the people. Co-operation between state and federal authorities was sought. In some instances stocks of foodstuffs were seized; some profiteers sought to transfer the hoarded stocks.⁵ The declaration in the report that unless the packers were stopped, they were about to dominate all important foods in the United States, as well as the world meat trade, created as much discussion by the public as any question since the armistice.

Rent profiteering touched a few places during the war, outside of government circles. But after the war it seemed to fail none. In New York it became so aggravated that churches were thrown open to shelter those turned into the street. The legislature found it necessary to make new laws governing landlords.

No less than these, did the workmen bring the blight of

⁴This report showed no depletion of food stocks. On the contrary, supplies on hand June 1, 1919, ran from 3 to 298 per cent above those of a year earlier, yet with a constant and large increase in prices.

⁵On August 15, 1919, just eight days after the Commission's report became public, a telegram was sent from the governor of Ohio to the United States Attorney General, that one Cleveland concern was about to remove its hoard to Chicago. Thereupon the federal attorneys in Ohio were instructed to take necessary action, should the attempt be made.

At the same time, the federal attorney at Detroit informed the Department of Justice at Washington that in three cases he had filed libels, and had seized 10,460,000 eggs and 300,000 pounds of butter.

And the following day there were seized in St. Louis 15,664,880 eggs held for seven owners by the Mound City Ice & Cold Storage Company.

In Newark, New Jersey, forty warehousemen, packers and wholesale food dealers were required to appear, with their books, before a special federal grand jury to testify as to profiteering in foodstuffs.

In Buffalo libels were filed involving thirty or forty firms, the stocks including 3,590,000 pounds of butter and 3,000,000 dozen of eggs.

Other sections of the country furnished their quota of these leeches sucking the life blood from the public.

profiteering to the land. One of the worst types of profiteer during the war, and one of the first, was the workmen engaged on war contracts, already receiving a wage out of all proportion to the pay of others, notably government clerks, clerks in banks, sales people in stores, stenographers and the vast numbers who go to make up the great American citizenship. Taking advantage of the government's needs, he threatened and sulked, he shirked, he was a slacker. He was less a better citizen than the poorly-paid clerk; and it will be difficult for him to justify his conduct before the enlightened citizenship of his country—as difficult as it was for President Wilson to justify his coddling of him, shrinking before his unwarranted demands. He was as low a type of profiteer, whether in building worthless ships, in hiding out of sight at nine dollars per day, or by pursuing any like course, as was the profiteer in clothing, munitions, or food. His kind was encouraged by the Administration, and he flourished to the Administration's finish. It is true that in mid-summer, 1919, the President, when organized railroad men approached him for another increase in wages or else a decided lowering of living costs, did not accede to their demands but went to Congress with the matter. Congress declared there were ample laws; that what was needed was enforcement. Though the country had been earnest and long in its complaints upon the high cost of living, the Administration gave no heed to these scores of millions, Americans all. It was once more the threat of a few organized railroad men that gained his ear, a class whose wages had kept approximate pace with living costs, while those of the other great millions had not. Eager to tour the country in support of the League-of-Nations Covenant, he attempted to pass the responsibility on to Congress by asking that body to enact what were practically the same laws then in existence for the Administration's control of profiteering. Neither the war-time food laws nor the war-time fuel laws had been changed.

The situation was well summarized by an eastern newspaper keenly analytical of national situations:

Manufacturers have looted the purchasing public, not only by cornering raw materials and inflating prices, but by shamelessly lowering the quality standards of their goods, until to-day merchants who are jealous of their reputations have to fight to get products they dare to guarantee as sound. Wholesalers, jobbers and retailers, down to the smallest, have joined in the game of grab. Labor, yielding to the prevailing spirit, has used its power of organization to get its share. Nay, the whole public has been infected, and over the entire country there is sweeping a wave of greed, of extravagance, of idleness, of devil-may-care defiance of all the principles of economics and morals.⁶

But action of the government in the prosecution of profiteers was slow and uncertain. Immediately the President went before Congress for action, the Attorney-General began warnings through the public press. A blare of trumpets never frightened criminals of their type. The method was described as "a gesture made by pointing the finger at the profiteers." The President began the crusade by making the favorite gesture of a politician incapable of doing anything substantial—appealing for legislation. This gesture is the special favorite when the politician is dealing with economic forces which he does not understand and does not so study that he may understand. From that time on the office of the Attorney-General gave out threatening statements with fair regularity to the end—monthly statements. The end came October 15, 1920, when the final statement announced that the campaign would end November 1—the day before election—one reason for which was insufficient appropriation to carry on the work, while another stated that falling prices made it less needful. The people refused the bait. While Mr. Palmer was prosecuting, prices continued to rise; and when the break came, it came from other causes. So outrageous had become pro-

⁶ Philadelphia *North American*, January 1, 1920.

fitteering in clothing by the spring of 1920, that what became known as the overalls campaign was started as a protest—started as a local impulse, it became a nation-wide phenomenon. It grew so rapidly that through whom or where it started was lost sight of. In public offices and in courts, in halls of legislation and private business, overalls were worn. Clubs and societies, eagerly formed associations and individuals hastened to encourage the wearing of overalls. College undergraduates and high-school pupils, learned professors and dignified presidents wore overalls. Mayors were inaugurated in overalls; “denim and calico” weddings were solemnized. It was a campaign more powerful than the thunderings monthly from the office of the Attorney-General of the United States; more effective than his prosecutions of profiteers, resulting in 181 convictions (one to about each 600,000 people), fines aggregating \$275,000, and sentences aggregating ten years and ten months, at a cost to the government of \$500,000. The big profiteers were not molested. They met their signal punishment in the inexorable law of supply and demand, a law beyond the reach of Attorneys-General, Presidents or Profiteers.

It was this law, mightier than peoples, potentates and powers, that bore with relentless weight, at first upon the suffering people, then upon the shameless profiteer. The difficulty with its operation was that the government did not see to it that it had free course, and it played into the hands of the evil-doers—played by the people to an excess that gave the profiteer the upper hand, while debauching the former.⁷

⁷ Instances are as widely spread as the broad land. A few will illustrate:

In New York a leading Broadway clothing house making a whole-window display of serviceable suits at \$25, was unable to dispose of them until the price was marked notably higher. In St. Paul a woman of most modest means went to a leading store with \$100 with which to purchase a coat, and found nothing satisfactory until the salesman showed one at \$300. She wanted to pay the \$100 cash, the balance of \$200 on time. The head of the department was called and refused; but a little later she returned

But not spoiling the great masses who were under the extreme pressure of high prices with a but slightly increased income, it led to resentment everywhere at the profiteering in sugar, a staple of home life. Here the mightier law was strangled almost unto death. It was one of the things that was probably not forgotten by the masses at the polls on November 2, 1920. It was in late summer, 1919, that the Sugar Equalization Board, in two separate communications at two different times, warned President Wilson of sugar shortage and that there would be an increase in the cost of sugar if he did not agree to the purchase of the 1920 Cuban crop at the price then offered—6½ cents per pound. He refused to act on these urgent representations. The crop was sold elsewhere. Shortly afterward, Attorney-General Palmer, without any warrant in law, suggested to the Louisiana producers that they were permitted to charge 17 to 18 cents per pound at the plantation. The Cuban planters readily took their cue from these suggestions. The price of sugar immediately began to rise by leaps and bounds. An increase of two cents per pound meant an increase of \$180,000,000 to the American people per year. With sugar at the price of 18 to 22 cents per pound in February, 1920, the American people were paying substantially a billion dollars tribute to the sugar profiteers, through the attitude of President Wilson and his Attorney-General—as *Harvey's Weekly* said at the time: "Because one man was omniscient and another hebetudinous." By early May, 1920, after much false publication of the scarcity of sugar in the world, it became known that imports of sugar from

with the additional \$200 and took the coat. A Philadelphia dealer, unable to sell a line of silk stockings at \$2.50, cleared out the entire stock in a few days by marking them up to \$4. In a small up-state town in Pennsylvania, a merchant was offering at \$8 a good shoe that cost him \$5.50 a pair. An employe in a factory, after looking them over, said he would like something better, whereupon the merchant asked him to call later and he could satisfy him. Changing the same shoes to other packages and marking them up to \$15 he made sale to the factory employe, who then informed fellow workers of his bargain, and the merchant sold all his \$8 shoes at the higher figure.

all sources for the year ending June 30, 1920, would show an increase of about 14 per cent over those of the preceding year, making a total of approximately two pounds of sugar a week for the use of every man, woman, and child in the country. Sugar prices continued advancing until in some important centers was reached the price of 35 cents per pound; and many grocers would sell it only in limited quantities with other purchases in their stores. There was a clear 20 cents a pound between the import price and the retail price—probably the largest scheme of bleeding the whole mass of the American people ever forced upon the country by a President contrary to the written advice of men expert in the line of the duties laid upon them. When the banks refused longer to back these profiteers, the inflation began to disappear, they began to try to save one another, the price of sugar dropped, after some dealers had lost many hundreds of thousands of dollars, and by the end of 1920, sugar was selling at 8 cents retail in the same cities where it had reached the 35-cent price.

In February, 1921, the United States grand jury at Indianapolis accused mine operators and labor leaders of conspiring to mulct the public of every dollar possible, while staging a conflict as a camouflage.

Let it never be forgotten that the interest of the great mass of American citizenship is paramount to all others combined.

RECONSTRUCTION

Readjustment or reconstruction? All understand that it refers to the period immediately following the signing of the armistice, when the nation was seeking to return to normalcy; and while some writers insist that it was a period of readjustment, others understand that it was a period of reconstruction. The former would be correct if the country were simply getting back to where it was before the clash of arms. But there was something more: a reconstruction of industrial and social forces. A new world came out of the furnace of conflict; much of the dross was gone. It would have been a disaster for America to seek to adjust herself to the old status. It was the period of RECONSTRUCTION.

It was not easy for the world to meet these conditions thrust upon it by the Great War. Seven million of the choicest of the world's men slain in battle; 7,000,000 more so seriously disabled as to be no longer available as producers—these 14,000,000 of the world's most capable laborers out of the race created a condition in the economic world that required time to meet. In the United States alone 5,000,000 were taken from ordinary occupations to meet the fighting requirements, while a very large number besides were required to manufacture and transport all kinds of war implements—all withdrawn from the ordinary course of business at a time when there was a correspondingly acute demand for men and goods in every part of Christendom, confronting this nation with an accumulated deficit of production and productive power.

While the war was still in progress, the Administration

gave some slight attention to matters pertaining to the days after. The Council of National Defense, organized primarily for the war emergency, passed, as a permanent body, into such reconstruction tasks as seemed imminent. As early as June, 1918, a small staff from it was organized to "survey, classify and digest the reconstruction activities" of this and other lands, with instructions to report to the proper department. If any other active effort looking toward preparation for the reconstruction period was made by the Administration before the war ceased, it is so slight as to be negligible. For this reason it was freely charged against the Administration that it was as unprepared for peace as it had been for war.

When President Wilson was asked to create a reconstruction commission, he declined upon the ground that he preferred to leave that work to the various war boards. In fact, nothing was done, although it was pointed out to him at the time that the chief commercial nations of Europe were at that very time constituting commissions of their ablest men for that purpose. The British were thinking of reconstruction the next year after they entered the war; and their government, even before Asquith was replaced by Lloyd George, had taken action accordingly. The idea grew with them, and they were so much impressed with the importance of the "new world after the war" that an out-and-out ministry of reconstruction was created. Not even in the darkest days of their fiery ordeal did they fail in steady preparation for the day they foresaw after the battling should cease. For the entire four years the British Board of Trade had been co-ordinating the work; their commissions had been at work for months at home and abroad gathering data and making ready for the new era.

The United States Chamber of Commerce addressed to President Wilson a letter indicating an anxiety among business men of this country to know what course the Government proposed pursuing. And immediately the armistice

was signed he took under consideration the appointment of a reconstruction commission to develop a program for the nation's return to a peace basis, such commission with advisory powers only. Nothing came of it. As is now a well-known part of the history of the time, he was engrossed with international affairs to the almost total exclusion of the affairs of his own nation. For nine months the nation was plunging toward an economic and social crisis that was appalling to contemplate. And the nation's head manifested a profound unconcern for the seriousness of the situation.

This attitude was indicated when, in December, 1918, he was asked by a notable gathering of the business men of the country for suggestions of guidance. This was the Reconstruction Congress, held at Atlantic City, of industrial leaders, the most representative and important gathering of that character ever held in this country. At such a time it was of supreme importance. With nearly 5,000 delegates from all sections of the country, representing 380 different industries, it was of chief importance because of what it proposed to accomplish. This congress, naturally looking to the head of the nation for an expression as to the Government's point of view in the serious situation then confronting the country, asked him to state that position. He paused long enough, in his preparations for sailing for Europe, to make this amazing reply:

You may be sure that I would send a message to the meeting if I knew what message to send; but frankly, I do not. It is a time when we must all thoughtfully take counsel and apply the wisest action to circumstances as they arise.

In this mood of exalted preoccupation he left the country, with no one in the nation's capital for seven months with authority to speak or act for the executive branch of the government. If he saw the storm clouds gathering over the land, he manifested no concern until given a rude shock

by the demands of a few organized railroad men, in the summer of 1919, who bluntly informed him of the disaster in store unless he quickly awoke from his international dream. "Let somebody drop a match, and it will be a sorry day for all of us," is what the railroad man said, truthfully portraying the result of a policy which the railroad men, with the aid of the President, had forced upon the country.

An Administration lacking policy, program or leadership at this time became an invitation to an economic debauch. A spirit of recklessness seized the country, and "there ensued an orgy of profiteering which caught into its intoxicating influence well-nigh every class and group of population."

Such being the attitude of the head of the Administration, there was not much to be expected from the heads of the several departments. And whatever effort was made was without concerted plan or co-ordination—the same weakness that had held the Administration helpless in its war efforts. The industrial and social leaders of the country, after looking in vain for guidance and constructive leadership from that source, concluded to proceed with what measure of assistance they could obtain from any quarter. It was thought that a federal employers' industrial body could accomplish something by going to Europe and there at first-hand study conditions in the devastated part of the world. Accordingly, a little more than two months after the conflict closed, Secretary of Labor Wilson commissioned such a body to go to Europe to inquire into the industrial conditions and the method by which the industrial leaders and laborers there were meeting the situation.

A suggestion of the results of the lack of a head at Washington was found in the antagonism that developed between the Department of Commerce and the Railroad Administration in the spring of 1919, while the President

was in Paris. The Industrial Board of the department had made an attempt at stabilizing prices. This the Railroad Administration attacked upon the ground that it was interfering with prices of steel rails.¹ Abolishment of the board by Secretary Redfield on May 9, 1919, brought to an end a bitter controversy of almost two months between these two federal branches of the public service that were very important at that particular time, Mr. Redfield declaring that so far as his department was concerned the law of supply and demand would be permitted to govern in problems of industrial reconstruction. He later resigned his cabinet position.

But before he resigned, he assumed the position apparently that the United States should not seek to extend its trade until the other countries of the world had had an opportunity to gain a firm footing, in the markets of South America and other lands. In an authorized interview, he is quoted by the *Federal Trade Service*, published by the Publicity Corporation of Washington, as saying:

We have a great decision to make. It is whether we shall take this opportunity and the immediate rich profits it offers, or whether we shall restrain our energies for awhile, giving France, England, Belgium, Italy, the neutrals and even Germany's reborn people a fair and free opportunity to get on their feet.

And Secretary of Labor Wilson declared, at an even earlier date, that we had made about all the provision that could be made for foreign trade as a means of securing additional markets. "The first thing is to know where the trade can be had, and through the commercial attachés of our consulates operating through the Department of Commerce we have kept continually in touch with the possible opportuni-

¹ Director-General of Railroads Hines made public a statement on May 23, announcing that he had been compelled to purchase 200,000 tons of steel rails at the steel trust's own price, upon ascertaining that six large companies had sent in bids that were identical, not only in price, but as to conditions, and that all were in strict accordance with those approved by the federal Industrial Board.

ties." ² And he properly added that shipping was an important factor to be considered. It was a remarkable contrast with the position of the head of the Department of Commerce himself.

But in the midst of all the confusion and lack of co-ordination on the part of the Administration at this crucial time, there remained one man who maintained his balance and who had a plan—Secretary of the Interior, Franklin K. Lane. He planned to locate the returning fighters on the public lands of the United States, of which there were millions of acres: 15,000,000 of arid land to which it was proposed to bring water for irrigation; 70,000,000 of swamp lands that might be drained; 200,000,000 of cut-over land, that which was once timbered, from which were to be cleared brush and stumps. These he offered to the returning men on easy terms. It was a worthy idea. But it failed for two chief reasons: First, wages were too good at easier employment in great industrial centers; and, second, the Anglo-Saxon of to-day, though his ancestors were the greatest subduers of wild prairies and the greatest vanquishers of stumps and swamps the world ever saw and that with the small means of civilized life at hand, wants the modern school and church and all that goes with a community furnished with these easier means of helping his children at once to the higher step in a progressive life. Had life been found less attractive in the larger wages at the great centers of life, Mr. Lane's plan would have been more attractive. It deserved better consideration than it received.

The foregoing is substantially the efforts of the Administration at the beginning of the crucial period known as the Reconstruction. Other efforts on its part were defensive, as shown elsewhere.³ They were in no sense aggressive reconstructive programs. Even the Conference of Gov-

² *Collier's Weekly*, February 1, 1919.

³ Chapter on "Profiteering."

ernors and Mayors called for the White House March 3 and 4, while the President was temporarily in the country, was of this character, the resolutions then adopted condemning the doctrines which inveigh against God and government. For then it was already seen to what the President's recently proclaimed internationalism and his more recent dallying with the Bolshevistic doctrines of Russia were leading in this country.

Thus it devolved upon the leadership of the country's business men to supply the lack. Even in the midst of the rejoicing over victory and peace there ran an undercurrent of uncertainty and apprehension in the business world because of the realization that the Government faced the great change without policy or program. Manufacturers, bankers, and merchants had beseiged Washington in vain for some suggestion as to a definite plan on the part of the Government. Its inertia was again indicated in its process of laying down keels by the shipping board and of floundering in shipping, while fighting to maintain shipping rates ten times as high as before the war and the billions put into shipping was rapidly tied up to the docks to perish, with no plan or program, and clerks and supervisors no longer required crowded the shipping service, eating up the government payroll. In contrast, within forty-eight hours after the signing of the armistice, the director general of the British mercantile marine began demobilizing his forces, and in six months had sold more than 1,200 ships, realizing more than \$300,000,000 without loss; and not a clerk or cent of expense in that once vast department of that government remained. It was completely out of the shipping business.

First in importance in the matter of private leadership in the reconstruction period was the Atlantic City Congress of December, 1918. Most prominently announced through the public press of all the acts of this congress was the roundly applauded declaration of John D. Rockefeller, Jr.,

that "in these days, the selfish pursuit of personal ends at the expense of a group cannot and will not longer be tolerated." His industrial creed, as it was termed, took the very important position of recognizing three equally interested parties in all industrial activity—capital, labor, and the community. This was a matter of fundamental importance, as neither of the other two groups had ever seemed to think that the great mass of the people had any right to consideration in their quarrels that were so disastrous to the community at large.

In the early months after the armistice signing, all industries were waiting for "the bottom to drop out of prices." But there was a constant rise. Some were of opinion that prices were up to remain high permanently and made extensive contracts accordingly. But in early February, 1920, there began the fall in prices, and it was at once realized that manufacturers must at once make a readjustment and purchase with greater caution. By this time exchange was so out of balance that \$69 would enable an American to purchase \$100 worth of goods in London, while \$36 in France and \$29 in Italy would purchase the same amount.

It was a year previous that there was on all sides the great fear of unemployment in the country, bringing into existence a considerable quantity of written matter urging that all kinds of work proceed at once, of which probably the most famous appeal is that of Richard H. Edmonds in the *Manufacturers' Record*, when he said:

Build that house now; construct that highway at once; build that school, that church; repair that broken pavement; build that garage, and even that chicken-coop, now—not to-morrow. Go ahead with your plans; speed the nation on the road to full employment, and thus hasten the day of individual and national prosperity and safety. Preach this from the pulpit, ye ministers of the gospel; act it from the pews, ye laymen who profess a love of humanity; put it into effect, ye county, municipal, and state officials; and remember, ye busi-

ness men of America, . . . that there is something in this infinitely higher and more important than the small amount of money involved which you think you could save by waiting.

Government officials, particularly those in high positions in the Department of Labor, were urgent in their utterances in this direction.

And the great employers acted upon the idea with good results. Indeed, many of them planned for conversion of their war plants into peace-time operations as soon as hostilities should cease. Such was the plan of the monster Eddystone plant at Philadelphia, owned by the Baldwin Locomotive Works, and which had made a great record during the war. Likewise the Du Pont Powder Company, with plants in various states, affords a striking example of the foreseeing method of dealing with the employment problem precipitated by peace. At that time, of its 100,000 men and women employes, 80 per cent were engaged wholly in war work, three-fourths of these were transferred into peace industries with scarcely a ripple, such as chemicals, dyes, paints, leather substitutes. When the Administration was helpless to point the way, business men proceeded without regard to the Government's purposes, even though it was the Administration which was responsible for an increase of wages for labor out of all proportion to the returns for vastly more exacting service to the community, such as teaching. And from these abnormal levels in wages and consequently in materials it was known that there must inevitably be a sharp recession. And while both labor and capital recognized this fact, neither was willing to make the first concession; and between the two, the public met the usual fate of being the chief sufferer.

In the early months of 1919, the Employment Service of the federal government and of the several States was watching anxiously for the bad spots of unemployment over the country; and even within a month of the close of the fighting reports were received. The reports at the end of

the first week in December, 1918, showed that of the 122 cities reporting to Washington, only 16 showed unemployment conditions; and in 91 of these cities the relations between capital and labor were reported good, in 8 as unsettled, and in 5 as acute. In the New England area, Bridgeport reported 7,500 unemployed, Derby 1,000, Hartford 3,000, an increase of 1,500 over the preceding week, and Meriden 1,500, an increase over the preceding week of 500. The steel and iron industries were laying off men. In Boston, Worcester, and Lynn upwards of 23,000 were out of employment among textile workers, while many concerns were on two-thirds time. There was heavy unemployment among boot and shoe workers, brick-layers, carpenters, laborers and machinists. Only in New Hampshire and Vermont did the demand for workers equal the supply.

About Albany a surplus of 6,000 was reported, an increase of 200 in a week; while Buffalo's increase was 1,000, making a total of 20,000. Newark's surplus was 6,000, Jersey City's 5,000, Trenton's 3,000; while Pittsburg reported 12,000 unemployed common laborers, 6,000 semi-skilled workers, and 1,000 clerks, besides 1,700 miners; and similar reports came from other large industrial centers of the Eastern States. Cleveland reported 75,000 unemployed workers, Dayton 11,000, and other Ohio points large numbers.

The middle west, the south, and the Pacific coast all reported substantially the same conditions. Of all the cities of the country reporting to Washington for the week ending February 24, 1919, sixty per cent reported heavy unemployment—an increase of fifty-eight per cent over the week previous and fifty-seven per cent over the week before that; the number of cities reporting an approximated equality of demand and supply decreased twenty-nine per cent in the one week. Every week for the first three months after the signing of the armistice showed the same tendency.

And now, at a rather late day, the Administration was

becoming alarmed and sent out danger signals. November 19, 1918, a week after the armistice was signed, Roger W. Babson, head of the statistical organization which furnished merchants, bankers and investors with a periodical "barometer letter," urged concessions to labor, closing with this question: "Shall we all voluntarily give up something, or shall we all run the risk of losing everything?" It was stated that fundamental economic conditions were bad, and that a period of trouble and depression was just ahead and could not be sidetracked. The number out of employment at the end of four months after the conflict of arms closed was formidable, the number between December 3, 1918, and January 31, 1919, being multiplied twenty-five times, the number at the latter date being about 1,500,000 which had increased in two weeks to 2,000,000. President Wilson summoned to Washington governors of the various States to consider the situation; and while they expressed confidence that there was little danger of violence during the reconstruction period, there was, throughout the land, clearly defined expression of doubt as to the validity of this opinion. The United States Employment Service, reorganized to find positions for the returned fighting men of the nation, practically suspended activities on March 22, 1919, because of the failure of Congress to make an appropriation for its maintenance. Its agents performed their most efficient service in efforts at the demobilization camps to put the discharged service men into suitable employment, unless they already had something definite in view. And through their efforts, communities throughout the land were organizing bureaus for this purpose, managed by local committees.⁴ It was a highly commendable plan.

⁴The Employment Service showed itself effective in many lines. Starting as a small beginning in the immigration service, it suddenly leaped to a position of usefulness and importance that challenged the admiration of the world. Unknown until about January, 1918, as an essential unit of service, in ten months it moved 2,500,000 men from peace to war activity; and by the middle of January, 1919, operating the reverse process, it had placed twenty-five per cent of all war workers who wanted employment.

But it was severely criticized. It was declared to be one form of the propaganda used by the Administration to make things appear what they were not. While the figures given in the foregoing paragraphs are from official sources, whereby the press of the country was made to believe that its continuance was a necessity, the deductions are open to question, and in some cases the figures themselves. *Industry*, a newspaper interested in the country's industrial development, declared that fewer men were out of work at the end of six months after the war ended than in any year preceding the war. The *Iron Trade Review* criticized the method of the service in securing the figures as to the number of unemployed.⁵ The *Washington Evening Star* published figures taken from representative papers in Washington, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Detroit, Pittsburg, New York, Boston, Cleveland and Buffalo showing that the advertising for help in January and February, 1919, was larger by 1,406 advertisements than for the same months a year earlier.⁶ And an inspection of the pages of advertising in the metropolitan newspapers in late 1919 and early 1920 shows page after page given to the most expensive advertising for "help wanted." Common laborers were

In early 1918, it devised plans for effecting the wheat harvest of that year with the minimum of loss. Establishing offices in the great centers of the wheat belt, speed and efficiency marked every movement of the great land army of harvesters numbering nearly 10,000 under its direction. Cooperation was sought from newspapers, and other agencies used were moving pictures, the national grange, commercial organizations, and rural telephone lines.

Owing to the failure of appropriation to continue its service, the reduction ordered in March, 1919, cut its force 80 per cent, leaving a mere skeleton of its former force.

⁵In the case of the Cleveland figures, it stated that the Employment Service asked for an estimate from its local office there, which, in turn, asked for an estimate from the Cleveland Federation of Labor, and then the two were to make a guess. This guess was then forwarded to Washington where it was given out as fact.

⁶The advertising for female help amounted to 265,095 lines as compared with 210,443 for the same period of the preceding year. On the other hand, the papers selected from eight cities for the same months showed 61,095 lines of advertising for "situations wanted" (male) as against 57,509 for a year earlier.

those most readily taken up in the early days of reconstruction.

The period immediately after the war closed was marked by strikes of unusual violence in the United States, with the avowed purpose of destroying so-called capitalism and orderly government. It is to be regretted that prominent in this effort at destruction were noted leaders of organized labor who herded many of the honest laborers like so many sheep into the wrong fold. And it was with less basis for strikes than ever known in history. There was never less need for increased wages than at that time, or for improved conditions of work or living of the laborer, as shown elsewhere.⁷ The propaganda was actively at work blowing smoke into the eyes of the American people, seeking to blind them to the fact that it was the European variety of Bolshevism finding its way in America. And by the time of the next presidential election, the people were awake to the fact that the broad announcement of Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, that it was the duty of organized labor to support the party and policies of President Wilson, was not sound either in sentiment or principle. Honest laboring men by the hundreds of thousands repudiated the whole destructionist scheme. Said a leading newspaper on the Atlantic seaboard:

Whatever may be the constructive aims of Mr. Gompers and his followers in the American Federation of Labor, the purpose is that which was proclaimed on the very first day of the strike by John Fitzpatrick, head of the strike committee: "We are going to socialize the basic industries of the United States. This is the beginning of the fight." And with radicalism in control of the basic industries—the necessities of existence—there would be created such a condition of civil war as now threatens Great Britain.⁸

⁷ Chapters on "Labor and Wages" and "Russia and Bolshevism."

⁸ Philadelphia *North American* of September 30, 1919.

It was the time chosen by Bolshevism and all of its hybrid associates to overturn the best government the world ever knew—and for a class purpose wholly. The situation was sobering, even alarming, almost desperate. It gave serious-minded people pause. But the result of the 1920 national election was as hard a hit at radical laborism, with which Mr. Gompers was dallying, as it was at Wilsonism. Indeed, upon the statements of both President Wilson and President Gompers, the minds of the two lay alongside of each other, and to strike one was to strike both. The blow was sent home.

When, in the face of a national calamity, in the summer of 1916, the organized railroad men, aided by President Wilson, forced their demands upon the country through a servile Congress, they set a pace that was followed by all classes where it was possible, for increases in prices and costs of living. Had the government conscripted labor and capital at the same wages it paid the fighting boys, there might have been a modicum of justice in the process. But the debauch begun in 1916 continued throughout the reconstruction period.

The first feeling of timidity and uncertainty, immediately following the cessation of hostilities, soon gave way to a riot of money-spending. Hotels everywhere demanding exorbitant rates were crowded to capacity and travellers found it difficult to secure lodging unless engaged well in advance. Theaters the country over were doing a record-breaking business. High-priced restaurants were patronized beyond anything ever before known. Dealers in jewelry and in the most expensive kinds of men's and women's apparel, purveyors of all the infinite varieties of things unnecessary and of high cost did an unheard-of business. Nor was this on the part of the rich people who could well afford to indulge in such a riot of buying. But it was while they were turning their suits and having them retailed, that men and women working for modest salaries and in

humble position were freely purchasing of jewelry and garments that cost hundreds of dollars apiece.

Now the country was reaping the reward of the enormously bulged prices that were forced by organized labor upon the country in 1916. Office boys who were receiving \$8 to \$10 per week were put on the war-plant pay-rolls at \$20 to \$30; unskilled laborers jumped from \$15 to \$40. The farmers were stripped of labor by the lure of the prices paid by industrial centers, while his costs were rising, necessitating a rise in cost of the food he produced. Then labor, finding that its bulkier envelope brought no better living, made fresh demands. Building ceased because of excessive prices for material and labor, rents shot skyward, railroad rates increased—and labor insisted on higher wages. The vicious cycle was in full swing. It was at this time that organized railroad men again made demand upon President Wilson for further increase of wages unless there was to be a reduced cost of living; and while the President was discoursing upon "the judgment of society" and dwelling upon his constructive statesmanship in world affairs, A. B. Garretson, chairman of union railroad representatives, was frankly describing the contest as one between the cave-men when he said:

In times like these, men go back to primal instinct—to the day of the caveman, who, with his half-gnawed bone, snarled at the other caveman who wanted to take his bone away. We leaders are fighting for our men, the railroads are fighting for their stockholders, and the shippers for themselves. The public will pay.

It was shortly after this, in late 1919, that public journals were comparing prices and other conditions after the close of the Civil War with conditions prevailing at the close of the Great War. Referring to the earlier period, a New York correspondent of the *London Times* stated at that time:

This war has brought the levity of the American character out in bold relief. The indulgence in every variety of pleasure, luxury,

and extravagance is simply shocking. There is something saddening in the high glee with which the people here look upon a grievous national calamity. The jewelers' shops . . . have trebled their trade; the love of fine dresses and ornaments on the part of women amounts to madness. They have money and they must enjoy it.

Suggestive of the increased cost of living at that time, these figures are cited:

Eggs jumped from fifteen to twenty-five cents a dozen, cheese from eight to eighteen cents a pound, potatoes from \$1.50 to \$2.25 per bushel. All necessities rose in value from sixty to one hundred per cent. Wages lagged behind, the average increase in all trades being about twenty-five per cent.

But one who passed through the high-living costs after the Great War may smile at the foregoing figures, especially when it is remembered that the paper-dollar value of that time was far below that of gold, while in the reconstruction period of 1919-1921 they possessed equal value. For now eggs went to \$1.00 a dozen, and in late 1920 sold in the middle West at \$1.20; turkeys at Thanksgiving, 1920, retailed at fifty cents per pound. Potatoes were sold at \$6.00 per bushel, in the spring of 1920, in a distinctively potato section of the central Northwest, where butter reached \$1.00 a pound in a famous dairying State. These prices fairly represent costs of the time, as affected by foodstuffs.

As touching the building costs in early 1920, an architect in a section of the country where the lumber business is prominent stated publicly that the general-contract low bid of \$4,090 on a house in 1915 had been raised to \$11,800 for exactly the same specifications, and that a \$4,265 house of 1915 would cost \$12,950 at the beginning of 1920, while number-one maple flooring costing \$37 per thousand feet in 1916 was held at \$200 in February, 1920.

According to the National Industrial Conference Board, during the period from July, 1914, to March, 1920, the increase in living cost was 95 per cent, or about 1.4 per

cent a month; but that during the year previous the total was 21 per cent, or about 1.75 per cent a month. Begun by the reckless extravagance in all directions on the part of the Administration, the unprecedented inflation of prices was continued by equally reckless buying by the public until the first sign of a break came with the overalls movement late April, 1920. The hoarders and profiteers tried to laugh it out of court as an absurd transitory fad, but it proved their undoing. Negligible in itself in the quantity of clothing purchased, the movement, by the sympathy engendered among all classes of the general public, created a determined sentiment against swollen prices that was of great value at that particular time.

And while it had been fact that to mention the possibility of a lowering of wages was taboo, and particularly among newspapers, it was evident that in mid-autumn of 1920, a decisive slackening was shown in dropping overtime work. With this elimination came a just demand for a higher standard of production per man. From that time on there was a constant and strong recession. By December of that year there was a sharp decline in wages, in many instances upon the initiative of the workers themselves. And as 1921 dawned, men were out of employment who, but a short six months previous, could have had any one of a half-dozen remunerative positions. Organized labor had overshot the mark, creating a deep-seated public opposition; now the high wages had disappeared in riotous living of a year earlier, and self-respecting men, going about looking for something to do, brought back into current vernacular the old familiar, but long-lost, "tramp."

The November, 1920, letter to the public, put out by the National City Bank of New York stated:

For the first time in the history of the United States, a period of expansion has been checked and prices have turned decisively downward without a banking panic.

And for this fact, the banks of the country deserve great credit for refusing longer to aid those who were going the swift short road to financial oblivion until, about the middle of 1920, the banks of the land called a firm halt to the ruinous pace. But so sudden was this step which should have been taken earlier, that before mid-December so many men were out of employment that governors of States and mayors of cities were called upon to take up public work that had been in contemplation, in order that men might not suffer through the winter.⁹

And at this very time, dealers of the country were going through an ordeal that tested the strongest fiber. Said one of them:

The world's commerce is going through the fires. . . . The clouds are black, but thank God there is sunshine behind the clouds. It took neither a bright man nor a courageous man to prosper during the boom just past, but you must have a backbone now, you must be a fighter in this great game of commerce and you must be prepared to fight clean.¹⁰

The problem with every dealer in commodities was to get rid of his war-priced stocks with the least possible loss when the crisis came. Each group of dealers thought his suffered most. Each winced under the galling load, yet bravely met his fate. The wage-earner who was first to be favored by the arbitrary demands upon the nation through the President in 1916, was the last to meet the losses. The farmer was probably hit the hardest and complained the most bitterly. But all were touched—manufacturer, jobber, retailer, farmer, toiler. It was inevitable that each group had to absorb his portion of the loss due to the pricking of the bubble. There was sympathy with all, except

⁹ See resolutions of the Manufacturers' and Employers' Association of the State held at Jackson, Michigan, December 19, 1920. This severe condition of unemployment continued to grow until President Harding called a conference in Washington, autumn of 1921 to devise means for its abatement. A month later it was said 1,000,000 of the unemployed had been put to work.

¹⁰ George H. Capper of Chicago, in December, 1920.

the profiteer, whether among the capital class or the organized-labor class whose production was far below standard with an immoderately increased pay coming from the great unorganized third party, the large general public, for whom no President entered a plea. A full year before the final adjustment came, there were warnings of the coming decline in unprecedented prosperity and high prices, that the country was entering upon the final phase of the delirium—the delirium of the profiteer in commercial and industrial life as well as of the organized labor; the delirium of spending without considering the possible lean years of the period that was to follow.

But prices of garments, cost of housing with 1,000,000 houses fewer than the demands, wages, and pricking of the inflation bubble were not all that demanded serious attention during the reconstruction days. There was also a crying need for education in the spirit of American ideals, a need emphasized with the discovery that in some sections of the country there had been tampering with schoolbooks in the interest of German propaganda. From the splendid public service rendered by the schools during the war came an impetus to project school effort further into civic and national affairs; and this at the very time when the pay of teachers was far below that of wage-earners who paid nothing to prepare for their common toil, resulting in a depletion of the ranks of the more competent teachers. So deep was the impression the war made upon educators that at the meeting of the National Education Association, early in 1919, the greater number of the topics discussed were upon the war's reconstruction of educational aims and ideals.

In all of the great aims of the reconstruction period, perhaps nothing surpassed in importance that of this educational purpose. On approximately the same plane, however, was the insistent demand for social justice, particularly a more equitable system by insurance against the hazards of sickness, unemployment, and old age, relieving workers of

the anxieties tormenting beyond endurance. To this end, there was a large demand for full recognition of the dignity and authority of labor in the scheme of democratic civilization—not merely a group who happened to be of organized labor and urged the debarment of all who happened not to belong to their group, the closed-shop workers, but equally of all honorable laborers. For the disclosures in the building profiteering investigations of New York, late in 1920, besmirched prominent organized labor leaders as badly as it did the contractors. And the laborer who is ready to smite the honorable laboring man simply because he happens not to belong to the organization is not less a danger to society than the employer who will smite a laboring man because he does belong to the labor union. And the investigation revealed the pitiable fact that the Bethlehem Steel operators boycotted dealers who employed union men; and union labor boycotted those employing men who did not belong to the union. Again it was the great third party, the general public, that suffered; and this third party was unable to distinguish between the tactics of the other two. Both were accursed in its view.

But the materialism of these two antagonistic forces, dominant for the moment, could not persist without extreme danger to the nation. It was the force seeking the upper hand the first year-and-half after the close of the war; but when the people saw through their purpose, the nation turned its back, deserting the materialism for the spiritual forces. At the beginning of 1919, the president of the University of Minnesota in a public address, relating to the spiritual forces operating in reconstruction, declared that labor was then face to face with its most critical situation in history, and urged all groups to set their faces in the right direction and work for a better mutual understanding. He added:

Present conditions are calling for the new American. Changes have come, and more are coming. The new American must have

initiative, a spirit of independence, and an appreciation of honesty. The present period is one of clash between things that are old and things that are new.

This was the sentiment calling for an honest day's work for a full day's pay; and a square deal on the part of the employer for the employe; and a square deal on the part of the union man toward his fellow outside of the union. It called for a square deal all around.

If captains of industry and captains of unionized labor were pilfering the great public of the last obtainable nickel in a quiet, gentlemanly fashion, others sought their end in a less canonical manner, during this period. A crime wave swept the nation from the close of the war, with increasing pressure and volume, until its crest was reached by the ushering in of the year 1921. So violent did it become that in many cities the police were unable to cope with it. New York, Chicago, even Philadelphia, and other cities became notorious centers of lawlessness and lax morals. In other places men of the American Legion offered their services to help subdue the criminals. Private citizens armed themselves for self-defense. Officers were instructed to shoot to kill. And when the public became so fully aroused that it would not permit itself longer to be trifled with in the pursuit of its orderly and legitimate business, the terrorism began to diminish.¹¹ In large measure the great impetus given these outbursts of the criminal instinct must be attributed to the profligacy and dishonesty of the Administration in dealing with the public during the Great War.

While this deplorable side of human nature was manifesting itself; while shameless employers were battenning on some employes; while no less shameless labor leaders were aiding in the pilfering of the general public, it was a great relief to know that God was not lost sight of in

¹¹ The character of the criminal features changed, but not immediately the degree. In November, 1921, United States Marines were placed on guard to protect the mail against robbery, with instructions to shoot to kill.

the greatest period in which it was man's privilege to live. Though the ill-starred Inter-Church World Movement created a feeling of depression, it taught valuable lessons. And other movements of world-wide import came into being in individual denominations. Scarcely had the clash of arms ceased, when these denominations began to make appeal, for world-rebuilding of civilization, for sums running into the hundreds of millions, additional to regular expenses. After all the endless millions poured out for welfare work in the war, it seemed like an unwise move to call for other millions at such a time. The Methodist church started the appeals by asking for \$85,000,000, or, conditionally, \$105,000,000; it received \$120,000,000. The Baptists then asked for \$100,000,000 and other prominent denominations in similarly large sums.

In the year 1920 lay the crisis of reconstruction. The most dangerous corner was turned in safety, the speed having slackened. As the year died away, an age passed into history. The supreme efforts of Bolshevism to capture the great democracy of the western hemisphere, materially aided by the indifference if not actual sympathy of the Administration, failed. Falsifying organized-labor leaders were taught a severe lesson in the trouncing it, together with Wilsonism, received at the hands of the great mass of the people in the national election of that year. Profiteers and domineering captains of industry were shown that a new day had dawned. Social justice and higher ideals of even the traditional Americanism were given a new impetus. The world looked brighter than ever before. President Harding's harking back to the Americanism of Washington and Lincoln, in his inaugural address, stirred the great mass of the people to new enthusiasms.

Never again should the nation be permitted to be headless in the severely exacting days of a crisis.

CHAPTER XXI

INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION

From its foundation, the nation has been grateful to those who went forth in time of peril to fight its battles. One manifestation of its gratitude has been in caring for the disabled and aged veteran, and for his widow and children. The large aggregate of its pension bill ¹ for wars preceding the Great War is but suggestive of other care it has bestowed, such as soldiers' homes, orphans' schools.

During the Great War there was added a new and greatly improved feature to the pay of the man in service and those dependent upon him. This was an allotment by the government to the wife and child left at home, in part deducted from the man's pay, in part paid from the United States treasury, but all sent direct to the wife by the government. Most beneficent in its conception, the execution of this law became a farce and a national disgrace by reason of the Administration's failure to meet these payments as they became due; and the anxiety of the fighting man for his wife and babe at home became to him a greater horror than facing the guns of the enemy war-machine.²

A yet greater improvement upon the government's plan for caring for the fighting man and his dependents was the law prepared by Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury. The Act of October 6, 1917, permitted each man in the service to take out a life insurance policy to the amount of \$10,000, for the payment of which the government was responsible. No safer insurance was ever known in all the

¹ The total to June 30, 1920, was \$5,830,815,717, of which \$5,502,445,815 was for Civil War pensions.

² See chapter on "Labor and Wages."

world's history, and none at so low a rate. The insured is permitted to carry this insurance for five years after peace shall have been declared by presidential proclamation.

The same law granted the fighting man compensation for disability incurred in the service; and, in case of his death, to his widow and children, or other relatives dependent upon him. At the same time provision was made for rebuilding the men after their fight in the war was over, so that they might continue the battle in life's keen struggle on a more nearly even footing. It undertook to rehabilitate the disabled so as to restore them, at least in some measure, for useful activity, indemnifying them, so far as may be, for the loss occasioned through any incurable lessening of efficiency.

It was the most advanced position ever taken by any government since governments began to exist among men, in a matter of this kind. At the time of the enactment of the law it was aptly described as "the most generous piece of legislation ever written on the statute books of a grateful nation." And the nation assigned large credit to those who conceived and brought it forth.

By the end of July, 1918, the total amount of insurance taken by the nation's fighting men was \$25,000,000,000, an amount exceeding the fondest dreams of the most sanguine, that for July alone being \$4,000,000,000. At the close of the war, the total had grown to \$39,669,198,000, taken by 4,539,048 men, the average per policy being the amount of \$8,740. The claims made for payment on these policies amount to \$900,000,000 during the war activities; and during the same period the premiums paid in on all policies amounted to \$200,000,000.³ Great energy was displayed by the officials having the matter in charge to see that, so

³The law, embracing the allotment, insurance, compensation, and rehabilitation features, originally provided compulsory allotment of at least \$15 monthly to the wife. The government's allowances were made only on request and after payment of the compulsory allowances. The government allowed \$15 for wife alone, \$25 for wife and one child, \$32.50 for wife and two children, and \$5 for each additional child up to the

far as may be, every man in the service was insured. The success in the widely scattered sections of Europe was due in great measure to the efforts of 35 officers and 65 men who left Washington and on Christmas, 1917, sailed from New York to urge the importance of insurance upon the men.

This just provision for the fighting men of the nation must be attributed, at least in very marked measure, to Secretary McAdoo, as one more of the notable things his great brain was able to accomplish for the country. When the bill was drawn, he gave to the public through the usual news channels the statement that the scandal connected with the old pension system, in vogue up to that time, was to be avoided; and that the American public, as well as administrative officials, would be spared the humiliation of having repeated the unworthy conduct that had attached to the old pension system. The idea caught the eye of the American people, and they were misled by not inquiring into the basis for any such statement. Even intelligent men, those accustomed to investigate and to set before the public only well-established facts, were relying upon Mr. McAdoo's statement.⁴

That the various laws providing pensions for the sol-maximum of \$50. For one child alone \$5 was allowed; for two, \$12.50; for three, \$20; for four, \$40; and \$5 for each additional.

The compensation feature, which originally allowed a man \$30 a month for total disability, was increased to \$80 by the amendment known as the Sweet bill, which became law December 24, 1919; and thereunder, a man with wife, from \$45 to \$90; with wife and one child, \$55 to \$95; with wife and two or more children, \$65 to \$100.

There is preserved in a steel cabinet in the insurance division of the War Risk Bureau a paper of rare historic significance. It is the original, grimy with the soil of the trench, bearing the names of those who signed on it for insurance the night before going out at daybreak into No Man's Land, signed under a strong enemy offensive, some of the signers never to return. It is preserved with the sacredness of the last will and testament of those boys.

⁴In the Editor's Preface to the publication, *Effects of War upon Insurance*, with Special Reference to the Substitution of Insurance for Pensions," issued as No. 6 of Preliminary Economic Studies of the War, by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, appears this statement: "The old-fashioned method of pensions was unsatisfactory from several points of view. Not only was it inadequate in numerous instances, but it

diers in wars preceding the Great War were abused is well known. All were based upon disability of the applicant up to a few years before the Great War shook Europe. The Act of October 6, 1917, the basic law governing in the Great War, is also based upon disability; and, in case of widows, the provisions are not greatly unlike those governing pensions. When two widows claim the same compensation, the same kind of evidence will be required to determine their claimed rights as has always been required since the Government existed. A man who was not in the service, but claims that he was, will have to seek to establish his right to the compensation just as men always have in the past. If an ex-service man claims that he was disabled in the service or in any manner provided by law, that claim will have to be established by human records and human testimony, just as it has been heretofore. And unless human nature has undergone a revolution since October 6, 1917, there will be the same tendency to corruption, to intrigue, to securing something for nothing that there always has been. It may be lessened; but even that is doubtful, if there is any basis for an opinion in the duplication of wives who appeared for allotment upon the same man's service, even before the author of the law had left office, or the war was concluded. The law is great, the greatest of the kind ever enacted by man; but that is hardly sufficient reason for misleading the public as to its unequalled merits. In brief, in

afforded many opportunities for corruption, political intrigue and unfair distribution."

The learned author of this publication states (p. 153) with perhaps something more of reserve: "Pensions have not infrequently been used to further political ends. Considerations of fairness and equity as between individual pensioners have been so often disregarded that the old pension system in the United States became a reproach to the representative form of government. The generosity of a grateful people to those who gave their lives and services to the perpetuation of the republic was prostituted by selfish considerations.

"The contrast between the old system of pensions and that provided by the war-risk insurance acts of 1917 is most striking. The feature of compensation, so far as such an end is possible, is made the basis of the new laws."

Name of Bureau later became Veterans Bureau.

the underlying idea of disability in this law, as in previous enactments, it seems that three words, "Compensation for disability," have been substituted for the single word "Pension." And already charges are being made of political intrigue in seeking advantages additional through Congress; and, to their credit be it said as a matter of early history in the affair, the ex-service boys as a whole are standing firmest against it. The one great, distinguishing, and beneficent feature of the law is the provision for rehabilitating the disabled fighter and financial aid to his wife and children while he is undergoing the rebuilding process. There is nothing in it to prevent intrigue, corruption, whether political or other, or scandal, more than in preceding laws.

The War Risk Bureau originated when the Great War began in Europe. It began in September, 1914, with the intention of providing facilities for the insurance of American vessels, cargoes, and seamen against the risks of war, and had as its office two small rooms in the basement of the Treasury Building in Washington, and three years later the Bureau had only 93 employees.

Then came the great law of October 6, 1917, creating the military and naval divisions for consideration of allowances to the fighting men and their dependents, and swiftly it became the largest bureau to meet the immediate demands upon its energy. In August, 1918, the employees numbered over 8,000, while by the following March they had increased to more than 17,000. These were officed in eighteen widely separated buildings, of which the insurance division alone occupied four. By the late summer of 1919, the number of employees was reduced to about 15,000. Later all were officed in one building of eleven stories.

At the time when this work was so heavily thrown upon the bureau, it was necessary to scour the country for help, and green clerks without any office experience whatever were accepted, and yet the cry was for more clerks.

Added to this impediment was the more serious one, be-

cause the more fundamental, of undertaking to establish it in a new bureau without organization and at a time when every conceivable organization facility of Government was employed to the utmost in forwarding measures for the battle-front; a bureau without proper records and without the proper trained force of clerks. And this was in face of the fact that the Bureau of Pensions, thoroughly organized, with a large trained office force in operation for decades, with records and the card index system, with its own work lessening by reason of the depleting of the Civil War pension lists, could have handled the matter most efficiently.

It appeared to be another manifestation of the Administration malady of seeking something new upon the ground that the old and tried must be corrupt or untrustworthy; of disregarding experience and probable results. The results soon appeared. Speaking of the administration of this notable statute, President Wilson said:

This nation has no more solemn obligation than healing the hurts of our wounded and restoring our disabled men to civil life and opportunity. The Government recognizes this, and the fulfilment of the obligation is going forward, fully and generously. . . . It is merely the payment of a draft of honor which the United States of America accepted when it selected these men and took them in their health and strength to fight the battles of the nation. They have kept the faith. Now we keep faith with them.

The words were nobly spoken. But what of the event? In any great and new undertaking suddenly thrust upon a new organization, particularly governmental organization, there are sure to be mistakes and resulting complaints. But what reason ever existed for withholding the pay and allotments, small though they were, from the fighting lads and their wives and babes at home when they went willing to pay the price with their lives, while men enjoying the comforts of home who did not leave their firesides to go into the trenches were regularly paid two to four or six times as much from the United States treasury, never missing a

pay-day on schedule time? What reason ever existed for the failure of an efficient administration of the trust to which the President so eloquently referred?

Yet, after fifteen months from the armistice which brought the armed conflict to a close, nineteen months after the Federal Board for Vocational Training was organized, the Administration was not keeping faith with those who, the President declared and the world knew, had kept the faith. Of the more than 300,000 injured in the war, more than 200,000 were registered as disabled. Of these, 110,000 were recognized as eligible for training under the Board of Vocational Training, and there were placed in actual training slightly over 24,000, of whom, after nineteen months, 217 had been placed in useful and gainful occupations at a time when positions were crying on all hands for persons to come and occupy.

In the War Risk Bureau, complaints arose from every section of the country by the tens of thousands. The clerks were occupied, they worked hard enough to bring results. But it was the treadmill process. There ensued delay, confusion, and aggravation of claimants who should have had immediate attention. The administration of the office was severely criticized, both from within and from without. Affairs in the Bureau were topsy-turvy and apparently without head to any portion of it, without capacity to manage a large undertaking. It but emphasized Senator Chamberlain's statement that the Government had ceased to function—an outstanding characteristic of the Administration, though as many as 3,000 clerks in Washington were working on the list of 110,000 eligible for vocational training, at the beginning working under a code of rules comprising 522 sections. The Federal Board of Vocational Education denied with vigor the charges of neglect against it, except as to delays due to the War Risk Insurance Division.

This was the one bureau of the Government where, above all others, once the nation was fully in the war, ex-

petition was the great demand. It should have met its obligations to the splendid fellows who went to the front at least as promptly as it did with those whose profiteering was reinforced by contracts whose preparation required great time and the nicety of exactness, or the officials who remained in Washington from the President down.

Overwhelmed by the mass of business for which it was utterly unprepared, the War Risk Bureau became a mass of inefficiency. Under these circumstances, Secretary McAdoo asked Colonel Henry D. Lindsley to accept the position of Director of the Bureau, in the hope of saving it and preventing billions of dollars of insurance lapsing. Colonel Lindsley accepted upon condition that he be given a free hand to effect necessary reforms and to introduce business methods. When he found the indescribable condition of affairs in the Bureau, he asked Secretary Glass, who in the meantime had succeeded McAdoo, to aid in the removal of some obstacles that existed in the endless red-tape, so that he might meet the requirements of the law looking toward the real aid that he found was denied the soldiers and sailors of recent service. In reply, Secretary Glass asked for Colonel Lindsley's resignation. He and all his assistants promptly resigned, leaving this most important bureau practically without a head—a tragedy in the nation.

This new and great bureau had fallen into disrepute. Demoralization, utter and profound, appears to have settled down upon its operations. A special committee, with Charles E. Hughes, former Republican candidate for President, at its head, was appointed in mid-summer, 1919, to investigate the situation and devise some way for extricating it from its sad state. The country received something of a shock when informed by this committee that three-fourths of the men who had taken out insurance had failed to keep up their payments, though with every advantage of governmental organization, authority and backing. And

the Government literally placarded the entire country in a campaign urging the insured to keep up their insurance. And just before the holidays, end of 1920, large display advertisements appeared in the newspapers urging friends to present the insured with receipts showing premiums paid up to that time as a Christmas gift.

So disastrous was the failure of the bureau to function, that the complaints became so grievous as to make the whole country feel that it was scarcely less than an outrage against the boys who suffered at the front and who were now made to suffer doubly. And at a conference held at Indianapolis, Indiana, early in November, 1920, the national commander of the American Legion declared to the department adjutants from thirty states that it was necessary for the Legion to place itself between the disabled service men and government incompetency. Middle of the following month, a Montana delegation went to Washington to seek relief from Congress, and in that state cases of neglected disabled men became so glaring as to threaten legal steps to compel action.

The enormous load placed upon this newly organized bureau was sufficient to swamp any organization at the beginning, an error chargeable to the Administration. The new bureau failed to meet the requirements of the situation, when, after the war had been closed for more than two years, it was still floundering while the disabled men were suffering and unprovided for. As late as October, 1921, a special Senate committee reported that to July 1, of that year, there had been 388,000 applications for vocational training, but only 5,000 had been rehabilitated, and added: "It is with deep regret that we report this melancholy fact."

The country will never look kindly upon any organization or institution that neglects its disabled fighters. For 1922, however, the expenditures for disabled ex-service men will be \$510,000,000.

CHAPTER XXII

THE SPIRIT OF AMERICA

There is an abounding literature upon the Spirit of '76, some of it boastful, all of it cheerful. It creates an exhilarating spirit among real Americans. There is ample, also, upon the Spirit of '61, which, however, partakes of something of a sectional character, though it relates to the preservation of the Union. There is a lesser literature upon the Spirit of '98, when America as one man flew to arms to redress the outrage of Spanish tyranny. And there are other Spirits which have gained a place in American history, even if they do not grip present-day American thought.

It remained, however, for the conflagration which began its devastation of Europe in the summer of 1914, to bring forth the real Spirit of America. In '76 there was no America; in '61 it was a divided America; and in '98 it required so little of America. But in 1914-1918 there was a real demand for the genuine American Spirit from the very moment disaster to civilization was threatened by the destructive forces at militarism's command. And this spirit promptly began to take shape, once the purpose of Prussianism was discerned. True, there was propaganda spread insidiously throughout the land by the Prussian forces at work and by the destructive forces of anarchism in our own land, most of which were operating in Germany's behalf, and the no less insidious forces of pacifism among American citizens led in large measure by those in high places in Administration circles. As leaders of the American thought there stood forth a few souls preëminent in their Americanism, who grasped the situation and understood

how the various forces in operation were related to the preservation or destruction of American institutions. It was an extremely unfortunate moment for America that none of these outstanding men were found in governmental positions. It is no less unfortunate that those in the Administration who did undertake to represent the genuine American spirit were excluded from the Administration counsels.

The statements put forth by Administration leaders at first confused, then baffled, American opinion. When America was attacked, deliberately and murderously, by the German government in the sinking of the "Lusitania," sending to the bottom of the sea innocent men, women, and children, there was such an outcry at the outrage, which was known clearly to be an outrage, that President Wilson felt called upon to state that the people should not be seized with hysteria, that he could not be unbalanced from his normal course of thought, and that some people were too proud to fight. This the Spirit of America looked upon as scarcely less an outrage than that committed upon the "Lusitania." The American Administration had been looked to to give guidance to American thought and purpose in the devastating conflict of arms in Europe. But it now knew that it had been looking to the wrong source. Even Theodore Roosevelt, sane and clear-eyed citizen that he was, admitted that he had been misled by assuming that those in high authority had information which he and other private American citizens did not possess; but from that moment he became the embodiment of the American spirit, and to him the American people turned for guidance in the hour of distress.¹

¹ School books in New York were ordered changed because they conveyed an erroneous idea of this great American, then still living. In December, 1918, Superintendent of Schools William L. Ettinger notified all high-school principals to eliminate all reference to Theodore Roosevelt's attitude toward the Great War in its earlier stages. These are the portions ordered eliminated:

The Germans invaded Belgium August 4, 1914. The same day our official proclamation of neutrality was issued. Two weeks later President Wilson sent an appeal to the American people in which he said:

So pronounced was the spirit of America in the emergency that tens of thousands, not relying upon the Administration's lead, crossed the line into Canada and enlisted with the Canadian forces in order that they might get into the fight of right against wrong; while yet other thousands crossed the seas to enlist directly with the British or French forces.

But America became fully aroused by the gravity of the situation. Then neither the President nor a supine Congress could prevent that stirring of the American spirit which has always been profound in times of national crisis, or where right is matched against wrong.

And there was probably never a greater manifestation of eagerness to serve than was found in America in the first weeks the nation was in the war. The sum of the effort that grew out of that impulse for service was tremendous, incalculable.

And in it all, there was found nowhere a finer manifestation of the real spirit of America, the spirit to serve, than was found in its institutions of higher learning, where it might be thought to be most apathetic. For there was a large and growing class in all of America's older colleges, commonly known as the rich or well-to-do class, city bred, who accepted college life largely as a social tradition, that

"Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned." The following month ex-President Roosevelt in a magazine article wrote: "It is certainly desirable that we should remain entirely neutral, and nothing but urgent need would warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or the other."

Replying to this statement in the New York text-books, former President Roosevelt declared that he had assumed, as he had a right to assume, that the national Administration was dealing fairly with the American people, knowing the inside facts of the diplomacy in connection with the Great War, instead of misleading and egregiously deceiving them by its conduct of foreign affairs; and that it was under this misapprehension that he had written the words quoted. He objected strenuously and righteously to school books quoting him when he was laboring under a misapprehension, as was all America, because of the deception practiced by the Administration upon the people; and not quoting his thorough American spirit after he was put into possession of the facts as to neutrality through channels outside of the Administration.

In this connection see also the chapter "Looking Toward Peace."

was moved to a deeper seriousness by the events of war. A large proportion of them entered the military or naval forces as soon as possible after our declaration of war. They met danger, endured discipline, and suffered privation in the finest spirit. Practically all of the leading colleges of the nation were transformed into army posts, and scarcely a man was found shirking his duty—colleges that were thought to be beyond the reach of war, whether on the plains of the West or in the mountains of the East or on the seaboard. The men in the colleges possessed of this spirit quickly grasped the situation and were ready for the utmost trial and the supreme sacrifice.

It was in June of the year 1917. The occasion was a college commencement. Many of the young men of the college had already entered the fighting ranks of the nation, so that the college was depleted by a high percentage of its student body. The ample rains had carpeted the expansive lawns with a perfect green. The sky overhead was of the deepest blue. The air was balmy. The warmth of the sunshine permitted the choice of summer garments. The mountains round about were as great fortresses, and at their base flowed the gentle stream through the undisturbed quiet of the valley. Platoons of student soldiers were in regular formation of battle or of maneuver. The alumni of the century-old institution had gathered from every section of the nation. Young ladies in their gayest summer costumes, gazing upon the scene, wore the smile becoming the perfect day it was. The procession across the campus headed by the institution's president was a thing to be remembered. The oratory of the day was different from the oratory of other days. The whole procedure was quiet and without ostentation. Boys from the institution, boys from the homes of those who had returned for the events of this great day, were in the ranks in other sections of the country or were crossing the seas to engage in the death struggle of autocracy against democracy. This scene, wonderful

in its conception, surpassing in its impressiveness, could be repeated whether in the mountains of New England or in the plains of Kansas or Oklahoma. It was, in the concrete, the American spirit as manifested in the outward form among the most intelligent.

In the early days of the war, they were joined by the tens of thousands of comrades from every walk of life—a thing to remember with pride. But no less a demonstration of magnificent loyalty was the spectacle of 10,000,000 young Americans quietly assembling at their polling places, and placing their lives at the disposal of their government, to which, at a later date, were added 14,000,000. As finely phrased by President Wilson: "This is in no sense a conscription of the unwilling; it is, rather, selection from a nation that has volunteered in the mass."

And all these, like the men they were, stood ready to meet the shock of battle in the manner of America's best tradition. Many made the supreme sacrifice; all were ready. America never exhibited a finer spirit on the battle-front, or one more universal. This spirit was well illustrated in the unequal conflict in which the 8,000 officers and men composing the Marine Brigade engaged near Château Thierry on June 5, 1918. This was to stop the German thrust at Paris, and was thrown into the breach at the crucial hour. The marines, in the fighting, took Lucy-le-Bocage, cleared Belleau Wood, and captured Bouresches. But before it could be relieved at the end of the month, the brigade had lost 126 officers and 5,073 men.

This was not exceptional, save for the opportunity for sacrifice which it offered. A writer in a national weekly, as he saw it on the American battle-front from Vaux to Soissons, gives this incident:

All our boys lay stretched exactly in the same direction, as if by some mysterious magnetic current they had been pointed toward some spiritual pole—the pole of their avenging purpose. They lay stretched exactly in the line of the advance, head toward the foe, and bodies

still beautiful and lithe, while the Germans were in huddles at the bottom of shell holes.²

The nation is very proud of the war record of its splendid fellows over there. At Belleau Wood; at Château Thierry; in the dashing sweep by which the St. Mihiel salient was wrested from the enemy after it had been held with a grip of steel for four years; in the dogged, terrible weeks of deadly combat in the Argonne our men added laurels to the American arms as fine as any in our history.

It is the same story by all of them—the very old story told over and over. It is the same story which had been writ large across the pages of history whenever the deeds of American soldiers have been recorded. Never staling in the telling, it thrills American hearts at every repetition, and never did it thrill more than in this, the latest telling.

The only thing that stopped the victorious American soldiers on the trail of the German armies was an order issued on the day the armistice became effective. The news that the German command had thrown into the lines opposite the United States army its last available division came simultaneously with the order to American divisions to halt in their tracks at 11 a. m., November 11, 1918. The news of the armistice was sent by telephone, telegraph, radio, and runner to all headquarters. The formal field order, timed fifteen minutes after the armistice was in effect, furnishing written confirmation of these, runs as follows, and is the last field order of the Meuse-Argonne drive:

I Army, Am. E. F.

11 November, 1918, 11:15 H.

SECRET.

FIELD ORDERS

NO. 112 (MAPS: No change.)

1. (a) Yesterday the enemy threw into the line opposite our 3rd Corps his last available division on the western front.

² James Hopper in *Colliers*, December 14, 1918.

(b) An armistice with Germany has been signed and all hostilities cease at 11 hours, November 11th.

(c) The Allied Armies hold themselves in readiness for further advance.

2. The I. American Army while holding its present front will prepare for further advance.

3. (a) *ARMY CORPS, ARTILLERY AND SERVICES.*

The present line attained will be organized in depth. Troops will be disposed so as to obtain the maximum rest and comfort consistent with the necessary arrangements or security and with preparations for further advance.

(X) No troops will pass the line reached at 11 hours, November 11th, until they receive further orders.

All communication with the enemy is forbidden pending further instructions. The cessation of hostilities is an armistice only, and not a peace, and there must be no relaxation of vigilance. The troops must be prepared at any time for a rapid forward movement.

Special steps will be taken by all commanders to insure the strictest discipline and to be prepared for any eventuality. Troops must be held well in hand and higher commanders will personally inspect all organizations with the foregoing in view.

4. Administrative details—No change.

5. P. C.'s. and exes of liaison—No change.

By command of Lieut. General Liggett:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

G. C. MARSHALL, JR.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

Preëminent as an aid to the fighting spirit is the consciousness of a worthy cause. Then comes the maintenance of morale, a mighty factor in any cause in which co-operation is essential. The Administration did well to recognize the value of the manly sports in developing this element. To this end, it made liberal allowance, and cannot be given too high credit therefor.

August 1, 1918, The War Department made announcement that for use in training-camps, the Department, with

\$250,000, had purchased sufficient material to equip all the training camps with sporting goods. This included 17,500 sets of boxing-gloves, 7,000 baseball bats, 21,100 baseballs, 3,500 play-ground baseball bats, 10,500 play-ground balls, 3,000 Rugby footballs, 7,000 soccer-balls, 3,500 volley-balls.

At the Great Lakes Naval Training Station alone were used 7,000 baseballs for the season of 1918. At the same station, footballs were ordered by the gross, and sweaters, jerseys, stockings for football, and the like, were ordered by the car-load.

At the same time the War Department made public the statement that the amount of clothing delivered since April 1, 1918, as shown by the latest statistical report of the Clothing and Equipage Division of the Quarter-master Corps, was as follows: 4,373,000 pairs of spiral puttees; 55,958,000 pairs of woolen stockings; 10,507,000 pairs of woolen breeches; 8,069,000 woolen coats; and 5,377,000 overcoats.

It was not strange, therefore, when the American soldier returned from his service overseas that he was found to be self-restrained, self-contained, and at the same time ready to be helpful. It was on the train out of Rockford (Camp Grant) that carloads of soldiers, on their way home from discharge, were met constantly. One could hardly have felt that he was among those who had gone through trials like Château Thierry and the Argonne. No loud word was heard in a two-hours' ride toward Madison; no discordant note. The train was crowded. There was every opportunity to become noisy and more or less fluent in uncouth language. There was none of it. Some were studying time-tables; some asked questions of the half-dozen civilian passengers, to get a true idea of home conditions, or told how New York was closed to those not from the metropolis and how open-armed was Chicago in the warmth of its welcome; some eagerly devoured the news of the lat-

est edition of the city papers, while others were deep in the magazine short story; yet others were reading books to which they had fallen heir, or trying to catch up in the matter of lost sleep.

One thing was markedly noticeable: As the last woman left the car there was an eager scramble to light pipes, cigars, cigarettes. Not a suggestion, however, of smoking in the presence of a woman in the coach was to be seen or heard anywhere.

It is none too strong to accord with the facts to say that the world had never possessed such an army as that which went forth from field and factory, from rail and boat, from office and street-cleaning force, from college professor's chair and scavenger's dump, known as the Yankee army. They went forth to fight the world's battle for democracy with those other nations that had stood the shock of the mightiest military machine the world had ever seen until it was difficult to stand longer under a strain such as history had not, till then, recorded. If the Roman legion was efficient, the free spirit of the American doughboy was more efficient. If the Prussian military machine was mighty, the free fighting spirit of the American doughboy was mightier. If the Spartan was taught to have his entrails gnawed out by a wild beast rather than complain, the American doughboy of the "lost battalion,"³ or any other, would gnaw roots of trees and plants to keep himself alive in order to send defiance at an overwhelming enemy in a more worthy cause.

That President Wilson was capable, on occasion, of rising to the highest flights in real appreciation of things accomplished was demonstrated on various occasions. Such an occasion was his tribute to the American army and navy, on December 2, 1918, when he said:

Their officers understood the grim and exacting task they had

³ Under command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Whittlesey, outnumbered overwhelmingly when surrounded and commanded by the enemy to surrender, defiantly refused, though without food, sustained life by eating the bark of roots until relieved.

undertaken and performed it with an audacity, efficiency and unhesitating courage that touch the story of convoy and battle with imperishable distinction at every turn whether the enterprise were great or small. . . . Such men as these hardly need to be commanded and go to their terrible adventure blithely and with the quick intelligence of those who know just what it is they would accomplish. I am proud to be the fellow countryman of men of such stuff and valor. Those of us who stayed at home did our duty; the war could not have been won or the gallant men who fought it given their opportunity to win it otherwise; but for many a long day we shall think ourselves "accursed we were not there, and hold our manhood cheap while any speaks that fought" with these at St. Mihiel or Thierry. The memory of those days of triumphant battle will go with these fortunate men to their graves; and each will have his favorite memory.

Nor were the Allies unappreciative of this fighting spirit. Expressing what was the general sentiment of the Allies toward the Yankee soldier, the French Government, on January 1, 1919, paid this tribute to America's dead in France:

The French government wishes to express its profound sympathy and gratitude to the American families whose sons have met a glorious death on French soil during the war. It wishes to share in their mourning. The graves of the young soldiers of America are as sacred in its eyes as are those of their French comrades and it will take the necessary measures to provide that they shall be respected and tended with a reverent and patriotic care.

And while it was at all times admitted that to the men who went through the trial of battle America gave its thanks and admiration, it was realized that the men who did not "get across" were ready and eager and would have given of themselves to the glory of the flag and the success of our cause as freely as those who laid down their lives in battle.

But fighting was only one form of the spirit of the American soldier. Dashing, heedless, dare-devil in their spirit on the field of battle, the American soldiers won other

and finer tributes than these—tributes calculated to stir all as profoundly as any that were won by their conduct in the smoke and uproar and fiery hell at the front. The Marquise de Nosilles, in a letter to a New York friend, used these words:

Bring a smile on somebody's face! That seems to be the motto of all Americans over here. Sugar plums, chocolate, gasoline, tires, delicious white bread, all luxuries now unknown, are given to the French by your people. One of the things that touches me most is the love of the Americans for little children. In all villages you can see little tots shrieking out in laughter while a huge boy in khaki romps about for their own particular amusement.

As if this were not enough she proceeds to give an instance of a poor, shriveled granny seeking to cross a muddy street along which the motors were running wildly, and fearful lest she be caught in the mud and between the machines, when a big burly United States soldier picked her up and trotted off across the street and set her down in safety. And she refers, in her letter to the inborn gentleness of the men, who did not forget their mothers and sisters at home, and who were always glad to extend the friendly hand to children. Tributes like these fell as thick as showers on our passing regiments by the hands of women and children once left in the brutal wake of war.

Every American that is 100 per cent a man cannot but tingle with pride when he reads of deeds like these, as much as he does when he reads of the dare-devil fighting fury of the same men when they hurled themselves against the brutal Germans who wrought all the wreck and ruin possible. His eyes, blazing with pride in the warrior, may become dimmed as emotion unsteadies his frame when he sees in the same man the cheery, light-hearted, bright-faced soldier in khaki, carrying the burdens of the weak and helpless, romping with laughing children, sharing his food and scanty luxuries with the hungry and heart-sick victims of an inexpressible wrong. It was all possible. There was no

sentimentalizing. It was all in the routine of the day's work—the instinctive matter-of-course routine of the gentleman.

When the first of the American forces landed in France, France was almost bled white. They had good reason to feel downcast, though there was not a thought of surrender. And when the French people saw the laughing, singing, rollicking youngsters from across the sea marching through Paris as if it were a mere holiday affair, they stood aghast. Horrified at the thought that these men could ever be of service in battling the German war machine, they turned aside with drooping spirit. They had not seen anything like it; had not conceived anything so incongruous. It was beyond the stretch of the splendid French imagination. But it was all there, and was all true, as the noble French discovered to their delight, when the opportunity came to face the machine.

But the Spirit of America manifested itself not alone in the fighting man. The same spirit that pushed him into the hell of battle, was breathed into those who had to remain at home. It manifested itself in many and diverse forms.

The housekeeper accepted the suggestions of Herbert Hoover, Food Administrator, as a religious decalogue; if the householder did not act with religious care upon the suggestions of Fuel Administrator Garfield as to how to run his furnace or sift his ashes or the many details as to the saving of fuel, it was because he understood it less readily. When the Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo asked the people to buy bonds to help the nation, they bought, often skimping themselves in the actual necessities of life for the purpose.

But nowhere was the Spirit of America more freely and openly shown than in compliance with the simple request of the American Red Cross Society that everything in the nature of tin and tinfoil be saved and turned into its hands.

In this small act of service, dignified elderly gentlemen vied with young men and maidens in gathering from the sidewalks, even from the gutters of the cities and towns and the country villages, all scraps from cigarette wrappings or cigars or any other source that would be a compliance with the Red Cross request—all for the sake of the spirit which it manifested and not with any thought or suggestion of money remuneration.

One feature of the developments growing out of America's relations to the Great War that accomplished much for the better community spirit throughout the land, was the helpfulness rendered by neighbor to neighbor and by community to community. It is to the credit of the Administration that it gave great encouragement to this spirit; and it should be recorded as one of the ennobling features of the Administration's relation to the Great War. Mrs. A. would take care of the children of her next-door neighbor Mrs. B, while the latter visited the downtown cash-and-carry store to make purchases for herself or for both. Mrs. C. would gather all the neighbors her automobile would carry and together they would visit the store where they could make purchases for their families to the best advantage. Mrs. D. made her home the center for collecting all the clothing to take care of the needy children in her immediate vicinity. And Mrs. A. and Mrs. B. and Mrs. C. and Mrs. D. with all their neighbors gathered at the home of some one of them for the forenoon or the afternoon or the entire day to knit and sew and do any other work that was necessary to relieve the suffering not only in their immediate vicinity but in the large community, perhaps to clothe some Belgian orphans brought to America or to provide clothing for suffering humanity across the sea. There came also the larger service when the neighbors of a whole community would meet at the public library or in the public-school building or in the guild-hall or in the church to carry on the larger and broader work for the Red

Cross. Thus there developed in America that neighborly, home-like spirit, which was the spirit of Jesus when he was upon earth, that became so helpful in administering to the acute conditions that arose after the war due to the unrest and the uncertainty in the settlement of the social problem.

Republics, and democratic nations generally, have been accused of being slow in action, and probably not without reason. But once America took a decisive stand, there was never any question of the achievement. With 2,000,000 men in France, and with the assurance of 5,000,000 more ready, had the war continued until the middle of the next year; and with a war budget of more than \$25,000,000,000 for the year 1918, the conviction that the democratic system was necessarily inefficient was dispelled. The nation was turning out rifles at the rate of more than 3,000,000 a year—a rate that was constantly increasing—machine guns at the rate of more than 400,000 a year, with shells, shrapnel, and small-arms ammunition in corresponding quantities. Whereas in 1917 the nation was turning out 13,000 rifles monthly, a year later they were being turned out at the rate of 264,000 every month.

With every man from 18 to 45 years of age registered for military service, with most of the nation's industrial plants transformed to factories of war materials, with clubs, schools and miscellaneous buildings every day converted into hospitals, with all the agencies of transportation becoming avenues of traffic leading directly to the front in France, with homes half deserted because the members were engaged in Red Cross work, in selling bonds to carry on the war, in gathering funds for the Y. M. C. A. and other welfare agencies,—with all these the American spirit was being manifested in its real form in the American nation.

By the middle of October, 1919, announcement was made that 8,000,000 American women, aided by many boys and girls, produced in the twenty months ending February 28, 1919, more than 371,500,000 relief articles, valued at

approximately \$94,000,000, for the benefit of American and Allied soldiers and sailors and destitute civilians. Besides this, the report of the American Red Cross, covering its activities during the war, showed that 23,822 of America's women enrolled themselves as Red Cross nurses; while others who remained at home, through the canteen service of the Red Cross furnished refreshments such as sandwiches, candy, cigarettes, ice-cream, etc., to soldiers and sailors 39,948,733 times. All of this was done at an operating cost of only 1.7 per cent.

Indeed, the ardor and unanimity with which the American people enlisted in the cause of democracy and made it virtually a national religion is one of the outstanding phenomena of history.

The artists of the country played a very important part in the manifestation of the American Spirit during the war, through posters, large and small, on billboards occupying as many feet as the space to be had permitted. Picture posters of rare beauty and aptitude were placed before the people showing facts that were essential for the informing of the public upon the great needs of war. Space for these posters was amply and generously donated by individuals, organizations, and municipal and state bodies—on prominent vacant lots, in front of courthouses, on church lots, on the grounds of state buildings—anywhere and everywhere that they would serve the desired end.

They were among the many influences uniting to win the war. Not much was written about them, though they weighed heavily for victory. It was the National Pictorial Publicists Association, of which Charles Dana Gibson was the head, that took in hand the chief part of this work. It might appear a little out of order to consider the pencil and brush as weapons of warfare; but these are the facts that the story of the war brings to light. To win the war, the boys had to be fed and armed; to buy food and guns, money was needed; to raise money, an appeal had to be

made. The poster, the painting, the cartoon were used with telling effect to drive home the appeal.

The most noted and highest paid artists of the country banded into this Association to give their service freely for the maintenance of morale and cultivation of donations or money. Between April 17, 1917, and November 15, 1918, fifty-eight departments worked steadily to create the national spirit through posters and pictured stories. Seven hundred poster designs, 287 cartoons, 60 paintings for the Food Administration, and 1438 labor drawings were turned over to the Government free by the organized artists. The posters are to perpetuate the art of the decade through the centuries, as every war poster has been preserved by the Government.

In the conduct of the great mass of Americans of German blood there was a fine and enduring testimonial to the power of America's spirit. It stood steadfast and with marvelous patience under the lash of humiliation. But these Germans that were so loyal to the land of their adoption were an offset to the disloyalty of Germans of distinctly pro-German sentiments who stood for the Fatherland rather than for the land to which they had come to secure their education, gain a livelihood and more, but of which they did not actually become a component part. There was none among all the races of earth that were ready to endure more than the distinctively American of German blood.

As the reply to the un-American doctrine of these pro-Germans, backed by the international Socialists, the American Legion gave expression to the ringing American doctrine in the preamble to its constitution as follows:

For God and Country we associate ourselves together for the following purposes: To uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of America, to maintain law and order, to foster and perpetuate a 100 per cent Americanism, to preserve the memories and incidents of our association in the Great War, to inculcate a sense of the individual obligation to the community, state and nation, to

make right the master of might, to promote peace and good will on earth, to safeguard and transmit to posterity the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, to sanctify our comradeship by our devotion to mutual helpfulness.

But one of the rich fruits of the war was the arousing of the American spirit throughout the nation. This manifested itself in the adoption of loyalty pledges, a determination to serve the country better, to stand for service to others rather than for personal selfishness or personal glory.

A typical stand of this character is that of the people of Spokane, Washington, in adopting a loyalty pledge in April, 1919. Among other things stated are these:

I am proud that the United States of America is my country, the Stars and Stripes my flag. No matter from what race I sprang, or what nation may claim my friendship, my watchword shall be, America first. A citizen by birth or choice, I will ever strive to make my government revered at home and respected abroad. I believe in open, just and honorable covenants with other nations to establish, in keeping with the laws of God, a world of justice and peace. . . .

Therefore, I pledge to my country the love of my heart, a true, constant and absolute loyalty; I pledge respect and obedience to her laws. I pledge my property, my service, my honor, and, if need be, my life, to defend her. I pledge allegiance to my flag and to the republic for which it stands, one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

And the Spirit of America marches on and in many divisions. When the national assembly of the American Legion was in session at Minneapolis on the first anniversary of the signing of the armistice, the chairman, Colonel Henry D. Lindsley, as the hour of 11 o'clock approached, stated to the assembly:

We are approaching the moment when the world ceased that great struggle which resulted in victory for democratic peoples all over the world. I am going to ask every delegate here to rise and bow his head as the moment arrives, thinking what it means, particularly to

those comrades lying on the other side, who made the supreme sacrifice for the cause of free people.

Let us have a thought in our hearts and our prayers because these men, our comrades, went there and gave their lives in the great cause.

Every delegate rose and stood with bowed head as faint organ notes sounded through the hall. Eleven strokes of the clock marked the first anniversary of Germany's surrender.

As the last echo died away, the organ pealed out the "Star Spangled Banner." The massed ranks of delegates standing, furtively wiped away tears.

And why all the awful sacrifice? Why were Americans willing to enact this tragedy in a million homes?

The President undertook to assure the American people that this great nation had put itself behind some abstract principles, and that it was for these that the people striving at home and the fighting men in the conflict of battle were putting forth every energy they possessed. There was probably not one soldier, either at home or overseas, who ever thought for a moment that he or the country was carrying on a war "against the attitude of the balance of power" or in behalf of the Fourteen Points, or to establish a League of Nations.

But they knew what they went out to fight for: they were fighting the Germans, because the Germans were brutalizing mankind, violating international law, and destroying people's homes and happiness and liberty. Nor was there a man among them who would not fight again for the same thing.

The story is related of a young American soldier found dead on the battlefield of France on whose body was found a card with these words: "America stands for freedom and justice and is always ready to give the lives of her citizens that all the world may be freed from tyranny and live in peace and happiness." It is not known who wrote these

words. Printed by hand, they were unsigned and undated.

And where was this mighty power lodged, which drove America with all her energy into this war, compelling her Administration to accept *her* dictum of *no* neutrality, of *not* too proud to fight, of *no* peace without victory?

The English writers took the view that in any democracy like America there is an oligarchy, whether of intellect, of interest, or of mere popularity. In the present instance they declared it was the sovereign will of the President that carried the American people into the war. A writer cited the case of conscription, which, in America, became a law over night, though 3000 miles separated America from the scene of conflict, while it took England two years because their democracy would not accept an oligarchy.

As was well pointed out by a noted American publicist, this was a misapprehension of the American point of view, admitting that the people of the United States were singularly united and obedient to leadership but stating that the English comment failed to find a true interpretation of the fact. This American writer says:

This nation has never bowed to "the sovereign will of the President." It has respected the voice of individual conscience. It beheld in the conduct of Germany an inexpressable wrong of gigantic proportions. It shuddered but it did not hesitate to judge or condemn. Millions, tens of millions, of men in America wanted to fight Germany when the will of the President was not yet for war, and chafed under the neutrality of their Government. Thousands of our young men went to Canada and to France, in order to help in defeating Germany before any "sovereign will" had expressed itself in the United States. Here was a peaceful nation that did not want peace, but victory; a nation that would have accused and cursed itself if it had not been allowed to fight. The "oligarchy," if there be one, responded to the "sovereign will" of an aroused people, not to the leadership of a President. It adhered to him in war, not because he commanded it, but because it had commanded him.

And he declared that the principle involved was not the enunciation of the Government; "it was a deep-seated and almost universal declaration of the national mind."⁴

In his annual report in 1918 Secretary Baker showed that in the nineteen months elapsing from the declaration of war to the signing of the armistice, the army created an embarkation service which succeeded in shipping overseas 2,075,834 men and 5,153,000 tons of cargo. Even these large figures do not tell the whole story. For time was required in drafting and training the men and for organizing the production of supplies, and most of these stupendous movements occurred in the last half of our active participation in the war. From January 1, 1918, to the signing of the armistice, a period of ten months, the army embarked 1,880,339 men and shipped 4,660,000 tons of cargo. Nothing to compare with the movement of these numbers of men and tons of supplies across the Atlantic is known to the military history of the world.

An epochal chapter of the world's history has been closed. The tragedy has been enacted. Those who initiated the crime against civilization that personal aggrandizement might result have been overwhelmed. The curtain has dropped on the horrid scene. Autocracy has crumbled. Democracy is supreme. Though America played a belated part, its spirit was ready from the beginning. The benumbed soul of America has re-awakened. Other demands upon her vital energies will be made and met. Her sons and daughters will crush any autocracy that rears its head, however insidious in method or comely in form. They will maintain constitutional government that liberty and justice may live; and through the nation's vitality, happiness may spread to all mankind.

Applying the challenge of Colonel John McCrae's "In Flanders Fields" to America's own brave dead in France, the answer, to-day as then, is:

⁴David Jayne Hill, 209 *North American Review*, 18-19.

Rest ye in peace, ye Flanders dead.
The fight that ye so bravely led
We've taken up. And we will keep
True faith with you who lie asleep,
With each a cross to mark his bed
In Flanders fields.

Fear not that ye have died for naught.
The torch ye threw to us we caught.
Ten million hands will hold it high,
And Freedom's light shall never die!
We've learned the lesson that ye taught
In Flanders fields.

And perhaps nothing that came from lip or pen during the Great War surpassed in vivid expression of America's passion, now as on the yesterday, those thrilling words. Yet there is always to be persistently kept in mind the inspirational words of such men as Washington when he declared:

The unity of government, which constitutes you one people, is also now dear to you. It is justly so; for it is the main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquillity at home and your peace abroad; of your prosperity, of that liberty which you so highly prize.⁵

Until America loses her vital spirit, she will be ever ready to rise and crush any attempt from within or without to overthrow constitutional government, civil liberty, and the opportunity for the legitimate pursuit of individual or community happiness through orderly and well-established channels. To quote the heartening words of President Wilson's successor, a contrast with the "Covenant greater than Government:"

To make the real America to which we all aspire, we must have distinctly an American spirit, and must become a race born of a national inspiration.

⁵ Farewell Address.

CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing pages, some fair conclusions touching the relations of the Wilson Administration to the Great War would seem to be:

1. In the first place it should be remembered that at the beginning of his term in the presidency, Mr. Wilson held in his hands the high hopes of the nation; and for two chief reasons: First, as Governor of New Jersey he had gained for himself, whether rightly or otherwise is not here discussed, a reputation for standing by the people; and, second, he made large promises, as shown in his book, "The New Freedom,"¹ which is "the result of the editorial literary skill of Mr. William Bayard Hale, who has put together here, in their right sequences, the more suggestive portions of my campaign speeches," as stated by Mr. Wilson in the preface. Relying upon these two facts, a reputation and promises, one following directly upon the other, the people placed full confidence in Mr. Wilson's disinterested purposes and his capacity.

2. When the demands of the Great War were upon the nation, not from the European point of view, but from the standpoint of Americanism and for humanity's sake, the Administration appeared to be honeycombed with a pacifism most deadly to the rousement of the people to the hour's great needs and with a leadership possessed of a tendency to lean toward Germany's cause rather than toward that of the Allies, notwithstanding that the latter were heroically battling with inadequate equipment against the frightful barbarities of the greatest war machine known to all

¹"The New Freedom, a Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People," Doubleday, Page & Company, New York, 1913.

human records. Witness to this is the part taken by the Secretary of State in pro-German meetings and his dallying with pro-German societies and individuals. Treachery and perfidy were permitted full sway in the land, as witness the hostile acts of the German and Austrian ambassadors.

As if this were not sufficient, when it was found that there was a real Secretary of War in the cabinet, he was displaced by a pacifist of so pronounced a type that his acts or do-nothing plans sickened his own people, declaring that no preparation for the inevitable conflict was to be hurried, since the war was 3,000 miles away, and who thanked God that, when the country was plunged into the thick of battle, it was without preparation. And as a result, the country was stampeded into such a furor of haste, disorder, confusion, and waste as to result in great unnecessary sacrifice of life, the development of profligacy, and all the kindred evils of the unwarranted situation, following the clear note of warning sounded on all sides except the German.

3. Once the country was in the mighty conflict, and even before that event, President Wilson would take a stand that met the demands of the patriotic mind of America; and would then waver in his purpose. Thus American sentiment was divided, when unity was the stern demand of the hour.

So pronounced became this vacillation of the Administration as to lead those urged to stand by the President to inquire where he stood. Moreover, he had placed in prominent places for influencing the public, men whose American-mindedness was severely open to question—men like George Creel, William Bayard Hale, Lincoln Steffens, and numerous others, to all of whose writings attached more or less of official flavor. And while he showed his zeal for the cause of preparedness by marching at the head of a parade in its interest in Washington, he could as insistently and persistently urge leniency toward the murderous anarchist Mooney who set a bomb that killed and maimed scores in-

terested in a preparedness parade in San Francisco, giving no adequate reason therefor.

Indeed, there was such a leaning toward pacifism at the first, and latterly toward the so-called liberal minds, those willing to adopt internationalism even to the undoing of constitutional government, that the question was raised as to the quality of the Americanism Mr. Wilson was willing to represent.

4. As the Great War approached its close, Mr. Wilson seemed glad to accept all power lawfully conferred upon him and to usurp other powers to some end never made clear by him to the nation; as witness the taking over of wire control after the close of hostilities, a power granted him for war purposes only. The people gladly confer extensive powers, with all the privileges attaching thereto, upon an Executive who is with the people and who proposes to use it solely for the people's benefit. They determinedly resist its appropriation for some remoter purpose.

5. War is always a matter for most serious consideration before undertaking it. So many possibilities are involved as to make the issue uncertain. The Great War was no exception, with this consideration noted: That with the two sides so nearly balanced, there was assured in advance an outcome favorable to the side on which the United States would throw its great weight, not merely because of its resources, both in men and material, but because of the moral influence upon other neutrals. And it is a momentous responsibility that rests upon the shoulders of any régime that carries to a conclusion a war of unexampled proportions. No fair-minded man will deny to the Wilson Administration due credit for its share in the vast undertaking. And once it threw itself into war-making as a business for the time being, it made prodigious strides, whatever may have been its previous shortcomings. For this the people were pleased to give, and to this day do give, all credit.

The difficulties were legion, and far beyond the vision of ordinary men do these difficulties project themselves.

6. But difficulties piled mountain high do not warrant shirking. To meet them as the occasion requires is one of the glories of Americanism, one of the duties and one of the marked privileges that belong to high position and great power. Besides, the people cheerfully placed themselves at the ready disposal of their Chief Executive and with their might support his worthy efforts. Yet, they want to know that he is right—at least approximately right; and they like the idea of reciprocal confidence. They are willing to trust him even after he has made many mistakes and serious blunders. But there may come a time, in the course of events of his own shaping, when their confidence is sapped, when their trust is gone and the last tie of moral obligation to him is sundered. This was never more true in the whole history of the presidency than during President Wilson's Administration. Buoyant with hope at the beginning, the people wanted to trust him to the end, but felt so outraged as events succeeded one another in swift course that the cord was snapped.

7. True, they remembered that Mr. Wilson was their President; they knew him as the legal Chief of their nation. They further knew that he was a very sick man—so ill and so secluded that a committee from the Senate waited upon him to ascertain his condition and whether able to carry on the onerous duties of his office; when it found him sufficiently alert to inform them that Senator Moses could be assured, though he might be disappointed. But the people felt that his conduct warranted the withdrawal of their confidence from his measures and proposed measures.

8. They remembered with satisfaction his bold declarations against organized and established wrongs; they distrusted his favoring classism. At first divided over his vacillation and shirking in the face of German brutalities, they finally carried him in their sweep against Prussian

militarism and butchery. They were stirred when pacifism was found rampant in official circles and by the discovery of public enemies at the nation's capital and within the shadow of the White House, under the protection of the Administration, in the persons of the Ambassadors of Germany and Austria threatening to destroy the integrity of the nation. They massed almost solidly against the delays and consequent wastes of the war preparations, and yet more against the carefully planned deceptions to cover the blunderings of the Administration. They resented President Wilson's telling them that any member of his cabinet was as good as any he ever knew, when they knew better. They took determined position against the alleged liberalism, amounting practically to Germanism and socialism, found in the men officially seeking to create an artificial public opinion through an enforced reptile press. They stood by him when the war was forwarded to the utmost of the nation's capacity and resources, they gave him unstinted support when he declared there was to be no peace with an unsubmitting Germany. They resented his individual efforts at peace when other nations equally to be considered and having suffered vastly more should have been consulted. They applauded his swift and certain, as well as devastating, reply to Germany's peace proposals made through Austria. They took him severely to task for his partisan appeal in the congressional elections, fall of 1918, and sharply turned down his proposal that he be given *carte blanche* liberty to become their "unembarrassed spokesman" at the peace table; and, though they were willing to hear him yet again, he from that time completely forfeited their confidence. They defiantly resented his taking control of all of the nation's wire lines as a war measure after the war was ended, and no less his secrecy in the Peace Congress after proclaiming zealously open counsels. They became deeply concerned over his undertaking to bind the Government to unprecedented obligations at a time when the coun-

try had had no opportunity to express itself upon the issue, closing the freedom of the nation's action, and his failure to explain it intelligently after declaring that he could make it all clear. They showed their sympathy in his illness, but little with the cause that produced it. And as a finale, they concluded that the best way to be rid of Wilsonism was to administer the most crushing rebuke within their power; and this was done in the overwhelming defeat of his party in the presidential election of 1920, which he zealously supported.

9. Beginning with his act forcing the Adamson bill through a servile Congress immediately prior to the presidential election at which he was a candidate for re-election, a piece of legislation prepared and whipped through Congress by a class for its own benefit as against the people by a subterfuge, President Wilson continued his favor to that class. Against this classism the people turned in its wrath with swift and unerring precision, once they grasped the facts.

10. The people are more trustworthy on the problems of maintaining national integrity and freedom of action than a Chief Executive who may have some ulterior purpose in view, once they are permitted to view the situation as it is and not have it discussed only in a closet.



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